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Abstract
Poems to Open Palms: Praise Performance and the State in the Sultanate of Oman
by
Bradford J. Garvey
Advisor: Jane C. Sugarman
This dissertation traces the musical constitution of moral, economic, material, and social
relations between rural communities and the state in the Sultanate of Oman. I argue that
communities embedded within the authoritarian state hegemony of the Sultanate form and affirm
social relations with the state through its embodied proxy, Sultan Qābūs bin Ṣa‘īd Āl Bū Ṣa‘īd,
via the reciprocal exchange of state-directed giving and praise poetry responses. The circuit of
exchange catalyzes the social production of political legitimacy and ensures continued generous
distribution by mythopoetically presenting such cyclicity as resulting from elite and non-elite
mutuality. This praise poetry is rendered within two song and dance complexes: al-razḥa, a
collective war dance with drumming and antiphonal choral singing, and al-‘āzī, a choral ode with
a solo singer, tight poetic structure, and a chorus of responders. Through a close analysis of the
content and context of praise poems sung by Arab men’s performance troupes experienced over
a year of participant observation fieldwork, I argue that praise poetry is an overlooked site for the
construction and negotiation of state political legitimacy. Drawing on heterodox and Gramscian
political economy, I show how musical performance operates within broader circuits of
exchange by functioning as a site wherein non-market economic logics are fused with moral,
performative, and political norms. Instead of simply tracing a circuit of utilitarian exchange
(praise for gifts for praise), I focus on the how gifts and their responses reciprocally negotiate
social relations between state elites and non-elites. By focusing on the words and actions of nonelites as they integrate the various proffered benefits of a distributive state into their own
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communities, I attempt to complicate standard explanations of Arabian Gulf politics and
statecraft. I posit two social mechanisms—one which relates generosity and political legitimacy
and one that relates performance with the construction of a moral political community—and then
follow them through their operation in social space. By singing praise poetry at celebrations of
state distribution, praisers rhetorically render such state gifting as “generosity,” which is deeply
tied to good leadership in the Omani context. In addition, praisers simultaneously
mythopoetically generate a political community of generous givers and grateful receivers who
are linked by relations of history, homeland, religion, and kinship. In this way, praise “opens
palms” and induces continued elite distributions. However, unequal gifting is fraught with social
hazard and threatens to trap communities in dependency relations with the state. By attending to
the pragmatics of performance, however, I argue that razḥa and ‘āzī tacitly address this threat of
dependency by performing strength and dignity while simultaneously seeking to redraw the
relations of unequal gifting from ones of dependency to ones of mutual obligation—a “moral
economy.” This ethnomusicological study is an attempt to show how musical and linguistic
performers draw on a wide variety of tacit and explicit economic, moral, political, and communal
factors in order to take social action in a context of authoritarian state hegemony.
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A Note on Translation and Transliteration.
Translating and transliterating Omani Arabic is a complex task. I have chosen to use the standard
of transliteration adopted by the International Journal of Middle East Studies due to its
simplicity.

’=ء

=زz

=كk

ا،=ىā

=سs

=لl

=بb

 = شsh

=مm

=تt

=صṣ

=نn

 = ثth

=ضḍ

=هh

=جj

=طṭ

 = وw, ū, aw, -uww

=حḥ

=ظẓ

 = يy, ī, ay, -iyy

 = خkh

‘=ع

=ةa

=دd

 = غgh

 = الal, -l-

 = ذdh

=فf

ٍ ِ = i, in

=رr

=قq

ِِ = a, an
ٌ ٍ = u, u

xviii
I have attempted to render the sounds of Interior Omani dialectical speech with some spellings
but not with new orthographic characters. This is only for parsimony: words such as: ! هود
“ هودknock knock!” are perhaps better rendered with a dipthong like “hōd” instead of “hawd”
but readers familiar with such phonic differences will be able to identify issues like these with
relative ease.
Translation issues were constant with this project because no standard dictionary of Omani
dialectical Arabic is available. Dialects differ in substantial ways from neighborhood to
neighborhood, let alone over the large province my research was located within. While I learned
as much as I could and checked translations as often as possible, some words and phrases eluded
even my most poetically inclined colleagues and interlocutors. When there were questions or
issues, I chose what I took to be the best rendering of the word or phrase. Errors are mine alone.
Some features of Interior Omani Arabic as I learned it that may confuse speakers of other Arabic
dialects are (1) the use of infixes (-inn-) between pronomial suffixes and verbal nouns (e.g., شايفنه
shāyifinnuh, “I saw him”); (2) the use of  يومyawm for “when” as in ‘ عندماandimā; (3) the
alternation between the “hard” Egyptian jīm (g) and the “soft” Emirati jīm (y); (4) the use of shay
for the Shami “fī” in “there are…” constructions; (5) wāgid as a general amplifier/intensifier
(more, lots, many, very, etc.) (6) frequent use of anaptyxis: masqaṭ rendered as musqāṭuh, etc.;
(7) ultimate emphasis when using pronomial suffixes: e.g., ’a-KHĪ “my brother,” ’ab-WĪ “my
father”; (8) use of -ish for the 2p f.s., e.g., kitābish “your (f.) book.”

1
Introductions: Approaching the state by way of poetry: Praise, performance, and political
economy
Āh, yiwāb, yallah yiwāb!—Ah, answer, O God, answer!
So began a poem sung before Qābūs bin Sa‘īd bin Ṭaymūr Āl Bū Sa‘īdī, the Sultan of
Oman, as similar poems have begun before similar Omani rulers for more than a century. This
time, the poem was given on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Sultan’s taking the
throne. On that day in November 2010, thousands of heavily armed Omani men were gathered in
Muscat to sing praise poetry, arranged in neat squares under the Sultan’s stoic gaze. The poetry,
composed specifically for the event, was an Omani ‘āzī, or choral ode, presented after a
collective sword dance, razḥa. Both performances, addressed to the Sultan, praised his leadership
and the Omani renaissance he brought about. Such performances have marked nearly every
National Day (yawm al-waṭanī) since 1970, though perhaps never with such spectacular
character. The singer of the poetry, the famous Muḥammad al-Marzūqī, stood tall in his white
dishdāsha and clutched the straight Omani sayf sword in one hand and its sheath and turs buckler
in the other. A maṣar, a large, embroidered square of thin wool, was wrapped painstakingly
around the crown of his head, while a matching belt wrapped and framed the deeply bent khanjar
dagger that he wore at the front of his waist. Al-Marzūqī marched the group straight towards an
open gap in a huge arrangement of other Omani men, arranged in tight, uniform squares:
shirtless wrestlers, phalanxes of police and soldiers, and thousands of other similarly dressed
performers. The performers were all members of one or another of the hundreds of
governmentally registered performance troupes from all over northern Oman. Two-headed,
slightly hourglass-shaped drums, a larger and a smaller historically twinned, hung from the
shoulders of drummers, thundering out responses in the open space between poetic and human
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performing lines.. As Al-Marzūqī sang out the lines, he held up his arms and turned his head and
trunk back and forth, addressing audiences actual, televisual, and virtual to the conclusion:

،قابوس قابوس قابوس سلطان البالد
نشهد لعدلك أجمعين
Qābūs, Qābūs, Qābūs, sulṭān al-bilād,
Nashhad li-‘adalak ’ajma‘īn.
Qābūs, Sultan of the land,
We all bear witness to your justice!
Al-Marzūqī was at the head of a large group of similarly dressed and armed men who roared
responses to each hemistich of the ode, beating the drums in affirmation.
Yā slimt! They cried, “Truly!”
Al-Marzuqi continued:

،يامن تعليت الوتاد
وتشرفت باسمك سند
Yā man ta‘alayt al-witād,
Wa tashsharaft bi-’ismak sanad!
O, you who raised up the wall-pegs,
You are honored as your name is treasure and pillar and bond.
Music Example 1 contains a sketch of two selections from this performance, one drawn from the
very first line, and one from the last. Measure 1 represents the first half of the first couplet. Measure
2 is the final half of the couplet, including the unchanging final addition, ṣubyān yā kibār alshiyyim (youths of the greatest moral character). Measure 3 skips to the the first hemistich of the
final couplet, the intensive climax of the piece. The event, broadcast live on national television
and radio channels, recorded on video and CD, was sold in stores and posted on dozens of internet
forums and on Youtube. The 2010 performance is often referenced by Omanis as emblematic of
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‘āzī, a perfect performance of what it is and does, and indeed, it has served as the basis for
imitations both in Oman and abroad.

Music example 1. A sketch of the first couplet of the 40th National Day ‘āzī vocal line,
which is the basis for all others except the final couplet.
The 2010 performance raises a number of questions about the role of sung poetry and
performance in the mediation of the state. According to the Omani Centre for Traditional Music,
the people of the Sultanate perform some 180+ distinct musical practices. Why did the Omani
state, known for its stability and prosperity, choose to celebrate its 40th anniversary in this way,
with historical genres of sung poetry and a war dance? What is the history of these practices of
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praise? What does such musical praise do? Who sings, to whom is it directed, and why? What do
performances of these collective praise practices tell us about the ways in which political authority
in Oman is imagined, enacted, transmitted, communicated, and reproduced? If these genres were
selected for this highly politicized context, what role, if any, has collective performance had in the
development and legitimation of Omani political structures and shaping of political space?
This dissertation is a study of the relationships between men’s public performance and
political authority amongst Arabs in the Sultanate of Oman, based on field research conducted
over thirteen months between 2015-2017. In it, I propose to study the social legitimation of
contemporary political authority in the Sultanate of Oman by closely studying Omani Arab
performance practices, called al-funūn al-sha‘abiyya (lit., “popular arts”). I especially foreground
performances like the one recounted above, that are framed as praise responses to the Sultan, the
state’s embodied duplicate. As we shall see, such praise is often rendered as a response to statedirected giving, rhetorically producing it as generosity—a trait that is tightly linked with good
leadership in Oman. Rather than studying these practices as reflecting or commenting on other,
more concretely political behavior (as we might imagine protest music does), I frame them as
political behavior. They are an irreducible part of a political economic order predicated on
generous giving.
Poetry and dance may seem a strange way to enter the study of politics. This is perhaps
doubly true of praise. However, the specific configuration of ideals of political authority,
especially links between generosity and good leadership, historical patterns of material inequality,
governance in authoritarian oil-states, and cultural associations among poetry, giving, and
authority make such an entry appropriate. Performance has not just functioned as praise for Omani
Arab elites, however, it has also accompanied their armies and colonial ventures. This relationship
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has further cemented the role of public performance as central to state hegemony. I will argue that
poets, especially praise poets, have historically occupied an important role in Omani political
economy by shaping the interactions between rulers and the ruled through facilitating
communication and material and musical exchange between them, and that this historical
relationship has been seized upon by contemporary capitalist state agents to solidify contemporary
state hegemony.
The main way that Omani state elites have sought to legitimate the contemporary stateform is by providing state-directed development and other distributions of state largesse, which,
as an aspect of good leadership, demonstrate right authority, leadership capacity, and responsible
rulership. Leaders give. Understood as a kind of gift that necessitates response amongst recipients,
state generosity prompts certain lower-status groups to offer praise as a form of recognition of that
legitimate leadership, in order to incorporate that generosity into deserving communities. Since
gifts between unequal groups have the potential to draw individuals and communities into
dependency relations with the giver, praise is also taken as a site for lower-status praisers to
represent themselves and make claims on the higher-status gifter. Whether or not all these aspects
are successfully implemented or always function adequately is highly contextually dependent, but
this basic function is an understanding that is implicitly shared amongst many performers and nonperformers alike. Generosity, as a value that is widely shared across class lines, can function as an
avenue of communication across those lines as well as a source of temporary cross-class alliances:
hegemony.
However, this study does not simply track generosity and giving as a hegemony-producing
strategy of state elites. Rather, I focus on non-elite responses to generosity. As Antonio Gramsci
wrote, “hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the
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groups over which hegemony is to be exercised” so “that a certain compromise equilibrium should
be formed” (1971:161). Hegemony is a tensely negotiated and only fitfully realized
rapprochement, drawing unsystematically on some values and practices that are shared across
classes and some that are not. Taking this reversed approach highlights how state-directed giving
is not simply a unidirectional process, but a conflictual, semi-voluntary, and constantly reevaluated
cross-class compromise: in Katherine Bowie’s terms, a détente. Generosity, as a mutually valued
ideal shared between elites and non-elites, forms both a useful tool for elites and an exploitable
resource for non-elites. I take an ethnomusicological approach to the production of hegemony as
a function of the mutual give and take, the push and pull, of generosity and praise. Praise doesn’t
just mechanically respond to or account for generosity: it changes it, compels it, acts on it. In
Oman, praise and generosity are not simply batted back and forth by vain elites and sycophantic
non-elites: they circle each other in tense equilibrium.
To draw out these varied aspects of performance and its relationship to the political efforts
of elites, I often draw on Antonio Gramsci’s insights into the complex interweaving of political,
economic, ideological, and cultural elements in the formation of state hegemony to help inform a
critical perspective that attends to the actual material relations of domination as well as the
intricacy and historical embeddedness of poetic performance, social relations, and gifting. I argue
that subordinated praisers use praise—and the ideal models of authority that are communicated in
praise—to insist on the mutual interdependence of lower and higher classes in making a just, wellled, and moral community. They do so, in their view, without ceding autonomy. Praisers perceive
their praise as continuing but also prompting circuits of giving and praising between dominant and
subordinated classes. Praise opens palms. Ultimately, I and my Omani interlocutors see in praise
the potential to shape the behavior of leaders in such a way that bends them towards justice,
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redistribution, and caring responsibility—not by demanding representation due to taxation, but by
manipulating the fame, name, and reputation of elites.
Towards a Political-Economic Ethnomusicology of the Oman
While I draw on a variety of fields, I cannot do so with equal expertise. I see this
ethnographic and ethnomusicological research as making important contributions to three
overlapping literatures: (1) the ethnomusicology and anthropology of the Middle East, specifically
of the Arabian Gulf and Peninsula, and the relationship between men’s poetry and politics; (2)
political and economic ethnomusicology; and (3) and the anthropology and ethnomusicology of
the state.

a. Poetry and Its Forms of Life: Ethnomusicology of the Middle East.
I engage three broad strands in the ethnomusicology and anthropology of the Middle East.
First, I continue and extend studies of the relationship between performance, politics, and social
relations. Second, I draw upon studies of political organization to show how performances of
praise intervene in a political economy that has historically been predicated on generous
redistribution. Finally, I extend research on Islamic legal and intellectual interpretations of the
permissibility of music in an Ibāḍī context, arguing that scholars have underestimated the
pragmatic justification of sonic practices deemed practically useful by overemphasizing the
capacity of sonic formations to help develop ethical or moral personhood.
The Middle East is an ideal setting for this kind of research because, over the last thirty
years, scholars have increasingly noted the deep relationship between politics and performance in
the region. J. Andrew Bush has advocated that “the politics of poetry [in the Middle East] is a
problem to be discovered anew in each milieu” (2016, 203). Tracing poetry as an everyday activity
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of politics, rather than a spectacular one, compels us to reckon with how poetry works to “distribute
obligations and attachments across a set of relationships” that call our notions of subjectivity,
temporality, and the ordinary to “account” for themselves (202). Bush’s urge to rediscover the
relationship between poetry and politics helps to situate the performance of praise as a crucial
amplifying node in the circulation of elite generosity, praise, and legitimation.
Anthropologists have shown how expressive practices form an arena for a variety of
ideological and political engagement, ranging from discourses of urban modernity (Shannon
2006), to tribal mediation (Caton 1990). The study of poetry, both formal, ceremonial poetry and
local vernacular genres, has long been recognized as a lens into Arab men’s political worlds. As
Khaled Furani argues, “poetic forms and forms of life are inseparable” (2012, 2). Such work has
dealt with poets’ roles in managing interpersonal,1 intergroup,2 or socio-political conflicts,3 while
other scholars have focused on poetry’s ability to manifest alternative social ideologies 4 or its
relationship to political power in the present and past.5 Anthropologically informed research into
Arab poetry has sometimes taken its political function to be exhausted by its role as a medium for
conflict. As Abu-Lughod pointed out in Veiled Sentiments (1986) and emphasized in her new 1999
preface, the study of men’s poetry in particular has seen it as a form of agonistic contest, often
ignoring its other pragmatic, economic, emotionally affective, affiliative, and communicative
features. It was Steven Caton’s work in the late 1980s and early 1990s that helped to show the
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conciliatory aspect of poetry, one in which armed conflict is mitigated, rather than celebrated, by
persuasive words (1987, 1990). Nevertheless, much work since Caton and Abu Lughod’s insights
has refocused on the role of poetry in conflict, though this has been expanded beyond the narrow
confines of martial valor, tribal bellicosity, or fakhr boasting to include critiques of colonialism,
imperialism, patriarchy, tribalism, and Zionism. Other trends have moved to studying poetry’s role
in creating selves, both religious and otherwise (Furani 2012, 2018; Bush 2015, 2016). Perhaps
because previous research has so strongly emphasized conflict as the context for poetry, or the self
as a central nexus, there has been little ethnographic attention to praise. Praise is quintessentially
other-regarding poetry. Praise is neither the celebration of martial conflict nor its conciliation, but
rather a deep affirmation of connection, dependence, and mutuality. Hearing praise as guided by
Omanis, as this dissertation does, sheds light on a form of politics that focuses on building,
affirming, and maintaining socio-political relationships within a status-differentiated group rather
than amongst separate classes. Politics, so often seen as conflict in the Middle East, can be
conciliatory and deferential without being “weak,” “indifferent,” or “passive.”
Abu-Lughod’s conclusion further criticizes previous work on Middle Eastern politics for
minimizing the role of emotional engagement in political activity, which is seen as a rational male
domain (1986, 255-8). Flagg Miller’s The Moral Resonance of Arab Media (2007) helps to address
this second issue by showing how particular registers of poetic speech and topicality help
constitute poets as moral agents who eschew material gain (2007, 23). Yet, there is little research
on the ways in which actual performance parameters help to shape and communicate the emotional
content of ostensibly “rational” political speech. Khaled Furani’s (2012, 2018) sensitive attention
to the technical aspects of poetic composition is a welcome examination of the ways in which
poetry’s metrics are understood as a means of becoming “free” through formal mastery. I pay
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special attention not to metrical features, but instead to the pragmatic features of performance that
help build and propagate emotional states amongst performers alongside texts. I therefore respond
to Sheila Carapico’s (2004) “invitation” to study the Arabian Peninsula by studying emotionally
charged oral performance with explicit political-economic ends in Oman. My study extends the
literature on the close connection between performance and politics in the Middle East by
identifying a precise and historically continuous mechanism for this connection, contextualized
within a process of authoritarian state-formation that has gained broad legitimacy via the expansion
of historically salient modes of poetical-cum-political engagement.
Much recent work in the anthropology of poetry has emphasized its sonic and linguistic
aspects, seeing these aspects as a way to move between semantic, lexical and affective aspects of
poetic speech (Fox 2016; Furani 2012; Webster 2016, 2018). Taking seriously the rhythmic,
melodic, and performative features of sung poetry amongst Arabs in the Peninsula may be an
especially helpful extension of this literature on Arab poetry. Ethnomusicology has always adopted
this analytical specificity, but in the Arab Gulf states it is an emerging field. The publication of
Lisa Urkevich’s The Musical Traditions of the Arabian Peninsula (2015), a comprehensive
catalogue of performance forms grouped by geographic region, is an important basis for
comparative work. Urkevich’s extensive fieldwork and broad familiarity with Gulf musical scenes
is unequalled in English-language research. However, she does not include any examples from the
“southern Gulf” (the UAE or Oman), despite the fact that many genres discussed in the text have
direct analogues in those areas. The sensitivity of Urkevich’s fieldwork setting dissuaded fuller
engagement with anthropological or historical literature, which prevents both generalization and
further insight into social mechanics relevant to the history and development of the genres. Omani
primary literature also prefers this documentary approach, eschewing historical and
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anthropological detail for close but somewhat decontextualized investigation of particular regional
art forms (al-Khusaibi 1985; al-Muwwaytī 1991; al-Shaydī 2008). Urkevich maintains that she
does this to avoid “insulting” her interlocutors, and similar constraints were managed by other
scholars working in English, including Aisha Bilkhair Khalifa (2006), Majid al-Harthy (2012), and
Salwa El-Shawan Castelo-Branco and Dieter Christensen (2009), who worked with local scholars
to produce engaged, critical historical and social scientific work.
Christensen and El-Shawan Castelo-Branco’s 2009 monograph, which situates dozens of
performance practices in their recent historical and social context in the coastal city of Ṣoḥār,
Oman, is the most important ethnographic source for this dissertation. The main strength of the
work is its simultaneous comprehensiveness and attention to ethnographic detail, which includes
many direct quotes and excerpts from interviews. The commitment to comprehensiveness is
important in basic research in the Arabian Gulf region, which boasts a bewildering number of
practices, terms, concepts, and ways of organizing performance, but often leads to many more
questions than answers. For example, the razḥa as performed in Şoḥār is considered by locals to
be the most emblematic local art form, even though the government has declared a different and
relatively unloved form as representative of the region and has prominently patronized its
performance to the detriment of the razḥa groups. The investigation of why and under what
circumstances this occurred is underdeveloped and is one specific question I hope to answer. More
generally, the question of how the government has patronized and disseminated various art forms
and thereby impacted developing national political spaces and framed its legitimacy amongst
different regions can be addressed in dialogue with this existing work. Lastly, this work, in
combination with Musallim al-Kathīrī’s (2005) and Christensen’s (2003) earlier work, provides a
good basis for musical analysis that I will extend further and in more detail. In sum, no monograph
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exists that focuses directly on a small number of related genres and attempts to historicize and
localize them within relevant social mechanics based on anthropological theory.
The second aspect of Middle Eastern anthropology that I critically address is the study of
political authority in state contexts, and specifically relations between rulers and ruled in the
Arabian Peninsula. I offer an ethnographically informed analysis of what I term a “social
mechanism” of legitimation through the directed generosity of rulers and the inducement of
reciprocal responses to it. I will address the concept of social mechanisms after the literature
review. By “directed generosity” I mean the way that distributions are managed by rulers in order
to implement relations of dependency amongst subordinated classes, while also building alliances
and mutual support. While historical research has identified this strategy as crucial to maintaining
and even expanding a ruler’s sphere of influence as a general Middle Eastern pattern (Karateke
and Reinkowski 2005), studies of Bedouin and Peninsular urban groups have explored it more
ethnographically (Lancaster 1981; Lancaster and Lancaster 2011; Al-Rasheed 1991). However,
few studies have explored what such directed generosity means amongst the ruled. Specifically,
little ethnographic research has sought out the way that groups receiving such redistributions think
about them, how they find meaning in them, and how they respond. If we recognize that directed
generosity is one part of a larger circuit of exchange, then we should expect it to generate a specific
response. I identify this response as the performance of praise poetry and collective dance.
This same arrangement has often been considered as an example of patronage-clientage
relations. While I argue against this approach in Chapter 3, I nevertheless draw on this literature
to explain certain socio-political relations in Oman. Michael Gilsenan’s well-known contribution
to Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury’s edited collection Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean
Societies (1977), entitled “Against Patron-Client Relations,” argued that focusing on the
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integrative capacities of such patronage obscured the class relations of unequal power that sustain
them. Rather than simply personal relationships or balanced exchanges of goods and services (see
for example Campbell 1964), Gilsenan saw patron-client relations in the ‘Akkar mountains of
Lebanon as shot through with power, with its implications being dependency and domination. Alex
Weingrod (1977), in the same collection, also focused on power relations, but concluded that rather
than dismissing personalized relations as the ideological constructions of elites, they might be a
way to navigate relations of dependency. “Encounters between patrons and clients, or among
patrons themselves,” he concluded,

are highly stylised, ritualised performances, and hence patronage relationships
can also be conceptualised as ceremonies of a kind. This is perhaps what
[John] Campbell had in mind when he wrote that ‘the role of the patron is to
give benefits; that of the client is to honour the patron by accepting
dependence’ [Campbell 1964, 259]. To ‘give honour’ is to partake in a
ceremonial offering, and hence patronage relationships can be conceptualised
as a series of performances. (1977, 50)
Praise, as we will see, is central to these performances. Is a turn to praise not a retreat from
class- and power-oriented analyses, however? I argue that it is not—we can recognize both
relations of inequality and the deeply personal ties and practices that manifest across class lines
within those relations. In fact, this is what gives them such immense cultural importance. Isabelle
Rivoal (2012, 2014, 2017), Andrew Shryock (2004, 2008, 2012), and Sally Howell (2001), for
example, have argued that relations of hospitality, hosting, and honoring guests furnish a
perspective on politics that richly attends to the dynamic tensions manifest in personalized,
sociable interactions in the context of sometimes radical class inequality. Following the recent
anti-utilitarian turn in Francophone anthropology exemplified by the Mouvement Anti-Utilitariste
dans les Sciences Sociales or MAUSS, Rivoal’s research amongst Druze clients in the Shuf of
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Lebanon reveals how patron-client relations are never a “duality”: “The understanding of Lebanese
politics cannot be exhausted by describing power as it manifests itself in the confessional system
and patronage relations, in terms of the control of resources and asymmetry alone” (2012, 17). 6 It
is not simply economic inequality that explains relations of clientage and patronage, but the way
these relations are normalized, interpreted, internalized, and communicated. Clientage is intensely
personal, even quotidian, motivating emotional attachments and desires even as it shapes them.
This “return to hospitality” has prompted a special issue in the Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute devoted to the theme (2012).
I take the insights developed within these studies to reflect on the way that deeply
personalized relations with the state and its proxies can nevertheless manifest within structural
relations of profound inequality. In the context of the state-form, however, such personalized
relations take on new significance as they are motivated as the basis of claims of sovereignty
(Rivoal 2017), and, in the case of Oman, legitimacy. I take this research on visitation, hospitality,
and patron-client relations in new directions. Specifically, because I focus on the way the state is
brought into these relations, I identify some important differences between hospitality, patronage,
and generosity and what these distinctions imply. I argue that the correct way to interpret statedirected giving to state citizens in the Arabian Gulf is not “hospitality,” which is more properly
directed at “outsiders,” nor as “patronage,” which implies extra-state political affiliation, but as
“generosity.” Peter Lienhardt noted that a common attitude towards foreigners in Kuwait was
expressed in the formula lā ta‘ṭī al-ghārib al-‘āda; hūwa rāyiḥ, “give the stranger something better
than everyday treatment; he will soon be on his way,” which I also found prevalent in Oman

“On ne peut épuiser la compréhension du politique au Liban en décrivant le pouvoir tel qu’il se
manifeste dans le système confessionnel et les relations de patronage sous le seul rapport du
contrôle des ressources et de l’asymétrie.”
6
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(Lienhardt 1993, 50). Generosity is an attribute of leaders that is also an expectation placed on
them by the ruled, which impinges directly on the behavior of all parties involved. Rather than
leaders showing “hospitality” to their citizens, they are rendered as “generous”—a rendering that
is achieved in a praise response.
My research indicates that the response given by the ruled to the rulers is not a kind of titfor-tat account keeping, but the nurturance of a specific relationship based on mutual, reciprocated
obligations: to give and to praise. Contrary to the predictions of “Rentier State” theorists, 7 the
absence of taxation does not compel a lack of engagement with the state or a kind of political
quiescence (see Mitchell 2013), but in fact motivates a variety of praise responses. Praise,
however, is neither simple nor straightforward. Giving and praising do not simply equal one
another, match each other, or negate one another, but compel and catalyze one another. The
profound emotional states and affective associations developed while singing praise poetry and
jointly moving in collective dance are real and poignant, even if they occur in the context of class
domination. Similarly, poets do not believe that their poetry falls on deaf ears, but instead fiercely
contend that their poetry solves political problems, instructs leaders on how to behave, and pries
open miserly fists. Praise poetry, far from sycophancy or money-grubbing, is concrete political
practice. Conventional praise responses not only communicate the fulfillment and consequent
recognition of state development (coded as generosity) but also serve to render state development
and historical patterns of leadership based on generous redistribution as identical. It is in the
context of the contemporary oil-state that this relationship of mutual obligations, densely
interwoven with personalized relations and class asymmetries, is amplified and universalized to
become a core pillar of the legitimation of the state. As Alice Wilson (2016) has shown, the same

7

See Giacomo and Beblawi 1987, but also updates in al-Farsi 2013 and Hertog 2010.

16
modes of governance can serve to sustain vastly different forms of socio-political organization,
from tribes to state-projects. I see the recognition of generosity through praise as playing an
important role in sustaining cycles of redistribution that are themselves a mechanism of political
legitimation.

b. Political and Economic Ethnomusicology
“I mean, like, nobody owns the stuff [Irish traditional music]. You can’t own this
stuff.” (Irish traditional musician, reported in McCann 2001, 92).
I see this dissertation as making critical interventions in ethnomusicological research on
political and economic topics by explicitly modeling a political-economic approach to
performance that builds on research on music, reciprocity, and the “moral economy” (Carrier 2017;
Götz 2015). In this section, I briefly present these terms and my approach while foregrounding
recent ethnomusicological literatures that take a similar line.
As a point of departure, we might note that, speaking broadly, most ethnographic
approaches in ethnomusicology have committed to both roughly holistic and roughly orthodox
notions of “economies” and “politics.” While this is simply practical for research that does not
directly critically engage with taken-for-granted political institutions like governments or practices
like voting, my argument calls into question some of these common sensical usages by highlighting
their deep embeddedness in one another. This research is not unique in this regard, but insofar as
my ethnographic data interrogate such approaches, I think it is useful to pick out specific previous
engagements with the notion of the “economic” or the “political” as independent categories,
without implying any attempt to disaggregate them from their cultural and historical settings.
This dissertation is predicated on two heterodox political-economic notions: reciprocity
and the moral economy. Reciprocity at its most basic is concerned with the ways in which actions
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compel responses and therefore lead to continued, mutually reinforcing (i.e., reciprocal) action
chains.8 Linda Molm defines reciprocity as a norm that can be glossed as “the giving of benefits
to another in return for benefits received” (Molm 2010, 119) but the inverse (punishments for
punishments) also exists. While reciprocity has seen tremendous development as a theoretical
concept in anthropology, economics, sociology, psychology, game theory, and other fields, my
approach to reciprocity relies mostly on anthropology. Here, reciprocity refers specifically to the
non-market exchange of goods, ideas, or labor, governed by a norm that demands the return of
benefits extended. For more than a century, reciprocity has been exemplified by the practice of
giving, receiving, and returning gifts, as sketched by Marcel Mauss (1923). The gift literature is
vast; I examine it more closely in chapter 4. I frame praise and generosity as locked in reciprocal
circuits that construct relationships between elite givers and non-elite praisers who are linked by
senses of mutual obligation. The construction of a legitimate, well-ordered community is
predicated on these inculcated senses of mutuality and inter-reliance that emerge in the acts of
giving, receiving, and returning benefits of different types and qualities.
The way that continued reciprocity—that is, the circulation of generosity and praise—helps
to construct a community of mutual, contrasting obligations has most often been referred to as a
“moral economy” (Carrier 2017; Scott 1976; Thompson 1971). For James Carrier, a “moral
economy” is not one in which moral notions circulate or one that seems to have net moral benefits,
but is instead one whose reciprocal relations “encourage us to look at economic transactions in
terms of relationships and their histories” (2017, 32). Rather than the faceless, anonymous, and
profit-maximizing transactions that operate in an admittedly hypothetical market economy,
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transactions in a moral economy are based on trust, obligation, and mutualism. Mutuality and
obligation are not simply structural features of something called a “moral economy,” but are
instead produced by the continued norm-governed interactions of differently constituted
individuals and groups. Reciprocity and the moral economy are linked concepts: we might say that
moral economies are those economic networks that foreground relations of reciprocity and
obligation. Profit and market logics still operate in a moral economy but are attenuated by human
sociality, norms of reciprocity, and the centrality of obligations. In this sense, I identify a reciprocal
relation occurring across class lines in a southeast Arabian context as a moral economy that
manages the movement of goods and praise. What praise does in the Omani context, I argue, is
highlight and commend the reciprocal elements of this moral economy, encouraging their
continued salience. Praise is a bulwark against the collapse of a moral economy into a market
economy.
Before turning to the research in ethnomusicology to which this dissertation is indebted,
we should briefly address some more orthodox economic approaches in the field. Much recent
explicitly economic ethnomusicology is dedicated to understanding the role of music as a
commodity within certain “markets,” which are often considered to be coextensive with an
“economy” in a certain country. I am thinking particularly of the work done by Georgina Born and
her interlocutors in the MusDig project: Music, Digitisation, Mediation: Towards Interdisciplinary
Music Studies,9 and studies of particular “music economies” (such as Perullo 2011 in urban
Tanzania, Beaster-Jones 2016 in India), but also the increased interest in intellectual property
rights (best exemplified by the SAGE Handbook in Intellectual Property of 2014). This research
effectively studies musical products as they circulate within narrowly defined state capitalist legal
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networks, which are taken to be an important context for studying the circulation of music, rights,
and money. This is important research, but given the tremendous variety and historical time-depth
of human musical practices, it is surely not the whole story—and to be sure, these scholars make
no such claim. However, the study of music and “the economy” is often presumed to be a study of
a capitalist music market, with musical products as commodities.
Further, we might note two deeply linked problems with this presupposition of capitalist
economies. The first is that the “national economy” is not a natural state of affairs but a deeply
managed ideological construction that is coterminous with the rise of states and that therefore
requires historicization.10 If there are broadly analogous processes occurring in various economies,
it is unlikely to be the result of anything but the imposition of certain legal frameworks, economic
modeling and tracking technologies, and the like. The “economy” imagined by this research is
often overly systematized and circumscribed as a “market”. That is, this understanding of “the
economy” posits a universality for global capitalism and its concomitant social effects that it does
not have while it simultaneously excludes or effaces other forms of economic logic.
The second problem is that such analyses operate with “music” functioning
straightforwardly a “commodity.” While some scholars have investigated commodification as a
process (notably Taylor 2016, 2017), accepting the commodity status of music as a given may
discourage our ethnomusicological imagination. Taking reciprocity and moral economy
approaches helps to show us how objects and performances do not necessarily emerge as
commodities nor are they destined to become them. They are transformed into commodities. By
eliding this process, or by assuming markets, or by ignoring other economic logics, we risk what
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feminist Marxist scholars J. K. Gibson-Graham have called “capitalocentrism,” that is, a bias
whereby

forms of economy (not to mention noneconomic aspects of social life) are
often understood primarily with reference to capitalism: as being
fundamentally the same as (or modeled upon) capitalism, or as being deficient
or substandard imitations; as being opposite to capitalism; as being the
complement of capitalism; as existing in capitalism's space or orbit. (1996: 6)
Capitalocentrism renders “capitalism” as a totalizing system, a powerful and completed imposition
of logics of market relations that have swamped and replaced all others. As Gibson-Graham have
argued, “the economy” is in fact a dense, historically and culturally contingent collection of
practices in which only some are governed by market-derived logics. Other logics of giving,
exchange, sharing, communality, debt, sacrifice, theft, care, distribution, obligation, offering, and
exploitation are always operating alongside and amongst market relations (1996).
Against this prevailing logic, Mayfair Mei-Hui Yang’s work on what she terms “economic
hybridity” in Wenzhou, China offers a way to understand how “indigenous economies are not
always plowed under with the introduction of capitalism but may even experience renewal and
pose a challenge to capitalist principles” (Yang 2000, 477). Yang’s investigation of ritual
economies that involve the conspicuous accumulation and destruction of capital in rural China
(similar to “potlatches” amongst Kwakwaka’wakw nobles) challenges the notion that capitalist
logics fully replace other preexisting ones (2000; 2007). Yang and Gibson-Graham not only
demonstrate that reductive, capitalocentric economism and the “Eurocentric assumption that the
Midas touch of capitalism immediately destroys local indigenous economies and cultures” (Yang
2000, 481) fails to describe our actual lives, but it also fails to imagine economics otherwise.
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I want to be clear that I don’t think that research into the circulation of music objects within
some circumscribed capitalist sphere is useless or trivial. It is emphatically not. The problematic I
am picking out here is that such research takes too much for granted about “music,” its commodity
status, and its relation to “the economy.” Rejecting this premise, ethnomusicologist Jayson
Beaster-Jones asks us to consider “what makes music as a commodity different from, say, soap?”
(2014, 336). Despite “not being as different as we might hope,” Beaster-Jones concludes that the
experience of music and the use of music, along with its potential to “overwhelm” exchange, are
two features to which we can concretely point (336-37). While we may quibble with that, the more
important point here is that “music is only ambivalently a commodity,” a status that “must be
enforced” with “rigorous policing, lobbying, legislation, and enforcement” (337). Anna Tsing
shows precisely this enforcement and management of commodities as she traces the
metamorphosis of the matsutake mushroom from gift to commodity to gift as it circulates around
the Pacific (2015). This is a pivotal insight. It is not that we have failed to imagine the various
ways music can circulate (“as commodities” versus “as gifts”) in or as “economies” but that we
have failed to interrogate the conditions of possibility that undergird that circulation. One of those
conditions has been the violent enforcement of capitalist social relations as they are folded into the
ideological and material construction of the state form and its transnational legal frameworks.
Gibson-Graham and Yang’s shared intervention is an important one if we are to try to
understand reciprocal circuits of praise and obligation as not just reducible to rational actors
exchanging tit-for-tat benefits, or as a simple manifestation of capitalist market logics, or as a mere
puppet show of power since “gift economies” have historically been entirely replaced by “market
economies” (Bowie 1998). Without a robust alternative model—say, reciprocity and the moral
economy—and a good reason to think that capital relations might not explain all the facts—the
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critique of capitalocentrism—the tendency to explain praise relationships as basically the purchase
of consent seems just obviously true. It is not. So let’s sketch out such an alternative here.
One way that economic anthropologists and ethnomusicologists have come to imagine the
economic otherwise is to turn back to Marcel Mauss’s insightful research on “the gift” presented
in his Essai sur le don published in 1923 (Buenconsejo 2002; McCann 2001; Morcom 2015a,
2015b; Sykes 2018). A similar move has been to evoke the notion of “moral” exchange that is
tentatively opposed to market practices (Hoffman 2002; Petrović and Hofman 2018; PotuoğluCook 2006; Tausig 2014). While in both anthropology and ethnomusicology this has often
manifested in a tendency to invoke “egalitarianism” or “primitive communism,” in which
reciprocal relations of gifting or music-making are devoid of structures of power and class,
feminist scholarship has shown this conception to be quite false (Kisliuk 1998, among many).
While there are many examples of this appeal to “egalitarianism,” we can focus on more
fruitful analyses here. Ethnomusicologist Anthony McCann, for example, has argued that the
traditional Irish “session”—a collective performance of “at least three people who play jigs, reels,
hornpipes, planxties, and so on in heterophonic union” (2001, 91)—“conforms readily to the idea
of a ‘gift cycle’ ” (93). Drawing on Lewis Hyde’s (1983) application of gift-thinking to art
production, McCann argues that the free movement of authored music, learning, and expertise
within sessions is a form of “de-commodification” in which tunes “written as commercial,
commodified money-making works” are nevertheless transformed into “gifts to be distributed
freely among musicians in a context of tradition and community” (McCann 2001, 92-3; see also
Kaul 2007). While McCann develops this position into one that posits Irish traditional music as a
“common property resource” (96), we can see how the concept of “tradition,” so often maligned
as an ossifying, museumifying discourse which renders certain practices, attitudes, and relations
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as “non-” or “pre-modern,” might actually be a social relation of a profoundly anti-capitalist nature.
It is perhaps no wonder that “tradition” is so often seen as a source of backwardness. Nevertheless,
as Ian Hayes argues, even such self-consciously “traditional” North Atlantic musicians must
“strike a balance” between “sharing and charging” for musical performances (2011).
Rather than positing traditional music as a protected reserve, shielded from capital relations
and “market forces,” ethnomusicologist Anna Morcom has studied various Tibetan musicians’
integration into the “hegemonic world system” as “non-linear and inconsistent” (2015b, 293). “The
capitalist nature of a given form of music or music making,” she writes, “is not simply a factor of
monetisation or marketisation or technological or stylistic format and it cannot be judged in
isolation” (293). Instead, as she shows, various logics, obligations, and values motivate Tibetan
performers to give music away, use it for charity, or frame their performances as “community
work” even as they engage with it as a money-making enterprise (288). Such work turns on the
expectation that singers sing “primarily for the community rather than individual gain” (289).
Morcom sees this as an example of Polanyi’s notion of an “embedded economy,” one in which
economic activity is constrained and delimited by non-economic processes—for Tibetans, the
experience of exile. For Morcom, tracing the impact of “capitalism” in music relies on a threelayered approach consisting of “a lowest subsistence layer, the middle layer of market exchange,
and the capitalist layer of the anti-market on top” (292). The “embeddedness” of Tibetan pop music
in wider communal engagements creates an “air pocket” which selectively separates it from total
inclusion in alienating capitalist relations, complicating straightforward narratives of the total
subsumption of music making into global capitalist flows.
Monograph-length studies that analyze musical objects as “gifts” are fewer. I’ll discuss
two notable attempts: José S. Buenconsejo’s ethnography Songs and Gifts at the Frontier: Person
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and Exchange in the Agusan Manobo Possession Ritual, Philippines (2002) and Jim Sykes’
ethnography The Musical Gift: Sonic Generosity in Post-War Sri Lanka (2018).
Buenconsejo’s ethnography of Manobo possession rituals—which include “ritual song,
dance, and speech”—shows how reciprocal relations do more than “perform formalized
sociability,” but are basic to “envoicing” Manobo subjectivity (xi). Contesting the straightforward,
utilitarian reading of Mauss that holds that gifts are given to receive gifts in return, Buenconsejo
shows that Manobo gifting is best explained as a kind of sacrifice. For Manobo, “gift giving goes
beyond ‘getting something in return.’ Instead, it is sacrificial because it is meant to be "eaten,"
distributed, destroyed, or shared… To give is to become a sociable being, one capable of sharing
gifts with others because those others are also human beings like oneself” (300). Exchange,
manifested in the movement of food, songs, and possession, makes persons and makes them equal.
Through careful reading of Manobo ritual texts and contexts, Buenconsejo diagrams deeply shared
values of reciprocity enmeshed in Manobo subjectivity and how these values have been
“confronted” by Visayan lowland settlers, missionaries, money economies, and logging. He
examines such figures as the sacrificed “anarchic pig,” the sharing of symbolically dense foods,
and the role of literal and figurative sweat in indexing “togetherness” as the ritual, embodied, and
symbolic manifestation of proper reciprocal Manobo sociality (50ff., 64). The narrative retelling
of myths called sugilen not only relays messages like “ ‘one receives if one gives’ and that ‘those
in a top position who will not participate in prestations now will later on be in the low position of
the Other World,’ ” but also inculcates senses of the place of Manobo in the greater cosmos,
kalibutan (64). Buenconsejo concludes that these kinds of narratives relate the “Manobo
epistemology of the person: one that is inherently sociable because s/he is naturally predisposed
to share food with his kin who is a katunged (i.e., one who is literally in front of the self). It is
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shameful to be otherwise” (295). To be kin, in Manobo terms, is to share food without question or
compromise—an implicit baseline reciprocity that is manifested and disseminated in ritual
performance.
The increasing imposition of market logics has caused some Manobo to modify ritual
practice in order to build “strategies for circumventing that material inequality” (295). The
increasing saliency of market relations and material inequality were heralded by the arrival of
Visayan outsiders to the Agusan valley in the 1950s and necessitated a response in ritual form. In
his studies of newly hybrid ritual forms, Buenconsejo argues for a conception of communication
that is undertaken “to recreate a community, pulling what is distant into the circuit of affinity”
2002, 240). “What is distant” might include Manobo persons, animals, deities, Visayans, and
spirits, diwata, from whom Manobo learn how to share, how to live, and how to make community.
Communication in dance, ritual, song, speech, and sacrifice pulls individuals into social relations,
which are implicitly predicated on sharing and communality. The distant are drawn into gifting
relations that bring them into safe contact with the Manobo. As spirit mediums take on the roles
of the figures in myths and contemporary social life, they “sacrifice” themselves as a kind of social
gift in order to (re)produce social harmony in the face of social disharmony of various types.
Communication in ritual “bridges the experience of forces from strange distant realms outside the
community” by incorporating them in Manobo bodies, cosmologies, and social relations (353).
Gift relations achieve a similar end—they bring outside beings (spirits, Manobo kin, Visayan
elites, missionaries, anarchic pigs) into humane communal relations. These gifts are often encoded
in ritual song and dance, and so therefore operate on social and spiritual relations:
the repeated act of giving ritual gifts to [spirits] does not place human beings in a fixed
subordinate position. On the contrary, gifts can undermine the structural asymmetrical
context of "dominance" and "subordination." They make participants— spirits and
humans— acquire equal values. (353)
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Rituals “viscerally [reinstitute] the notion of reciprocity and interpersonal exchange” amongst
humans, spirits, elites, and affines by asserting their commonality as partners in exchange (349).
Confronted by predatory elites, international capital, and material inequality, ritual forcefully
asserts the continued relevance of a moral economy amongst the Manobo.
Buenconsejo’s careful study itself tries to bridge political economic and symbolic,
structuralist, and critical approaches. His exploration of a Manobo moral economy is one of the
most detailed and rigorous I have yet read. There are two broad findings from Buenconsejo’s work
that inform my analysis. The first is that while Manobo gifts may be intended to be sacrifices—a
major way Buenconsejo contrasts Manobo gifts with Mauss’s conception—they nevertheless
compel returns. Even if they are eaten, destroyed, gifts are not necessarily important as quantifiable
objects that cue a later return, calibrated by some utilitarian maximization. Rather, they constitute
both a social relationship and mark the giver as a human, one with whom relations can be made.
However, Buenconsejo’s characterization of Mauss’s claim as a utilitarian calculus to which the
Manobo gift-sacrifice is a corrective is a misreading of Mauss. Rather, anthropological
theorization on Mauss’s gift has deliberately shown how it is the relationships formed in gift
exchange that are as important as any objects or values moved between persons. More positively,
however, Buenconsejo opens up a path for understanding how gift exchange might not always be
a simple recapitulation of dominance and subordination, of magister and minister. Gifting
relations, and the capacity to instantiate them, might draw participants into recognizing their basic
equality as persons and as gifters. In Chapter 4, I try to show how the specific performance of
razḥa as praise upsets straightforward readings of dependency on elite distribution.
Jim Sykes’s The Musical Gift: Sonic Generosity in Post-War Sri Lanka (2018) takes a
different tack. Rather than focusing on social relations, he focuses on the gift’s role in care,
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protection, and peace-making. Sykes argues that “some sounds are meant to be given… as a
technology of care… [as] ways of helping others with sound” (2018, 15). “Musical giving,” Sykes
offers, “is perhaps the major missing actor from music studies” (16). “Musical gifts,” such as those
prestations made and given by the Beravā drummer caste of Sinhala Buddhist ritual masters, are
“given as public offerings to encourage deities to protect people” and to cement certain kinds of
relations and obligations of protection between humans, gods, Buddhas, communities, demons,
and animals (19). Beravā “drum speech” prestations are gifts given to achieve something:
protection, care, relationships, access. He terms this “sonic efficacy”: the capacity for music to do
things in the world. At the same time, these gifts circulate amongst many different social (and
supernatural) groups in Sri Lanka. This reality directs Sykes to “think broadly about various Sri
Lankan aesthetic systems that utilize sonic generosity” in order to understand how shared musical
resources can become caught up in processes of ethnic differentiation (47). He claims that sonic
generosity as manifested in a “sonic gift economy” (7) has been historically obscured by a
“distinction between ‘the monetary economy’ and ‘the arts’ reinforced by British colonial
liberalism and postcolonial ethnonationalism” (12). Sri Lankan sonic practices of various kinds
came to be defined as “music” in the Eurocentric sense, and so were transformed from a “sonic
gift” into an expression of certain static, bounded, and individualized identities. Much of Sykes’s
theorization is, in fact, concerned with upending the “liberal aesthetic” construal of music as being
important only to building and expressing identities, not as political action, not as nurturing or
caring for others, and not acting as a gift. “Musical giving is ignored,” Sykes argues, “because of
the centrality to the modern global imagination of the idea that music is a form of personal and
communal expression” over and above anything else (17). This serves to bifurcate musical
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practices from political and economic ones, which prompts Sykes to conclude that “the arts exist
in economies but are not typically considered to be economies” (17).
There remain lingering issues with Sykes’s argument, similar in shape to those manifested
in earlier egalitarian approaches. From the outset, there are many scholars who consider music to
be an “economy” of one sort or another: say, as an economy of emotion or aesthetics (Jarjour
2018), of moral sentiments (Hoffman 2002), as overlapping systems of exchange (Quintero 2018),
or just as a “music economy” (Perullo 2011). So it’s not a problem of recognizing that music
circulates within certain prescribed networks, but rather a problem of conflating that circulation
with market economies. Are there no other ways to impel the circulation of sounds? Obviously,
there are: as Sykes points out, sonic gifts circulate between humans, animals, demons, Buddhas,
and deities predicated on beseeching protection—and yet even then he ultimately posits that Sri
Lankan “musical gifts” circulate within a “sonic gift economy” that might be separate from or
folded into “the” capitalist “monetary economy.” However, this splitting of “the economy” into
two “economies”—say, one motivated by the gift and one motivated by the market (pace Gregory
1982, see Bloch and Parry 1989)—has been specifically challenged by much recent research in
economic anthropology.11 Buenconsejo might be read as pursuing the same split, between
exchange that makes persons and exchange that alienates them. Rendering Sykes’ “musical gift”
or Buenconsejo’s “sacrificial gift” as an economy that is at least tentatively drawn against “the
global capitalist economy” fails to recognize how “the economy” already contains an incredible
diversity of relations beyond, beneath, and behind those organized by the market, as shown by
Gibson-Graham, Yang, and others. Surely analyzing something as “an economy” does not show
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how it runs counter to a “monetary economy.” As we have learned from Morcom and McCann,
diverse logics of exchange and the material realities of obligation, community, and inequality that
constrain them are tightly interwoven. Musicians and ritualists draw on and are compelled by these
various opportunities and constrictions.
The most considerable oversight in Sykes’s invocation of “the gift,” however, is his failure
to recognize the potential of gifting relations to produce dependency by sustaining economic and
social asymmetries, especially in state spaces. Buenconsejo accounts for this potential but does not
demonstrate its negotiation in musical or ritual life, rather relying on his understanding of the
“sacrificial gift” to eliminate this potential. For Sykes, “musical gifts” seem to circulate freely
amongst elites and non-elites, rulers and ruled in Sri Lanka, because there is almost no attention
to questions of class, power relations, or state/elite domination—fundamental features of any
“anarchist (ethno)musicology” that I would understand (2018, 47). Reciprocal systems are not
innocent systems. I follow this thread very closely through the literature of the Middle East and
within the anthropology of the state.
While a few ethnomusicologists have framed their problematic in terms of reciprocity,
more have usefully invoked the notion of a moral economy as a way of explaining the tense
relationships between music production, money, obligation, market logics, and community. While
most ethnomusicologists have invoked a moral economy to mean a domain in which moral
sentiments circulate (Hoffmann 2002; Petrović and Hofman 2018; Potuoğlu-Cook 2006), others
have invoked the more specific anthropological notion or something like it (Cooper 2015; Miller
2002; Morcom 2015a, 2015b; Tausig 2014). Katherine Hoffman, for example, has modeled Berber
women’s song poetry genres (tizrrarin and tinḍḍamin) in the Anti-Atlas of Morocco as a “moral
economy” (2002, 510). While she does not draw on the economic or anthropological literature on
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moral economies, she points out similar processes: the sung poetry is “uncommodified” (512), it
trades in moral commentary, and it sustains relationships between participants. Benjamin Tausig,
on the other hand, directly invokes the notion of “moral economies” in his discussion of moral
dynamics in music making and monetary compensation at Red Shirt protests in Thailand (2014).
Tausig takes the example of Mii, a mor lam musician, as a case to examine manifestations of a
“musical morality” in the face of neoliberal reform, money-making in market settings, and teacherstudent dynamics (263). Mii negotiated his moral commitments—to students, both Thai and
foreign, to “provincial culture”—in the midst of the Red Shirt protests and neoliberal
developments in Thai society that opened up new spaces for money making as well as moral peril
(269-71). Here, Tausig hints at the capacity of preexisting moral forms to retain their shape and
their ability to induce behavior in the face of sometimes overwhelming neoliberal change—a
critique of capitalocentrism as manifested in neoliberal myth-making.
Adjacent to research that shows how non-market-based practices (like reciprocity) or
certain comportments and relationships (like moral sentiments and obligations) co-exist with
market logics is research on alternative, non-state-based political modalities. There are two
literatures that I think have been very effective in this way. The first emphasizes the radical
potential of art to articulate, facilitate, or imagine non- or extra-state political interactions, and the
second shows how music and performance has constituted a primary political activity before and
during the rapid expansion of the capitalist state form.
The first literature has found its most emphatic and convincing expression in dance studies
(Graff 1997; Kowal, Siegmund, and Martin 2015; Martin 1998; Mills 2017; Thompson 2014).
Dancer and theorist Randy Martin crystalized the capacity of dance to sharpen our perception of
“a proliferation of political activity throughout the social fabric and not simply confined to what
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are formally considered to be political institutions” (1998, 2). While Martin draws our attention to
dance’s potential to carve out new political spaces, others have emphasized the ways in which
dance questions normative understandings of expressive politics. Dana Mills theorizes studies of
political dance in Dance and Politics (2017) as vacillating between “the weak reading of political
dance—the use of dance to rearticulate the meaning of ideas discussed in verbal language—and
the strong reading of political dance—dance expressing the meaning of political ideas
independently of verbal language” (2017, 25). Strong readings of political dance show how dance
can become a “source of possibility” for participants and spectators, as Ellen Graff (1997) showed
in her studies of collective dance and Leftist political organizing in New York from 1928-42.
The second literature is sparse but deeply suggestive. Here, I examine historical and
contemporary studies of varieties of performance that have constituted a basic political activity in
polities other than contemporary states. These are, in effect, studies that trace the incorporation of
historically functional musico-political practices into the international capitalist state-system, the
juxtaposition of musical forms of recognizing authority, or the historical roles of performances,
instruments, and sounds to serve particular political orders. Since these studies operate on the claim
that sound is/was political practice, they are often historical.
Damascus Kafumbe’s Tuning the Kingdom: Kawuugulu Musical Performance, Politics,
and Storytelling in Buganda (2018) presents Kawuugulu, a drum ensemble closely associated with
the Baganda king, or kabaka, as a form of political action which predates the expansion of British
colonialism and postcolonial state-building processes. Kafumbe argues that kawuugulu
performances “articulate the very means by which Buganda and its society manage themselves”
insofar as kawuugulu performance deals with the linked political domains of “kinship, clanship,
and kingship” (7). In its role as a royal ensemble, kawuugulu was tasked with entertaining,
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educating, celebrating, and even “protecting” the kabaka—a duty that was unfulfilled when the
Ugandan government attacked and abolished the Kingdom of Buganda in 1966-67, killing
performers and destroying musical instruments (25). State violence targeted music-makers and
instruments in Uganda precisely because they were political “agents,” in Kafumbe’s terms (4142). Kafumbe shows that kawuugulu has functioned politically within and between Baganda clans
as well as fulfilling obligations to the kabaka. By focusing on such ensemble performances, the
Butiko clan that performs on kawuugulu, and other objects of the royal regalia, Kafumbe shows
that this social arrangement of political musical practice “allows” kawuugulu “to manage,
structure, model, and legitimize a collaborative relationship between the kabaka and his subjects”
(62). The kawuugulu and its performers are clearly a basic political activity in Buganda, through
which the Butiko clan “speaks for all clans… and also to all clans” (79).
While Kafumbe shows how a particular drum ensemble is a crucial site in which the
political operates in the Lake Region of Africa, musicologists, especially of the Renaissance and
Baroque, have produced several useful studies that present music both as an expression of a certain
political order and as a political activity that links ideals of royal authority to musical practice
(Feldman 2010; Heller 2004). Katherine Butler’s Music in Elizabethan Court Politics (2015) asks
“how and why was music useful” within this royal political order (6). In 1575, “Court musicians
William Byrd and Thomas Tallis claimed that music was ‘indispensable to the state’,” likely
drawing on “Plato’s notion that the character of the state could be moulded by the modes and
rhythms that were permitted” within it (6). Similarly, music might also “inspire virtue” in the
monarch, or persuade them to take good counsel, just as much as it might be used for manipulation
(10 ff.). Butler concludes by noting three ways in which musical performance was concrete
political practice for Elizabethans: “first as an audible harmony comparable to political concord;
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second as a sign of education, social status, and even virtue (if correctly used); and third as a means
of persuasion” (11). These three forms of music-making as politics can be found in many other
times and places: performed music as an instantiation of cosmic harmony animated performance
in 17th-century Spain (Gonzalez 2015) as much as it did Ancient China (Brindley 2012). To these,
however, we must add music as praise, which has functioned as a mode of political engagement
in the Middle East (where it has mostly been traced in literary works) and in sub-Saharan Africa,
where its musicality and oral performance has been more appreciated (Omojola 2011; Waterman
1990).
The upshot to all this is that our deliberate investigations of music and the economy or and
politics should not assume the economy or politics are generalizable domains. I want to conclude
by pointing out two pitfalls that seem all too common: the assumption that “Politics” looks like
the politics that occurs in capitalist states of the last hundred years or so, and that investigation of
music in an economy is investigation of music as it relates to capital. I think we need to tread a
narrow path between making everything into politics and too strictly defining politics to what
conforms to conventional notions of the political. Similarly, we should be wary of slipping
between talking about economies and interrogations of capitalism as a historical phenomenon.
Neither of these things is identical to the other. Avoiding these pitfalls requires rigorous
historicizing, a dogged commitment to ethnographic specificity, an open ear, and a willingness to
be both surprised and corrected. More concretely, we should recognize how music functions as
both a commodity and as a way to build relationships of obligation, responsibility, and care that
constrain the mechanical grind of the market.

c. The Cultivation of People in Song: The Ethnomusicology of the State
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As a topic in social science, “the state” has inspired scholars to develop a dense and
complicated literature. The state was an early interest as well, occupying some of the pioneers of
the discipline (see Chapter 6). Rather than simply adopting a productive research agenda, this
review will present some substantive critiques of the major positions and propose a novel
rearrangement of them. Ethnomusicology and anthropology have often engaged with the state,
usually because it is seen as the proper arena of “politics” (which I challenged above), but also as
a patron of arts, a colonizing power predicated on white supremacy and genocide, a “fiction,” a set
of institutions, a vanishing organizing power predicated on territory, an irrelevancy due to
transnational media connections, and so on. While I will save a fuller review of this literature for
chapter 6, I want to at least sketch my approach to “the state” here as both a material and
ideological project. Assessing the “state” as a project, or as being composed of various projects,
has produced considerable insight while acknowledging the simultaneous concrete existence of
the state, the capacity of its elites to “improvise” (Jeffrey 2014), and its necessarily unfinished
character. Further, grasping the “state” as a complex of sometimes contradictory or unaligned
material and ideological projects shows how music, sound, and performance can abut, adjoin, and
sometimes align with state power.
This dissertation began as a study of the contemporary authoritarian state in the Arabian
Peninsula and the role of certain performance practices in legitimating its rule. In studying the
multiple social and class relations, histories, ideals of authority, and aesthetics that animate this
relation, I was drawn in several directions: towards praise, generosity, dependency, anti-political
performances, notions of practicality, and Islamic legal discourses on music, amongst others. I
approach all these topics as unfolding in conjuncture with “the state,” which I take to be an
unfolding social project that attempts to organize, stabilize, and perpetuate social relations of
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inequality between dominant class minorities and dominated class majorities through material
strategies such as the centralization of bureaucracy, legal systems, delimitations of acceptable
politics, regimes of audibility, and organized violence. “States” are not simply objects, or
structures, or systems, or organizations, but are historically realized through lived, shifting, and
“improvised” tactics, modes of governance, and patterns of class interaction that largely aim to
concentrate power amongst the ruling classes. They are simultaneously the fixation of unequal
social relations and the ideological strategies that mask this practice by rendering it intelligible as
a social object.
The state “has always been the patrimony of some privileged class or other,” Mikhail
Bakunin noted, “a priestly class, an aristocratic class, a bourgeois class… but it is absolutely
necessary for the salvation of the state that there should be some privileged class devoted to its
preservation” (Bakunin 1972, 318).12 This concentration of power in a state is never complete,
however, because states exist amongst other states: “whoever says state necessarily says a
particular limited state, doubtless comprising… many different peoples and countries, but
excluding still more… consequently whoever says state says a state, and whoever says a state
affirms by that the existence of other states” (316). The coexistence of states, for Bakunin, is a
virtual guarantee of “competition, jealousy, truceless and endless war,” conquest, and “conquered
peoples, enslaved and in bondage” (316). This unavoidable conflict is grounded on the “supremacy
of state morality” over particular, local, human interests, so much so that states can only co-exist

The broadly “anarchist” understanding of society as composed of “ruling classes” and
“subordinate” or “ruled classes” has often been critiqued as idealistic, simplistic, or unable to
capture the complexity of actual class identity. This is probably true. It is also true that those who
rule are also very often social elites (Khan 2012), either being drawn from this stratum or
entering into it predicated on rulership, especially when combined with capitalist markets.
Further, much of the work of rule is engaged across this “class divide.” As I argue in chapter 6,
the clearest way to address this weakness is with Gramsci’s notion of state hegemony.
12
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for a short time (316). States, ideologically represented as territorial units, necessarily rupture “the
universal solidarity of humanity” (316). “State morality” compels the ruling classes to “see to it
that all its subjects think and, above all, act in total compliance with the patriotic morality of the
State,” which construes the building and maintenance of the state as being “the supreme objective”
(316-7). Here, Bakunin succinctly links the material social relations of rule to its legitimating
ideological tactics. He probably overstates the case. What is important is to emphasize that this
legitimation is profoundly empowered by the concentration of social power and material resources
within the hands of the ruling classes, whatever shape this power takes.
The scholar whose approach both best addresses the ideological construction of the “state”
as a monolithic entity and interrogates its material basis of unequal social relations is Antonio
Gramsci. Gramsci is useful here because, while Bakunin and other anarchist thinkers effectively
and radically diagnose the state form, they have relatively little to say about why and how it is
legitimated amongst the ruled, how it manufactures consent, how it coaxes and cajoles the
populations it claims to behave in certain ways and to accept “the terms of order” (Robinson
1983)—in Foucault’s parlance, how they “conduct the conduct” of the ruled. If we accept an
anarchist definition of the state above, the question of how that system of inequality is maintained
becomes crucial.
This is precisely the question that Gramsci’s elaboration of hegemony seeks to answer
(Crehan 2002, 104). Gramsci shows how inequality is sustained by the capacity of the ruling
classes to employ a wide range of tactics to perpetuate their dominance: in one case, state elites
might jail dissidents or murder drummers, in another they might build a highway or dam or protect
a border from an enemy, in another they might overwhelm dissent with gifts, while in another they
might implement piecemeal reforms or boast their defense of abstract notions like “the people,”
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“law and order,” or “free markets.” All these strategies draw subordinate classes into recognizing
the tacit topologies of power under state rule: its “general direction,” or “common sense.” For
Gramsci, the “‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general
direction imposed on social life by the dominant influential group” is just as much produced by
the state as it is produced by civil society (1971, 12, 263). These strategies function as yet another
arena where the putative divisions between classes are obscured, as well as providing another way
that state elites can impose their “general direction” on human life. One example of this is the ways
that Omani state agents have targeted local civic performance groups for registration, requiring
renewal every year. The Ministry of Heritage not only requires that groups register with the state
before performing at state celebrations, but also uses these registrations to monitor their activity,
edit their song texts, and delimit their performance repertoire. While I found this somewhat
troubling, I ultimately had to acquiesce to my Omani friends who told me it was “better that we
register than not doing razḥa at all” (nasaggal al-yawm ‘ashān ’āshwālinā min innā mā narzaḥ
b‘ad).
With this notion of hegemony, it becomes much clearer how praise poetry can legitimate
the political order of authoritarian regimes when ideals of authority rest partially on generous
giving. Praise poetry, especially public, collective praise poetry, is rendered from subordinates to
rulers, that is, across class “boundaries.” It forms a link, a tenuous and temporary alliance, that
might be strengthened or weakened over time. While it can be strengthened in various ways, the
imposition of a general order is never complete, since it is routinely demystified by subordinated
classes (Scott 1985, 305ff.). For example, as E.P. Thompson has pointed out, “even ‘liberality’
and ‘charity’ may be seen as calculated acts of class appeasement… what is (from above) an ‘act
of giving’ is (from below) an ‘act of getting’” (1978, 150). Interpretations differ based on class
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position, but competing ideologies do not just exist, they are actively cultivated and disseminated.
Gifts are neither fully explained as “how elites intend [them] to be seen—as disinterested
liberality” nor as how the critical analyst reads them—as “a cynical disguise for appropriation”
(Scott 1985, 309). Instead, gifts are a constituting medium of social relations, whose character is
deeply sensitive to context and manipulation.
As James Scott argued in his study of class conflict and hegemony in a Malaysian town he
named Sedaka, morally valenced stories that circulate across and between classes are “attempts to
create and maintain a certain view of what decent, acceptable human behavior ought to be” (1985,
23). “The implicit purpose of these competing ideologies is not just to convince but to control,” he
continued, “better stated, they aim to control by convincing. To the extent that they shape behavior,
they achieve a class purpose as well” (23). While Scott recognizes the vulnerability to elites to
“slander, gossip, character assassination,” he overlooks another potential “weapon of the weak”:
praise.
Praise weakly exploits the very narrative that elites insist is true—that elites are generous
and hence moral leaders—by asking them to “put up or shut up.” More important is that praise is
not an element of state hegemony that can be modeled as a consequence of elite failures to
effectively coopt, coerce, and constrain the available actions of the subordinated (Scott 1990,
90ff.). Often, hegemony is tacitly understood as an equilibrium that maximizes exploitation while
minimizing the potential for direct violent reprisals from the exploited. However, this
understanding fails to account for how the subordinated actively, not just reactively, shape the
contours of a given hegemonic order, as Bowie (1998) and Greenhouse (2012) point out. In the
Omani case, I think that praise poetry can function for and against the prevailing political “terms
of order” by strategically manipulating certain axioms of legitimated domination. Rather than
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actively questioning that order, since, as Scott has noted, “most acts of power from below…largely
observe the ‘rules’ even if their objective is to undermine them,” praise plays parts of the system
against itself (Scott 1990, 93). It is a tool, a tactic, an attempt, a mechanism—an effort to shape
the behavior of elites. It is an active practice of training elites to be members of the moral economy
from which they claim their legitimation. Praise may be one way that the subordinated work a
given system of exploitation to their “minimum disadvantage” (Hobsbawm 1973, 3ff.).

d. A brief word on social mechanisms
To conclude this overview, I want to briefly address a key theoretical device in my analysis.
It is the concept of the “social mechanism.” The concept of the social mechanism was first sketched
by Herdström and Swedberg (1998) but has been expanded by many others. Sociologist Neil Gross
summarizes the social mechanism as “a more or less general sequence or set of social events or
processes analyzed at a lower order of complexity or aggregation by which—in certain
circumstances—some cause X tends to bring about some effect Y in the realm of human social
relations” (2009, 364). I use social mechanisms in what Daniel Steel has called “process tracing”
(2004, 67). “Process tracing,” writes Steel, “consists in presenting evidence for the existence of
several social practices that, when linked together, produce a chain of causation from one variable
to another” (67). As I trace the role of praise in compelling generosity, and generosity’s potential
for producing dependency, I show how certain pragmatic features of performance address this
danger. Tracing the relation between ideals (like what makes a good leader), practices that define
social relationships (like generosity), and the social effects these practices have leads me to
speculate on mechanisms that might plausibly explain such regularities. I hypothesize two specific
mechanisms (described in chapters 3 and 4) and demonstrate their historical stability and the
results of their joint operation.
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This dissertation, my biases, and my research methods
I am a white, cisgendered native English-speaking man that was born in a smallish city in
western Massachusetts and lived most of my childhood in urban and rural settings. I was raised in
a neighborhood of what used to be termed “ethnic whites” (Irish, Polish, Portuguese, and Italian,
mostly) and Puerto Ricans, who liked one another mostly because they were all Catholic. Nearly
all of my early communal memories were associated with my Parish, including schooling. My
father, whose father was Irish and Yankee and mother was French-Canadian, grew up in the same
city. His Yankee ancestors were land-owning farmers in a nearby rural area and his Irish ancestors,
who spoke Irish well into the twentieth century, were carpenters and factory workers. My mother,
Italian and Irish-German, grew up near Albany. Her father and grandmother emigrated together to
the United States from southern Italy, while her Irish-German side had arrived in New York City
about a generation earlier. My parents, two brothers, and I lived in a duplex with my uncle while
my parents worked in a chain bookstore. Later, when my father got a job in IT and my mother
attended community college to become an registered nurse, we were forced to move to a more
rural area.
I think the move, which happened around the year 2000, was personally very alienating for
me, which is useful for an ethnographer. The change in social world was drastic. In a mostly
WASP-y protestant farm town, I learned that everyone wasn’t Catholic and that not everyone
wanted cannolis for dessert. Obviously, the attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11 and the
subsequent imperialist war-crime attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq were of tremendous importance,
but I wasn’t aware enough at the time to do anything but to try and keep informed. My later studies
at The University of Massachusetts, Amherst introduced me to Arabic and anthropology, while
my musical background led me to investigate the Middle East’s various art traditions. Many
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anthropologists of the Middle East note that studying the Arab world was “in” for a while due to
the amount of government funding for language study and research. I didn’t benefit from this until
I received a “Critical Language Scholarship” to study Arabic the summer before I began my
graduate study in ethnomusicology. I received an email from the State Department asking if I’d
prefer to study in Morocco, Jordan, Tunis, Egypt, or Oman. I knew that I didn’t want to study in
Morocco or Egypt. I wanted to study somewhere that was not like those places. I chose Oman as
a first choice and Jordan as a second.
Visiting and learning in Oman changed my life. It felt simultaneously exotic and wonderful
and also like none of the other students wanted to be there. I felt that there were interesting things
going on everywhere, but even other anthropology students were profoundly disinterested. One
memorable conversation included the gem that “Oman seemed like an orientalist’s version of
Egypt.” In any case, I knew then that I wanted to do research there. Since I was already interested
in music and performance, I asked around about “music in Oman.” To my surprise, nearly all my
friends responded by claiming that where they were from in the interior, there wasn’t any music.
But there was music in Dhofar, or maybe with the Bedouins. Later in my stay, I watched several
āzī-s and performed in several razḥa-s, which, as I know now, are not music. But they were
performed by those same friends who claimed that no music existed in the interior. Nizwā, being
a cultural center of some import, would later be my base for conducting ethnomusicological
research within the regional network of towns in the interior province of al-Dakhiliyya.
I received a Wenner-Gren Dissertation Fieldwork Grant on my second try in late 2015 to
fund a year of research on the role of “tribal arts” in political legitimation in Oman. (I did earnestly
think “tribal” was the best way to describe them, to my current horror, but this phrasing is
sometimes used in Oman). I secured recognition and support for my research from the Ministry of
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Heritage’s office of the Popular Arts in Muscat, for which I will always be thankful. This was one
of the main offices that helped to inscribe the ‘āzī as part of our Intangible Cultural Heritage in
2012. I stayed in Oman, living near the north-south highway interchange in Nizwā, for about ten
months before returning for another three. By this writing, I have spent about a year and half in
Oman working on this project.
A sketch of the performers and their social environment
The Sultanate of Oman is a unitary, authoritarian state whose Sultan (and Prime Minister
and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defence and Minister of Foreign Affairs)
is Sultan Qābūs bin Ṣa‘īd Āl Bū Ṣa‘īd, the longest ruler in the Middle East and the absolute
monarch. He issues law by decree, such as the constitution-like Basic Statutes of the State, which
ostensibly affords basic civil protections for citizens. In actuality, governance is largely based on
distribution networks—of legal arrangements, import rights, financial outlays, contracts,
development funds, land, loans, and of government jobs or favors—and is therefore highly
personalized, secretive, and contextual. This is called wasṭa (connections, “pull”) as it is in many
Arab contexts. Much of the daily operation of government distribution flows from the Sultan or
his agents in Ministries through the hands of many local leaders arranged in a loose but structured
hierarchy. Elites (shaykh-s, government agents, hospital administrators, ministry officials, state
media, government contractors, business owners) form the capillary ends of a distribution
hierarchy that moves goods, services, cash, and opportunities from the state to its citizens. Hence,
for everything distributed by the state, there is a long chain of gifters and intermediaries. This form
of distribution may seem corrupt (or at least potentially corruptible) but it is not anathema to
accounting and formal budgets, as we shall see, and can be extremely flexible to current demands.
Nevertheless, it is extremely opaque, elitist, and can be easily weaponized against dissenters,
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making it a major hedge against political reform. While suffrage was extended to most citizens in
2002, most elections are perfunctory and the Sultan appoints members of the Majlis al-dawla
personally. As of 2016, no independent media exist in Oman. The government actively discourages
private assembly, social development projects, and political parties are outlawed. Journalists
critical of the regime are routinely jailed or exiled, their books banned and families threatened.
Some piecemeal democratic reforms were made to address the limited protests occurring in 2011
and 2012, and while people remain enthusiastic for more involvement in the political process,
opportunities are limited.
While the Omani economy is one of the more diversified economies in the region, the
largest sector (fluctuating between 60% and 80%) of GDP comes from the crude oil industry.
These revenues accrue largely though state ownership of 60% of Petroleum Development Oman,
the largest supplier of crude oil and natural gas in the Sultanate. A huge proportion of the state
budget is redirected into social services, and, while this percentage has declined slightly in recent
years, expeditures to citizens still hover around 40% of the total budget. With a population of about
2.99 million Omani nationals (as well as some 2 million expatriates) and growth at a steady 5.2%
clip, such expenditures are likely to continue at similar levels for some time. This support system
is increasingly necessary as unemployment reaches 20%.
As has been noted by many scholars, Oman has perhaps witnessed the most dramatic
change in living standards of any country in the world over the last 50 years. The UNDP report of
199713 reports an HDI of 0.704 and adds that since 1970,
Life expectancy has increased by 30 years [to 70 years in 1996]… infant mortality was
reduced from more than 200 per 1000 live births in 1960 to less than 30 in 1994… in 1970,
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However, see Castles 1998 for criticism of this data.
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there were ony three schools—all primary, providing an education for 900 pupils—all
boys. By 1994 there were 454,000 students in 920 schools, and 49% were girls… Maternal
deaths declined to 27 per 100,000 live births. (28)
At the same time, the state had provided some 96% of its population with free basic health care
access. As of the 2018 update, Oman has improved over ten percentage points from a “Middle”
(up to 0.799) to “Very High” development score at 0.82 (UNDP 2018). Increases in mean years of
education (nine and a half) and expected education (nearly fourteen) and increases in life
expectancy (to 77 years) and general health have continued to show improvement, alongside a
high Gender Development Index of 0.942. Crime, with the exception of smuggling and whitecollar corruption, seems to be very low.
It is this history that helps to explain why the Sultan is both a despotic autocrat and a
generally beloved figure. While political rights are minimal, social welfare programs are
considerable and incredible development—perhaps the most significant improvement in the entire
world—is a demonstrable fact of everyday life (“Oman most-improved nation in last 40 years, UN
index says,” The Globe and Mail, 2 May 2018). So while some agitate for democratic reforms,
many others are hesitant to criticize the state’s own narrative of its success (Al-Farsi 2015). When
we turn to praise, the situation becomes yet more complicated as payouts, obligations, manners,
history, aesthetics, and community cohesion all come into play.
Focusing more on my research area, the Dākhiliyya or “interior” province has long been
the heartland of Arab Omani culture, as well as a center of Ibadism, the third great Islamic
madhhab. Dākhiliyya iself is of modest populational size: government statistics put it at about
350,000 Omani nationals out of a national total of 2.99 million, or about 12% of the Omani
population (NCSI data 2019). The wilayat of Manaḥ has only about 15,000 persons, compared to
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the 90,000 of Nizwa and 60,000 of Bahlā’, but in all parts of Dākhiliyya population levels are
rising rapidly. Over the last 30 years, household size in the region has hovered around 8 persons,
which, coupled with the significant population growth, indicates that many new households have
sprung up, straining existing housing arrangements (NCSI 2019). The province is distinctly split
between the large towns and the outlying agricultural villages, with certain parts seeming very
urban and others very rural. Nevertheless, the towns in which I worked had thriving social and
musical scenes—if one knew where to look.
Luckily, the performance groups I had maintained contact with since my language studies
and brief pilot research were gracious hosts. I worked with a number of neighborhood-based
performance groups, but none were more helpful, patient, and engaged interlocutors than the Firqat
al-‘Arabī li-l-funūn al-sha‘abiyya bi-wilāyat Manaḥ in the neighborhood of al-Ma‘arā in Manaḥ.
In Bahlā, I worked with the Firqat Bahlā li-l-funūn al-sha‘abiyya administered by the Shukaylī
brothers and their sons; in ’Izkī, with the Firqat ’Izkī li-l-funūn al-sha‘abiyya and the Firqat
Shamūkh al-Magid (which no longer exists); in Nizwā with the Firqat al-Shihabā’ and the Firqat
al-Shabābiyya; and in Manaḥ with the Firqat al-‘Arabī, the Firqat ḥarat al-Bilād, and the Firqat alMa‘mad.
Groups like these are based in a neighborhood and usually include a number of generational
cohorts: it is very common for brothers, fathers, uncles, and grandfathers to all be present for one
performance. In a very real sense, the groups themselves form the core of a given community—a
group of neighboring, relatively socially equal households that are well-known within this or that
neighborhood. Groups are composed of friends and neighbors who typically have known each
other all their lives. They were often groups of friends who had passed through primary schooling
together, then transitioned to local sports and civic clubs, maintaining their social ties and
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increasing their prestige in the community. Group members join because doing razḥa is an activity
that is perceived as heritage, they can spend time with their friends, write poetry, and remain active.
While not everyone in town joins these groups, the more connected people are with the local
community, the more likely they are to be a member of the group. The extremely low performative
barrier to entry means that most people can join in, even for a few songs, though they may not be
able to be a permanent fixture in the group. When asked, members often report that razḥa is not
only fun, but ismembership is incumbent upon them as members of their community. If people
who can perform don’t, word spreads and they are cajoled back into the group. Certainly, young
men sometimes drag their feet when asked to perform, some shy away from dancing and singing,
and others are too busy. Nevertheless, performers, in general, are proud to perform part of their
heritage.
It is important to point out that I specifically based my research on groups that perform
praise—hence, the perspective of those that find praise nauseating is lacking. There are certaintly
people in Oman who find praise to be uninteresting, sycophantic, obsequious, and the like and
consider praise of the state to be appallingly naïve. Those people also generally do not perform the
funūn. I focused intstead on praisers and sought to understand how and why they praised the state
and its agents. While praise of the state is sometimes offered because it is a “safe” and supposedly
“neutral” topic and allows for performances to continue unmolested, much more often praise is
given with real sincerity.
Performance groups are often one aspect of broader civic organizations that might include
a soccer team, committees that plan street and falaj cleaning days, organize workshops for health
and safety, run a large, communal tanur oven, and so on. As we shall see, these performance/civic
groups are more common in provincial areas, but they are by no means exclusive to them. Since
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cities like Muscat and Sohar are sectioned into neighborhoods, groups often form within the
confines of one of the older neighborhoods, performing much the same function as those I studied
in the countryside. In Muscat, for example, the Firqat Sidāb in the neighborhood of Sidāb performs
mālid, a choral, antiphonal singing practice, for local occasions and teaches younger neighborhood
boys how to perform as well. Similar groups exist in Old Muscat, Seeb, and other older sections
of town devoted to razḥa.
Razḥa and ‘āzī flourished in both urban and rural locales within Dākhiliyya. While razḥa
has a rural character to it, it is less seen as a specifically “country” performance as it is an
expression of a primordial Omani identity, which is strongly associated, in part, with an imagined
rural past. Similarly, coastal genres appeal to an imagined seafaring past. While of course there is
some debate about the reality of these pasts, rural folks in the Dākhiliyya were happy to boast
about a seafaring past. Part of the rural character of the razḥa is associate with bellicosity, warfare,
and “older” or “traditional” values of community, egalitarianism, sovereignty, and self-reliance.
These values are displayed in the organization of the dance, the costumes, and in the poetry, all of
which inspire serious aesthetic fascination. The poetry is the primary interst of most performers
and audiences, but costumes and weapons also arouse delicate attention and interest. Poetry is
regarded as extremely evocative: it can be coy, boastful, prideful, flirtatious, and morally
purposeful. While urbane, cosmopolitan folks may look down on razḥa because it is a little coarse,
blustering, and loud, they do not, in general, disparage it as inauthentic or sycophantic. Part of this
is due to the positioning of razḥa as a kind of national art form, and part of it is due to the way
razḥa clearly reflects real socioeconomic divisions in the Sultanate.
The socioeconomic status of group members may vary widely but shaykh-s and hence
shaykh-ly families never participate. There is a clear distinction between families who are fairly
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wealthy and those that are shaykh-s. For example, in Bahlā’, group leaders are significantly more
wealthy than some of the other members, but no group members do not work for a living, be it in
agriculture, auto repair, animal husbandry, or other service work. The groups leaders are not
shaykh-s—at least not to a level where they might consider not performing. In fact, Oman has seen
a significant decrease in wealth inequality over the last few decades (a GINI index drop from the
low 40s to the high 20s since 2000, NCSI data 2019). This is especially striking in a country where
a thin layer of elites control such a huge proportion of revenues. On the topic of money, while
performers do make some money for performing (the amount varies with the patron) no one can
make a living on just performing, since payouts are too low and inconsistent. Further, handshake
deals (moderated through WhatsApp nowadays) between friends, locals, and acquaintances may
mean playing a wedding for free or in exchange for a share in the feast. Other engagements, such
as playing for the opening of a car dealership or a grocery store, might net the group a few hundred
riyals, which usually ended up in a shared group account administered by one or two persons. The
funds might be used for clothing, daggers, gasoline, swords, food, water, and other such things.
During national holidays, especially the big celebrations every 5 years, a performer might be given
a few thousand riyals, but this is not a subsistence strategy for most. This is evidenced by the fact
that group members will sometimes choose not to perform at an event but instead set up a small
booth to sell smallgoods, toys, and candy at the margins of a performance space rather than
performing. Similarly, educational levels can vary: I spoke with doctoral students, college
students, bank managers, and engineers as well as some older folks who had not had any formal
schooling after learning to read the Qur’an.
Within one town, several performance groups may be present, some of which boast
histories from the early 1970s, while other are only a few years old. Of these groups, only one
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contained a working agent of the Omani state, the Firqat al-Shihabā’ in Nizwā, whose manager
worked in the Wali’s Office in Nizwā. Because so many individuals draw at least part of their
income from the state (as cash, loan forgiveness, beneficial interest rates, land grants, etc.), it is
impossible to draw a strict dividing line between folks who “work with the state” and those who
avoid it. Most rural groups, like those in Manaḥ and ’Izkī, were composed of working-class rural
men and lower-middle-class townsmen. Often rural men worked in service sectors in nearby towns
(like clerking in cellphone offices) and on family farms, while others worked as private tow-truck
operators, excavators, taxi drivers, or guards for governmental buildings or banks. Most
supplemented their incomes in various ways: selling farm produce (mostly melons and onions) or
trinkets, candy, and toys at stalls in town markets. Some group members were in technical college
in Nizwā whiles others were in the army or police and only participated when they were home. In
the larger towns of Bahlā’ and Nizwā, groups were considerably wealthier and concomitantly
larger, more well-equipped, and more closely associated with state performances. The leaders of
the Firqat Bahlā’, Muḥammad and Sālim bin Sulaymān al-Shukaylī, are nationally recognized
experts and their performances were chosen to represent ‘āzī and razḥa in the new Omani National
Museum. Pictures and videos of their performances frequently circulate on Omani social media
networks. Despite the comparatively modest wealth that their performances have brought them,
Sālim still works part-time in a smallgoods shop just north of Bahlā’ in al-Ma‘mūra. His sons and
nephews raise shoats for local restaurants (which are very delicious) and are affluent enough to
sponsor several Bengali “guest” workers.
What all these groups have in common is that they perform razḥa and ‘āzī. Only one group
performed a third genre, called al-rūgh, using a short, dual-reed pipe (similar to a Lebanese mijwiz)
of the same name, and they did so because it was a shawāwī genre, that is, one that belonged, like
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them, to a small group of semi-nomadic pastoralists. Razḥa and ‘āzī, on the other hand, are linked
genres in the minds of these performers, and are performed by Omani townsmen in the Dākhiliyya,
Bāṭinah, Sharqiyya, and Ẓāhira provinces of northern Oman. Bedouins have other genres, as do
people in other regions. I chose to study in Dākhiliyya because of the density of towns with active,
governmentally registered performance groups. While I could have situated my study in Sharqiyya
and studied an arguably more vital performance scene (but with fewer formal registered groups),
I was interested in the ways in which performance was related to state rule. Dākhiliyya seemed to
be the best place to situate the research expressed in that way.
Razḥa and ‘āzī in Dakhiliyya are most often performed to celebrate—as Omanis put it, for
faraḥ, joy. This might include weddings, university graduations, religious holidays, or the opening
of a new car dealership. I was often invited to perform razḥa for collective weddings, religious
holidays, and more minor opening ceremonies, such as for sports events or branches of restaurants.
These kinds of events were strictly opposed to those that celebrated government actions of one
kind or another. Those are not for faraḥ, and, accordingly, I was never invited to perform in those.
For example, I attended several events tied to the opening of a new majlis, or community center
devoted to one or another neighborhood. The razḥa-s presented in those ceremonies were thought
to express the solidarity of the neighborhood and reconfirm the mutual relations of political
obligation that inhere in that act of giving and receiving. I, as a guest but not a member (nor even
a potential member) of the political body in question, was not fit to participate in performances
that express such political solidarity. Similar events might be held for opening a new satellite of
the Ministry of Heritage and Culture or a new water pumping station. Other events I was not invited
to participate in were those that celebrated National Day, that praised the Sultan specifically, or
were organized by a governor for some special state occasion. ‘Āzī-s were only given at occasions

51
like these, ones of particular importance, those that might have a row of important elites seated
before the performers. These elites would range in importance from local shaykh-s to members of
the ruling family, ministry agents, and local governors, wālī-s. For these occasions, new ‘āzī-s
were typically written, as was the ‘āzī presented in the beginning of this chapter. I discuss the
importance of the distinction between celebratory and political performances throughout this
dissertation, though I focus explicitly on political ones.
My research was almost entirely composed of various modes of interviewing, recording
performances, and participant observation. I recreate many of my interviews throughout this
dissertation so I will not belabor them here. It was important for me to bring Omani voices
themselves into the text as naturally as possible. While I did not transcribe all my audio interviews,
I notated them all and have transcribed relevant portions. By participant-observation I am happy
to say that it mostly meant singing and dancing with people who were very kind, thoughtful, and
welcoming. While I often took breaks to record the performance, I was welcomed in most dances.
I was excluded from the most serious praise poetry, Omani music and praise videos, and state and
civic events, which were highly politically charged. While I struggled with the decision to wear a
dishdāsha and kumma, I ultimately decided against it in public. The next time I go I will consider
wearing it to performances, but I think I was right to not wear it in general. I felt that it was too
much like wearing a costume. Especially as a white-read Westerner, I was afforded considerable
unwarranted respect and privilege, and I thought that wearing the local clothing was a situation
where, even if it was wrong, no one would tell me so until it was too late. I asked Omanis I trusted
many times and they were split—some thought it would be strange or disrespectful while others
constantly encouraged me to do so.

52
I had hoped to convince a drummer to teach me how to play the raḥmānī and kāsir drums.
Everyone I spoke to thought this was a bad idea—nobody else did that, so why should I? I would
just pick it up as we drummed and danced, like everyone else. I did, but I felt like I wasn’t being
a good ethnomusicologist. Surely there was a drum language, or some deep symbolic significance
only understood by drummers that I would miss? There might be, but mostly the drums were not
considered a very interesting thing to study. What most folks pointed me to was the poetry, the
collective emotions of performance, the way that praise demonstrated their goodwill and joy, the
way it connected them to the Sultan and local leaders. I attended many performances but I analyze
only a dozen or so in this dissertation. I notated most of the razḥa melodies while I was in the field
and drum parts back in the US. Transcription was sometimes interesting to my Omani friends, and
I taught a few how to read the melodies as I had written them, which they decided wasn’t really
helpful because they knew the melodies anyhow. I had to agree.
I realized a few things early on. First, and something with which I am not comfortable, is
that I was never going to meet any of my friends’ female kin or wives, except for a few very kind
grandmothers and young children. This was just not possible. At my first wedding in Manaḥ, our
razḥa troupe was marching down a short side street toward the host’s home. Behind us, a larger
group of women were performing al-wayliyya al-manḥiyya,14 a woman’s communal dance.
Wayliyya is performed by women in public without an ’abāya, but rather in colorful sirwāl
trousers, a tunic, and heavily decorated headpieces. As they linked arms around their shoulders,
they swayed down the street in ten or so rows, free hands shaking the ‘aḍūd, an anklet that doubled
as a rattle, like a maraca. They sang melodies in a manner very similar to razḥa, and so I lifted up
my phone to record. As I did so, my friends grabbed my phone and tutted at me: “Hey, that’s not

14

See al-Shaydī’s description in (2008, 336-7).
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for us. They wouldn’t like if you filmed them.” I didn’t protest, but it was not the last time I would
be told by my friends not to record women performing wayliyya, al-kīdhā’, or wannā. Filming
women performing would have been disrespectful and would have lowered me in the eyes of my
friends. I chose not to, but it wasn’t much of a choice.
Two other things bear mentioning. I was rarely invited to the “family” section of houses,
which was a source of deep disappointment for me. I felt this meant that I was not really an
accepted member of the society in Manaḥ, where I had spent so much time. I’m not sure this is
true in retrospect, but it felt that way then. Second is that I was not considered wealthy by my
Omani interlocutors. I was a guest, who, for some, overstayed his welcome. In any case, I had no
problems that stemmed from perceptions that I had more money than anyone else. No one tried to
get a visa to the US from me. Only rarely would someone ask me for cash or to buy a phone card.
As a guest, I was an illogical target for requests. While some folks tried to see if I had any
government or ministry connections, I struggled with a severe lack of wasṭa, connections, or pull.
Without children and away from my wife, I was considered a bit of an anomaly, but there was
some recognition that Orientalists (mustashriqīn, like me) could study Arabic poetry. And so I was
affectionately integrated as the “duktūr/dukhtūr” who was studying al-funūn al-sha‘abiyya, which
constructed me as honoring Omani heritage and bringing some respect and foreign recognition to
it, which I hope is true.
The dissertation outline
I develop the argument of this dissertation over five ethnographic chapters. I begin with a framing
chapter that focuses on Oman’s natural and social environment and then proceed to the core
subjects of my research: praise, generosity, legitimacy, and the state.
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Chapter 1 is a presentation of information about Oman, its location, geography, flora and
fauna, and rural life that is relevant to the study of sung poetry and praise as a political-economic
practice. I present a historical, economic, and political overview that helps to situate my argument.
I sketch some topics of significant importance: archaeological accounts of agriculture and
irrigation, human geography, social structure, tribes, and political organization on several social
scales. I round out the chapter with a critical account of the events and changes over the twentieth
century in Oman, a period that has seen intense historicization by local and foreign scholars.
Chapter 2 is an attempt to “take praise seriously,” that is, attend to it with the same mindset
as Omani poets and performers do. It connects praise poetry in Oman to the practices of political
power in Oman. In it, I make the case that praise poetry, far from being an exercise in mere flattery,
has in many times and many places been considered crucial to the maintenance and reconfiguration
of social order. In scholarly discourse, maligning praise is a thoroughly modern obsession, the
allergy to it a thoroughly modern disease. Chapter 2 also serves as an introduction to the ‘āzī as a
poetic and performance form.
Chapter 3 links praise poetry to a social mechanism that I term the “Generosity/Legitimacy
mechanism.” I show that generosity (amongst many other practices) has been considered a critical
obligation of leaders in the Middle East, and that display of generosity, the act itself, is a
demonstration of the effectiveness of that leadership. I show that generosity is not merely an
ideological conceit developed by ruling classes to accrue consent or quash political resistance, but
a profoundly and deeply shared moral commitment amongst all kinds of people in all sorts of class
positions. This shared cross-class valuation of generosity does not altogether avoid the dangers of
“the gift,” which compels response at the risk of signaling dependency. This chapter also serves
as an introduction to the razḥa as a performance practice.
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Chapter 4 turns directly to the ways in which razḥa acts as praise of generosity without
necessarily signaling dependency. I posit a second mechanism, the Razḥa Integration mechanism,
to explain why razḥa performance changes (or appears to change) the dynamics and dangers of
gift exchange in unequal social situations. I argue that praise integrates power into community.
Since it is the role of leaders to give, but taking those gifts may signal weakness, I show how razḥa
performance skirts the threat of dependency by framing the reception of generosity as an
affirmation of support in continuing circuits of mutual obligation. It is, as I sketched above, a
practice that asserts the moral character of this moral economy. This is delicate terrain, however,
and this is not always seen as successful. Omani performers think of praise as a kind of work that
sustains community as a moral economy, work which is invited and never imposed. Praise
performance is a deeply shared emotional practice, but as a way of displaying dignity and pride, it
can and sometimes does fail to waylay accusations of dependency, sycophancy, and weakness.
Chapter 5 turns to ’Ibāḍī legal interpretations of the proper role of music amongst good
Muslims. I show that an underappreciated category of “acceptable” music, in certain Islamic
contexts and at certain times, has been music that serves a practical purpose: in the Omani case,
for war. Since war is, as Bakunin pointed out, the inevitable destiny of states, music for war is
inevitably the music of the state. I analyze this situation because it shows how music can be
rendered “Islamically” legitimate simply because it is useful for the ends of the state, not for the
inculcation of religious orthodoxy or personalized practices of self-fashioning.
Chapter 6 is a discussion of the ways in which razḥa and ‘āzī have become so closely tied
to state power in Oman. Based on the previous chapters, I show how it has functioned as a real
juncture in the political-economy of Omani state rule, a role it has had for some time. Within the
contemporary state, this role has simultaneously expanded and contracted. As alternatives to the
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state were destroyed, one by one, praise became centralized and served largely to render the Sultan,
as the proxy of the state, as a generous giver and ferocious defender of Oman, hence legitimating
his authoritarian rule over the country. The state has also capitalized on the “Arab” character of
these genres, promoting an image of the state as masculine, militant, traditional, Arab, and Muslim.
Finally, the conclusion revisits some of these themes, questions some of their (and my)
assumptions, and suggests some avenues for further research. I dwell especially on the category of
“legitimacy,” which I construe as essential to the Omani authoritarian state, and, indeed to many
other states. Is it? Are there other ways to understand the ubiquity and perpetuation of political
domination? Lastly, I turn back to the notion of the “moral economy” and link it to recent
approaches to ethics in ethnomusicology and anthropology, proposing a new old way of looking
at things.
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Chapter 1: Historical Patterns of Social and Political Organization in Oman
I rely on a detailed understanding of the history and environmental setting of polities in
Oman, and, while my focus will be mainly on the last two hundred years, certain background
knowledge on the ecological and economic base of interior Oman will be valuable to contextualize
the argument. This overview largely focuses on Inner Oman, the setting of the dissertation.
There are four purposes to this introduction to Oman, its ecology, and the history of its
peoples. The first is that the diversity of species, especially flora, displays the multiple avenues of
movement for humans, animals, and even climactic patterns into and through the region, and neatly
summarizes its unique location at the juncture of three major geographical regions. The second
purpose is to draw attention to how the human settlement pattern of Oman has had implications
for the development of structures of governance in Oman. These settlement patterns have helped
to develop and privilege certain modes of group-based interaction, display, and communication.
The third purpose is to familiarize the reader with the animals, plants, and material culture of the
townspeople in the Omani interior. The genres under discussion are, generally speaking, performed
by agriculturalists, and often invoke imagery and vocabulary unique to their experience and not
shared with the elite written poetry of the literate ‘ulamā. As a fourth purpose, this chapter serves
as an introduction to several social, cultural, and political concepts that will be referenced
throughout the dissertation, including historical polities (the Ibāḍī Imamate, the Sultanate, tribes)
and social structure (authority structures, human geography, historical economic interactions).
Finally, this chapter will give a brief overview of my critical reading of the state in the twentieth
century.
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The Ecological Setting
The Arabian sub-continent occupies a central position bridging Africa, the Levant, and
Asia, providing both marine and terrestrial avenues of dispersal to humans and other animals
between these larger regions. Situated on the extreme southeastern corner of the 2.5 million km²
Arabian Peninsula, the Sultanate of Oman (roughly stretching between 16.5° N to 25° N and from
52° E to 60° E) is bordered on all sides by inhospitably arid deserts and the sea. To the east and
southeast is the Indian Ocean, which along the northern shore quiets into the Arabian Sea and
funnels into the Persian Gulf proper through the Strait of Hormuz (on the Persian coast) and the
Musandam Peninsula (on the Arabian coast). While the northern shore of Oman is relatively quiet
and slopes gently from mountains in the interior to the sea, the eastern and southeastern shores
plunge directly into the Indian Ocean. Framing the north and south of the country are two high
mountain ranges (~3000m), between which stretches the long gravel plain and wadi outwash
regions that extend the rocky piedmont of these mountains. As these gravel plains stretch on and
water grows scarcer, they gradually transform into the arid desert region that characterizes the
middle of the modern country and that separates the north from the south, called the Jiddat alḤarāsīs after the main Bedouin group that now inhabits it. In the south, the Ẓufār range extends
still further along the coast into Yemen’s Ḥaḍramawt and frames the large southern coastal city of
Ṣalāla.
The north of the country (roughly 21° N to 25° N) is the most densely populated region in
Oman. It in turn is dominated by the Ḥajar mountain range, which forms a central backbone
mirroring the coast from Ra’s al-Ḥadd in the east to the tip of Musandam in the northwest. The
mountains, topped by the limestone massif called Jabal Akhḍar or “Green Mountain”, are riven by
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large wadi15 systems that drain rainwater from the tops of the mountains both northward and
southward into large gravel outwash plains, which have been the main natural feature sustaining
human settlement. The range itself is divided into two halves, western and eastern, by the Sumā’il
Gap, which slopes rapidly upward from the coastal capital of Muscat into the high plains of the
interior. This remains the largest and most accessible pathway between the coast and the interior
of the country, though several other natural pathways radiate northward and connect interior and
coastal towns along the range’s length. The broad gravel plain called the Bāṭina extends
approximately 50km between the coast and the mountains and is heavily populated and extensively
cultivated by tapping groundwater via wells. On the southern, interior side of the mountains, wadi
outwash radiates outwards for more than a hundred kilometers into the central desert described
above and the large sand dune desert of the Rub‘a al-Khālī—the famed “Empty Quarter”. These
natural barriers have served to isolate the interior from the central high plains of the Arabian
Shield, now known as Najd in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Natural ecological zones in Oman depend on the availability of water. Contrary to the
popular imagination, Oman is not devoid of plant and animal life, though it is characterized by
uneven blooms due to fluctuations in rain. Vast stretches of gravel plain are only sporadically
punctuated by seemingly unvariegated plant life. Annual rainfall averages one hundred millimeters
and is both highly locational and seasonal, with some regions receiving nearly none (the Jiddat alḤarāsīs, for example, Chatty 1996, 79-81). In certain areas, especially near still or flowing wadi

Wadi, (Ar. wādī), refers to both a dry river bed and the valley or drainage area that it is
situated within. Wadis are almost always named and are often named after the largest group that
lives in its confines. Wadis are important geographical features because they channel available
water in predictable ways, even if they are prone to dangerous flooding.
15
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beds and in the many microclimates produced by the vagaries of the piedmontane and montane
regions, plant life is arrestingly verdant and diverse.
In general, plant biologists and ecologists note that Oman is separated into two main zones:
the south, which is wetter and is largely composed of plants that are related to those in Africa, and
the north, whose flora are continuous with the mountainous regions of Iran. Along the central and
southern coasts, monsoon patterns driven along Indian Ocean currents result in far more available
water arriving in the form of thick, moist fog than actual precipitation. It is here that Frankincense
trees (largely Boswellia sacra, CLA. al-lubbān) have been harvested for thousands of years. This
late-summer monsoon season, called al-kharīf, is an immensely popular time for vacationers
throughout the Arabian Peninsula to visit due to this brief lushness.
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Figure 1. Map of the Arabian Peninsula, © OpenStreetMap contributors:
https://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright
In the north, moisture precipitates along the tops of the Ḥajar mountains and is funneled down
along the wadi gullies and eventually into deep aquifers (though Al-Mashakhi and Koll 2007
estimate only ~15% of precipitation reaches these). Snow is not unknown atop and along the
ranges, where the temperature, as is common in semi-arid regions, can fluctuate more than 30°C
in a single day. Plant life in Oman, as in most agricultural areas, is neatly divided between wild
and cultivated species, and knowledge of plants as both crops and forage is distributed widely. In
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fact, many regions are symbolized by a plant in their own and in governmental media—Samā’il
by the date palm, Ẓufār by the Frankincense tree, and Manaḥ by the medicinal shrub mitk.
Generally speaking, cultivated plants are more common in poetry than wild plants, but herbs,
foreign spices like saffron and clove, fruit trees, and wild flowering trees that are used in honey
production are very common poetic images in the oral poetry of Omani townspeople. While arid
regions of shifting dunes may support a variety of grasses that sprout up after rains, the semi-arid
gravel plains and piedmont regions that form the main ecological zone of this dissertation are
characterized by stretches of tall grasses, both annual and perennial, and wild herbs.16 Grasses
generally sprout for a few months after early spring rains and are valued fodder for pasturage,
alongside commercially grown feed crops.17 Thorny Acacia trees18 are common throughout the
plains of Oman, together with huge ghaf trees (Prosopis cineraria) and the ubiquitous date palm
(Phoenix dactylifera). In the piedmontane regions, drupes19 flourish alongside many kinds of small
shrubs and stubborn succulents. Flowers and various asters are commonly found higher in the Jabal
Akhḍar range, where domesticated roses (mainly “Damask” varieties CLA. ward) are cultivated
for rose water production.

Common varieties: Ruta augustifolia, “Rue”, CLA. sidhāb; Coriandrum, “Coriander”,
“Cilantro”, CLA. quzbar; Eruca sativa, “Arugula” or “Rocket”, OA. , gargīr, pl. garāgir;
various fragrant Ocimum species “Basil”, CLA. riḥān, including “African” O. gratissimum and
“Holy” sanctum; Trigonella, “Fenugreek”, CLA. ḥulba. All of these types are both cultivated
and foraged.
16

Chiefly Medicago sativa, “Lucerne” or “Alfalfa”, CLA. al-fiṣfiṣa, OA. qāṭ, and Chloris
gayana “Rhodes grass”, introduced in an agricultural project outlined by Dutton 1982.
17

18

Both tortilis, CLA. simr, simra and ehrenbergiana, CLA. salam.

Ziziphus spina-christi, ‘Christ’s Thorn’, Z. jujube ‘Jujube’, and the wild olive, Olea europaea
CLA. ‘atm.
19
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In love razḥāt, razḥāt ghazzaliyya, plants are often used as a metaphor for women and women’s
bodies. Some are broadly shared motifs, including flowers:

يا ورد زاهي وين قاصد ترتحل خليت دارك والمنازل خالية
خليت نارك في الحشايا شاعلة ما تنظفي دام المودة باقية
Yā ward zāhī, wayn qāṣid tartaḥil,
khalayt dārik wa-l-manāzil khāliyya.
Khalayt nārik fī-l-ḥashāya shā‘ila
mā tanẓafī, dām al-muwadda bāqiyya.
O brilliant rose, where do you intend to go?
You’ve left your home, the houses empty.
You’ve left your fire in the hearth
burning unextinguished—love yet remains.

هللا طلبتك في صالتي والقيام تجمع قلوب هايمة ومشتته
تحي البساتين العنب والياسمين وتحي قلوب باالمس كانت ميته
Allah, ṭalabtak fī ṣalātī wa-l-qiyām
tajjama‘ qulūb hāyima wa mushattata;
Taḥay al-basātīn al-‘anb wa-l-yasāmīn
wa tahāy qulūb bi-l-’ams kānat mayyita.
O God, your request is in my prayers; all creation
gathers love-mad and distant hearts.
You enliven the gardens of grapes and jasmine
just as you revive hearts yesterday dead.
Others are more locally specific. Here, the anonymous poet imagines the issue of loving two
people as similar to the problem of cultivating different fruit trees, the date palm and the banana
plant.

يا موز اللغتالي يا موز اللغتالي طاح النخل وبقيت عواوينه
خايف على مالي خايف على مالي طاح وتهدم من سواوينه
Yā mawz al-lughatālī, yā mawz al-lughatālī,
ṭāḥ al-nakhl wa baqayt ‘awāwaynuh
Khayif ‘alā mālī, khayif ‘alā mālī,
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ṭāḥ wa tahaddum min sawāwaynuh
O, verdant and tall banana tree! O verdant and tall banana tree,
The date palm has fallen and only its stalk remains.
I fear for what’s mine, I fear for what’s mine,
It’s fallen and destroyed what I’ve built.
This poem turns on the identification of kinds of women with kinds of plants—the banana
tree, fertile and foreign, stands in for an extramarital and exotic lover, while the date palm, ordinary
and local, for the loyal wife. The date palm’s falling represents the loyal wife leaving her husband,
likely to take up with her kin, the husband’s shamag, thus destroying all that he has worked so
hard for. The “verdant and tall banana tree” is informed here that the affair has ruined his life. This
poem was explained to me several times referring to women from non-Arab or Zufārī
backgrounds—just as they come from away and live in northern Oman, so did the banana tree.
While it’s considered a little risqué, it is a poem known by many performers.

Figure 2. Date palms (Phoenix dactylifera) growing over a cover crop of Rhodes grass,
Chloris gayana, January 2016. Al-Ḥamrā’, Dakhilliya.
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Figure 3. Maturing dates, July 2016. Al-Ma‘arā, Manaḥ, Dakhilliya.
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Figure 4. A gelba of alfalfa, qāṭ, Medicago sativa, bordered with Rhodes grass, July 2016. AlMa‘arā, Manaḥ, Dakhilliya.
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Figure 5. Acacia tortilis, CLA. simr, simra, close, December 2015. ‘Ibrī, al-Ẓāhira.
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Figure 6. Arabian toad (Duttaphrynus arabicus) in flooded falaj irrigation basin (galba) with of
Coriandrum, January 2016. Wadi Bani Kharūs, ‘Awābī, al-Bāṭina.
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Figure 7. Acacia tortilis, CLA. simr, simra, November 2015. Bāt, ‘Ibrī, al-Ẓāhira.
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Figure 8. Ghaf tree, Prosposis cineraria, close, June 2016. Al-bilād, Manaḥ, Dakhiliyya.
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Figure 9. Zizyphus, ‘jujube’, immature fruit, February 2016. Wadi Ḍamm, ‘Ibrī, al-Ẓāhira.
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Figure 10. Wadi Ḍamm pool, February 2016.
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Figure 11. Riḥān, ‘Holy Basil’, Ocimum sanctum in Hamad’s court garden, July 2016. AlMa‘arā, Manaḥ.
Fauna in Oman are also divided into Asiatic and African origins. While mammals are
relatively sparsely distributed over the landscape, insects and birds are very common. Many birds
are seasonal, moving with the monsoon around the northern Indian Ocean rim. One of these
seasonal visitors is the iridescent blue Indian Roller, Coracias benghalensis, who makes its home
amongst the dense foliage of the date palms in the north. Called variously bū ‘Azrāq or al-ṣuqrāq
in the Interior, these jay-sized birds are known for their acrobatic and “rolling” flightpaths, often
glimpsed as a flash of blue just beneath the dusty green of the palms. Other Passerines range from
the drab: thrushes, scrub robins, swifts (Apus), cuckoos, to the spectacular Palestine sunbird
(Cinnyris osea), hoopoe (Upopa epops), and white-eared bulbul (Pycnonotus leucotis). Desert
adapted insects and arachnids occupy the most arid regions to the watered wadis, sharing space
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with the arabian toad (Duttaphrynus arabicus, O. Ar. al-kurra), various dragonflies, mud wasps,
lizards and geckos. Mammals are largely nocturnal, desert-adapted variants of species common to
southwest Asia, ranging from the miniscule jumping mouse jarbū‘ (Dipodidae), various vesper
bats, the Ethiopian hedgehog (Paraechinus aethiopicus), desert foxes, hares, and caracals, to the
possibly extirpated arabian leopard (Panthera pardus nimr, CLA. nimr). The most varied and
populous large mammals are bovid ruminants, including various species of Capra, wild (C.
nubiana) and feral, gazelles, and the Omani tahr (Arabitragus jayakari). The magnificent arabian
oryx (Oryx leucoryx, CLA. al-mahā) has recently been reintroduced (Chatty 1996). Perhaps
because wild fauna are relatively sparse in Oman the discovery of species new to biology is a
relatively common occurrence, with new lizards, plants, and even something as large as an owl
being documented as late as 2013.20 Many of the bovids have held onto niches in the region for
many thousands of years and have been primary prey species for human populations, as well as
becoming rich and densely layered poetic and artistic symbols.21 The flighty and graceful gazelle,
al-rīm, is a common stand-in for female beloveds; while the ostrich, al-na‘āma, long ago extirpated
from Oman, stands for a speedy messenger or steed; the Arabian Oryx, al-mahā, has become
something of a national symbol in Oman for a noble and strong individual. Just as women are often
considered as prey species and as plants, men are often considered predator species. Clive Holes
and Said Salman Abu Athera make an important note about the role of predators as poetic images.

“New owl discovered in Oman”: http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/new-owl-discovered-inoman-1.1928796
20

21

See Collins 2002 for an extensive overview of human/animal relations throughout the ancient
Middle East, and compare with Sowayan’s 1985 discussion of modern poetic symbolism with
camels, horses (32-3) and other animals (58).
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Predators at the top of the food chain, like falcons of various kinds (ṣaqr, shihān, nadāwi),
eagles (‘iqāb), lions (layth, asad, sabi‘) and cheetahs (fahad) are always used to represent
the alpha male of the human species—noble, single-minded, ruthless, and brave. Thus a
routine piece of praise for a prominent Bedouin tribal leader begins:
He’s like a noble falcon, and he’s generous to a fault;
Lavishly, unstintingly, he gives, and we exalt! (Holes and Abu Athera 2009, 19-20)
Truly exceptional men and women, however, are often represented as celestial objects: the sun,
the moon, comets, and stars.
Human Settlement
Human settlement in the Arabian Peninsula is ancient, owing to the Peninsula’s proximity
to East African avenues of hominin dispersal and the later movement of peoples from the Levant.
This is evidenced by both genetic data (Rídl et al. 2009; Cabrera et al. 2009) and Acheulean
archaeological remains from the Early and Middle Pleistocene, from 2 million to 200,000 years
ago (Petraglia 2003; Petraglia et al. 2009). These hominins likely migrated along with other
African species, such as the Papio hamadryas baboons studied by Fernandes (2009), during times
of favorable climactic conditions, even when the Red Sea was at a high point (2009, 90-91). They
seemed to have settled along the coasts, exploiting near-shore marine sessile deposits like shellfish
as they migrated from modern Yemen northward along the Red Sea and ringing the peninsula to
the Gulf (Bolvin et al. 2009; Giraud 2009).
Jumping forward to the Pleistocene/Holocene transition, by c. 7000 BCE an
agrarian/pastoralist system based on domestic bovine and caprine domestication, blended with
natural resource gathering in several biomes, was well-established. Dromedary camel (Camelus
dromedarius) domestication is more recent, likely innovated within the last 5000 years due to the
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increasing aridity of the Middle East and northeast Africa. Uerpmann (1999) presents a camel and
horse graveyard in Sharjah, UAE, active between 300 BCE and 200 CE, which richly attests to
their cultural and economic role amongst human settlers by that time. Wild dromedary remains in
Yemen have been reliably dated to c. 7000 BCE by Grigson et al (1989). Almathen et al.’s 2016
analysis of the largest dromedary DNA set so far leads them to conclude that dromedaries were
first domesticated in the southeastern Arabian Peninsula, though they are also marked by
continuous wild genetic inputs that are extremely varied due to the wide ranges of caravan routes.
While dromedary and equine pastoralism is largely the province of nomadic groups and is present
throughout the country (Janzen 1986; Chatty 1996), bovine pastoralism is more concentrated in
the south, though some house cows are kept in the north for milk, manure, plowing, and meat.
Various caprines are kept by villagers, shawāwī (semi-permanent pastoralists exploiting hilly and
mountainous terrain) and Bedouin groups for milk, meat, leather, and wool.
Regardless of its exact shape and origin, a recognizable nomadic pastoral technology
complex seems to have been present in the region over the last 4000 years, during which human
settlers began to divide into two broad groups. These groups have long recognized themselves as
ḥaḍar and badū22 in modern Arabic. Ḥaḍar, or agrarian villagers and town dwellers, historically
have clustered around reliable water sources and pursued large-scale agriculture and small-scale
animal husbandry. Crops depended on the availability of water, elevation, and other specifics of
climate, but staples were dates and grain, supplemented by fruit trees, vegetables, fodder crops,
onions, and honey cultivation. Honey is extremely highly valued in Oman as a kind of medicine,
and has been supplementing the incomes of agriculturalists for some time (Lancasters 2011,

Villagers also referred to badū as ‘arab, though this has largely come to refer to the broader
ethnic group (cf. Jabbūr 1988, 1-3).
22
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chapters 5,6). Badū, or Bedouin, are fully nomadic pastoral specialists, have historically exploited
the vast expanses of semi-arid plains with their domesticated flocks. This has resulted in two linked
but semi-separate populations who exploit two very different environments within the same
geographic region that are nevertheless inextricably linked. This social structure, which Chatty
(1983, 149-50) refers to as the “ecological trinity” of urban town, rural village, and pastoral
nomadic, is the economic basis for human settlement in the Arabian Peninsula in the historical
era.23
No one segment could survive without interaction and exchange with the others, and the
combined exploitation of each environmental niche was crucial for survival in harsh conditions.
Pastoralists exploited arid and semi-arid environments by flexibly responding to changing weather
conditions and took advantage of foraging opportunities over large ranges to produce dairy, meat,
wool, and other animal products. These products were traded in larger market towns, which in turn
imported foodstuffs (rice and coffee, animal feed) and technologies (firearms and cookware) that
sustained nomadic life. Wealth from the villages, which produced the bulk of the food (dates,
vegetables, fruits, and grains), handicrafts (from wool, leather, metal wood, and palm leaves),
fodder, and labor in this system, was concentrated and distributed by the towns (Dutton 1999). In
Greater Oman, interior economic systems were also connected to those on the coast, which formed
the first node in the crucial overseas trading links that have sustained and connected these

23

On the urban town system, see Al-Torki and Cole 1989, Al-Rasheed 1991, Meneley 1996, and
Limbert 2010; on rural villages, Eickelman 1984 (though al-Ḥamrā’ has some unique
characteristics), Dutton 1999, and Lancaster and Lancaster 2011; on nomadic pastoralists, see
Cole 1975, Lancaster 1981, Jabbūr 1988, and Chatty 1996. There are of course many other
authors, including early orientalists like Doughty (1932) and Thesiger (1959). Social movement
between and amongst these groups is high. Several anthropologists have noted that as the badū
have been forcibly settled by state apparatuses, the term badū has come to refer more to an
‘identity’ than an economic niche (cf. Cole 2003 and Jordan 2011 for discussions of this process
in Saudi Arabia).
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communities to larger Indian Ocean trading networks. Coastal fisherman and the Jenaba Bedouin
produced various species of dried sardines (‘awma) as feed for camels and fertilizer, along with
dried shark for consumption (qursh), though with refrigerated trucks for seafood this is becoming
rarer. Delighted to see my reaction to its relatively mild flavor but unforgiving texture, an older
performer told me that “Sharks eat people all over the world, you know, but in Oman, we eat
sharks!” The goal of all of this economic exchange and interaction, as the Lancasters (2011, 296)
point out, was not necessarily wealth as much as self-sufficiency.
a. Agriculture, irrigation, and settlement
As has been noted by archaeologists, geographers, and historians, the availability of water,
both natural and culturally modified, has played a major role in the dispersal and settlement of
humans throughout their history in Oman. Though early theorists considered the availability of
water in arid environments to be the determining feature of human social evolution, detailed
scholarship has shown that these models fail to accurately account for observed patterns (Cleuziou
2009). The cultural and technological management of water is nevertheless crucial in the
agricultural belts that stretch northwest and southeast along the north and south faces of the Ḥajar
range. These two regions form the agricultural belts of northern Oman, linked by cultivation up
the wadis and down the main central gap. Different areas, of course, can sustain different
cultivation patterns, but some features are common enough to be taken as generalities. The
agricultural pattern of the interior of the country is substantially similar to other regions, and so
will be taken as a model.
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b. Irrigation Basins
One widely shared feature, regardless of irrigation type, is the organization of cultivable
land into small irrigation basins, usually called galba-s, measuring some twenty square meters on
average.24 These irrigation basins are usually square and surrounded by a short dirt wall
(approximately ten to fifteen centimeters) and are connected to an irrigation source, either a well
or a falaj, so that they may be intermittently flooded. The rebuilding of the short wall (built up
from dried soil at the surface of the galba) and the irrigation of the basin are often reciprocal labortrading events that culminate with a picnic or some other gift being exchanged for a few hours’
work. Galba-s need to be shaped and sloped to the available land and require a relatively large
amount of labor-power to produce and maintain each growing season. Often, these galba are
shaded by one or two date palms, which help trap moisture and dampen the sometimesoverwhelming sunlight to provide a cooler, moister, and more hospitable microclimate for other
crops and animals. Both family gardens and large fields in Oman are typically cut into a patchwork
of these galba-s, which allows for the selective funneling of water to successful areas, simple
fallow period rotations, and more varied cultivation in a small area.
c. The Falaj-s of Oman.
The technological innovation of falaj-s (CLA. plural aflāj, horizontal well and channel
irrigation systems), in the eastern end of the Peninsula allowed for the typical pattern of nucleated
settlement in the piedmont and wadi ecosystems that Costa (1983) identified and that still
characterizes the Greater Oman region (see Potts 1990). The falaj system of Oman is based on
tapping groundwater associated with wadi beds and their alluvial fans, with most channels dug

24

See Dutton (1999, 32-4) for a detailed discussion.
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Figure 12. A ghayl or surface falaj and a holding pool irrigating Alfalfa and mixed crops on the
left (west) and not on the right (east), July 2016. Karshā’, Manaḥ, Dakhilliyya Province, Oman.

more than ten meters below the surface, as opposed to the surface-water trapping techniques like
terraces and dams utilized in Yemen and the Hijaz (Charbonnier 2015). The very largest of the
underground channels, qanat-s, may reach for more than 12 km, such as the extensive Mālikī falaj
that runs through the interior. Dutton (1989) reports that by 1982, the Public Authority for Water
Resources in Oman estimated that existing falaj-s irrigated some 55% of all arable land and this
figure has likely expanded since then. The remaining land is watered by wells, as the falaj system
has always been supplemented by excavated wells, both for concerns with defense (Wilkinson
1987, 24) and due to local conditions and new settlements (Limbert 2010, 117-23).
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Though the source of the falaj technology and the identity of its original constructors remains
a debate,25 the presence of agricultural crops like wheat dated to c. 3000 BCE points to the probable
development of irrigation, likely wells, horizontal or otherwise by that time (Charbonnier 2015;
Desruelles 2016). These “underground water-draining galleries” (Boucharlat 2001, 2003) were
undoubtedly widespread by the time of expanding Iron Age settlements(1300 to 300 BCE), though
controversial research in Bahlā has dated parts of an early falaj to the Early Bronze, c. 3000 BCE
(Orchard and Orchard 2007; but see Charbonnier 2015 for criticisms). From the 6th century BCE
to the 7th century CE the Oman peninsula was administered by successive Persian empires: the
Achmaenids to c. 250 BCE, followed briefly by the Parthians, and by the 3rd century AD the
Sassanians had expanded and seized control of coastal ports and larger interior towns. It is this
later period that Wilkinson (1987) recognizes as the most likely period of deep qanat construction.
The Persian colonists were already familiar with qanat technology in Persia and applied it to
similar habitats in the mountains and wadis of northern Oman, starting with the western piedmont
zone leading to the coast (Wilkinson 1977, 1983b, 1987). Local Omani oral traditions date certain
falaj-s as well, attributing some to rich families and others to mythic figures. The Mālikī falaj
mentioned above was supposedly ordered by the mythic Mālik bin Fahim, the leader of the ‘Azd
tribes out of Yemen and into Oman after the collapse of the Mārib Dam in Yemen in the 570s CE.
Suffice it to say that the day-to-day management of falaj systems in Oman is extremely
well-developed, despite Wilkinson’s (1983b) shock that Omanis did not verbally distinguish
between the different “types” of falaj that he identified. The Arabic root from which falaj is derived

25

See English 1968, Wilkinson 1977, Potts 1990, al-Tikriti 2002, and Boucharlat 2001, 2003 for
the discussion of the provenance; see these and Orchard and Orchard 2007 and al-Tikriti 2010
for disagreements over dating. Charbonnier 2015 provides a thorough overview of this literature.
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refers to “splitting” or “dividing” a source, and this accurately describes both the macro-level
function of the falaj system and the everyday management of its water resources.
Daily allotments of water from a main falaj or well are distributed to farmers’ fields over
a certain period, which are monitored and administrated by local irrigation officials, wākil, some
deputies, ‘ārif-s, and an accountant, qābiḍ (cf, Charbonnier 2014 on this system in Ādam). These
administrators manage the distribution of the available water based on managing access and
flow—each farmer is allotted a certain span of time, measured in ‘athar-s, (roughly a half-hour),
during which water is shunted into their fields (Al-Ghafiri 2004; Al-Ghafiri et al. 2013). During
the day, the sun was historically referenced for timing; at night, the stars against some physical
feature (some towns still used these methods well into the 21st century, see Nash 2007 and
Lancasters 2001, 193). Most falaj-s have been mapped and renovated by the Sultanate over the
last 40 years, resulting in a visual and technical uniformity that may not reflect historical
differences. Repair and amendment of the deep main qanāt falaj-s and subsidiary ghayl and saqiyā
falaj-s has been a constant endeavor of Omani townspeople, even though massive new
construction efforts were likely rare—limited by labor availability, cooperation, and intermittent
foreign and civil warfare. Historically, the ‘Awāmir tribe have been contacted to maintain and
repair failing falaj-s, but not necessarily to build new qanat-s, though wealthy families have paid
for the expansion of falaj-s for particular towns or villages. Indeed, as Limbert points out, Omani
historians have represented the prosperity of towns as inextricably linked to the status of their
falaj-s, a connection continued by state ideology on water access (2010, 117-9) and in local chat,
which often relates to water and where it is “feeding” (taghadhī) the land.
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Figure 13. A raised falaj aqueduct, April 2016. Birkat al-mawz, Nizwā, Dakhiliyyah.
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d. Concentric rings of settlement.

Figure 14. A diversion to the southern spur of the same ghayl falaj towards al-Ma‘arā, Manaḥ.

At its most basic, interior settlement can be envisaged as a series of concentric and abutting
rings of agricultural villages and market towns, drawing water out of a single wadi system and
distributing it selectively throughout its alluvial fan. It is crucial to remember that these towns’
populations form more or less integrated systems, all trading, moving, marrying, and
communicating with varying intensity as the natural and social environments permit.
These wadi-cum-market systems begin with a ring of small but agriculturally rich villages
at the base of the western Ḥajar that are situated near the head of a wadi. These towns often have
smaller deposits of rich soil tucked into rocky crevasses and lack larger fields, and so some can
invest more in orchard agriculture over field crops, including guavas and papayas, mangoes,
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pomegranates, bananas, lemons, citrons, and stands of date palms. Most agriculture in this area
was undertaken on land held by the farmers themselves, but small amounts of sharecropping and
seasonal labor was also present. From north to south and around the western Ḥajar: Yanqul, alḤamrā’, Tanūf, Birkat al-Mawz (“Banana Pond”), and ’Imṭī are examples of these small but
agriculturally rich towns. These smaller towns are often valuable targets for the expansion of a
certain shaykh’s power, a location where he might control a sufficient amount of the land to
consider the area his power base. Al-Ḥamrā’ and Misfat al-‘Abriyyin are considered strongly
linked to the ‘Abriyyin; Dārig al-Fawārīs, to, unsurprisingly, the Fawārīs. Tanūf is another
example, once being the stronghold of the Bānī Rīyām under Sulaymān bin Himyār al-Nabhānī,
“The Lord of the Green Mountain,” who, along with a leader of the Ḥirth from the Sharqiyyah and
the last Imam Ghālib bin ‘Alī bin Hilāl al-Hinā’ī, led the Jebel ’Akhḍār conflict (1954-9) against
the Sultan. Tanūf was flattened by a small contingent of British bomber aircraft at the direct order
of the Sultan, in retribution for Sulaymān bin Ḥimyar’s refusal to cede power. Inhabitants were
warned beforehand.
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Figure 15. “Concentric rings of settlement”: the red line marks the approximate heads of
wādī-s and the first ring of small towns. The blue line and the first major highway, in grey,
mark the ring of market towns (the small outward jutting box includes Manaḥ). The black
line marks the outer edge of settlement that is sustained by this wādī drainage and falaj
network. © OpenStreetMap contributors.
Further along the alluvial fan of the wadi are large, market towns that control falaj flow
downstream and have served as administrative centers for governors and Islamic judges, qāḍī-s,
during times of state centralization or as independent city-states otherwise: ‘Ibrī, Bahlā, Nizwā,
and Izkī. These towns continue to play key governmental roles by being the seats of local
administrative “states,” wilāya, that are named after their associated major town: wilāyat Nizwā,
wilāyat Bahlā, etc. Nizwā, for example, was also the nominal capital of the Ibāḍī Imamate over
certain periods, largely due to its geographic location and mixed population.
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Most agriculture in these towns was and is composed of family-owned date palm gardens
that shade mixed small-crop farming, amended by household animal husbandry. In these towns,
the percentage of sharecroppers and seasonal laborers was also higher, as larger proportions of the
total agricultural land was owned by absentee landlords, whether wealthier Bedouin or townsfolk.
Nowadays, most farmland is owned by Omanis who employ foreign laborers from the Mashriq or,
increasingly, South Asia. Dates and animal fodder are the largest crops. Typically, sections of
these towns are densely inhabited by certain families and marked by the presence of a family sablā,
a specialized majlis or communal meeting room. Often, these neighborhoods are named for local
notables, like Al-Sayfī section of Nizwā, northwest of the market, or the Ṣabbagh neighborhood
of Bahlā inhabited by several Al-Shukaylī families. Regional souqs, or markets, are invariably
located in these larger towns, and they also therefore host the largest concentrations of trading
families and handicraft producers, including weavers, potters, metalsmiths, carpenters, and other
skilled professions.
These market towns are extremely ancient in Oman, have substantial forts, walls, and the
oldest mosques. They are divided into many local neighborhood quarters (Wikan 1982; Eickelman
1984) and often two tribal-cum-political “moieties,” usually referred to as “upper” (CLA. ‘aliyā)
and “lower” (CLA. sifāla) sections.26 These divisions have remained salient even as they have
been transformed and shifted by new state infrastructure, documented by Limbert (2010). A
Qaṣṣābī inhabitant of ’Izkī’s wealthier Yaman division related to me that youths from the poorer
Nizār division would pelt his car with rocks whenever he lingered too long while passing through.
He explained this enmity as a lingering result of the fact that inhabitants of Nizār were active in

The sections are not equally divided as segmentary lineage theory would predict – rather, they
are often divided into a larger (2/3) section and a smaller (1/3) section.
26
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their support of the revived Imamate in the 1950s, while those in Yaman were pragmatically more
receptive to whoever seemed to be winning—the Sultan’s army and foreign mercenaries. The
subsequent wealth of Yaman in comparison to Nizār is not a coincidence, but an effect of state
politics in Oman. Natives of the various towns also harbor a distinct competitive streak amongst
one another, comparing the age of structures in the town, their historical importance and relation
to key figures, stereotypical attitudes, foibles, differences in accent, and—especially in
conversations with me—musical authenticity, techniques, and abilities. 27
Further downstream from the market towns is a long and uneven ring of smaller towns and
villages that often specialize in wheat-sorghum-barley agriculture due to wider tracts of available
land. Most of these productive villages are small, such as Tan‘am, al-Bisyah, Gabrīn, Manaḥ, and
Zukayt. Manaḥ is something of an outlier, as it is situated at the juncture of two large wadi systems
(receiving water from falaj-s from Nizwā and ‘Izkī) and has soil rich enough to sustain both a
relatively large population and, historically, a variety of orchard crops and flowers. Manaḥ has
long been considered the “breadbasket” of the Interior, and control of it has been crucial to securing
a base of production for Imamate leadership. Typically, dates and orchard crops are more difficult
to sustain, but the concomitant increase of arable land makes these regions especially suited to
grains, melons, flowers, animal fodder, vegetables, and herbs. In times when water is abundant,

Nizwāns and Bahlāwīs are undoubtedly the target of the most playful derision, likely due to
their prosperity and renown in comparison to the other towns. According to one interlocutor,
Nizwans are constantly “cackling like owls” (ḍāḥikīin mithl al-būma) amongst themselves but
play at being deadly serious amongst other townspeople (owls are considered rather stupid birds
in inner Oman). Other common insults claim that Nizwans use “Indian” or “Bengali” drums
rather than true “Omani” drums, and that they wait to see what Bahlāwīs do musically in order to
copy it. Bahlāwīs fare no better, accused of not being able to pronounce the glottal qāf (instead
producing the weak velar kāf) while some of their performance troupes are described as being
“yes-men” for the government (sometimes called muṭabbilīn (“drummers”) and sometimes
ma‘ama‘aīyyin from ma‘, or “with”).
27
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tree crops like almonds, mangoes, and citrons flourish. Further, the wide, flat plains filled with
Acacia and various wildflowers make this area especially conducive to beekeeping and honey
production, with towns such as Fīqīn hosting particularly productive hives. Increased water usage
in the larger towns due to population increases and the concomitant stress on water availability has
been particularly devastating to these agricultural communities. Outside this ring, towns are
progressively less integrated with the large market towns of the interior and more Bedouin in
character owing to their proximity to the more arid habitats exploited by them (such as ‘Izz and
Sināw).
Social structure and the development of states
The overview of human settlement patterns above gives us a good picture of the
environment in which people have lived and labored through the historical period in question. The
situation we find in the interior is broadly characterized by wide stretches of open, unsettled
country punctuated by many small settlements, some extremely dense and well-developed. This
situation produces a kind of paradox. There is both undeniable uniformity, in pastoral/agricultural
technologies, especially highly complex skills like date farming and dromedary husbandry, but
also in social structure (tribes, qabīla, pl. qabā’il; housing/family units, ḥayyān; bilateral kinship
networks, ‘ayyāl, shamag; neighborhoods, ḥārāt; ‘moiety’ divisions), religion and religious law
(Ibadism), customary law (‘urf, see Wilkinson 1987, 196-7; Weir 2008 for a case in Yemen),
marriage patterns and law28 (generally patrilocal), modes of warfare, family roles, language,
clothing and adornment, domestic material culture, architecture, musical instruments, social
reproduction, cultural values, notions of authority and leadership, and shared markets. However,

28

See Dresch 2013 for an extended discussion of “equality” in marriage.
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despite these broad simlarities, this settlement pattern also allows for the contrary possibility: to
retract from these systems, remain isolated, autonomous, and separate. Wilkinson’s (1987) by now
notorious theory of the “Imamate Cycle”29 relies on just this tendency in Oman, in which he posits
a kind of “circulation”—of goods, ideas, technologies—that affords Omanis the reciprocal
capacity for “fusion” into larger centralized states and for “fission” into independent units based
on geographic and settlement structures. These twinned factors are expressed by very fine grades
of dialect variance, vocabulary (gestural and linguistic), clothing style, and senses of “home”.
Just as “fission and fusion” is shaped by the arrangement of settlement relative to water
sources, we also find modes of communication between and amongst groups that are appropriate
to this social system. Indeed, this intense cultivation of difference in the face of overwhelming
similarity is no better expressed than in the wide variety of seemingly minor details that distinguish
the collective performance styles in the various towns, with each town claiming their own as best
and most authentic. A common difference cited between razḥa performers in Nizwa and elsewhere
is that Nizwans tend to tightly cross their arms and rock from the waist when particularly
emotionally aroused, a gesture that was glossed as “womanly” by other groups. When I pointed
out that this was often associated with the ecstatic states of Sufis in other parts of the Arab world,
this was taken as yet more evidence of the femininity of the gesture. As another brief example,
drum shape, sound, and ways of addressing and playing drums, questions of what composes a
matching set, the number and size of drums, whether they can be named, and how to wear them
are all points of contention that invoke regional specificities. Some groups feel comfortable using

I do not deal with the “theory” in depth – see Eickelman (1980) for an unanswered critique
based on Wilkinson’s earlier formulations. The theory attempts to account for state formation in
Oman by looking at features that are internal to Omani society, and fails to adequately recognize
features of state formation that are external – features that all theorists of state formation rightly
prioritize.
29
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drums as a seat, while others find this an unbelievable affront to the drum. This situation of
settlement dispersal/cultural commonality and fission/fusion state formation reveals that Omanis
had developed means of communication and interaction that could simultaneously allow for this
broad-based sharing of cultural values, modes of behavior, and senses of authority and right
leadership, but also flexible enough to allow for the expression of group-based identities that were
often quite fine. To properly contextualize this claim, I now turn to a brief overview of the social
and governmental system of Oman over the last few hundred years, with special reference to the
interior.
Tribes in Oman
Any discussion of the notion of the “tribe” in social science discourse is complicated due
to definitional variety, rampant misapplications, and the impact of colonial rule. In this
dissertation, “tribe” is an English translation of the Arabic term qabīla, which refers to a kin group
that shares a variable sense of identity or belonging based on a biological or fictive relationship to
an eponymous ancestor. This definition is complicated historically in Oman by the presence of
alliances and protections, shaff and khuwa, Arabian slavery, fictive kinship, and contemporary
state attempts to curtail the social weight of tribes and tribalism. Nevertheless, historically, one’s
position in relation to a tribe has largely structured one’s position in society and potentials for
movements within it. As historians of Omani sources have pointed out, social movements and
conflicts are often narrated by Omani historians as actions by “one of tribe X” or even simply
“tribe X did such and such.” In this way, the anonymity of individuals is maintained and the tribe,
however delineated in a particular instance, becomes equally implicated in the actual actions of a
small number of people. Tribe names stand in for the actions of many people, such as when
migrating or managing conflict, and thus have a certain role to play in historical and social thinking
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more broadly. Qabīlī, an adjective based on qabīla, is nevertheless often used to describe
nepotistic, stupid, or anti-social behavior—this is most often used in performance contexts to
lightly criticize a group for not inviting other groups to perform alongside them, or for preferring
nearby groups to ones further afield. One example of this was a discussion about how performance
troupes are chosen to perform at events. A Nizwan performer brought up the situation in Birkat alMawz at a collective wedding:
Nizwan performer: Someone in Birkat al-Mawz might contact so-and-so from tribe so-and-so
(bū fulān min bānī fulān) because they don’t want any trouble from other folks, I mean, they want
to honor their guests with a troupe that is appropriate [to the occasion]. Some down the way hit
the road (ba‘aḍu yaḍrab al-ṭarīq) up the mountain [Jebel Akhdar] to get a troupe. You were at the
collective wedding there [in Birkat al-Mawz on 15 July 2017], no? Yeah, so you know that the
group from Manaḥ was there. Now, what were they doing there? (Birkat al-Mawz is in the wilāya
of Nizwā, Manaḥ is the capital of its own wilāya). That’s tribalism for you—al-Tawbī, al-Riyāmī,
al-Rāshidī, so on and so on... look at the names!
BJG: Hmm, yeah, that’s true, but there’s Tawbiyyin everywhere and there were also Manādhīr at
the wedding as well, from al-Sulayf. And Firqat al-Shihabā’ (my interlocutor’s troupe in Nizwa)
is available…
NP: By God, we’re available!
Later, when I was discussing the same topic with the group from Manaḥ that was performing at
the group wedding, a member laughed:
Manaḥ perfomer: [Laughs] they said that? We attended (ḥaḍart al-firqa) because we bring real
arts, authentic art (fann ’aṣīl), and they know we throw new razḥāt (nilqā razḥat gidīda, meaning
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newly written verses and suitable to the occasion] to honor the occasion. They are very new (Firqat
al-Shihabā’) and I don’t think they have a manager (munassiq).
This exchange indicates how charges of “tribalism” are levelled against certain groups to explain
their relative success. Whether or not “tribalism” actually explains the troupe from Manaḥ’s
presence at the collective wedding in Birkat al-Mawz or whether it is explicable by their superior
marketing is unclear.

Figure 16. Public invitation to the collective wedding. The top two lines read: ‘Sponsored by His
Excellency the shaykh ‘Alī bin Nāṣir al-Maḥrūqī, secretary general of the majlis al-shūrā’. Then
follow other sponsorships, directions and times, and finally the name of the young men who are
being married. AQAR is one of the largest Omani real estate and development firms and owns a
large hotel just up the road on Jebel Akhdar.

One major way that tribes structured the social world in Oman was by tribal “divisions,”
sympathies or antipathies that were assumed based on tribal positioning. These divisions and the
number of terms relating to various subsets of them have changed over time. A current, if shifting,
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major division in Oman involves one of two large groupings, or confederations, referred to as alGhāfirī and al-Hināwī. Both of these confederations are composed of a shifting number of smaller
tribal coalitions, such as the Bānī Rīyām, which were historically led by an ‘amīr. These large
concatenations are composed of individual tribes, such as al-Tawbiyyin, which are headed by a
shaykh derived from a prominent lineage within them. It is this level of organization from which
individuals derive their third name: al-Tawbī for men, and al-Tawbiyya for women, for example.
Today, these smallest tribal genealogical units are most important with regard to governmental
policy, reputation, marriages, and social standing.
While older sources (Eickelman 1980; Carter 1982; Wilkinson 1987) do take a critical view
of the neatness of the tribal system and the degree to which it conforms to the “ideal type” of the
tribe posited by segmentary lineage theory, the current situation of tribes in the new state has
changed very much. As Limbert (2010, 40-1) notes, the role of the shaykh has taken on a new
salience for the state. The position of the shaykh in the Arabian Peninsula has historically been
very elastic, and could describe quite different situations of authority, derived from different
sources—the term shaykh might refer to a religious figure with little in the way of political
responsibility or a neighborhood leader just as legibly as it could be applied to a local power broker.
In order to curtail the authority of larger tribal leadership, the state now directly appoints
the shaykh-s of a given neighborhood (and always favors those that have supported the Sultan),
which may or may not correspond to the shaykh of a tribe. This has served to entrench deeper
economic divisions between “shaykh-ly” families and non-shaykh-ly families, replacing the
historically variable role with a hereditary one. By multiplying the roles of manufactured authority,
the state has effectively divided tribal authority in such a way as to preclude historical methods of
coalition building by tribal allegiance—“fusion.” This also results in the petty competition of an
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increasing number of claimants on authority in a given place or group: one of Limbert’s
interlocutors maligned the current situation as having “too many shaykh-s” (2010, 41).
The most important aspect of tribalism for this study is its authority structure of shaykh-s
and ’amīr-s (or shaykh-s al-tamīma) and the reciprocal obligations that manifest between them and
their tribes or neighborhoods. The shaykh is a position of authority internal to a tribal grouping,
but not necessarily in control of it in a coercive sense (contrast Lancasters 2011, chapter 7;
Wilkinson 198,7 chapter 4). Nevertheless, the shaykh for any single tribal grouping is typically
derived from a single family, often referred to as a shaykhly family, who share a tribal name with
the broader lineage group (for example the shaykh of the Tawbiyyin would probably be named alTawbī, of the Shukayl, al-Shukaylī, just like any member of the tribe). Shaykhly families maintain
their status by extracting wealth from the people and land that they have authority over, not just
their own tribe. A shaykhly family might own property in many locations, some of which might
even be administered by a different shaykh. Nowadays, shaykh-s derive a large portion of their
income and holdings from the Sultan’s government, which they then keep, distribute, or donate as
they see fit.
Active coercion emerges through the relations with which shaykh-s solidify their
economic position: collecting taxes and customs, demanding shares of crops in areas that they have
leased to sharecroppers, seizing illegal property, leading raids, and the extensive and predatory
money-lending that has plagued Arabian laborers for centuries. While never as baldly exploitative
as the lending practiced in pearl fisheries, shaykh-s and wealthy trading families often engaged in
money-lending practices that kept agriculturalists, tradespeople, caravaneers, and low-volume
traders in a state of permanent debt. Agriculturalists, tied to land and reliant on the weather, have
been perennial targets for exploitative money-lending, which only became more necessary over
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the last hundred years. Of course, debt relationships and exchange relations are very common
amongst agriculturalists exploiting highly variable niches all over the world, but, with the decline
of in-kind trading (muqayatha) and the imposition of the money economy, shaykh-s and traders
with cash at the ready were well-positioned to exploit cash-poor agriculturalists who were no
longer able to pay taxes and debts with their produce. Borrowing against future agricultural
production to replace crop loss, invest in new and necessary technological advancements, make
household repairs, or pay for a wedding, farmers were often forced to give up their own property.30
This land, was, of course, not farmed by the shaykhly family, but was instead sold, leased, or
granted to loyal retainers or groups that the shaykh wanted to bring into his political orbit.
At times when centralized state structures were weak or non-existent, shaykh-s could,
through various means, come to rule larger and larger territories and thereby assume authority over
larger groups of people. As many scholars of the region have noted, it is authority over people,
rather than land itself, which is valuable in semi-arid environments. As an example, Al-Rasheed
describes the expansion of the Rashīdī power base the town of Hail in modern northern Saudi
Arabia over the past few centuries (1991). The Rashīdīs were largely recognized as leaders by their
intense development of the Hail area in the 12th/18th century, investing widely in agriculture,
drawing in regional trade routes, and restoring the local marketplace, or sūq. The financial outlay
the Rashīdīs were able to afford solidified their position as ’amīr-s, an authority above that of
shaykh, and the efflorescence of Hail was evidence of their success and leadership. The local

30

Farmers in Oman were generally free owners of their fully alienable land (mulk), rather than
being organized into fiefs, semi-feudal’iqṭā‘ relations, or communal ownership as in other Arab
contexts. Land and ownership of land is relatively poorly covered in sharī‘a law, and so various
local systems have existed in the Islamic world. See chapters 5 and 6 of Wilkinson 1987 for a
more detailed description of an idealized system, and chapters 2 and 9 in Al-Torki and Cole 1989
for a more realistic description.
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economic boom in Hail drew more people to settle there, and the Rashīdīs even drew a stipend
from the Ottoman Sultan, under whose nominal authority Hail remained. Further, the family was
instrumental in re-routing caravan trade from Mesopotamia and Persia through Hail to the Hijaz
by organizing guards to guarantee their defense and ensuring public safety. The region of Hail and
its hinterland came to be known as an ’imāra, the seat of a centralized authority related to a
particular family. Hence, tribally related shaykh-s of non-Rashīdī families came to rely on the
Rashīdī ‘amīr for benefits, legal judgments, defense, and arbitration. As more and more people
came to recognize the Rashīdī ‘amīr-s as legitimate leaders, their reputation grew and added to
their prestige. The ultimate failure of the Rashīdī ’imara to fend off the attacks of the Āl Sa‘ūd, a
non-tribal alliance based on Wahhabi Islamic teachings, illustrates Wilkinson’s claim that the tribal
state is ultimately a “dead-end.” As Al-Rasheed shows, the Rashīdī state could only expect to
integrate people from outside its tribal network as long as its leaders could hold personal control,
and expanding the ’imara was all the more difficult when it bordered other similarly derived tribal
states. While expansion over friendly and related tribal groupings could be extremely rapid,
expansion grew more and more difficult and expensive as genealogical links (fictive or otherwise)
dwindled in contemporary relevance.
Within Greater Oman, the ’amīr need not always exercise the excellence of leadership
displayed by the Rashīdīs in Hail to remain ’amīr-s, nor even hold power within a defined ’imara.
Rather, within larger tribal groupings the shaykh-s of certain families functioned more as ’amīr-s
while also fulfilling the role of shaykh within their own branch (Lancasters 2011, 305). For
example, historically, the shaykh of the Nabāhina has operated as the shaykh al-tamīma or ’amīr
of the entire Bānī Rīyām, which includes the Nabāhina, the Tawbiyyin, and many others. The
’amīr at this level represents the interests of his tribe and those that are aligned with it to some
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higher ruler—in Oman’s case, the Imam, a king, or the Sultan. It is precisely this supra-tribal
position that the current Sultan and his father succeeded in eliminating through murder, prison,
exile, and politicking.
Above the position of the tribal ’amīr, the very highest political position takes different
names in different places and times. Local strongmen might take mālik (“king” or “lord,” hence
the “Lord of the Green Mountain,” Sulaymān bin Ḥimyar who held power in the mid-20th century)
while larger regional leaders might choose sulṭān, ’amīr, or ’imām under differing circumstances
of state structural stability, loyalty, sources of legitimacy, and prestige. These names reveal subtle
shades of difference between the assumed privileges and power bases of the wielder and the
leader’s relationship to preexisting institutional regimes of power, which reciprocally places
certain obligations and duties upon the holder. Many of these will be discussed more concretely in
chapters 3 and 4.
Government in Oman
There is a tendency in Omani historiography to present the Imamate of Oman and the
Sultanate of Muscat as “opposing” polities. While this is true for some periods, this antagonism
was not the natural relationship between the interior and the coast, but the result of predatory elites
of one region trying to capture the other.
As a result of these predations, the present-day Sultanate of Oman is a concatenation of
several largely independent historical polities and a number of peripheral regions that were
officially integrated in 1970 (although unsettled borders remained a political issue until the early
1990s). The two most important and historically stable polities were the Ibāḍī Imamate of Oman,
which flourished and dissolved several times over its lifespan, approximately from c. 133/751—
1378/1959, and the Sultanate of Muscat, a thallassocratic coastal trading state that fissioned off of
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and eventually eclipsed the Imamate due to its economic and military dominance in the mid12th/18th century. The Ibāḍī Imamate, a theocracy based on the well-developed political philosophy
of the third great Islamic madhhab, Ibāḍism, was located across the central Ḥajar range, and, at
times of maximum centralization and expansion, could stretch along the coasts of Oman to Julfār
(modern day R’as al-Khayma), Ṣūr, ‘Ibrī, and Ādam. The Imamate should not be considered, as it
has been in the past, as entirely located in the current interior province of Dakhiliyyah, since the
capital of several Imamate governments was al-Rustāq, an old Persian capital (hence the name) on
the coastal side of the Ḥajar mountains. Further, Imams were often interested in exerting
administrative control over profitable coastal port cities like Ṣuḥār and caravan nodes like ‘Ibrī in
order to supplement their often meager treasuries.
The Sultanate’s leaders, on the other hand, who began as Imams, were largely interested in
securing the coast of Oman and its important ports in order to extend their power over Indian
Ocean trade. On the coast, much more emphasis was placed on mercantile trade throughout the
Indian Ocean, with Muscat and Seeb forming crucial harbors at the headwaters of the Arabian
Gulf. Over the 12th/18th and 13th/19th century, the coastal Sultans were able to take advantage of
economic gains initiated by the Ya‘arībī Imams (reigned c. 11th/17th-12th/18th centuries) to build
new naval fleets and impose their nominal and later functional rulership over Hormuz (which was
actually rented from the Persian government), Bahrain, the East African littoral, and even parts of
modern Pakistan and India. As European colonial powers gave more control to their colonial
governments, these extra-governmental apparatuses were more able to thwart the Sultan’s
ambitions in the Indian Ocean militarily and economically.
The Imamate and the Sultanate of Muscat, when they coincided, alternated between open
conflict and stable coexistence. Economic specialization was often maintained by regional politics,
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since any attempts by the Imamate to expand into coastal trade were disrupted by, at first, the
‘Abbasid Caliphs in Baghdad, and, later, the Persian shahs, both of which depended on the region
for overseas trade and customs income and would not allow the establishment of an independent
state on the coast. Thus, the Ibāḍī Imamate was often confined to the interior, while the coast was
alternately threatened by or under the direct rule of foreign powers until the 18th century. Historians
Patricia Risso (1986) and John C. Wilkinson (1987) have produced dense histories of these
relations, both internally and regionally, and modeled their development as dependent on each
other: as the Imamate gained centralized control over the interior, coastal power waned due to raids
and defections, prompting its seizure by foreign powers and its defense or recapture by the Ibāḍī
state; as coastal power increased and local elites could fend off foreign invasions and prosper
economically, the interior languished and fissioned into smaller local political entities, allowing
coastal leaders to extend their hegemony into the interior, and, eventually, to far reaches of the
Indian Ocean and central Africa.
a. The Ibāḍī Imamate in Oman
The latest iteration of the Ibāḍī Imamate in Oman ended in the 1370s/1950s but can be
traced back for over a thousand years prior. A strongly decentralized theocracy based on Ibāḍī
Islam, the Imamate thrived between periods of the great expansions of nearby Islamic and, later,
European colonial empires. Generalizing about such a long-lived, idealized, and variable system
of government such as the Ibāḍī Imamate in Oman is difficult and is made even more so by the
fact that the only extant historical sources were written by a small number of male Arab Ibāḍī
intellectuals drawn from religiously trained families. This has resulted in accounts that are histories
not of Oman and its people, but of one of its governmental systems from the perspective of those
who most benefitted from it. Indeed, if we take Wilkinson, the main Orientalist historian of the
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Imamate, at his word, the Imamate may not even be a particularly unique system of government
in the Arabian Peninsula. Wilkinson (1977, 1987) describes the Ibāḍī Imamate as built out of and
accommodating pre-existing tribal authority structures in the region, even as it was an overlay of
certain Ibāḍī political principles over a largely tribal base. Further, Wilkinson is at pains to
distinguish the Ibāḍī Imamate from other extant theocracies on the Peninsula, such as the Zaydī
Imamate of Yemen and the Sa‘ūdī-Wahhābī state of Saudi Arabia, and even from similar theocratic
systems across the Muslim world. In short, there is little that distinguishes the Ibāḍī Imamate from
other theocratic supra-tribal states across the region, other than the highly developed political
philosophies developed within each one.
Two such distinguishing features for the Ibāḍī Imamate were the notion of a drafted
contract binding rulers to certain responsibilities and obligations (‘aqd), and the formal election of
each Imam by oligarchs and theocrats, as outlined by Ghubash (2006). As Lienhardt (2001) and
Al-Rasheed (1991) have pointed out, dynastic succession in Arabian tribal states (“shaykhdoms”)
has the potential to be intensely violent, as no principles like primogeniture are recognized. The
Imamate, however, was conceived as an elected position that was to be held by the most capable
of a field of candidates. While in theory each election selected a candidate on his own virtues,
electors (the ahl al-ḥall wa-l-‘aqd, “those who loosen and bind”) functionally created the major
dynasties that have ruled Oman in various ways since 548/1154 : the non-Imamate Nabhānī Kings
(mulūk), (548-1033/1154-1624), the Ya‘arībī Imams, (1033-1162/1624-1749), and the Āl Bū Sa‘īd
Sultans, (1162-current/ 1749-current). The Imamate was predicated on sustaining the rule of a thin
stratum of tribal leaders, landowners, and religious experts to the exclusion of common people.
When those classes ruled, historians recognize the Imamate. When other ones did, they do not.
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Despite a long and contingent history, certain regularities of the Imamate can be
established, and histories of nearby societies can help us understand the interim periods of nonImamate rule. The institutional structure of the Imamate was largely a thin administrative
apparatus that spread over towns and villages that accepted the Imam’s appointment of a wālī, or
governor, and a qāḍī, or judge, for the town. These officials were drawn from various elite shaykhly
families who supported the Imamate, and while they acted largely independently from the Imam,
they could be trusted to consult him on serious matters, side with his decisions, extract appropriate
taxes, raise tribal levies, and ensure the peace (salāma) and rule of law (’imn wa ’imān). As the
Lancasters (2011) note, the most crucial role of any leader was arbitration, ḥukm, from which
common words for government, ḥukūma, and a wise leader, ḥākim, are derived. These terms are
still used in the razḥa poetry of Omanis to describe their leaders and their attributes. Strong imams
were noted for being arbiters par excellence, mediating between tribal elites near and far. The most
binding and important of the Imam’s duties, however, was to uphold sharī‘a law amongst the
believing community, as interpreted by Ibāḍī doctrine. Of crucial interest here to common folk
was the Imam’s role in maintaining a responsible “police” force, ‘askārī-s, and guaranteeing
“safety and security” in the Imamate (largely by controlling forts and the distribution of weapons).
Importantly, the Imam did not command a standing army, and, indeed, a standing army was
considered illegal and indicative of coercive intentions. While he did maintain retainers and
guards, formal armies needed to be raised from the local population. The defense of the Imamate
was considered the duty of all good Muslims within the Imamate, and this duty could be called
upon by the Imam as was necessary. Imamate armies were raised by sending out a call for the
organization of tribesmen via the beating of war drums and the circulation of war songs, razḥa,
and associated genres, and these songs accompanied the warriors along their mission.
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According to modern and contemporary sources, the Imam himself would hold majlis-style
meetings in the administrative fort in his capital in the mornings and early afternoons to settle
disputes and hear legal cases that could not be arbitrated through other means. In this way, the
Omani Imam acted in a way that was almost entirely like tribal ‘amīr-s in the Arabian Peninsula
more broadly, especially in the Gulf and Central Arabia. The main difference was the Imam’s
severely constrained ability to impose taxes and the inability to maintain a private army, countered
by his status as a religious expert. Only those types of taxes and amounts permitted in Islamic law
were allowed. Nevertheless, Imams often held vastly different amounts of coercive and economic
power. The interpretation of the Ibāḍī Imamate as being virtually identical to the overall function
of tribal state formation is supported by the capacity of several Imams, like the first Ya‘arūbī Imam
Nāṣir bin Murshid (r. 1033/1624-1059/1649), to assume a level of legitimacy with sheer economic
and military might.
Leveraging his success in waging war on the Portuguese and accumulating land, Nāṣir, a
weak Imam elected during the tail end of the Nabhānī dynasty, successfully rejuvenated the
Imamate and overshadowed the Nabhānī by building a large, multi-tribal coalition. Nāṣir’s nephew
Sayf bin Sulṭān (r.1104/1692-3-1124/1711) distinguished himself by rebuilding damaged falaj-s,
introducing new crops (including saffron and coconut), and buying up, reportedly, a full third of
all agricultural land in his domains, earning him the nickname “qayd al-‘arḍ,” the “Chain of the
Land.” The decline of the Ya‘arūbī dynasty in factional infighting amongst cousins with equal
claim to the Imamate is yet more evidence to the closeness of the governmental styles.
The capacity of some leaders to have their wider ambitions legitimated is underlined by
the political-philosophical notion of the Imamate and the Imam as having two states: one of
strength and one of weakness. Periods of open rulership and expansion of the Imamate apparatus
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were ex post facto called ẓuhūr, “open, visible,” and the Imam might even have certain military
capabilities penned into his election contract, in which case his leadership would be referred to as
shārī (literally, “seller.” i.e., one who sells his life in battle). The other was a period of weakness
of the Imam’s powers (a ḍa‘ifī imam), manifesting in his inability to fulfill his main obligation in
“enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong” (The Qur’ān, Āl ‘Amrān, 3, 104, 110), leading the
Imamate into a state of decline or concealment (kitmān).
The most recent expansion of the interior state was not possible until the arrival of
European colonial powers (primarily the Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British) in the 11th/16th
century, when coastal Omanis were able to leverage the Europeans against their Safavid rulers. At
first, the Portuguese simply replaced the Persians at the top of the Gulf tax and custom collection
hierarchy, which resulted in the Estado da India imposing their own cartazes system all around
the Indian Ocean rim (Newitt 1986). By the 1060s/1650s the Imam Nāṣir bin Murshid had driven
the Portuguese from the Omani coast, though they remained entrenched in southern Iran, east
Africa, and India. Imam Nāṣir’s sons pursued the Portuguese relentlessly using their own captured
caraval-style ships, waging generally successful campaigns to the south, capturing East African
city-states, and generally unsuccessful campaigns along the coasts of Cochin and Malabar in India.
The weakened Persian Empire (during the Safavid/Afsharid transition) could not afford to
reestablish its control of the Omani coast, and the Imamate quickly took this opportunity to seize
coastal towns and install themselves as the main beneficiaries of maritime economic activity,
resulting in a brief period of Imamate coastal control that brought considerable wealth to the
Interior. The dynastic rule of the Ya‘arubā Imams, noted above, led to a succession crisis which
was resolved by one of the parties inviting the aid of Persian armies, which, upon completion of
their mission, seized control of the coast for Persian leaders once again. This final direct colonial
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aggression paved the way for a coastal Ibāḍī elite of the Āl bū Sa‘īd tribe, Aḥmad bin Ṣa‘īd Āl Bū
Ṣa‘īd, to lead the fight against the Persians from his base as appointed wālī of Ṣuḥār. He was
eventually formally elected Imām of the Ibāḍī state in 1749, largely by virtue of his military
success and wealth, since he possessed virtually no religious credentials. His dynasty, still in power
today, saw the extension of Omani overseas economic activity into the western coast of India and
the present-day Congo of central and southern Africa, the occupation of Zanzibar, Mombasa,
Baḥrain and Gwadar on the Makrān coast. The immense Omani maritime empire had, by the
1840s, established itself as an important trading power in the eastern Indian Ocean, especially in
the export of slaves and spices from central Africa to south and southwest Asia. In 1856, due to a
colonially imposed succession crisis, the unified state was divided into two separate realms—one
located in Oman proper, the other in Zanzibar on the Swahili coast of modern-day Tanzania. The
immense productivity and wealth of Zanzibar compared to Oman, and the collapse of the slave
trade due to the British Moratorium in the 1840s, prompted nearly 80% of all Arab families in
Muscat to migrate to East Africa, many of whom are now only beginning to return. This state has
often been called a “trading state” by historians, as it survived mostly on the imposition of customs
and taxes and extended its control of coastal cities largely for economic reasons—legitimacy was
linked more to economic control and military strength than anything else. As the focus of the
Muscat Sultans turned ever more away from Oman and toward East Africa, shaykh-s of the interior
were more able to build their own increasingly independent city-states.
b. A critical approach to the twentieth century
Much of the rest of this dissertation discusses the twentieth century, so I will only briefly
sketch it here. The twentieth century witnessed the end of the interior Imamate and the unification
of Oman as a Sultanate by 1959. In 1913, the largely independent tribal states of the interior fitfully
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united under the banner of the Imamate and elected Sālim bin Rāshid al-Kharūsī as Imam in Tanūf,
simultaneously declaring the Sultan as illegitimate. The Sultan soon afterwards died of natural
causes. Imamate-affiliated elites immediately began raiding the rich cities along the coast, who
they saw as valid legal targets for pillaging. The Imam eventually agreed to endorse the Treaty of
al-Sīb in 1920 with the coastal Sultan Taymūr bin Faisal (r. 1913-32), which tacitly recognized the
Imamate’s autonomy in the interior in exchange for their cessation of raids on coastal cities. The
treaty remained relatively stable until Taymūr’s son, Sultan Sa‘īd (r.1932-1970), sold oil
exploration rights in the interior to the newly formed British Petroleum Development Oman
(PDO), which interior leaders saw as their legal prerogative. This move unexpectedly
corresponded with the death of the Imam, Muḥammad bin ‘Abdullah al-Khalīlī, which pushed the
newly elected Imam, in a bid to legitimize himself, to initiate a secessionist movement by securing
Saudi Arabian military and political aid. By 1959, and with the help of the British, the movement
had been defeated, the Imamate abolished, the treaty abrogated, and tribal elites had formally
capitulated to the rule of the coastal Sultan. With the relative stability that this produced, oil
production was increased, export regularized, and the Sultanate’s finances began to improve. After
this victory, Sultan Sa‘īd withdrew to the southern Ẓufār region and isolated himself from everyday
politics. His isolation, sluggish development, and ineffective leadership led to the spread of a
Marxist rebellion in the southern region of Ẓufār in the 1960s, and periodic unrest in the interior.
In 1970, Sultan Ṣa‘īd bin Ṭaymūr’s son, Qābūs, led a successful and bloodless palace coup
and installed himself as Sultan. His rule has seen the gradual expansion of an efficient
transportation network, intense infrastructural development, the establishment of a modern
hospital and education system, and regularization of international trade and foreign relations. As
many critical anthropologists have shown, the Omani state in this period has often been described
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as progressive and developing merely by the juxtaposition of two numbers: one from before 1970,
and one from “today.” Such and such miles of road existed before 1970, observers claim, while
many more miles exist today. The same is replicated for schools, hospitals, electrical transformer
stations, banks, and so on. This is useful, but it portrays development and urbanization as “the
inevitable juggernaut of progress,” as Emily Yeh puts it (2013, 203), and perhaps more
problematically renders development as a simple matter of numbers.
In any case, the numbers are arresting for their incredible growth and much of this is due
to the expansion of the state’s institutional presence predicated on booming oil revenues. It is easy
to overemphasize the gross export of oil in Oman and ignore the structural reality of its tiny
population, rendering the per capita distributional potential of the Omani state incredibly high in
comparison to other states. Eickelman notes that in 1979, Egypt’s state oil-derived income in fact
doubled Oman’s (1987, 181). This capacity for distribution is often used to make claims about the
“nature” of the state that distributes: that it is predicated on “rent,” that it is an “allocation state,”
that it is “distributional” or has a “reversed tax system” (Eickelman 1987, 181). While I challenge
this conception more in chapter 6, I want to point out now that this is a peculiarly “capitalocentric”
construction, as Gibson-Graham put it. It takes for granted that “the Midas touch of capitalism,”
manifested as oil export-derived profits, overwhelms, displaces, and eventually obliterates
preexisting ideas about fairness, exchange, distribution, generosity, and many other social
relations, obligations, and ideas about mutuality (Yang 2000, 481; Yang 2005). As anthropologists
have shown, this is not quite right: a wide range of practices, logics, and orientations to money and
obligation concurrently circulate alongside the market. For example, the notion that state
distributions of wealth result in a “rentier psychology” that produces political quiescence is an
ahistorical misreading of social life before such distributions (Luciani 1987). Political scientist
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Jocelyn Sage Mitchell has shown that the political stability of Gulf regimes is not fully explained
by distribution (2013). A number of the theses derived from the “rentier state” school are incorrect
(“loyalty is to the system, not the individuals in power,” “an allocation state does not need to refer
to a national myth” [Luciani 1987, 74-5]) but some are very insightful (that appeals to ethnic
belonging and genealogical tradition restricts claimants on distributions (Luciani 1987, 75)).
Therefore, the assumption that these oil export-derived profits resulted in drastic changes in local
social norms in ways that are similar all over the world is probably wrong.
Nazih Ayubi developed a detailed and profoundly insightful analysis of Arab states that
draws on both “political economy” and “political culture” approaches (1995, 6ff.). He, more than
most others, has been able to show how various Arab states progressed in different directions based
on their “lop-sided” development: some were guided by the military, others by national
bourgeoisies, mineral extraction, or factories. The most profound insight is his insistence on the
“articulation” between the capitalist mode of production and a variety of others, including
tributary, control-based, and circulationist modes. “Articulation” is the neo-Marxist term for the
process by which forms/modes of production coalesce into and change one another, which shapes
and is shaped by ideological production. This is broadly analogous to Gibson-Graham’s and
Yang’s critique of “capitalocentrism.” This high level of articulation is why Ayubi describes many
Arab states as having a “fluid class map” in which movement is possible and hardened class
identities are rare. Such a class distribution makes attending to anarchist approaches to the state,
sharpened by a Gramscian attention to the ways in which alliances, ideas, and values are shaped
across strata and throughout that class map, more appropriate. The money derived from the export
of oil, as we shall see, not only changed the way that ruling classes perpetuated their rule but

109
changed the stakes of political interactions between rulers and ruled in affect-laden and historically
charged arenas like praise.
So let’s now turn to praise.
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Chapter 2: “We salute the designs that are in good order”: Praise, Power, and Poetry in
Oman

أول سالمي ع الدار والحله
وعليكم خاطري ومن سكن فيه
في ديرة العز اهل الكرم
فله قابوس يا نورا شارجا فيها
My first greetings go to the homeland and the encampment;
you are on my mind, and those who live there.
The people of generosity are in pride’s homeland!
it is for him, Qābūs, O its eastern light!
- Anonymous welcoming razḥa.
Ne al soh ne al les ꝥat leod-scopes singeð.
What minstrels sing is neither all true nor all lies.
-Laʒamon, The Brut, a 12th century Middle English history poem.
This chapter is about praise poetry and its relationship to power in Oman. Following other
ethnomusicologists, I take poetry and its performance as a crucial lens on sociality. While the focus
is on one country in the Arab Middle East, it draws on examples from many historical periods and
regions. This is justified by the fact that praise poetry is one of the most extensive, ancient, and
common forms of poetry in the Asian, African, and European continents. Praise is and has been
deeply embedded in the social poetics of everyday life and in the relationship between rulers,
patrons, poets, and communities. These widespread practices, while varied, resemble each other
in ways that point to profound similarities in social function and, as Lila Abu-Lughod puts it, an
“ideology of social life” (1986, 32). In examining this ideology, I follow Abu-Lughod’s (1986)
call to situate poetic performances more firmly within the “background” of social life and
investigate the “basic cultural notions” that animate it (1986, 32). Likewise, I am guided by Saad
Sowayan’s recently repeated call to bring more theoretical rigor to the study of Arabian poetic
performance practices, especially due to his interest in examining it in light of “cultural notions”
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that are broadly shared with Classical societies (2003, 2015). Finally, I embrace certain political
economic strands of linguistic anthropology that argue that we should recognize the role of praise
poetry as a constituent practice within certain political economies, rather than a more conventional
argument that traces how a broader political economy impacts one or another genre.
Almost 30 years ago, Susan Gal (1989) and Judith Irvine (1989) pushed us to consider
language performance as constituting what we call political and economic practices, not just as an
arbitrary system that represents actual political and economic practices. It’s the difference between
a protest song and a vote. One reflects, the other just is. Irvine identified West African praise as
the perfect example. It doesn’t reflect broader political economic concerns. It just is a political and
economic practice of certain social arrangements, like selling or buying or voting or giving things
away. Without it, things don’t work.
I argue that in Oman, today and in the past, ideals about how rulers should rule, how power
can be exercised, and what constitutes proper and dignified exchange between rulers and ruled are
modeled in men’s performance of public praise poetry. The crucial cultural notion that manages
poetic exchanges between rulers and ruled is the notion of madīḥ or madīḥa, “praise.” Praise (CLA,
madḥ), for Omani Arabs of the Interior, is a crucial function of ‘āzī and of razḥa, and each
performance of these genres is at least partially animated by it. Praise poetry in Oman is now and
has been a vital indicator of relationships between rulers and the ruled. It makes claims on correct
behavior and works to facilitate the exchange of deeds and goods between ruling classes and the
ruled. Praise is not ironic or facile, and is, in fact, deeply engaged in the everyday creation of both
class hegemony and shared values between classes.
Unlike other praise contexts, the general pattern of gift exchange animates this Omani
praise relationship, in which gifts and good deeds obligate a public reception which stimulates a
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return of the gift and a replication of the cycle. In this case, good deeds and correct action obligate
praise which in turn stimulates continued correct action. Furthermore, the ties between people and
their home is so tight that they feel obligated to respond to good deeds with thanks and recognition,
and to do so in a way that is related to or representative of their location. How and why praise
functions in managing relations of power and creating communities in the context of the
contemporary authoritarian state is investigated in this chapter but is also essential to
understanding the analytic arc of my argument.
In this chapter, I argue that thinking with Omanis about the function of praise in regimes
of power reveals the ways that exchanges of praise manage relations between communities and
ruling classes in Oman. Further, I hypothesize that aspects of this relationship continue to operate
today, primarily to symbolize ideals of rulership that undergird Arabian authoritarian regimes. To
make this argument, I review some general literature on praise poetry and compare and contrast
various systems (Early Irish; West and Southern African; Greek; Icelandic; Chinese; English;
Arab; Nepalese) through history and space. I will review some of the literature on the classical
Arabic qaṣīda to show how it overlaps with and differs from the Omani choral ode, ‘āzī. Finally,
I take a close look at relationships between poetic forms, praise, authority, social structure, and
good manners in Oman.
a. Hearing Praise
How can we hear praise? And more to the point, aren’t we already? The simple answer is
no; the more complicated answer is—who’s we?
Music that involves praise is probably studied very often in ethnomusicology because it is
found almost everywhere, praising all kinds of things: humans, Gods, prophets, animals, seasons,
food, ancestors, plants, lineages, and so on. And yet, ethnomusicologists have said surprisingly
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little on praise as a social tool. It was obvious to my Omani interlocutors that I would study praise
in relation to power. It is less obvious to Western academics and intellectuals. Serious investigation
of praise poetry is, to some extent, harried by the deep antipathy with which praise poetry has been
regarded in Europe and the Americas in recent times. Praise poetry has come to be deeply suspect,
if not the height of inartistry, in the academy and among academics. The writing of ostentatious
praise, modern wisdom goes, is the province of the dimwitted, the weak, the purchased, or the
duped. Why is this so? I think part of this is a latent ideology of individualism in academic
discourse. Despite idealizing “strong” communities based on interdependence and mutuality, we
tend to sneer a bit at overt expressions of that same dependency when it admits to the central
weakness that is a predicate to interdependence. Similarly, the “romance of resistance” remains
alive and well: we prefer our subjects to hiss and spit at powerful elites rather than see those elites
as a part of society (even if deleterious).
The question of why praise has declined so far in the estimation of the literary elite
motivated J.R. Burrow’s short but insightful work, The Poetry of Praise (2008), which traces this
profound shift in English language poetry’s relationship to praise since Beowulf. In it he writes,
This study of praise in medieval poetry grew out of the observation that modern critics and
readers (myself included) commonly find it hard to come to terms with the many varieties
of eulogistic writing that are encountered there. So we either turn our eyes away from this
‘poetry of praise’ or else look in it too eagerly for such ironies and reservations as may
accommodate it to modern tastes and values. (2008, vii)
Indeed, for a thousand years after the inscription of Beowulf, the English language and its ancestors
had been used for praise poetry. Praise was a valuable and important function of poetry in England,
and in many other places besides. However, at the time of his writing, Burrow can comfortably
claim that “praise is no longer a prime function of poetic activity” (2008, 3).
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While Burrow points to the c. 1688 CE development of the English Poet Laureate as the
beginning of the decline in English praise poetry, whatever the cause, I was raised in a society that
did not value praise poetry. I was not alone in this, however. During a discussion of my fieldwork
with an anthropologist of Oman, I was told that in Oman “no one takes that [praise] stuff seriously;
they all laugh at it… it’s embarrassing.” During my fieldwork, an Egyptian friend told me he
despised Omani poets who “pull on scraps of meat (sharḥat laḥm) like dogs” when they compose
praise poetry for the elite. Ethnomusicologist Eric Charry reports similar “derogatory remarks
about the apparently unabashed soliciting of gifts by praise singers” in European reporting on
Malian jeli, or praise singers, whose great crime appears to rest largely in accepting remuneration
in public (2000, 98). 31 Praise, and the movement of material and non-material goods relating to
this praise, is undignified.
Drawing on literatures of praise poetry from many places and times, I argue for the exact
opposite approach. By hearing praise, I mean to think against this modern wisdom regarding praise
poetry. It is not tit-for-tat exchange, or blame, or accounting, or sycophantic. To be clear, it can be
those things. The kneejerk reaction to hear praise as embarrassing or sycophantic is probably
sometimes right but is also not nearly the whole story.
Let’s dwell on this kneejerk description of praise for a moment. There are two useful and
cautionary criticisms of this logic predicated on the critical position that I sketched in the
introduction. Think about why we work. Obviously, money is high on that list, because it allows
us to survive in a monetary economy. But, consider this: would you take one penny less a year if
it meant that you got honest, sincere validation and respect from your peers? A lot of us do more

Charry continues to make a crucial point, reflected in many other societies: “Whatever is provided to
the jeli [praise singer], be it cash, food, animals, land, or whatever, is not traditionally considered to be a
payment. But rather is seen as cementing an ancient historical interdependence” (2000, 98).
31
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than just take a penny less: we get on airplanes and fly all over the place to conferences and talks
for the chance to get that validation. Praise, at its most effective, validates persons for their actions,
predicated on some shared sense of social and moral commitments. Of course, validation and
conferences can be explained by invoking some kind of maximized capital-rationalization. But
here we should be wary of capitalocentrism, as defined by Marxist scholars J.K. Gibson-Graham
(1996, 2006). I noticed this in myself. When I thought about the problem of work and validation,
I kept thinking until I could explain this behavior in terms of getting money or ways to make more
money in the future. I just entertained other explanations until I could really explain it with
reference to market economics and money or earnings maximization. Why did I think that was
more correct than thinking of validation, senses of community, being heard, sharing a passion for
a topic, or any number of other motivations? That’s a perfect example of capitalocentric thinking,
which is deeply engrained and naturalized in us. Searching for a broadly capitalist practice instead
of recognizing other, potentially anti-capitalist or non-capitalist practices is precisely the way that
market capitalism comes to be understood as a stable, universal system in which all other things
are embedded—including praise, gifts, wealth destruction, and whatever else.
The second criticism also includes a minor reformulation of Gramsci’s notion of
hegemony. I want to suggest that praise, because it not only recognizes good deeds and ties them
to ideals like generosity, keeping promises, and the like, might keep those ideas in circulation
amongst the ruling classes. The way Gramsci sees hegemony construction is mostly (but not
completely) a one-way process: it is an imposition of a “general direction” on life, based on elite
bourgeois values and ideas, whose imposition is managed by both coercion and cooptation. I think
this is right. However, there are reasons to think that the reverse might also be possible. For
example, this imposition might not be complete (that is, “the general direction” isn’t everything),
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or maybe some ideas are shared at such a basic level that they bleed across class position, or maybe
some ideas move from the subordinate to the ruling classes. We should entertain the possibility
that hegemony is a bit more of a compromise than we at first suspect. Gramsci was, after all,
generally suspicious of anything being a fully completed and stable system, including things we
often think of as “systems,” like “culture” (Crehan 2002). We already know that elites take ideas
and practices from subordinated classes: think of blue jeans that cost $1000, working class
“authenticity,” or eating offal and off-cuts of meat in fancy restaurants. The best example of this
is the white elite adoption of cultural practices of racially subordinated groups, like the musics,
languages, and comportment of African-Americans in the US. Could praise be one way that ideas
and values are communicated and even shared across class boundaries in Oman?
Ideas like “you should be generous if you can” might ultimately be derived from something
like “the moral economy” identified by James Scott and others as obtaining within non-elite
groups. I think it is possible that praise sustains ideas that are derived from or benefit subordinated
classes. Praise might be one of the few ways that anti-political or anti-capitalist ideas are even
heard or entertained by the ruling classes, because praise is explicitly targeted at them and is
imaginatively dreamt up by the subordinated specifically to catch elite attention. I’m even tempted
to consider the sneering disregard for praise on the part of some middle-class folks and elites as a
handmaiden to the inculcation of a capitalist work ethic. Why ask for things when you could be
working towards getting them yourself? But let’s return to the issue at hand.
If a general disinclination to studying praise can be discerned, we can turn to the question
of “who’s we?” Here, I’m thinking of ethnomusicologists, and specifically of ethnomusicologists
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who see praise as functioning within a broad notion of political economy.32 Ethnomusicologists of
West Africa have certainly dealt with praise the most, and amongst those Christopher Waterman
(1990) and Aaron Carter-Ényì (2018) have been particularly insightful. Despite the richness with
which Waterman studies praise, I expect many ethnomusicologists share Veit Erlmann’s feelings
on the topic in his analysis of Waterman’s 1990 Jùjú: A Social History and Ethnography of an
African Popular Music. Erlmann suggests that jùjú serves to “underline a mode of transaction
focused on the generous distribution of wealth in exchange for favorable portrayals of the social
role of the rich and powerful” (1996, 22). Drawing on Bataille’s work on the gift in The Accursed
Share, he suggests that in jùjú “the lies of the rich are changed into truth” (22). Erlmann in turn
praises Waterman for seeing through the “embarrassingly obsequious song texts in modern jùjú”
and for Waterman’s tremulous denial that jùjú is entirely in the service of power (Waterman 1990,
227-8). Embarrassing to whom? To the praisers? To the praised? Or to the academic?
We might step back here and ask, why should Yorùbá elites pay for yìn, praise, or want to
have a good name in the first place? Mostly, it seems like reputation and networking. The
circulation of praise and money as delayed reciprocity is, in Waterman’s words, a “life strategy”
for people along a wide range of the class spectrum, a way of “making it” in urban West Africa in
uncertain times (1990, 177). Occasions for generosity, like jùjú concerts, funerals, weddings, and
all manner of other social occasions, are chances to “[activate] crucial socioeconomic networks”
and to “raise [one’s] standing in the community” (Waterman 1990, 174, 177). Waterman concludes
that it is music that “establishes norms legitimating public demonstrations of wealth, generosity,
and good character” as good deeds like generosity are refracted through praise to construe them

32

Socio-cultural anthropologists in general fare worse here: even if they do admit that
performance might have a legitimate social function, all the criticisms we might level at
ethnomusicologists then take over.
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both as a general social good and as an example to others (187). In her study of songs for the gurna
dance in northern Cameroon, Clare Ignatowski argues for the normative power of poetry as
operating in a similar way (2006). While Yorùbá weddings raise the status of the host, they also
“function as a support system for the poor, tálákà” who are “allowed to gather around the edges
of the host’s compound, and to partake in the food, drink, and gifts circulated among the invited
participants” (177). That’s a social good that should be encouraged, even if grounded on inequality.
There are lots of other good reasons to cultivate a good reputation, and many of them are shared
with humanity in general: to be represented as trustworthy, powerful, and well-connected is
probably useful in lots of contexts.
What differentiates the Omani context from the West African one is social structure and
orientation. In Lagos, praise performance is the medium of individual social networks; in Oman,
praise circulates between communities and their leaders. Praise does circulate in personal networks
wherein one poet habitually praises a web of patrons from whom he takes money in public
performance in Oman and the Gulf, but it is relatively rare—not a “life strategy” chosen by many.
Omani Arab poets do take money for their work (as they should) but it is not “sprayed” on them
in public as it is during jùjú concerts. In fact, we shall see that movements of money in that way
do occur and are explicitly contrasted with good, effective praise. The lack of public “spraying”
for praise is probably due to the fact that there is no social position devoted to praise like griots or
oríkì poets in Oman. What leaders are praised for in Oman is not helping individuals, but for
helping communities—villages, towns, cities—and so praise responses are often similarly
communal. Communities, or representative groups therefrom, praise leaders, which necessarily
disrupts the “ego-centered” praise networking so common in urban Lagos and other places. The
fact that there is no independent praising group means that there is correspondingly no criticizing
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group: in fact, without those personalized networks of competing patrons, much of the power that
critical poetry would be deeply diminished. If you criticize a big family in one neighborhood of
Lagos, you can expect that its rivals will throw some cash at you when they have a celebration. If
you viciously criticize the Sultan in Oman, don’t expect anyone else to be generous, because he
doesn’t have any rivals.
That music plays some positive or normative role in defining proper social comportment
is a strongly validated finding in ethnomusicology. Often, however, this function is not regarded
as “praise” so much as it is considered “discourse” in the Foucauldian sense. This is accurate, but
it is also important to disaggregate the clutch of speech and performance genres folded into the
notion of “discourse” to see how any single one operates in particular, historical ways.
In this chapter, I want to take praise poetry for what praise poets, the praised, and audiences
in Oman take it for—an authentic commendation of good deeds with an eye to promoting them in
the future. Praise picks out and celebrates social relationships between individuals and their
community in virtue of their fulfillment of ideals, moral norms, and social obligations. This is not
to take attention away from the crucial role that criticism and the threat of criticism also play. For
praise poets, however, praise communicates with leaders in a manner far subtler than criticism. It
also does so in a way that is “virtuous” and “high-minded” both for performers and for their
communities. Where praise and blame co-operate, blame, criticism, and invective are modes of
speech that beget only more blame, criticism and invective, which might quickly spiral into
violence. Praise, we shall see, has been conceived by many groups, including Omanis, to
encourage and amplify the lives, reputation, and sociality of all those involved. Praise is not
undignified—rather, the exchange that occurs in praise contexts is a crucial medium for the
communal portrayal and maintenance of dignity. That praise might be cheaply bought is true. That
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poets exaggerate and can be manipulated is wisdom shared in the Islamic world and outside of it.
However, praise, when done carefully and honestly, has lasting social effects that are important.
And, indeed, we shall see that these kinds of effects can be manipulated as well. But when we try
to hear praise, we can see that not only do Interior Omanis take praise poetry seriously, for very
specific reasons, but that their commitment to it is vital to the ways in which power, authority, and
governance are naturalized and rationalized in the Interior.
Praise in Many Times and Places
I was highly skeptical of praise poetry when I first sat down with a poet of ‘āzī, the most
vaunted vocal poetic genre in the Interior of Oman. I was mainly interested in learning how poets
overtly or covertly demand goods and services from authority figures through the threat of
invective. Invective in Arabic poetry was fun, humorous, and also dangerous—speaking truth to
power! Praise poets, on the other hand, at least to my mind, were sycophants and money-grubbers.
Listening to early interviews is now difficult due to my impatience to hear about the “real” secret
behind the poetry: veiled criticism, invective, bald-faced demands made on leaders deemed only
marginally legitimate. Despite the fact that I had been trained not to think in this way (see AbuLughod 1990 on “resistance”; Asad 1973 on “sultanic authority”; and Rosaldo 1989 on
“imperialist nostalgia”), I was not wholly naïve to expect this as an ethnomusicologist. The role of
the poet as a dealer in invective and social criticism is very strongly emphasized in the West
African literature on modern griots (Hale 1998; Kaschula 1999) and in Zulu and Xhosa izibongo
(Kresse 1998; Mafeje 1967; Opland 1975), on Yorùbá oríkì (Barber 1991; Barber and Waterman
1995), on ancient Irish filidh and baird-s (Carney 1985), Greek panegyrists (Kurke 2010[1991]),
Norse skald-s (Mitchell 2001), Somali poets (Andrzejewski 2011), medieval Chinese fu poetry (
賦) (Wu 2009), and so on.
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Praise is indeed often twinned with blame, and this twinning is often recognized as the
source of poetry’s social efficacy. Oftentimes, political economies of praise function largely
because the threat of invective is ever present. However, praise and blame operate in different
ways to impel or curtail action. Andrzewjewski, for example, writes that
Somalis often say that a good poet can sow peace and also hatred: he can win friendship
by praise and appreciation, deepen an existing feud, or lead to a new one… For a political
party it is a great asset to have a good poet devoted to its cause: poems in praise of sultans
and clan chiefs are increasingly giving way to panegyrics on party leaders and members of
the government, and political crises are enlivened from political bombardments on all
sides. Such polemical pieces seldom descend to the scurrility and churlishness of
eighteenth-century English lampoons, but use such weapons as exhortation, praise,
reproach and emotional blackmail. (2011, 6-7)
Hoffman notes that amongst the Mande, “the power to praise as well as to rebuke belongs to the
griot caste” (2000, 242). Throughout her ethnography of Malian griot, Hoffman highlights the
ways in which the poet wields a capacity for social change through words and the threat of words.
Opland (1975) writes that the Xhosa imbongi tribal poet in southern Africa had the role of herald,
praiser, disseminator, but also of critic. Public criticism, in fact, was the sole province of imbongi—
“the chief’s councilors could also criticize him [the chief], of course, but never in public, as the
imbongi did” (1975, 193). Fusheng Wu (2008) adds, however, that criticism, even in verse, was
not always open. Amongst early Chinese poets the function of panegyric was “to advise…in the
disguise of praise” (Wu 2008, 6). This amounted to the development of “indirect criticism” (feng
諷), which was a practice of Chinese poets “because it was dangerous to directly admonish the
Son of Heaven” (20). So much so, in fact, that the poet “Sima Xiangru put his political advice in
the mouth of His Majesty to create the impression that it came spontaneously from Emperor Wu
himself [r. 141-87 BCE]” (2008, 20). Chinese court poets used praise, rather than criticism, in
order to subtly influence rulers.
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In all these varied contexts, we find that the poet has a clear social function in relation to
worldly power and to relationships between autonomous groups. This was also the case in the
Middle East amongst Arab groups, both before and after the rise of Islam.
a. The Pre-Islamic Arab Poet
There is a long history of writing on the social functions of poetry amongst the pre-Islamic
Arab tribes. This mode of writing is perhaps typified by citing Ibn Rāshiq al-Qaywarānī’s (d.
456/1064) famous description of poets in his treatise al-‘umda:
When there appeared a poet in a family of the Arabs, the other tribes round about would
gather together to that family and wish them joy of their good luck. Feasts would be got
ready, the women of the tribe would join together in bands, playing upon lutes, as they
were wont to do at bridals, and the men and boys would congratulate one another; for a
poet was a defence to the honour of them all, a weapon to ward off insult from their good
name, and a means of perpetuating their glorious deeds and of establishing their fame for
ever. And they used not to wish one another joy but for three things—the birth of a boy,
the coming to light of a poet, and the foaling of a noble mare. (Cited in and translated by
Sir Charles Lyall 1930, xv-xvii)
The poet, for the pre-Islamic Arab tribe, was a mouthpiece. Arabist R.A. Nicholson has claimed
that:
In those days [the Pre-Islamic period or jāhiliyya] poetry was no luxury for the cultured
few, but the sole medium of literary expression. Every tribe had its poets, who freely uttered
what they felt and thought.33 Their unwritten words “flew across the desert faster than
arrows,” and came home to the hearts and bosoms of all who heard them… the pagan shā‘ir
is the oracle of his tribe, their guide in peace and their champion in war. It was to him they

Compare this to Kresse’s (1998) claim for the “poetic license” fiercely maintained for praise poets
“which applies to most south-east African societies, granting freedom of expression to public statements
in the form of praise poetry” (171).
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turned for counsel when they sought new pastures, only at his word would they pitch or
strike their ‘houses of hair.’34 (2010[1930], 72-3)
They advertised the tribe’s successes and virtues and lambasted their enemies’ failings within
conventionalized poetic forms utilizing meter and rhyme (qāffiya) instead of the rhymed prose
(saj‘) used by soothsayers and fortune-tellers (McDonald 1978; Nicholson 2011[1930], 74-6).
b. The Qaṣīda
The primary form of poetic contest amongst these pre-Islamic poets was the classical
qaṣīda, the polythematic monorhymed ode. Nicholson presents a number of theories on the
meaning of qaṣīda, though certainly the most compelling is that the poem is composed for a
specific purpose or as an entreaty, owing to the trilateral root q-ṣ-d, referring to “intention” (though
see Nicholson 2010[1930], 76n.3). This style spread with the expansion of the armies of Islam and
became a crucial part of the urbanized social poetics of the Islamic Caliphates, especially in courtly
contexts (al-Tha‘alibi 1990, 222-27; Sperl and Shackle 1996; Ibn Qutaybah 1986, 1:167-73, 1:388391, 3:135-219). Many scholars of Arabic literature have made contributions to our understanding
of praise poetry and the qaṣīda in the cultural milieu of medieval Islamic polities (Ḍayf 1960-8835;
Gould 2015; Sharlet 2011; Sperl 1977; Sperl and Shackle 1996; Stetkevych, 2002, 2010). Rebecca
Gould concisely presents the qaṣīda, amongst other panegyric forms including Sanskritic praśastī
carvings and Chinese fu poems, as “a discourse about, within, and sometimes against sovereign

‘houses of hair’, i.e., the woven goat-hair tents of the northern Arabian Bedouin, sometimes called
“black-tent Bedouin.” These are contrasted with southern (including Omani) Bedu groups, who did not
historically use woven goat-hair tents (see Chatty 1996, Ch.4, for example).
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For purposes of this study, cf volumes 1-5 (al-‘aṣr al-jāhili [The Pre-Islamic Era] (1960), al-‘aṣr alIslāmī [The Islamic Era] (1963) al-‘aṣr al-‘Abbāsī al-‘awwal [The Abbasid Era, v. 1] (1966) and al-thānī
[The Abbasid Era, v.2] (1973), and ‘aṣr al-duwwal wa-l-imārāt: al-jazīra al-‘arab, al-‘Irāq, ’Irān [The
Era of States and Emirates: The Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Iran] (1980).
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power” (2015, 264). More particularly, Suzanne Pickney Stetkevych has located Arabic classical
and vernacular poetry’s potency in its “mythopoetic function,” that is, its role in (re-) producing a
community in words, history, and myth (1993, 2002). This is a broad function of poetry in which
it is a medium to present history, character, myths, and a sense of communal heritage to an
audience.36 While earlier Arabists noted the social and normative role of poetry amongst tribal
groups, Stetkevych has tied this function to the ways in which praise in qaṣīda form “created,
encoded and promulgated a myth and ideology of legitimate Arabo-Islamic rule” in the courts of
the early Islamic Caliphates (2002, ix).
The formal classical qaṣīda was a means by which authority was recognized,
communicated, and legitimated. “The panegyric qaṣīda,” Stefan Sperl writes, is “a formal
testimony of the legitimacy of political authority” in which “the glory of the social order is
proclaimed” (1989, 26). Sperl especially notes the relationship between panegyric poetry and
cultural notions of kingship: “[the development of the praise qaṣīda) is a perfect illustration of the
function of Kingship in society.37 It suggests that this poetry is a liturgical expression of the basic
values and political ideals of the ‘Abbasid state” (1977, 90). The qaṣīda, then, models and vocally
iterates the qualities of the king, his leadership, and the basis of his authority. 38
If this was the case for qaṣīda-s in the courts of the Caliphs, it was no less the case in the
vernacular and within non-state contexts in post-classical Arabia up to the modern day. “The

See the example of the ‘āzī from 1996 cited below as one example of the mythopoetic function of
Omani poetry.
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For more in-depth looks at Islamic kingship and legitimacy see Belkaziz (2009) for a presentation of
modern Islamic philosophical perspectives; Oakley (2006, Ch. 2) for a historical comparative perspective;
Akbarzadeh and Saeed (2003) for a contemporary comparative perspective; Reid and Gilsenan (2007) on
Islamic state legitimacy in South and Central Asia.
For a recounting of the major changes that the qaṣīda underwent in this period see Badawi’s (1980)
description of “primary” (Pre-Islamic) versus secondary (later) qaṣīda-s.
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vernacular poetry of premodern Arabia,” according to Sowayan, “is a register of social events and
a codification of the moral principles and cultural values that made life… meaningful” for Arab
communities (1985, 17-8). In addition to this larger function, poetry was a critical means of
communication between tribes and individuals, whether badū or ḥaḍr (see Sowayan 1985, 53-66
for badū contexts, Ch. IV for the ḥaḍr). It is in this sense that vernacular poetic genres, be they the
nabaṭī traditions so valorized by the Gulf states, or the ‘āzī and razḥa in Oman, have formed a
crucial form of social commentary for Peninsular Arabs.
Yemeni vernacular poetry especially has been studied as a discourse “about, within, and
sometimes against” power. Steven Caton, in his study Peaks of Yemen I Summon: Poetry as
Cultural Practice in a North Yemeni Tribe (1990), highlights the moral and political role of
improvised oral poetry in a number of violent and nonviolent feuds, weddings, and everyday
interactions in Khawlān aṭ-Ṭiyāl in Northern Yemen. Caton writes that, for his tribal interlocutors,
rather than espousing universal truth or beauty, “the poet reveals only specific truths: he is
concerned with providing solutions to particular and concrete problems of political action” (1990,
182). Rather than wreathing universal truths with the garlands of beautiful phrasing, the poet has
a social obligation to identify issues of concern and prompt their solution. Lucine Taminian’s
(2001) dissertation on genres of Yemeni poetry documents how norms and practices of the
classical qaṣīda are managed and creatively transformed into the vernacular in a community of
other poets, who are often critically engaged in both poetical and social change. The form of the
qaṣīda is not a limitation on expression, but rather a set of norms that “[turns] poetic production
into a craft and the mastery of which requires the acquisition of specific linguistic and prosodic
knowledge" (Taminian 2001, v). Anthropologist Flagg Miller writes in his 2007 The Moral
Resonance of Arab Media: Audiocassette Poetry and Culture in Yemen that “Yemenis praise the
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use of folk poetry for ‘solving problems’ in the community…like doctors, I was told, poets could
‘reveal the truth’ (yikshif al-ḥaqīqah)” (2007, 107). He details what he calls the “epistolary
practice” of audiocassette poetry in the bid’ wa jiwāb (he translates this as “initiation and
response”) genre, in which poets trade poetic works that share prosodic patterning, melodic and
thematic material, and phrasing. Poems, Miller concludes, cannot be understood in isolation from
the answers or responses they have elicited or are responding to, nor can they be separated from
the political and material realities of the time of their composition. He cites a number of bid’ wa
jiwāb exchanges that occurred between regional governors and their constituencies: one in
particular, composed in 1957, sought to restore tribal unity in opposing British aerial campaigns
and colonial presence in Aden (Miller 2007,148-50). Kantrien Vanpee’s 2015 dissertation has
brought literary examination of the classical qasīḍa themes of praise and boasting into the nabaṭī
poetry of the 21st century by studying their use in waṭaniyya (“nationalistic,” or “patriotic”) poems
in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Vanpree examines both printed scholarship and the popular
nabaṭī competition TV program shā‘ir al-milyūn (“Poet of the Millions”) and ultimately concludes
that these poems “should be understood as one of the many guises of mubāya‘a,” an iteration of
“the performative lexicon of allegiance” to recognized leaders dating to the time of the prophet
Muḥammad (2014, iii, 99-102). These scholars all show how Arabic vernacular poetry constitutes
social action within a certain milieu, highlighting the agonistic, persuasive, moral, political, and
affiliative aspects of sung verse.
The Path of Glory: Praise in Oman
In my initial interviews on the subject of Omani poetic forms, I chose not to focus on the
literary qaṣīda, but rather on uniquely Omani forms of oral poetry: the processional choral ode,
‘āzī, and the shorter war-dance razḥa, which are forms linked in performance and function. I
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expected to find shades of the previous role of Arab poets in these Omani forms, especially the
mixture of praise and invective within single poetic genres. Such a mixture of types had been
reported by other scholars of post-classical oral poetry: in the non-qaṣīda genres of zāmil, bālā
and Jewish ḥumaynī poems, along with the vernacular bid‘ wa-jiwāb qaṣīda-s of Yemen (Caton
1990; Miller 2007; Wagner 2009); in both ghinnāwa and nabaṭī poetry amongst the Bedouin (Abu
Lughod 1986; Lavie 1990; Holes and Abu Athera 2009); nabaṭī in Saudi Arabia (Sowayan 1985,
1992; Kurpershoek 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002); as well as extemporized verbal dueling genres in
Palestine and Saudi Arabia (Sbait 1989, 1993; Sowayan 1989; Yaqub 2007 and Urkevich 2015,
23). Further, studies of the classical medieval qaṣīda indicate that praise neighbored blame even
in panegyric poetry (Sharlet 2011; Sperl 1989, 2009; Stekevych 2002, 2010). However, I did not
find Omani poets to wield invective as much as they wielded praise, nor do I expect invective—
covert or otherwise—to be some putative core of Omani oral poetry at all. The reason for this is
not that Omanis are not or cannot be sharp-tongued, but rather that the very poetic genres that I
had chosen to study were appropriate for some kinds of poetic expression but not others: namely,
for praise and not for blame.
a. Introducing the ‘āzī in Oman
I translate the term ‘āzī, as a performance practice in Oman, as a processional choral ode.39
This is because the ‘āzī is a presentation of an ode, a qaṣīda, by a single declaimer who calls to a
responding chorus, usually several dozen individuals, as they all march in a line or circle. The
declaimer stands at the head of a small group of drummers and swordsmen, which in turn march

The Omani Ministry of Culture, when it sought to inscribe the ‘āzī as a part of our human intangible
cultural heritage through UNESCO, prefers the term “processional elegy.” The English term “elegy,”
derived from the Greek elegeia, is incorrect. Elegy refers to lament and is dedicated to the dead.
39

128
at the head of a larger group. Often, these groups march together in a long line, but occasionally
the declaimer’s smaller group marches around the inside of a large circle framed by the chorus
group. During my fieldwork, the declaimer held an Omani straight-bladed sword, sayf, and a
buckler, turs. Sometimes, the poet carried a smartphone or a piece of paper behind the turs or even
instead of it, but this was frowned upon. The chorus members usually carry weapons, which might
be swords, shields, or rifles. After hemistiches, the chorus might discharge their rifles, slap the
swords and shields together, or snap their swords in such a way that the blade “buzzes” and shakes
(O.Ar. verb: hāz, yihizz), a crucial gesture of armed manliness and grace in wielding the weapon.
Drummers would play short bursts after hemistiches, but also play fast rolls after full lines, trailing
off in tempo as the declaimer took up the verse again. All participants also shout conventional
phrases at particular structural locations that varied from one region to another.
The term ‘āzī refers both to the person who “recites” or “throws” (O. Ar. yilqā’) the poem,40
and the form of the poem itself. ‘Āzī itself means several things. It can refer to praise and praising:
“Omanis say: ‘So-and-so ‘āzī-s41 you!’ or ‘He ‘āzī-s42 of you!’, meaning, he enumerates your
virtues and your fine and noble distinctions. He is proud of you all, or he humbly requests of you
that you support him” (al-Shaydī 2008, 204). The term ‘āzī can also refer to an act of appeal for
help, support, or aid in an activity. Most importantly, at least conceptually, it can also refer to
genealogy and lineage, and especially the invocation or elucidation of them. In classical Arabic,
this term refers to the delineation of a lineage, or of tracing some thing back along a history. 43 Al-

This person is also sometimes called the “poet,” shā‘ir, “singer (of nasheed),” munshid (al-Shaydī
2008, 205), or “performer,” mu’addī.
40

41

A form I verb of ‘-z-ū.

42

A form VIII verb of ‘-z-ū.

The classical definition includes, interestingly, “laying blame,” but this is not a part of current usage in
Oman. I do not know if this relates to the former capacity of ‘āzī to lay blame.
43
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Shaydī offers a linguistic example: “so-and-so traced [themselves] back to so-and-so by way of
lineage (‘azwā’an or ‘aziyyan)44, or, his relation to him, truly or falsely” (2008, 204).
In fact, famed ‘āzī Muḥammad bin ‘Alī al-Marzūqī describes the opening section of the
‘āzī as ‘azwā, referring specifically to the tracing of an ancestry, a commonality of history. What
most poets think was summed up by al-Marzūqī when he described ‘āzī as a kind of nasaba (root:
n-s-b refers to “relation; tracing”), that is, a kind of genealogical reckoning. Al-Marzūqī stated in
a television interview on ‘āzī that:
āzā [the root of ‘āzī] means nasaba [n-s-b]. So the ‘āzī-singer is a nāsib [n-s-b], a
“genealogist.”45 And the Omani, because he is the son of glory, because he is the son of
history, you always find this same inclination to a relation (intisāb, n-s-b) to his
community, a relation to his ’umma, a relation to his glory, history, civilization. And due
to that, this art came, this art unique to Oman, only Oman, and it expresses this Omani
characteristic. If an Omani, it’s said, ‘āzī-s another, perhaps his bin ‘am (extended family),
or his nation, or his tribe—(he states) his relation to them; he makes clear to them the path
to glory by way of example. 46
An ‘āzī is both a presentation of and a claim on a certain genealogy. The ‘āzī calls on living
ancestors of a certain lineage to praise them and to compare them to their forbears, thus praising
them all and exhorting them to certain actions or continued good behavior. Most scholars refer to
the main text of the ‘āzī as a “qaṣīda,” even as a qaṣīda nabaṭiyya (al-Shaydī 2008, 205-8). AlMarzūqī echoes most of my interlocutors when he claims that the main theme of the ‘āzī is fakhr

This is an awkward translation, utilizing the adjectival ḥāl construction, or “accusative of state,” of ‘azā
(Hassanein 2006, 79). That is, “s.o. traces their lineage back in the manner of tracing one’s lineage back.”
This is made more difficult by the disagreement of the trilateral root: either ‘-z-ū or ‘-z-ā (Wehr, 1994, ‘z-ū/’-z-ā).
44

The active participle, or ’ism fā‘il of n-s-b in Omani Arabic. In classical Arabic, a genealogist is nissāb,
a construction similar to the construction for carpenter (nijjār), butcher (jizzār), qaṣīda writer (qaṣṣād),
zajal writer (zajjāl), etc.
45

OmanTvGeneral. “liqā’ ma‘ ‘U. Muḥammad bin ‘Alī al-Marzūqī li-l-ḥadīth ‘an “fann al-‘āzī” fī
barnāmaj Min ‘Umān” [An interview with Muḥammad bin ‘Alī al-Marzūqī to discuss the ‘āzī on the
program ‘From Oman’ ”]. Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 2 Dec. 2013. Web. 13 July 2017.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eHAxsbwJBP8
46
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(self-praise or boasting) and madḥ (praise). He does not mention blame, satire, invective, lampoon,
or criticism—a number of terms denoted by hijā’—at all.
This omission is interesting especially when we consider the structure of the ‘āzī. The
opening section, which al-Marzūqī calls the ‘azwā, is usually referred to as al-ṣayḥāt (shouts), alhitāfāt (calls, acclamations), or, in the interior, al-ta‘iyūṭa (to call out). This is a sequence of calls
and responses (in parantheses) that begins:
Yā muslimīn tikabbar!

O, Muslims! Stand proud!

(Allāhu akbār!)
’Asūd a‘āzī bi-‘asūd!

(God is great!)
Lions! I praise/call on lions!

(’Asūd!)
’Asūd wilād al-‘amm!
(’Asūd!)
’Asūd baḥar al-ṭumm!
(’Asūd!)
’Asūd jabal al-ṣumm!
(’Asūd!)
’Asūd ahil al-rakiḍāt!
(’Asūd!)
’Asūd ahil al-sayḥāt!
(’Asūd!)

(Lions!)
Lions! Kin!
(Lions!)
Lions! The depths of the sea!
(Lions!)
Lions! The massive mountains!
(Lions!)
Lions! The riders of war-mounts!
(Lions!)
Lions! The people of the sayḥāt! [treeless
gravel plains]
(Lions!)

After this introductory call-and-response, the ‘āzī presents the poem to a conventional melody.
Depending on the location and the form of the qaṣīda, the poet calls out either two or four lines of
poetry before the procession responds. To mark the beginning of the declaimer’s poetry, he would
sing: āh, iwāb yallah iwāb47 (Answer, Oh God, answer). Between hemistiches, or a certain number

Iwāb = O.Ar., gawwāb = CLA, jawwāb. I do not know why some words are pronounced with the
“Emirati” pronunciation of jīm as yā’ rather than the Inner Omani gā’, or why others, like qāf, are
pronounced as gā’, a characteristic of the upper Gulf, Yemen, and the central and northern Arabian
Peninsula.
47
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of feet, taf‘īl, the chorus responds with: wa silimt! (Surely; unobjectionable!). After the conclusion
of the couplet or quatrain, the poet usually sings subyān akbār al-shiyim!48 (youths of the greatest
moral character!) or mulk allah yidūm!49 (the reign of God is everlasting!). After this, the
procession would give a long loud vocable cry: Āh! In analysis, final vowels are lengthened such
that silence is only very brief and avoided if possible. It is the wave of sound produced by the
chorus that propels the ‘āzī to sing.
We can take a short example from an ‘āzī “thrown” by a young Muḥammad bin ‘Alī alMarzūqī at the Sultan’s tent in celebration of the Eid al-Adha in 1996 in the northern Bāṭina coastal
town of Ṣaḥam.50 This is one “unit” of an ‘āzī couplet, by which I mean the couplet itself and the
frame markers that surround it and orient the listener.
āh, iwāb yallah iwāb

Answer, O God, Answer. [First frame marker.]

suna‘a al-’imāna wa-l-ḥalāl

[The ‘Azd tribe] made peace and rightness

ṭaradu al-furus wa burṭughāl!
(wa silimt!)
Al-‘azd yā nimr ar-rigāl,

[by] Throwing out the Persians and Portugal.
(Surely!) [distich line marker.]
The ‘Azd!, O tiger of men,

Ahil marwiyya wa-sh-shiyim!

Storied people, of great moral character.

Ṣubyān ya akbār al-shiyim!

Youths of the greatest moral character! [Ending of
couplet marker.]

(wa mulk allah yidūm!)

(And the reign of God is everlasting.) [End of unit
marker].

48

Usually considered a conventional ending in the coastal Bāṭina region.

49

Usually considered a conventional ending in the interior Dakhiliyya region.

Oman video. “Al-‘āzī – wilāya Ṣaḥam (Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al-Marzūqī) / al-mahrajān al-sha‘abī (‘īd alaḍḥā al-mubarak) 29-4-1996” [The ‘āzī – The State of Ṣaḥam (Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al-Marzūqī) / Popular
Festival (Eid al-Adha) 29-4-1996]. Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 28 Aug. 2016. Web. 13 July
2017.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8qXBRYx86A&t=0s&list=PLtxUcpgmZ5So0KE9u3lfkoGutVDSO0
Ofq&index=12
50
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Here, we can see how the conventional “frame markers” orient the listener to the text and
aid in the memorization of the text. Before the couplet begins, the ‘āzī cuts through the long cry
given by the procession to make the couplet heard. He then gives the first line of the couplet and
the procession responds. Finally, he completes the couplet and marks its completion with another
formula. Between full couplets, the procession carries the note in their long cry and the sequence
begins again.
b. Praise and Blame in ‘āzī
Here I want to present some transcriptions from my initial interviews with the ‘āzī Aḥmad
al-Riyāmī in al-Ma‘arā, in wilāyāt Manaḥ in 2015:
BJG (author): What would you say are the main topics of ‘āzī?
AR: The main topics? Well, praise, pride, the community (al-gumā‘a), the local homeland (aldīra), the nation, Qābūs,… these things. Al-‘āzī is praise (madīḥa), of course.
BJG: Praise? Who do you praise in al-‘āzī? Or what, I mean.
AR: I mean, it depends on the, the occasion. You need to praise the group you are with… The
community, Qābūs, the patron (rā‘ī), the same things as the topics, really. Like I told you, I write
an ‘āzī on the basis of the celebration, the occasion. Of course in the old days (zamān al-’awwal),
it was the tribe, tribal boasting (fakhr al-qabīla) was a part, and spreading news or events, meetings
between tribes, peace negotiations (al-ṣulḥ), and the like.
BJG: Now, praise, that’s one of the main types of poetry, is that not so?
AR: Yes, that’s correct…
BJG: And there are other types, several other types: there’s praise, there’s love (al-ghazal wa-lā
al-ḥubb) for example…
AR: Yes, of course!
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BJG: … there’s boasting (fakhr), there’s description (waṣf), there’s elegy (marthiyya)…
AR: …marthiyya, yes [laughs]…
BJG:…and then finally, there’s invective or satire (hijā’). So, praise and invective are the most
important…
AR: [cutting the air with his hand] No, no, no, no, no. Never invective, no, no, no. Without
invective, no, ‘āzī is praise, like I said. Love, maybe, description, maybe, but it is first and foremost
praise.
BJG: By God, you don’t use invective in ‘āzī?
AR: By God, we never use invective, not really. (Hushed tone) How could I throw lines of
invective (kayf ilqā biyūt min al-hijā’) in an ‘āzī from my own mouth? No, that’s completely
disrespectful (ghayr muḥtaram b-il-tamām). No, no, no (softly tutting).
BJG: … I mean, never? You’ve never heard a line of invective in an ‘āzī?
AR: (Gently) No, doctor. Never in my life in this art. Imagine, a line of invective sitting amongst
the praise! (khayyal bayt min al-hijā’ gālis ‘and al-madīḥa).
This is a very strong response, and not typical of most of my interviews. Often, poets or
performers would not disagree as strongly as Aḥmad. What Aḥmad is explaining to me for the first
time is how to properly separate madīḥa and fakhr, praise, from hijā’, blame. In ‘āzī, the proper
theme is only praise—of the self, the tribe, the ruler, the nation.
I translate hijā’ as “blame” here advisedly, because the category of satire, invective, and
defamatory verse in English language scholarship is largely collectively referred to as “blame”
when it is explicitly contrasted with praise (see Burrow 2008; Kurke 2010(1991]; Sharlet 2011).
As it turns out, this distinction is not only of extreme antiquity, but also crucial to the social
functioning of panegyric. I now want to turn to investigating this separation, alongside several
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other general principles that become important to hearing praise. We shall see that in ‘āzī the result
of this separation bears more resemblance to the “indirect criticism” (feng 諷) of Chinese praise
poetry than to the outright mixture of praise and blame that animates other such praise contexts.
This, in turn, interrelates with Omani notions of shūrā, or consultation between rulers and the
ruled.
There are five general principles that are important to the social function of praise poetry
in Oman that are relevant to my argument:
1) the separation of madīḥa and fakhr from hijā’;
2) that proper praise “magnifies” and improper praise or blame “diminishes”;
3) that praise is addressed to power and aimed at integrating power into community;
4) that praise manages power relationships by manipulating fame, name, and reputation;
5) that praise is civic labor, an obligatory response to generosity and an inducement to
further giving.
In this chapter, I discuss the first two points in depth. The other three will be addressed in
subsequent chapters that present why I believe praise poetry facilitates generosity and grants
legitimacy borne out of sense of cross-class mutuality in Oman. What is interesting about Omani
conceptions about the relationship of praise poetry and power is that they highlight both cultural
notions of poetry, praise, and authority of extreme time-depth and the impact of more recent
conflicts borne of authoritarian state formation, cultural policy, and the flows of global capital.
When we consider that the primary patron and target of praise poetry nowadays is the state,
symbolized by the personage of Sultan Qābūs, this leap is less daunting than it may at first seem.
Praise and Blame
Ní fuilet a maíne,
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nocho mó a-tá a maisse
nocho mór a géire:
Nocho déine acht braisse.
His riches are non-existent,
and his beauty is no greater,
nor great is his acuteness.
He does nothing but boast.
(A Middle Irish satirical verse, c. 1036).
As this short Irish poem shows, praise and blame are considered close kin in many places
and times: the mere removal of negative markers would render this poem as praise. Aḥmad’s
insistence on separating praise and blame is not unique to Omanis, but the way in which this is
achieved in Omani oral poetry does distinguish Oman from its near neighbors. In this section, I
trace the evolution of the separation of praise and blame in poetic discourse in Ancient Greece,
Latin and Northern Europe, and the Medieval Middle East. This circuitous route is actually much
more straightforward than it initially may sound.
Of primary importance to generalized (and elite) notions of poetics51 in all these societies
was Aristotle’s Poetics (c. 335 BCE), translated into Arabic c. 320/932 from a Syriac version
dating from c. 81/700 CE (Kemal 1991, 1-2). Poetics was the subject of a series of commentaries,
syntheses, and summaries by nearly every light of “Golden Age” Islamic philosophy, especially
in the Aristotelian and anti-Aristotelian continua adumbrated by al-Fārābi (d. 339/950, Latinized
as “Alpharabius”), Ibn Ṣīnā (d. 428/1037, “Avicenna”), al-Ghazzālī (d. 504/1111, “Algazel”), and
Ibn Rushd (d. 594/1198, “Averroës”). Rather than comb through the various analytics and claims
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While it is true that Islamic philosophies of poetics circulated amongst the elite, recent scholarship by
Jocelyn Sharlet (2011) makes the important case that, especially in the case of poetry and poetics, there
was a huge degree of social mobility in the Medieval Middle East and Central Asia. Successful court
poets came from many backgrounds and were exposed to elite culture, including philosophy, during their
stay. Further, Burrow (2008, chapter 2), makes the case that elite Latin cultural notions were just as
present in the English vernacular, evidenced by their discussion in Beowulf.
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made by these philosophers, it suits our purpose merely to distill the differences that they felt they
were justified in making to Aristotle’s notions of poetics. Though such skirting over of details is
certainly and avowedly problematic, excellent summaries, commentaries, and investigations from
much more qualified scholars are readily available (for example, Adamson and Taylor 2005;
Butterworth 1977; Corbin 2001; Dahiyat 1974; Kemal 1991).
Simply put, all of these scholars were interested in understanding both the social role of
poetics and its logical status vis-à-vis formal logic, language, mathematics, music, and geometry.
The reason for this, I would argue, is the high status accorded to poetry amongst the early Muslims.
Later Islamic scholars, in Kemal’s words, had to reckon with the fact that poetry was considered
to have “a relation to our minds, emotions, and behaviour which make it important to politics and
the community of Islam,” which also justifies its use as a grammatical aid to the Qur’ān (Cantarino
1975, 80-99; Kemal 1991, 79).
The most important and succinct summary of Aristotle’s work is Ibn Rushd’s, in which he
claims that “every poem and poetic statement is either praise (madīḥ) or blame (hijā’)” (1986, 54).
It was this bifurcated conception of Aristotle’s Poetics that was brought into Latin as laudatio and
vituperatio by Hermannus Alemannus (Hermann the German) in 13th century CE Spain. While
later commentators criticized Ibn Rushd’s translation of the Greek terms for “tragedy” and
“comedy” as “madīḥ” and “hijā’” as incorrect, Rebecca Gould has suggested instead that “Ibn
Rushd transposed Aristotle’s historical genealogy [that all poetic discourse originated from
distinguishing encomium, or praise, from lampoon, or blame], which pertained only to past literary
production, into a general theory of poetry” (2014, 3). Ibn Rushd’s intent was to universalize the
insights he found Aristotle’s Poetics and to “explicate a poetics more appropriate to his Andalusian
milieu” (4). When understood as Ibn Rushd did, “praise and blame were to shape subsequent
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discourse about literature in the Islamic world and Christendom well into the early modern period”
(3). A near contemporary of Ibn Rushd, the Qur’ānic scholar Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (“The Monk
of Iṣfahān,” d. 502/1109), neatly summarizes the intensity of this distinction: “let one who is not
moved to pleasure by praise or who does not react to blame with repulsion be reckoned dead”
(cited in Sharlet 2014, 8).
If we can clearly show that elite literary discourse embraced a strict distinction between
praise and blame, it is no less the case that this distinction operated throughout the society in
question. In a 2012 dissertation on the social milieu of pre-Islamic poets, Hamad Alajmi relates a
story about the relationship between praise and blame. Bishr, the great poet, composed some lines
of blame against the family of ‘Aws and his mother Su‘adā. After capturing Bishr,
Aws went to his mother, Suʻdá, and told her, “I got the one who attacked you and me [in
his verse], what do you think I should do with him?” Suʻdá replied, “I think you should
give him his property back, forgive him, and provide him with gifts, and I too will do the
same, for nothing can, except his madīḥ, wash away his hijā’. ” (2012, 186-7)
Praise and blame counteract each other. However, and more importantly, they are meaningful
because they have real social weight, because the poem outlasts the poet. This is evidenced by
examining any of the many societies in which poets have held a crucial functional role in relation
to authority.
a. Praise and Blame in Early Medieval Ireland
I want to take an extended look at one such society. I present some data on early medieval
Irish society (c. 8th-12th century CE) as an example of both the heights to which this division of
praise from blame can be theorized and the crucial social role that poets could claim in this context.
In a highly conservative, hierarchical, and decentralized society, poets played a crucial role by
communicating between leaders and managing the circulation of praise and blame by manipulating
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honor.52 Honor was not the abstract but reciprocal system of self- and other-regarding senses of
personal and collective worth that was formulated in Juliian Pitts-River’s classic 1965 article, but
rather, as Roisin McLaughlin’s Early Irish Satire (2008) puts it:
The importance of reputation in early Ireland is reflected in the concept of lóg n-enech
‘honour-price’. This established the amount of compensation due to a person in the event
of an injury and also acted as a measure of his status in a hierarchical society. (21)
This was a literal price that varied with structural position and could be voided due to improper
behavior. McLaughlin provides a useful overview of Old and Middle Irish sources that
demonstrates the types and varieties of satire available to the Irish poet, fili. Her description of the
fili’s milieu and role will already seem familiar to us:
Operating within such [an honorbound, highly conservative, hierarchical, and
decentralized] society, the poet wielded considerable power through his ability to praise
and satirise: just as a person’s honour could be enhanced through praise, so his standing in
society could be diminished through satire. (2008, 1)
Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī would likely agree with a law recorded in the Irish heptads: “There are seven
kings in Irish law who are not entitled to compensation or honour-price… [one of them is] a king
who tolerates satire or satirising” (McLaughlin 2008, 3-4). Here rendered as satire, blame was
accorded legal status in early Ireland and was tightly regulated. The early Irish judged satire to be
“justified or unjustified” according to the facts of the specific case. Justified satire was the due of
evil, greedy, or stupid deeds. Unjust satire required the payment of the honour-price of the
slandered party. This tight regulation was partly due to the cultural notion that blame was
considered a very serious threat to life and limb53—specifically one’s honor, enech, literally
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Fergus Kelly, in his A Guide to Early Irish Law, relates that only kings, lords, priests, and poets (I.,
filidh) were reckoned as having “fully privileged” status, called nemed (1988, 43).
Poets were considered to have magical means at their disposal as well – in a famous episode of The
Annals of Ulster, the poet-chief of all Ireland, Cuán ua Lothcháin, was killed in Tethba. Those that killed
53
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“cheek” or “face.” Kelly points out that the Irish terms for satire are commonly rendered as áerad
(striking) or rindad (cutting), and McLaughlin notes that a common motif of “cutting the face” of
the satirized so that blood would pour down their cheeks, literally and figuratively, was particularly
evocative (Kelly 1988, 137; McLaughlin 2008, 4-5). As late as 1414 CE, we are told, Lord
Lieutenant John Stanley died of satire-induced wounds (McLaughlin 2008, 4-5). Satire was also
legally regulated because rampant, uncontrolled blame could deeply upset the balance between the
various Irish túath, or kingdoms. Just as early Irish filidh had access to a powerful legal sanction
on their rulers, so too were unsanctioned satirists (cáinte) “reviled by both secular and
ecclesiastical authorities” because they wielded blame without the proper credentials (McLaughlin
2008, 4). Praise and blame were so well divided that “fraudulent poets” (filidh díupartach) were
considered to have their nemed status degraded, and “false praise” (tár molta) was considered to
be the “equivalent of satire” in its ill effects and legal status (2008, 6, 7).
Part of the credentials required by Irish filidh was understanding the varieties of legal satire,
outlined in the Old Irish tract Cis li Fodlai Aíre?, “How Many Divisions of Satire Are There?” and
various later commentaries. To cement the point, McLaughlin has translated a selection of 87
stanzas of Middle Irish poetry that classify the versified modes of satire (which she helpfully
numbers for our clarity):
1) Satires and curses (nos. 1-30).
2) Invectives, which are further classified into four types:
Type A: a series of abusive epithets in the vocative in which the subject is addressed
by name (nos. 31-49).
Type B: a series of abusive epithets in the vocative in which the subject remains
anonymous or is at most identified with a particular place (nos. 50-6).

him all “became putrid within the hour. That was a poet’s miracle” (Mac Airt and Mac Niocaill 1983,
462-64).
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Type C: a series of abusive epithets in the nominative in which the subject is named
(nos. 57-79) [for an example, see the poem 68, Rí Connacht, cenn lemain, “The King
of Connacht, a block-head”].
Type D: a series of abusive epithets in the nominative in which the subject remains
anonymous or is at most identified with a particular place (nos. 80-6) (2008, 2-3)
That satire was simultaneously a powerful tool and carefully regulated in Early Ireland should now
be abundantly clear. Palinode-s, praise poems, however, were considered an even more powerful
social tool. An unjustified satire demanded praise as recompense, rather than honor-price, because
“praise was believed to negate the ill effects of satire” (McLaughlin 2008, 7). What makes this
case so interesting and relevant to the separation of praise from blame, however, is the extent to
which the Irish agreed on why this was so valuable. An example from an Old Irish text on law is
worth quoting in full: “No wise or learned person should doubt that blood is shed by words and
tongue as it is seen to be shed by hands with weapons, i.e., no knowledgeable person thinks that
false words are any less of a sin than shedding of blood by hand” (McLaughlin 2008, 4-5). Satire
is a dangerous game, for it draws blood as surely and as easily as a sword or spear. Satire is a
means of last resort.
b. Praise, blame, and conflict
While we cannot ask early Irish filidh why this was so, they might agree with what an ~60year-old ‘āzī54 from the wilāya of ’Izkī had to say.
BJG: O bā, have you heard of blame being used in al-‘āzī?

54

Who requested to remain anonymous throughout this dissertation.
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AI: Hmm, blame. You mean strong/harsh words (kalām shadīda), is that not so? Hāāāāy, you
know the stock phrases of the ‘āzī… Asūd, gabal al-ṣumm! Asūd, baḥar al-ṭumm! (You lions, you
massive mountains! You lions, you depths of the sea!)
BJG: This is blame? This is…
AI: Asūd al-mashhūrīn! (You lions of the famed ones!) No, it’s not blame (hijā’) as the qaṣīda
poets have it (‘and munaẓẓim al-qaṣā’id). No, that’s not for ‘āzī; these are strong/harsh words,
meaning, words of war. Fighting words, you might say. (AI pushes out his chest and gestures
broadly) We will come at the enemy like the crashing waves of a typhoon! We are as steadfast as
the massive mountain peaks; unmoveable! (Iḥnā b-agī’ ‘a-l-‘adū ka-amwāg al-‘āṣifa! thābitūn kaqimmat al-gabāl al-ṭumm, ṣāmudūn!) You know, among the old-timers (kibār al-sinn), these
words were heavy (kān wāgid thaqīl), very heavy.
BJG: Heavy? Do you mean it was a declaration of war? Between the tribes, or…?
AI: Al-ḥamdulillah, no, may God preserve His Majesty Qābūs bin Sa‘īd Āl Bū Sa‘īd. Honestly, I
mean more like these are words one needs to believe in (‘alayh yu’min bihā), do you follow me?
They’re not weak words.
I believe that AI invoked the personage of Sultan Qābūs in order to avoid talking about
tribal conflict, even conflict that, in his case, was purely theoretical. He was just a boy when the
Royal Air Force was being deployed against the Nizār quarter of ’Izkī and further up into the
mountains.
However, as political scientist Marc Valeri has recorded, Interior Ibāḍīs still clearly share
the “memory of the Jabal Akhdar war in the 1950s, when the Sultan’s Armed Forces and the British
destroyed the Imamate… people in Inner Oman remember how bad the al-Būsa‘īd were and know
they are all alike” (2015, 36-37). As I learned from other young performers, there is a shared
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memory of tribal conflict, all relegated to the time “before Qābūs.” Here I discussed the issue with
a young member of the Firqat ’Izkī lil-funūn al-sha‘abiyya in 2015:
MFI: Al-ḥamdulillah, there are no bloody conflicts (mā shay ṣarā‘āt damawiya) like that
nowadays (referring to fighting between the Nizār and Yaman sections of ’Izkī). But why are we
called Yaman, doctor?
BJG: Tell me, akhī.
MFI: Because we are true Arabs, we came from Yemen. We are of the Qaḥtān. You know, ’Izkī
is far older than other towns, Nizwā for example. Nizwā is a youth compared to us greybeards in
’Izkī, [we laugh] truly, truly. But the important point is that us in Yaman, we are brothers of
Yemenis. And what of them now? Their situation is dire, dire, I mean (ḥālathū ḥāāāl, ya‘nī).
Fighting between the tribes, there is no winner, blood flows without end and the battles stretch out
(ṭālat)… may God preserve and protect them, the good-hearted, the humble. Wallahi, we are blood
brothers… God is all-knowing.
There but for the grace of God go I, MFI seems to be saying. His rumination on the current
conflict in Yemen links it directly to tribal and state conflict, a conflict that drags on and on. He is
making a point that is commonly heard in Oman: that without the guidance of Qābūs, or Omanis
“natural” distaste for conflict, or some other reason, contemporary Oman might look just like
Yemen (Phillips and Hunt 2017). The linkage here, between “strong words” and the potential for
tribal conflict, underlies the contradictions that swirl around the popularity of performance
practices so deeply linked with warfare and tribal conflict occurring in a state context that presents
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itself as an “oasis of peace” (wāḥa al-salām). In a conversation with an ‘āzī in Bahlā,55 he
responded to my question about whether he had heard of hijā’ in ‘āzī with a snort:
No, he said, and do you know why? When you are with your friends and you make a
mistake, they mock you “O fool, congratulations on such and such” in a sarcastic way,
what do you do? I said, you return the insult! Exactly, he said, it’s back and forth, reply,
reply, reply, reply like bullets shot back and forth. Then everyone is fighting, everyone’s
face is blackened [everyone is shamed]. The nature of ‘āzī is above this. (Fieldnote:
5/23/2016)
The poet is making the case that praise in ‘āzī is more high-minded, more collectively ennobling
than blame.
Kurke makes a similar point in her discussion of epinikia praise poetry in 5th century BCE
Greece when she writes that for Pindar, “each act of praising [was] a deliberate choice not to
blame” and incite conflict (1991, 87). For Pindar, there must be nothing mean in the praise, because
while praise is the construction of poetic community, blame is the active destruction of it, and
giving praise well and honestly is a reflection on the praiser’s virtue as well as the praised (87-90).
We shall see more of this discourse when we discuss the role of praise in facilitating generosity
and community in chapter three. We can conclude by examining Hoffman’s report that, during the
conflict between Kita griots, the very act of listing all the problematic behavior of the belligerents
would be physically dangerous:
So extreme was the anger and consternation of the griot leaders over their Kita brethren’s
refusal to resolve their conflict that to communicate it in elaborate speech, to go over every
detail, to rehearse all the faults and lay blame upon the guilty would have had even more
deleterious effects. Primary among these would have been the release of lethal quantities
of ɲama,56 of which more than enough to maim, kill, destroy relationships, and disturb the
55

This conversation was not recorded due to a technical failure. I reproduce his answer from my
fieldnotes written in my car after the interview, hence the looser translation.
56

The impersonal natural/mystical energy that Mande believe suffuse all things and activities. Exertion
and conflict, even or perhaps especially in words, release quantities of ɲama that are considered deadly
(Hoffman 2000, 67-8).
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peace of the griot had already been unleashed during the two years of warfare… all had
been wronged; all had done wrong. So much hurtful individual and collective history, so
much emotional damage, could not be adequately expressed with words. (2000, 182)
The Mande griots cited here see explicitly laying out every personal and collective wrong as simply
rousing antipathies that are best left unroused. Further, as Hoffmann adds, every party was guilty.
The recitation of these wrongs, especially amongst such a tight community, would simply lead to
more conflict. The Baṣran Islamic jurist al-Mawardi once wrote that the poet “is one who rides a
lion: people fear him because of his mount, [yet] he himself is even more fearful” (cited in Sharlet
2011, 35). Poets are powerful, but they must be wary of that power.
At the end of a conversation with Ḥamad al-Tawbī, he once grew frustrated with my
insistence on criticism. “Look,” he said,
all of us have faults and have erred. What good does it do, what benefit is there to casting
blame at one another? (natalāwimu b‘aḍinā b‘aḍ?) Everyone knows the failings of the
others (nadrī kullunā al-muwalimāt wa-l-mashākil māl al-‘awkhirīn), do we say, ‘I
rebuke/blame you, O whoever? (alūmik yā hūwa yā hīya)? No, no. Do you remember the
first razḥa we talked about? [sings] Khūtī lā talamūnī /hināk rūḥī makhazūnuh (O brothers,
don’t blame/rebuke me, There is where my soul is kept). ‘Don’t blame/rebuke me’, he is
part of the community, we don’t distance ourselves from him (mū nab‘ad ‘anuh).
In small, rural societies like Manaḥ and its villages, where population is low and the future, as
anthropologist Mandana Limbert (2010) has shown, is felt as deeply uncertain, picking fights and
casting blame is a self-destruction that must be avoided.
c. A lesson in praise and blame
Praise and blame were separated because they had different functions and they had
different results. Sharlet indicates as much when she writes that, amongst Medieval Islamic praise
poets, “intentional ambiguity of praise and blame was valorized, unintentional conflations were
not” (2011, 18). Similarly, among the early Irish, two types of mixture are telling: “áer co ndath
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molta, ‘satire with the colour of praise’, and molad co ndath aíre, ‘praise with the colour of satire’”
(McLaughlin 2008, 8). Praise and satire could be mixed, but carefully and without confusing the
two. Confusion between blame and praise could be socially disastrous. While the results of satire
could sometimes be dangerous, with praise it was rarely so. Of course, anyone who participated in
systems of praise was aware of the danger of false praise, seeking payment, and the like. However,
for Omanis, it is not just that blame can instigate social troubles. Rather, it is, as many
ethnomusicologists have noted, that speaking praise and blame has effects on the moral climate
within which one is constituted (an idea particularly well-studied in India, cf. Rahaim 2012;
Weidman 2006).
One night, sharing strong ginger tea with a performance troupe in Manaḥ after hours of
dancing for the ‘īd al-fiṭr, the conversation drifted to an ‘āzī performer that I had recently
interviewed. Several members of the group I was now sitting with in the mājlis had warned me not
to talk to him, saying, “We bring the drum-pair out for honor, he only brings the drum-pair for
money.” When I interviewed this poet, his son posted a picture of the interview on Instagram and
WhatsApp and I was instantly outed. I spent a day thumbing through a torrent of half-joking
“frowny face” emojis from my friends in Manaḥ on every social media platform available. This
failure was especially embarrassing since by then I thought I had learned to hide my activities from
others as best as possible, just as Anne Meneley had in Zabīd, Yemen (1996). I thought making a
joke would be appropriate, so I said, “You know, here you start the ‘āzī with “Yāh, iwāb!” (“O,
(hear me and) answer!”) He starts his with “Yā, riyāl!” (O, the currency of Oman!). While most of
the group laughed, falling over each other and tugging at each other’s sleeves, the eldest performer
cut us off with a pained look. “Imagine, strong words from the Amrikī! Do we not all forget our
manners sometimes, doctor? It is important to respect our kind-hearted neighbors in [ that village],
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just as they respect and honor us.” Suitably chastened, I sat in silence until we broke up and went
home.
d. Praise increases, blame diminishes
Later, when I reflected on this event, I understood that “strong words” had the capacity to
break bonds—not only for the speaker, but also for their community. Kurke, discussing the
“integrative” role of Pindaric odes, writes that “the encomium that occurs for the sake of one man
is an ornament also for the rest of the citizens” (1991, 164). Reflecting on the idea about praise,
blame, and manners that eldest performer was trying to communicate to all of us, I offer a mixed
metaphor: “rising praise lifts all boats.” That is to say, everyone in the community is bettered when
praise is administered honestly, well, and as a response to a legitimate good deed. Offering praise
with generosity is a reflection of the good manners of the community as a whole, while belittling
a good deed with unjustified blame, false praise, or jealousy is the opposite. Good manners increase
good manners, and bad manners not only encourage bad manners, but decrease good manners. In
Dwight Reynolds’s Heroic Poets, Poetic Heroes (1995), he notes how Egyptian oral poets use a
praise song to the Prophet Muḥammad to quiet crowds and gain their attention. Since such stock
phrases “require the appropriate responses,” the singing of praise verses to the Prophet Muḥammad
reminds the group of their shared interests in cultivating appropriate bodily and mental conduct
(1995, 184). Reynolds notes that this practice is similar to how the automatic recitation of
“religious formulas which require responses from all present” can “[diffuse] tensions” and draw
others into safe social contact (1995, 184).
Many groups have seen that praise augments, increases, adds, or magnifies the praised,
while blame reduces them. The Roman orator Quintilian wrote quite specifically that “to praise a
subject is to magnify it and adorn it” (cited in Burrow 2008, 28). Correspondingly, “when someone
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is praised,” Hoffman writes of the Mande griot, “it is said the person is enlarged. When someone
is generous, the person is said to be boundless” (2000, 275n.14). Charry quotes a jeli who claims
that “when a praise song is sung for someone, his energy to enact is augmented,” requiring
recompense in the sacrifice of money or goods (2000, 51). In the case of early medieval Ireland,
blame could literally reduce the honor-price of the target, to ignore the fact that it might reduce
their life by killing them (as seen amongst the Mande, as well). Marie Lecomte-Tiloune, in her
study of Nepalese bards, likewise notes that they “increase” their noble patrons with praise, badhai
(2016, 216-7). In Oman, praise increases (often the CLA. zād, yizīd; ziyāda) and rouses or
encourages (O. Ar. shag‘a, yushag‘a; shugā‘) the ’adab, or the good manners and refined behavior
of the praised. In a short discussion of praise, the Omani chronicler bin Razīq writes that “and it is
said that praise (al-ḥamd) is oral commendation (al-thinā’ bi-l-lisān) intending [for]
aggrandizement” (1978, 69).
One day, sitting alongside a dry falaj in al-Ma‘arā, Ḥamad extemporized on the different
roles of drums and poetry in Omani music: “Drums bring beauty; poetry increases/amplifies the
expression” (aṭ-ṭabl ya’tī al-gamāl wa-l-shi‘r yizīd at-ta‘bīr). Indeed, one of his own wedding
razḥa poems, on the theme of love, uses this same term:

ملتقانا اليوم في األنتر
نحتفي بالفرح وتزيده
والعروس تزيد وتتمختر
يا حالة اللبس في عيده
Multaqānā al-yawm fī-l-’inter
Naḥtafī bi-l-faraḥ wa-tzīdu,
Wa-l-‘arūs tzīd wa-tatmakhkhar
Yā ḥillāt al-labs fī ‘īdu
Our meeting today is at the Inter[continental Hotel]
We celebrate in joy and you increase it!
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The bride adds [to it] and walks swaying;
O, how beautiful the clothes on their wedding day.
Burrow calls this the auxetic function, a capacity of poetry to render ordinary things as
magnificent: the largest, the biggest, the tallest, the wisest, the most generous (2008, 12). Recall
the most fecund of all possible banana trees in Chapter 1, for example. Auxesis might also be seen
in the way that every object in praise poetry is made of gold, perfume is omnipresent, swords are
legendarily sharp, armor always gleams, and feasts are never-ending. Another razḥa, this time
unattributed:

بلبسك بلبسك خاتم
ذهب غالي وثمن
بعطرك بعطرك عطر
الورد والياسمين
Bi-labisik, bi-labisik, khātim
dhahib ghālī wa ṭhamin
bi-‘aṭirik, bi-‘aṭirik, ‘aṭir
al-ward wa-l-yāsimīn.
By your clothing, by your clothing;
a tent, golden, rich, and valuable.
By your perfume, by your perfume,
perfume of rose and jasmine.
Burrow traces the development of this auxetic function as amplificatio through Latin, derived,
once again, from Aristotle’s discussion of praise’s ability to “magnify” the praised (2008, Ch. 1).
Burrow cites Vincent de Beauvais’ (d. 1260s) approving citation of al-Farābī when he wrote:

the special business of poetry is, by its utterances, to make people imagine
something to be more beautiful or more repulsive than it really is, in such a
way that the hearer, believing, will be roused to either shun or seek what they
imagine. (cited in Burrow 2008, 17-8)
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Poets urge action by having the ability to exaggerate, to build up, to increase and using it well.
Indeed, Robert Von Hallberg has argued that “the objective of poetry is encouragement… poets
cannot praise constantly, granted, and yet the deepest power of poetry comes from praise, not
criticism” (2014, 40). Similarly, Burrow writes that the “standard medieval poetic justification for
poetic auxesis” was that Latin Christian medieval poets “have as their purpose to urge men on to
certain actions that are subject to the will, and to dissuade them from others” (2008, 19). This is a
familiar notion in Oman, though it is not necessarily held to only function within poetry.
Learning from Praise: Education and Manners
The concept of increasing or rousing “manners” or “refined behavior” was an important
one for Omani poets and performers. This is not the only emotion that music can evoke, by any
means, as we shall see in chapter 4 and in our discussion of Islamic jurisprudence regarding music
and warfare in chapter 5. However, a common story told by older Omanis who remember ‘āzī
from their childhood is that it was these poems that taught them not only proper comportment, but
also the numbers, the abjad (the ordering of Arabic letters), the days of the week, and the months
of the year. The qaṣīda that forms the main body of the āzī can take a number of shapes based on
ordering principles. Poetic line-groups might progress by using words that start with subsequent
letters of the Arabic abjad “alphabet,” called “al-’alafiyya.”57 Schematically,
A: A--- / ---a
57

This kind of didactic pattern was also used for runes in Anglo-Saxon, Norse, and Celtic poetic
traditions, and likely many others. Irish briatharogam-s presented the letters and sounds of Irish with
accompanying lines of kenning, or word combinations that, in this case, define the meaning of the letter
(MacManus 1988). According to Halsall (1981), Norse and Anglo-Saxon runes were enumerated and
sequenced in rune-poems which were “alphabetical” and also mnemonic. Two famous lines of the AngloSaxon poem are worth quoting. The ‘X’ rune, gyfu, was presented with the word for “gift” and the
accompanying line “generosity brings credit and honor, which supports one’s dignity; it furnishes help
and subsistence to all broken men who are devoid of aught else.” Feoh, ᚠ, “wealth”: Wealth is a comfort
to all men; yet must every man bestow it freely, if he wish to gain honour in the sight of the Lord.”
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---- / ---a
---- / ---a
---- / ---b
B: B--- /---a
---- / ---a
---- / ---a
---- / ---b
C: C --- and so on.58
See al-Shaydī 2008, 207-9 for a textual example. The āzī al-‘adidiyya proceeds by a sequence of
numbers, recently used by the Omani-Emirati artist al-Wasmī to structure an āzī for the 45th
anniversary of the Qābūs state in Buraimi. Further, rarer, sub-types proceed by day of the week or
months of the year.
‘Āzī are clearly didactic in the conventional sense. More important for oral poets in Oman,
however, has been their ability to bestow virtuous behavior and ensure good behavior. This is a
pattern that also has wide historical and geographic reach, especially in reference to praise. The
Dutch theologian Erasmus (d. 1536) made this educational function clear when he

criticized his contemporaries “who think Panegyrics are nothing but flattery
[and] appear not to know with what design this kind of writing was invented
by men of great sagacity, whose object it was, that by having the image of
virtue put before them, bad princes might be made better, the good
encouraged, the ignorant instructed, the mistake set right, the wavering
quickened, and even the abandoned brought to some sense of shame.” (cited
in Gould 2015, 255)
Not only does Erasmus explain a function of poetry, but he also shows that praise corrects in a
way that does not necessarily endanger the social order. Like Chinese poets putting words in the
mouths of their patrons, panegyrists can instruct without the use of blame. Von Hallberg’s

Interestingly, but likely just another quirk of philology, is the fact that hijā’ refers to both satire and to
the alphabetical ordering of things. This was never brought up by my interviewees, who knew precisely
what I meant by hijā’, but scholars sometimes use it in the alphabetical sense.
58
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statement that “to praise noble power encourages the powerful to act nobly” (2014, 69) would ring
true to many praise singers, and certainly to Omani poets. To return to the Islamic Peripatetics, Ibn
Ṣīnā’s notions of the moral status of poetry is relatively unambiguous: poetry attains a moral status
insofar as it renders honorable and valuable those values that a society has rendered virtuous, and
condemns and mocks those that are without virtue. Ibn Ṣīnā justifies the social status of poetry
through a clear social function. He also articulates inherited and developing Islamic notions that
correlate speech with clarity, sincerity, truth, revelation, and the inimitability of the Qur’ān by
clarifying poetry’s status within them.59 This cultural notion equating structured, thoughtful, wellmannered speech with truth and rationality is crucial to the ways in which poetic speech becomes
the medium through which power is addressed.

a. Manners and Propriety
Unni Wikan (1982) and Christine Eickelman (1984), two ethnographers working in
different places in Oman in the late 1970s and 80s, made note of the intense cultivation of manners
and refined behavior where they studied. Wikan, in her study of coastal Sohar, argued that the
notions of sharaf (honor) and ‘ayb (shame), while rarely articulated in casual talk, were deeply
embedded within a notion of a personal cultivation of right behavior. Honor, for Soharis, was both
an “ideal” and a “measure of one’s actual value as a person,” meaning that it was both measured

See also Charles Hirschkind’s (2006) The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic
Counterpublics for a presentist discussion of this notion in contemporary Egypt. This is especially
problematic in his contentious claim that aesthetic and rational aspects of ‘piety’ cannot be
“disarticulated,” despite this being a hallmark of every Islamic Peripatetic [for an example of
Hirschkind’s thinking, see 220n4]).
59

152
by a kind of shared conceptual yardstick and contingent on other’s measurements derived
therefrom (1982, 148-153). However, to her chagrin, she found that censuring talk was not at all
common among Soharis, who had little interest in slandering others and picking over their failures.
“If people are barred to this extent from censuring each other,” she asks, “how then is honor
secured?” (1982, 162). Her conclusions bear quite strongly on my argument:

Whereas among the poor in Cairo, life seems to center on the shaming of
others so as to gain value for oneself by contrast, in Oman the concern is to
build merit within oneself by honoring others… In Sohar, everyone is seen as
vulnerable—that is, the human condition, inextricably bound up with life in
society… Honor, in this society… demands of men and women alike that you
do not offend, but in a manner unassertive, graceful, and dignified, you must
treat everyone as politely—that is, tactfully, correctly, hospitably, morally,
and amicably—as possible. That is the essence of honor in Oman. (1982, 1667)
Honor is manifest in treating others with respect and dignity, in maintaining a sense of propriety
and dignity even when difficult. It is a refusal to do otherwise that is hallmark of honorable
behavior in Oman.
Eickelman’s 1984 ethnography, Women and Community in Oman, similarly documents the
nested notions of “propriety” and good manners in Oman, in this case, in the interior at al-Ḥamrā’.
Khajal, a kind of female-gendered bodily social comportment, animates Omani women’s behavior
amongst related and non-related kin in social situations (1984, 68-78). Maintaining khajal
demands a certain kind of deferential behavior, as it places a series of “constraint[s] caused by the
fear of doing something improper” (1984, 70). This sense of constrained action is traced through
the conduct of persons eating, marrying, and managing social inequality. We should not interpret
this, as Wikan can sometimes be read to do, as a kind of “hollowness” in the intensity of sociality
in Inner Oman. Rather, it is a shared and common gestural and cognitive vocabulary that creates a
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field of social interaction that is profoundly communal, despite social inequalities obvious to all.
Eickelman concludes (similarly to Wikan), that these differences

are overridden by the shared perception that the people of Hamra form part of
one tribe and one community, separate from others… this sense of trust in the
comportment of others in the community gives women considerable freedom
within the oasis—freedom to organize their workday and their visiting as they
see fit. Paradoxically, the people of Hamra place a high value on individual
responsibility and noninterference in the affairs of others. At the same time,
the range of comportment in public, and even within the household and family
cluster, is sharply limited by a strict code of conduct that everyone is assumed
to know and accept. The consequent necessity for indirectness in dealing with
others magnifies the most minute details of social interaction. (1984, 131-2)
These deeply shared senses of comportment, in these cases embodied largely by women, are
similarly central to maintaining social grace. By limiting the kind of agonistic social interaction
that so animates the Egyptian urban neighborhood and other Mediterranean societies, these shared
senses of propriety militate against the destruction of communal ties. Wikan’s shock that Sohari
women maintained social contacts with a “flagrant prostitute” is a particularly clear example of
the primacy of neighborly and communal ties over more agonistic ones. This is not to say that
agonistic ties do not exist. Instead, we should look for kinds of “indirectness” as they manifest in
praise and the didactic roles of Omani praise poetry.
The efficacy of indirectness can also be manifested in very direct ways. Indirect comments
in ‘āzī, we shall see, can help to produce direct results. I want to conclude this section with a longer
example of this direct indirectness which comes from my notes on a public performance of razḥas. One afternoon after the maghrib prayer, Ḥamad, the munassiq (manager) of the Firqat al- ‘Arabī
li-l-funūn al-sha‘biyya was preparing to address the group in the parking lot before a performance
at the opening of a new Science and Engineering building at Sultan Qaboos University. We had
driven out from Manaḥ in order to “bring pride to the students” at the opening of the building. The
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group, divided between the old-timers and the youths (al-shayb wa al-shabāb), was practically
giddy with excitement because the campus was packed with people. The parking lot was jammed
with cars, and the youths had taken their time in straightening their matching maṣar-s, or
headwraps, and hazm-s, or embroidered belts in the reflections of tinted SUV windows. Older
performers relished flicking their swords up and down: “zayn il-hizz il-yawm” (“The sword-flicker
is fine today!”) one said to another. “Al-ḥamdulillah!” came the whispered reply. The building
itself was a few stories tall and groups had gathered to see the performance in a central square.
The group was scheduled to perform before and after the SQU skateboarding club, which
was anxiously setting up and testing various jumps and ramps. Outdoor staircases led up the
corners of the building, whose façade arced like a “C” around the central square. No one under
thirty failed to point out to me that each landing was packed with young female students from the
university. “Il-ḥarīm, khawī, shūf! Wayyak binarzḥa taḥt al-munẓar wa aqūlik…” (“Girls, khawī,
look! And we’re gonna be dancing the razḥa with you right underneath their gaze…”) one of the
boys gestured weakly to a woman high in one of the spiral stairs leading up the building, “al-bint
māl al-azraq traaaaaaaykī inta” (“The one in the blue is loooooooking at you!”). The wave of
cackling somehow knocked into an older youth down the line, who feigned that it had caused him
to pull his maṣar down his face. He turned toward us with his brand new maṣar pulled down over
his eyes, cocked his head slowly to one side, and mocked pulling out his khanjar belt-dagger—a
gesture to spurned honor. “Yā guma‘a!” (“Hey, Everybody!”) came the shout from Ḥamad. “Sima‘,
sima‘ (listen, listen). Today, we’ve been honored to be invited to perform razḥa at the college of
His Majesty, His Highness Sultan Qābūs, may God lengthen his life.” He explained how the group
would enter the square in the mashiyya, a processional razḥa, but did not stipulate the poetry or
the melody. There was some squabbling about who would recite (ilqā’/yilqā’) the first line, and
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whether they would have an ‘āzī. The main ‘āzī performer begged off, saying that they had written
so many razḥa-s for the event that there was no need, which basically sealed the deal since no one
else was going to give an ‘āzī. Ḥamad continued, “we are guests here today, just as they are our
guests in the razḥa. We will not forget our manners (ma binansā adabunā baynū). I don’t want to
hear that “they had no manners, they had no respect” or anything like that (mū bāghī asma‘ illī ma
lahu adab, ma lahu iḥtirām walā shay kidhā). We will be amongst male and female students,
young women, so act like men and be good-mannered people (mu’addabīn).” When I spoke with
Ḥamad after the event, I asked him why he stressed the comportment of the group amongst the
students: “Well, first, as you know, regarding the mixture of men and women, this is the source of
many problems. You must [act] respectful, and our adab increases the adab and the good moral
behavior of the students, as well (’adabnā yizīd’adab wa-akhlāq aṭ-ṭalaba gumī‘an, b‘ad).”
A Case Study of Praise: Examining Praise at a Soccer Pitch
In the summer of 2016, a large private bank in Oman, Bank Muscat, was funding a huge
social development campaign which consisted of providing the numerous official soccer clubs of
Oman with turfed soccer pitches. Artificial and actual grass was trucked in to replace the gravel
and packed dirt fields that were (and still are) common in rural areas. This initiative, though funded
by the bank, was overseen by the Ministry of Sports Affairs, a ministry established by Royal decree
in 2004. Manaḥ’s Farīq al-‘Arabī, a sporting club, was chosen to receive one of the turf fields on
their field in the neighborhood of al-Ma‘arā, and it was built over the course of a few months:
equipped with high walls, bright lights, new goals, fresh artificial turf, and a watering system, the
pitch was completely transformed.
When the pitch was near opening, the performance troupe attached to the same
neighborhood civic club, the Firqat al-‘Arabī l-al-funūn al-sh‘abiyya, was called by the Ministry
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of Sports Affairs, the local wālī in Manaḥ, and the local shaykh-s of al-Ma‘arā to plan a
performance. The local Manḥī groups Firqat Ḥārat al-Bilād and the Firqat al-Ma‘amad were also
called upon to share the honor and to ensure a large body of performers. The poet Rabī‘ al-Mallāḥ
was chosen to write and throw the ‘āzī (though others have said that he “presents himself/puts
himself forward to be chosen” (huwa yataqaddam nafsu)” thereby forcing others to relent to his
wishes). In any case, the opening ceremonies for the soccer match would include several razḥa-s
written for the occasion, a qaṣīda written by local poet Ābū Ghaṣṣān, speeches by several figures,
and the ‘āzī.
After the ‘aṣr prayer, at around 3:30, I met the gathering Firqat al-‘Arabī just outside the
southern gates of the new field. As I moved around the group shaking hands and bumping noses
in greeting, someone called out, “Go and see the field, doctor, let us get ready!” Several of the
younger members of the group were straining to set their maṣar-s just right on their ears and
foreheads: straight, overlapped just so, and crisp. I walked out onto the beautiful green field,
completely at odds with the surrounding dusty browns. Several “big personalities” (kibār alshakhṣiyāt) greeted me as I entered and began to set up my microphones.
“He’s the one researching the popular arts,” I heard one whisper as they approached, “and
he hangs around al-Ma‘arā.” They greeted me warmly and insisted I take some water and other
drinks. “This is a big day,” I said, and before I could continue, one of the shaykh-s added, “It’s a
big day indeed! We are greeting a son of the Āl Bū Sa‘īdī, a minister from the Ministry of Sports
Affairs. And just look how we have responded: this is Manaḥ! We recognize [their] help and
support, the provision of services and the guarantee of safety and security.” As we chatted, I
reflected that this response was typical of talk about the role of the state in developing Oman into
a “modern” state. There is little that logically connects “safety and security” with laying artificial
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grass on a soccer pitch except that it is a similar kind of expectation placed on the state and its
leadership.
A few moments later, I heard the crack of the young brothers Aḥmad and ‘Abdallah bin
Ga‘arūf testing the tightness of their drums. I excused myself and made my way over, but they
pointed with the noses over toward the eastern gate of the field, where two lines of dancers were
forming. About 50-60 dancers formed two long rows extending out from the gate across the field,
framing a kind of walkway for the distinguished guests to walk down. Over the hubbub of the
crowd, I heard a voice shout, “someone give a razḥa!” As I sidled up to one of the lines, I heard
an older performer give a long, elaborate mulālā’, a kind of unaccompanied vocable melody that
outlines the melody of the coming poetry. I scanned the opposing line quickly and it turned out to
be Khalfān, an older performer from the Firqat al-Ma‘amad—an appropriate person to give the
first razḥa. His voice was almost caught off in the wind, but as he concluded, our line erupted in
response, echoing the mulālā’ back and establishing the rhythmic interchange of choral parts. After
a few more exchanges, Khalfān sang the poem that would “ride” (tarkab) the melody:

أول سالمي ع الدار والحله
وعليكم خاطري ومن سكن فيه
في ديرة العز اهل الكرم فله
قابوس يا نورا شارجا فيها
’Awal salāmī ‘a al-dār wa-l-ḥilla,
w-‘alaykum khāṭirī wa-man sakin fīh
Fī dīrat al-‘izz ’ahil al-karam fa-l-hu
Qābūs, yā nūran shārqan fīhā
My first greetings go to the homeland and the encampment,
you are on mind, and those who live there.
The noble people of generosity are in pride’s homeland;
it is Qābūs’s, O it’s eastern light!]
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This was a good choice by Khalfān because this particular poem is very common, so the
wind did not interfere with our ability to respond to it. Our line roared back, enthused by the poem
and by the incoming guests. As the drummers took their place between the lines, the choruses
began to sway back and forth. After a few exchanges of the poetry, the drums roared into action
and the dance began in earnest.
In this welcoming mode, the dancers simply took a step forward and back, starting with
the right foot and closing with the left, then rocking back on the left and closing with the right.
When the drums moved closer to one line or the other, those nearest to the drum bent their knees
deeply but kept straight backs, tilted forward at the waist toward the drums and bobbed together,
sometimes throwing their heads backwards and forwards in a deep nod. Others shouted
encouraging “Ho ho!”s on upbeats, eliciting a range of shouted responses. As the guests filtered in
and waved to us, I took a step back and began filming. I noted early on in my fieldwork that guests
rarely dance with the dancers—unlike in other parts of the Gulf for example—a topic I take up in
Chapter 4. For now, the dancers closed ranks behind the guests and marched them safely across
the field to their designated seats.
As the dancers took their seats, towards the northern goal, I watched as a procession of
well-dressed Omani bankers and businessmen made short speeches to the crowd. No one around
me appeared to pay any attention, due to the high winds and distance. After a few moments, Ābū
Ghaṣṣān, the talented local poet, brought his wheelchair up to the microphone and read a relatively
short qaṣīda, dedicated to the al-’Arabī team, the town, the shaykh-s, and the local representative
from the Ministry of Sports Affairs, Khālid bin Ḥamad Āl Bū Sa‘īdī. As Ābū Ghaṣṣān concluded,
several people nearby whispered, “aḥsant,” meaning a mixture of thanks and recognition for a job
well done. Soon after, our phones lit up as Abū Ghaṣṣān sent us the poem as a picture over
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WhatsApp. The managers of the event then beckoned the poet Rabī‘ al-Mallāḥ to start the ‘āzī,
and Rabī‘ waved his hands to gather the performers. They formed a dense group behind him and
moved to the center of the field with another razḥa. As they reached the center, Rabī‘ came to the
front of the group, turned them toward the seated guests, took out his iPhone and performed the
following ‘āzī in the manner described above—sword in one hand and phone in the other.
Hear him, O Lord of Splendor / The Everlasting God lives forever
Scattering peace like pure, fresh water / to guests and the graciously received group.
I greet you, O issue of the generous / You have honored your people and the station
And have given us from you a badge of honor / O creator of wondrous sayings.
O creator of sayings and art / O soother of the grievous mood;
Our homeland yearns to play a melody / Directly to you, O understanding one.
When we heard of your coming / We came to be in your presence.
O my lord, this is your [appearance] / We are proud of it, without doubt.
Lord and son of a lord by grandfather / You, Khālid bin Ḥamad,
If you undertook your actions my / pen is prepared to respond in its way.
Every homeland is built by men / When those men work hand in hand.
As for laziness, it has no place / neither near nor far.
This is the mission of every youth / Wading into challenge and difficulty.
And for those that walk the path of rightness / It's impossible for their actions to fade.
These are our benefits in Manaḥ / We salute the designs that are in good order,
[Those] that Qābūs taught us and acts in good faith / Qābūs is a physician to the 'umma.
O my homeland al-Ma'arā, peace! / You gave me pride, you gave me respect.
Around you men are on the lookout / For any strange thing.
In conclusion, I ask for your forgiveness / Time passes by so quickly.
If I only had more lines / to give the 'āzī right up to the setting of the sun.60

60

Appendix 1, poem 4.
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The poem itself is perhaps not beautiful but is a perfect example of the themes that we
examined in this chapter. First, the poet begins by placing the listeners into a certain context: God
is great, and we are Muslims gathered here in the long tradition of guests and hosts. He then greets
the host, “the issue of the generous,” and commends him for his actions in giving al-Ma‘arā a
“badge of honor” in the form of the soccer pitch. Note that the field was funded by Bank Muscat,
not just the Ministry of Sports Affairs. Nevertheless, neither the bank nor the Ministry are the focus
of praise. Instead, it is a minor member of the royal family, a ministry member sent off to attend
these kinds of celebrations probably dozens of times before. Next, Rabī‘ shifts to the desires of the
“homeland” to “play him a melody”—that is, give the razḥa—and have him hear it. In fact, he
continues, when the people of Manaḥ heard of Khālid’s attendance, they all rushed to volunteer to
sing praises for him. The voluntary nature of praise is established. This instance of praise is a
recognition of Khālid’s good deed of helping to establish the field, but also in attending the opening
and gracing it with his presence.
After this, Rabī‘ shifts to pointing out that the people of Manaḥ are not lazy. Why is this?
First of all, I think it is a way to represent praise as a civic labor, outlined in chapter 4. It is also a
recognition of the kind of gift that this soccer pitch is. It is unreturnable. It is a service that is given
in good faith to the people of Manaḥ to use and enjoy. Rabī‘ seems to say, “this is a fine gift, one
that we did not have. But don’t confuse our not having it with laziness, no, we’ve done our part in
cooperating again and again, and are not shy of work.” At the end of these two lines, he turns back
onto the praised: those who do good deeds are never forgotten. The gathered performers and the
neighborhoods they represent have done the hard work of building a community, but it is
“impossible” for the good deed of building the soccer pitch and attending the opening on the part
of Khālid to “fade.” It will. But playing on his vanity is a kind of social insurance.
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Finally, Rabī‘ praises the leadership of Sultan Qābūs, highlighting the “benefits” he has
brought and the “designs” he has wrought. Such a display links the current situation to broader
national and regional concerns with development and the Omani renaissance, mythopoetically
drawing the connection between soccer pitches with grass and broader narratives of national
development. Finally, Rabī‘ stamps the performance as indelibly emerging from the rightful,
watchful, and patriotic people of al-Ma‘arā. This good deed is good because it accrued to the
people of Manaḥ, as rightful recipients and watchful protectors of the state. In a way, the ‘āzī
concludes by claiming that the good deed so praised today is only possible because the people of
Manaḥ are “on the lookout for any strange thing.”
Conclusions
This ‘āzī is an exceptional example of praise in the Omani case. It moves between the core
interests of praisers and constructs the praised as ultimately reliant on the community, though
through their actions they are momentarily individualized and lauded. Despite the organization of
this chapter, it was hearing and discussing this ‘āzī that taught me so much about the circulations
of praise in Oman, and its deep connections to senses of community and political relationships.
The poem is not uncontroversial: many interlocutors found something to criticize. Often, they
pointed out that the poem was much too short and brief, but in my view, the brevity of the poem
distills the core elements of praise into a dense string of deeply meaningful statements full of
implication. It is, in a very real sense, a concentrated and forceful expression of what praise is in
the context of the Omani ‘āzī. What became clear to me after hearing this poem is that it is both a
recognition of a good deed and a way of ensuring those good deeds continue to happen. It is both
a response and a provocation, a reflection and an incitement. This is what is meant by praise as an
intervention: praise leaps into social relations to modify, manipulate, induce, and commend them.
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It is an exhortation as much as a recognition. Ideally, it shapes future action by extolling past
actions, linking them in the creation of community. In the next chapter, we will discuss what kinds
of good deeds deserve such praise, and in the following, we will examine why and how
communities perform in such a way as to demonstrate the mutually entangled political lives of
rulers and the ruled.
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Chapter 3: Swords and Gold: Generosity and Legitimacy in Omani Praise Performance

Praise poetry is by its very nature a gift exchanged. (Kurke, 1991, 91)
Authority is root and radical, sense and prescience. (Robinson 1983, 30)
Wealth is the measure of hope / and likewise it magnifies the despicable.
Even if he’s a falcon,61 if his palm is empty, / no one will look upon him.
And if I had the cup of wealth / [but] travelled like a poor camel-driver,
Folks would redouble greetings / and everyone would extend their hand.62 (al-Falāḥī 2013, 115)

The next two chapters examine how social relationships of authority and political
legitimacy are enacted in Oman through the obligatory circulation of praise performance and
generosity from leaders. Such economic arrangements are often called “distributive economies”
because goods circulate insofar as they are doled out by certain individuals, organizations, or
institutions. Generosity may seem a strange place to look for the relationships between authority
and performance, even in distributive cases. In fact, Omani performers I spoke with encouraged
me to conceive of praise for leaders in this way. Speaking with the ‘āzī Rabī‘ al-Mallāḥ about the
role of leaders after his praise performance at the opening of the soccer pitch in Manaḥ, he said
“Why do I say, ‘If you undertook your actions, / my pen is prepared to respond in its way’? This
mean that if he shows generosity, we will remember it (law yubayyin al-kirāma
binatadhākruh)!”
This chapter makes the case that generosity, manifested in many ways, is a shared
commitment of both performers and leaders in a variety of authority and political structures,

61

Ṣaqr, a type of falcon, as discussed previously, refers to a noble and brave fighter.

An Omani occasional poem, a qaṣīda nabaṭiyya. Composed in Buṭayn by Khalfān bin Sayf alFalāḥī known as “Wālid Shuṭṭa” after being ignored in the sabla in Ghussār.
62
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ranging from “tribal” to “state” (Wilson 2016). Leaders (both shaykh-s and sultans) are expected
to be generous to their followers, and when they are, performers from subordinate classes
respond with praise. For the ruling classes, this expectation of generosity can secure their
legitimacy in the eyes of polity members. For performers, displaying their appreciation of
generosity also displays their commitment to the generous leader and the social relations that
bind them. Many performers see the relationships between giving and praising good leadership
with razḥa as evidence of the efficacy of that relationship—a confirmation of a healthy social
order.
Two Takes on Generosity: The Gift and a Social Mechanism
“Generosity” is the term I use to generally translate a number of Arabic terms. Most are
used interchangeably (sakhā’, sakhāwa or ṣakhāwa; karam or kirāma; jūd or jawad; samāḥa)
some are considered archaic and only really used for poetry addressed to elites (like naddā or
marūwa), and others are somewhat specific to patronage and wasṭa. I think that more able
Arabists would try to match these terms to more specific English terms like “liberality,”
“magnaminity,” “open-handedness,” or more neutral terms like “giving,” but I think “generosity”
is an adequate covering term. It fails to distinguish between those who give because they are rich
and those who give even while poor, but this is in accordance with local usage. The underlying
notion of all these terms is plainly “generosity”: giving of oneself freely and indiscriminately.
Generosity is valued across social classes. In Oman, generosity is as much a virtue of the
pauper as it is the prince. It is precisely this mutual valuation that makes “generosity” a useful
basis for the inculcation of temporary cross-class alliances—hegemony (in Bowie’s 1998 terms).
Speaking very generally, elites see generosity as a strategy to legitimate themselves, and non-
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elites see the inculcation of generosity in elites as a hedge against uncertainty. Generosity, like
praise, lifts all boats.
I analyze this situation in two ways: first, as a manifestation of reciprocity and gift
exchange, and second as a mechanism that produces political legitimacy.
a. The Gift
I see the relationship between giving leaders and the receiving led as motivated not by
strict market logics of loss and gain, but as motivated by logics of reciprocity that are most
effectively studied in the literature on “the gift.” It is emphatically not a one-way process of
“distribution,” but one in which the led give the leaders something quite material in return. As
recent scholarship on the gift has shown, what makes circuits of exchange so crucial to social
reproduction is not that they merely circulate goods, but that they also form and define social
relationships. As anthropologists Keith Hart and Chris Hann conclude, Mauss’s most basic
insight was that “society” or “the social” could not be assumed to be “pre-existent,” but were, in
fact, always under construction, even demanding construction (2011, 166). Generosity and
giving form social relations, especially generosity from leaders, and that givers are rarely
disinterested in how that society takes shape. The risk of becoming dependent and subservient to
generous givers is very real. I show how a model of generosity that produces political legitimacy
has unique ramifications for performance in Oman. Because generosity is linked to good
leadership but also has the capacity to produce dependency and inequality, praise performance
becomes a site of distinct social tension. Praising generosity has been construed as sycophancy,
groveling, and self-interested—my research reveals a different aspect of this cycle. This case of
generosity and praise response illustrates several important features of Omani conceptual and
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behavioral associations between performance, sociality, and authority that are thrown into relief
by the social tensions that figure within such performances.
Generosity has been studied by anthropologist Margaret Wilson amongst Chinese traders
in Papua New Guinea, where she described it as “a model of giving which incurs no debt, and
emphasis on status that does not imply hierarchy” (1989, 26). “Generosity,” Wilson claims,
“emerges as a system for simultaneously negotiating status and for maintaining equality within
the community” (1989, ii). What is compelling about such a notion of generosity is how it can be
cited as the basis of actions that have profoundly divergent results—producing relations of
equality and also differentiating status. If such a claim is surprising for our critically minded
readers, it is not for those who have studied gifting and its relation to hospitality in the Middle
East, particularly in women’s networks of visiting. As Anne Meneley (1997) has shown in
Zabid, Yemen, gifts, generosity, and hospitality are serious business in the play of social
distinction but are nevertheless forms of caring redistribution. While circuits of visiting between
women are crucial in producing such distinction, the very predictability and obligations inherent
in visiting form a tenuous social network of “near-equals” who recognize themselves as
constituting the social elite of Zabid. As we shall see, generosity is a basic expectation for
leaders in the modern state just as much as it has been in the past for smaller-scale leaders. One
element in the endurance of this expectation (and the practices that follow it) is the continued
relevance of praise poetry as mediating relations between dominant and subordinated classes.
Praise largely circulates between classes.
More critically minded readers might balk at this formulation. They would prefer that
“generosity” in this case be framed in terms of bribes, intimidation, corruption, patronage
politics, or some other obviously coercive function of power. As I have argued previously, the
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ability to give in this way is a predicate of social inequality. The social relations that index this
inequality are sustained by material concentrations of social power, organized violence, and
practices that differentially arrange economic capital. However, in this chapter, I want to
examine the range that a word like “generosity” can exhibit, and how it can be deployed in very
different social situations to shape behavior. Generosity is not an ideological construction of the
ruling classes. It is a profoundly social impulse that challenges simplistic, capitalocentric
descriptions of social life, like those that balk at generosity. Pace Gregory (1982), markets and
gifts may be different ways of thinking about circulation and what impels it, but one does not
simply replace the other (Tsing 2015). This is why an Omani performer can buy a beautiful new
belt with cash from a wage job in the morning, freely Google a new melody on a phone gifted to
them in the afternoon, and praise generosity from elites through razḥa in the evening. Market,
mixed-market, and reciprocal exchanges co-exist.
b. A Social Mechanism
My second overarching contribution is to frame this mutualistic generosity and response
circuit as a social mechanism that produces political legitimacy. I term this the
Generosity/Legitimation mechanism and discuss it in detail in this chapter’s section on authority.
Even though generosity is a value and ideal that crosses class boundaries, it is clearly
differentially understood within those classes—and therefore makes generosity a potential basis
for hegemony construction. While conceptions of generosity may differ amongst the ruling class
(think noblesse oblige), it is also true that the material benefits derived from redistribution speak
for themselves. Who cares what the king thinks when you’ve got your goose, or your hospital, or
a paved road? What if, though, your king is Donald Trump and he has crazy ideas about
“bootstraps” and no regard whatsoever for generosity? What becomes interesting with praise is
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that it keeps ideas like “generosity” alive, afloat, worth something, circulating, mattering not for
just everyday folks but also for the ruling classes.
An ethnomusicological approach to this mechanism uncovers, or at least forefronts, the
performed response to the directed generosity of elites as praise. While other studies of
distributive economies do not record responses to generosity or fail to consider that generosity
might obligate a response, this study shows that generosity is not just repaid with “political
quietism” or necessarily results in a decayed civil society, but instead prompts praise responses.
These praise responses are not simply natural, spontaneous outpourings of joy, nor are they
entirely overdetermined, shaped, and controlled by elites—a kind of obsequious puppet show.
Rather, they are a negotiated, respectfully agonistic, not-quite-cooperative and not-quitecompetitive arena of compulsion, cajoling, and urging. Praise and generosity are locked in
continuous circuits of tense persuasion. The circulation of praise and generosity, locked in
circuits of obligation, leads to the construction of stable relations that undergird a moral
economy.
As we saw in the last chapter, praise is not a simple affair. Praise performance plays on
the differences between ideals and realities. As many scholars have shown, seemingly straightforward praise can hide multiple meanings, even if never stooping to outright criticism (AbuLughod 1986; Barber 1991; Gilman 2001, 2009; Hoffman 1995; Gunner 1995). Ideally, praise
attempts to subtly guide authority through persuasion (Caton 1987). In contemporary Oman,
however, praise is both very common and socially problematic. Authentic praise is understood to
be necessary to sustain mutual obligations toward generosity between rulers and ruled and
promote good leadership, but it can easily shade into sycophancy and undignified begging. This
is not unknown in Oman or in the broader Middle East. This danger of dependency and
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sycophancy is especially acute in the context of obligations of reciprocity inherent in “gift”
exchange and patronage. Many scholars examining different cultural contexts have shown how
gifts and generosity from social elites can put individuals and communities in a bind: refusal
jeopardizes social ties, but overeager acceptance can signal dependence and weakness.
c. Outline
I analyze the social uncertainty of generosity, gifts, and political legitimacy by drawing
insight from two literatures on norms of authority and gifting relationships in the context of the
state. Both of the approaches I just outlined move into and out of focus in the following
discussion. In the first part of the chapter, I discuss the razḥa as a performance practice. Next, I
present a deep survey of the ethnographic literature on the social norm of generosity underlying
the legitimacy of Arabian and Middle Eastern polities. I briefly present some recent social
scientific research on the notion of “legitimacy” (Cohen 1988; Jeffrey, McConnell, and Wilson
2015; Karateke and Reinkowski 2005) and “authority” (Agrama 2010; Feldman 2008; Gibson
2007). In the second part, I outline the tensions manifested in gift-exchange relations by
highlighting the social uncertainty manifest in obligations of giving, receiving, and returning
gifts (Douglas 1990; Mauss 1990; Sigaud 2002). Specifically, I examine how recent approaches
to “the gift” in the context of the nation-state have highlighted its role in legitimating the
dominance of the state over local communities. I review recent work on the construction of
Tibet’s political “indebtedness” to China via development programs (Caple 2015; Yeh 2013), the
ways in which gift exchanges recalibrate relationships in Asia and Africa (Campergue 2015;
Caple 2015; Coderey 2015; de la Perrière 2015; Wilson 2016), and most importantly, the
sometimes agonistic sociality of obligation in women’s visiting networks in the Middle East
(Eickelman 1984; Limbert 2010; Meneley 1997; Al-Torki and Cole 1989; Wikan 1982).
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I argue that the mutual obligations that are tacit in gift exchange relationships can be
manipulated in various ways to create and recreate new social relationships. In the view of
practitioners, the social uncertainty manifest in the Scylla of conceding dependency or the
Charybdis of being ungracious, immoral, and asocial is obliterated in razḥa performance. Ruling
classes may have a very different view. Praise and its return in generosity and its return in praise
is an ever-evolving dynamic. While razḥa works in several ways to “integrate power into
community” (Kurke 2013), I conclude the chapter by suggesting how this cultural complex has
been manipulated by elites to secure and legitimate the authoritarian state.
Razḥa as a performance form and a model of interaction
Razḥa is the most common Arab men’s communal dance form in most of northern Oman.
Razḥa-s can break out at many occasions, really wherever a group of men are gathering in public
in celebration: at religious festival days, weekend nights at the souq, soccer matches, national
holidays, and so on. Razḥa are most often planned for a specific event, however, by inviting and
engaging a firqa that specializes in razḥa performance. These planned events are even more
numerous: national festivals and cultural fairs in several Gulf states; opening celebrations for
stores, auto dealerships, roads, highway exits, infrastructural developments; horse races, human
races, camel beauty pageants, auto shows, date exhibitions, and local cultural exhibits.
Oftentimes civic groups will hire a firqa to enliven some public seminar or demonstration.
Weddings are a staple venue for many groups. I am most interested in those performances that
are directly funded by or have as their patron state agents, including the Sultan. They are neither
the most nor the least common type of event, but they are a rich site for exploring the relation
between these performance practices and ideals of authority and state legitimacy.
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Let’s talk a bit about razḥa as a performance practice. I will focus here on the
understanding of razḥa that was common amongst male performers in Manaḥ during my
research period. Razḥa in Manaḥ was very similar to other places I visited—certainly Manḥis
could dance with any other group, and others with them—but I will point out some places where
their conceptions differ from their neighbors.
There are a number of kinds of razḥa-s in Manaḥ, including those that are called
“walking razḥa-s” (razḥāt al-mashiyya), “fast razḥa-s” (razḥāt al-qaṣṣāfiyya or just al-qaṣṣafī),
and “slow razḥa-s” (razḥāt al-nāḥiyya). Some folks thought there should be a fourth, the razḥa
al-ḥarbiyya (war razḥa). A few folks in Manaḥ would refer to al-qaṣṣāfī as al-qaṣṣābī or as algaṣṣābī. Outside of Manaḥ, al-naḥiyya is usually called al-nā’iḥa. For some, there was no
difference between razḥa-s and another practice called razfa, but whenever this topic came up
people who “knew” the difference corrected those who thought there was none. The main
difference was the presence of drums and who participated: razfa had no drums whereas razḥa
requires drums, razfa was for Bedu and razḥa for townspeople.
Razḥa-s were almost always performed in a long sequence of linked dances with short
pauses between them. As many as ten razḥa-s might be sung in a row before dancers take a more
substantial break, with individual members joining and leaving the lines of singers and dancers
as they saw fit.
Depending on the type of razḥa, performers are arranged in one of two ways: either in a
long line, for mashiyya, or in a circle, facing lines, or a crowd divided into two groups for the
other types. Razḥāt al-mashiyya usually begins with the performers clustered as a group, but as
the group begins to move, they collect into rows of five to six dancers and follow the drummers
in a marching step. In al-qaṣṣāfī and al-nāḥiyya, dancers stand in two arching unlinked lines that
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frame a circle, within which circulate the drummers. The size of the circle was dependent on the
number of performers, but dancers in one line were usually touching shoulders, a situation called
takātif, or “rubbing shoulders.” Usually having enough space wasn’t an issue, but at the Fī ḥubb
Qābūs festival the number of participants made the performance space inadequate, and so the
circled dancers were two rows deep. This was not considered a good solution by the people with
whom I discussed it. The best setup for the circular razḥa-s is to have two facing semicircles of
dancers, close enough to hear one another.
All razḥa-s I heard had a few features in common. While mashiyya simply moved from
one location to another, the other types all occurred within a delimited area. Usually razḥa-s
were called for by one line or the other—if a member of line A began the last razḥa, then the
haqq, or “right” (but in this sense meaning obligation), was upon the other line to give the next.
One line might berate another: “verse,63 somebody! Who’s versing [giving the razḥa]? Where’s
the razḥa? (Shill! Man yishill? Al-razḥa hayna?)” When a specific razḥa began, say a qaṣṣāfī,
one initial singer took the lead, though he might not leave his spot in one of the lines of dancers.
He would gesture for silence, then yulāli’ or “give the mulālā’.” A mulālā’ is a string of vocables
sung to the beat of the poetic line that sketches the melodic arc of the piece. Mulālā’-s are based
on a few syllables and vowels: yā, layl, lay, way, āh, and lā. Mulālā’ are not fixed. Instead, they
are semi-improvised in order to “ride” (yarkab) the melody well and highlight the predominant
rhythmic feel. They are also not always sung the same way, even for the same text. The same
melody might be used for many texts, and often serve as a basis for composing poetry: if the line
“rides” the melody, then it is good poetry.
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Dieter Christensen and Salwa El-Shawan Castelo-Branco’s translation of shill/yishill (2009).
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The mulālā’ is sung until everyone knew it, which usually requires a number of cycles.
When the person who gave the razḥa is satisfied, he raises his arms for silence a second time and
gives the first poetic line. With this, the dancer/singers pick up the line and “throw” (yilqa‘) it
back and forth antiphonally, until the second poetic line iss given. This is usually called the radd,
the “response.” Due to the din of performance, not everyone understands the poetic lines before
the drums kick in, and so often singers would look down the line for someone who knew it and
listen in for an explanation while the other line was “carrying” (yaḥmul) the verse. One could
elbow one’s neighbor and ask, “what’s the radd?” and expect to hear the second verse spoken
out clearly. Oftentimes, singers would forget the first or second line and return to the mulālā’ for
a few sequences, or even just mumble through lines hitting major syllables. Only occasionally
was this criticized, and even in those situations very lightly.
This textual sequence is sketched in an example from Bahlā’, in Music Example 2. The
first three measures present the mulālā’ and the second three present the text to which the
mulālā’ corresponds.
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Music example 2. The relation between a mulālā’ and a poetic line, over a simplified
raḥmānī and kāsir rhythm.
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When the poetic lines were sufficiently spread along the lines, the razḥa began in earnest.
The dancers had usually already begun to sway and dance to the rhythm of the mulālā’, though
this often shifted with the introduction of the drums.
The drum pair, called the zāna, was usually composed of one larger drum and one
smaller drum. They were usually a pair of drums made together to be played as a pair, and so
were similar in design and construction. The larger of the pair was called raḥmānī, while the
smaller was called kāsir. Some groups used more than two drums, and the doubled drum was
always considered to be an extra raḥmānī, rather than the “middle” sized ranna reported by ElMallah (1998). The biggest difference in playing style was playing with the hands (bi-l-yid) or
with a striker (ḍarb, pronounced ẓarb) and a switch (radd). The other difference that was
commented on was the shape of the drum. Some were barrel shaped and made of very thin
plywood, while others were carved into an hourglass-shape and lathed with decorative lines.
While both styles were two-headed and tightened with ropes, the hourglass shaped drums were
usually considered higher quality—some even considered them “Omani” as opposed to the
cheaper drums, which were called “Bengali,” “Pakistani,” or “Indian.”
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Figure 17. Barrel-shaped drums used by the Firqat Bahlā’, played with the hands.
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Figure 18. The zāna drum pair played by the bin Ga‘rūf brothers in the Firqat al-‘Arabī,
played by a striker, ẓarb, in the right hand and a switch called radd, the “response,” in the
other. The drums were hung from the shoulder and the tightening straps along the ropes
were pushed toward the “striker” end.
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Figure 19. The Firqat al-‘Arabī with an ‘āzī singer from ’Adam with the zāna in the
foreground. The kāsir is leaning on the raḥmānī and both are hourglass-shaped. Both the
ẓarb and the radd are made of date palm parts. The ẓarb is carved from the heartwood of
the trunk and the radd is made by stripping the leaves off of an older leaf-stem.
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Figure 20. The Firqat Bahlā’ records an ‘āzī in the Bahlā’ Fort. Drummers play a raḥmānī
(right) and a kāsir (left) between poetic lines, both played with the hands.
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Groups that played with the hands (Bahlā’, Nizwā, and some groups in ’Izkī) were often
maligned by groups that played with sticks. The striker and switch combination was considered
to be the “original” or “authentic” (’aṣlī) way of playing. They point to the fact that this way of
playing is common in the Sharqiyya, which is taken to be the origin of razḥa in general. The
variety of techniques and sounds produced by the sticks was larger than with the hands, which
could only vary the sound of drumstrokes by hitting the rim of the drum or the center. In
performance, the raḥmānī (the “great” or “big one”) was considered a kind of “ground,”
emphasizing beats with which dance steps were coordinated. The smaller kāsir, or “cutter,”
played more elaborated lines against the raḥmānī beat. However, both drums often settled into
long stable patterns (as in music example 2 and 3), meaning that the kāsir player was not always
improvising over the raḥmānī, even though he was free to. On the other hand, drummers who
frequently played together often had cues for more complex drumming sequences that they
would use variously throughout performances. In music example 3, I have sketched some
interactions between the raḥmānī and the kāsir in a common razḥa al-nāḥiyya as played by the
Firqat al-‘Arabī (using strikers and switches). In this example, X noteheads are played with the
switch and filled ones with the striker. Measures 1-2, 5-8, 11-12 are a “stable” pattern that might
continue for 90% of the performance, while mm. 3-4 and 9-10 are some common zāna
variations, where both drummers coordinate to enliven the rhythm. These are common because
they shift the perception of the downbeat by emphasizing the upbeat after them, as in the
raḥmānī part in mm. 9-10, which is a typical variation that takes many forms. I have sketched
purely kāsir variations from the Firqat Bahlā’ in music example 4. In this example, normal
noteheads represent open, right-handed strokes on the right side of the drum, while crosses
represent open, left handed strokes on the left side.
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Music example 3. Zāna interactions in a razḥa al-naḥiyya.
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Music example 4. Kāsir variations from drummers of the Firqat Bahlā’.
The drum, especially the raḥmānī, anchors the dance steps. While they can be very
idiosyncratic, the basic steps are also sketched in music example 3 and 7. Upstemmed quarter
notes represent the right foot, while downstems represent the left foot. Arrows to the right over
the note mark a step forward, toward the center of the circle, and arrows to the left are steps
away from the circle. The basic step was a right foot forward on beat one, then a close with the
left foot, a step back with the left, and then with the right. Usually, this last right-foot movement
was “bobbed,” not really taking weight before it was emphatically stomped down on beat one
again. The shoulders and head were all used in different ways, usually bobbing on upbeats or
following the drumming. As a whole, the two lines danced in place for a few cycles of singing
the poetic lines, then the group that “gave” the razḥa would widen their dance steps and start to
move as a group around the circle counter-clockwise. When they reached the other line, that line
would begin moving around the circle as well until they made one full circuit and all dancers
were in their original positions. If desired, this circuit would continue. When movement around
the circle ceased, performers could then signal for a second sequence of moves, in which one line
would march forward until it reached the other, sing a few lines, and then retreat. This was
mirrored by the other line. Occasionally, both lines would march toward the center and surround
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the drums, with all the dancers in close contact. This sequence was usually only done once or
twice during a performance and was a period of intense invigoration. All of these dance figures
were signaled by one or more dancers by holding up their arms or otherwise communicating
nonverbally. To conclude the performance, one dancer at the center of the line would hold up
their ‘aṣā-s (camel sticks) or swords and waggle them in the air, and all the other would join in.
This meant that the poetry should not be repeated by the opposing line, and the performance
would cease.
a. Razḥa as a “Model” of Social Life
Amongst men familiar with it, razḥa is often used as an example of how social life is
imagined, or as an example of how it “used to be.” Since razḥa is based on communication,
cooperation, and interaction amongst peers that nevertheless includes some tensions (who should
give the poetry, how long to dance, who can stop a performance, and so on), this is not a huge
logical leap. Most interviewees described the basis of razḥa as “shakhṣayn mutiqābilayn,” that is,
“two people meeting” or “two facing parties.” When I asked who the people were—were they a
shaykh and a tribesperson? Two equals? The Imam and a shaykh? Enslaved people? one
respondent from Nizwā answered this way: “It is a meeting between folks on the same level,
dignified and honorable men. No one is beneath the other, one is not above [the other]. They are
equal—slaves or no, they are all Omanis and so they can razḥa.” When I pressed that the people
who played the drums in the last razḥa were all from formerly enslaved families, he answered by
seizing a kāsir drum from the SUV trunk next to us and playing it with ease. A few members
called out “yalla!” in approval since he rarely played anymore. “Who was a slave? All [can]
play, it’s to his taste. Whoever wants to play, he takes the drum. Stay awhile and you will see,
people take the role that they are comfortable [with].”
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A performer from Manaḥ concurred:
We are all Omanis, here we play together (nal‘ab ma‘ b‘ad). Tribes, slaves, we are sons
of al-Ma‘arā and we razḥa together because it is incumbent upon us to show that we are
united, strong, steadfast. I mean… We are one in razḥa because we are one in al-Ma‘arā.
Our lives are twisted up together (ḥiyatnā tafattala) like this, so [if] one has a good year,
we all do. We share our joys and our setbacks. Believe me, I lived in Muscat, we were
alone, each had their castle and we lived alone among many people, no neighbors, no
circles of friends [da’ira), no razḥa.
Contrast this with a discussion with a performer from Izkī. We were discussing the various arts
in the Arabian Peninsula, when we came to al-‘arḍa al-najdiyya, a war dance from the Najd
plateau of Saudi Arabia. In the ‘arḍa, I noted, the royal family also participates, whereas the
Sultan of Oman never does.
That’s true, yes. Of course, they are Saudi propagandists (literally “drummers,”
muṭṭabbilīn). Ordinary folks do sāmir, or sometimes they call this samra. Or ad-daḥḥa,
this is the authentic art of Najd [see Urkevich 2015 for descriptions of ‘arḍa (64-70),
samrī (73-5), and al-daḥḥa (24-8)]. Razḥa is authentic here in Oman, it’s in the blood.
The shaykh-s and the Sultan don’t razḥa because that’s not appropriate to their station
(maqāmuhum). You play the ‘ūd, yes? If you play the ‘ūd on stage, do you clap when you
finish? No, it’s the same thing. We razḥa for the Sultan, why should he razḥa with us
shoulder to shoulder (laysh yarzaḥ ma‘nā tikātifan)?
I asked if the Sultan even knew how to razḥa:
I don’t know. Remember he’s from Ṣalāla, on his mother’s side. The first time he arrived
in Muscat, he was the Sultan, he didn’t grow up in Oman but he knows it (Oman). When
he goes to Musandam [an exclave on the tip of the Oman peninsula] does he know the
rawwāḥ or the līwā or the nadbah?64 No, that’s not his role.
I pressed him as to whether shaykh-s or Majlis al-Shūrā representatives perform when razḥa
events were held for them:
No, they don’t. I heard that one of them said, he said, “I wish I could perform the razḥa
here in ’Izkī with all of you like I did when I was a child!” Now I don’t know if he did

Rawwāḥ and nadbah, a collective drumming practice and a formalized war-cry, respectively,
are common amongst the Shiḥūḥ in Musandam. Līwā is an Afro-Arab practice that takes
different forms up and down the coasts of the Persian Gulf.
64
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razḥa or not. But the government does not allow [it].65 You know, I told you we have
many police officers in the group, they can’t perform on National Day, or for government
representatives, or things like this.
During the second night of the ‘īd al-fiṭr in Manaḥ in 2016, I had driven over to meet
many of the performers in the Firqat al-‘Arabī who were going to dance in the center of town. I
parked at the junction of the main ring road around Manaḥ and a central branching thoroughfare
that hugged the northern edge neighborhood of al-Ma‘arā. The troupe slowly filtered in and
began performing razḥa-s a few hours after the later afternoon ‘asr prayer. Passing cars, filled
with other locals, honked and pulled over to film, join the dance, or watch. Members of nearby
houses slowly filtered out, women looking from windows and men bringing out sodas and water
bottles and shouting encouragement. Others opened their front gates and beckoned members
inside for meals, snacks, and conversation. Children played in and around our dancing lines,
demanding to have portraits taken, to handle swords, and to join the dancing and drumming.
We stood in two facing lines of fifteen men each, with many people joining and leaving
the lines over the evening. Men were dressed fairly casually, relaxing after a long day of visiting
and family events in kumma-s and unbuttoned dishdāsha-s. The dance lines stepped slowly in a
wide circle to the beat of the drums, dancers nodding and swaying their camel sticks in a loose
unison. One line, the line that received the poetry from the other, looped in a long arc toward the
others, who danced in place. When the moving line met the stationary one, they all moved in one
long line together in a full circle, finally coming to rest where they began. Members held up their
sticks to signify the final iteration of the song, which ends with little fanfare as the drummers
place their drums on the ground. As different members showed up, they were greeted with shouts
to join the lines. New arrivals moved down the lines of dancers shaking hands and touching
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I am unable to confirm if this is a written policy, an unwritten rule, or just a rumor.
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nose-to-nose (khashma), sharing conventional greetings. As the maghrib prayer approached, we
switched from the circle dance formation to the marching formation, snaking under the pastel
yellow street lights of the old town and between plots of heavy, ripening date trees to the old
masgid where most performers prayed. Others had prayed beforehand. As we waited for others
to finish, I spoke with Muhanna, a middle-aged performer. I asked him why they held a
performance of razḥa for the Eid and why they chose that part of town.
Of course we have to celebrate the ‘īd, we’re celebrating the fulfillment of Ramadan.
We’re expressing joy that we’ve fulfilled a religious duty, that we are in Manaḥ with our
families and our loved ones, that we can share in the joy of the holiday. And how can we
celebrate anywhere else? Are we not Manḥī-s, from al-Ma‘arā? So we perform in the
center [of al-Ma‘arā]. How can we go to Bilād [a nearby neighborhood] and razḥa? They
do their razḥa, they are proud of their heritage there (yaftakhirū bi-turāthihim), and so it’s
upon us to do so as well (‘alaynā nasūwīh b‘ad). Every town celebrates like this. Did you
see, not everyone performs, some, you know, they celebrate in different ways. The
shaykh-s won’t celebrate this way, but we do, for their sake (‘alā khāṭirhum).
This situation does not emerge solely from the dynamics of gift exchange, but also from
the tension between social norms and ideal models of authority. Social inequality, egalitarian
ideals, obvious hierarchy, and associations of performance and publicness also manifest. These
are closely tied, but useful to distinguish in analysis. These quotes highlight the juxtaposition of
social ideals like radical egalitarianism and personal autonomy with concrete social realities of
entrenched class inequality and hierarchy. This is especially complicated in the context of
racialized slavery and racialized guest workers. Everyone can play the drum, but drummers
descend mostly from enslaved peoples. The razḥa is about a meeting of equals, but modern
razḥa does not admit the Sultan or other minor leaders or authorities to participate. Leaders, like
women and non-Omani Arabs, are exempted from the razḥa, from the “burden” of representing
the community in this way.
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In this study, the context of recognizing the generosity of leaders is the most potent
generator of social tension because it places several deeply shared Omani cultural ideals at odds.
Generosity, especially by leaders, is often associated with the production and sustenance of
unequal relations. Kings give, and followers receive. However, cultural ideals of personal
autonomy, legitimate authority, radical equality, and dignity are directly undermined in contexts
of hierarchical generosity and a history of institutional slavery. Razḥa performance re-frames
these hierarchical arrangements by foregrounding the community they represent as Omani, Arab,
dignified, and as part of a circuit of exchange between rulers and ruled.
Generosity: An Ethnographic Interlude
One cool summer night, I sat in the breezy, aqua green painted majlis, or reception room,
of the poet Ziyād bin Khālid al-Shukaylī66 a northern neighborhood of Bahlā. The TV was
blaring a Turkish soap opera dubbed into Syrian Arabic. After his grandson brought in the coffee
and snacks, the fawālā, Ziyād poured coffee and handed me sambūsa after sambūsa, or fried
triangular dumplings (though in this case baked, because Ziyād needed to watch his fat intake
due to a heart condition. He mused “by God, these are just as good, anything baked is as fine as
fried!”). Eventually, we relaxed into chatting. We sat with our backs to the low green couches
that ringed the room, tiny porcelain coffee cups gently tinkling together as they floated in a bowl
of water between us. The topic of discussion was his ‘āzī performance, filmed earlier that
evening in the Bahla Fort, a UNESCO World Heritage site. The filming was for their entrance in
the 2016 Sultan Qabūs Prize for Culture, Arts, and Literature. Certain performance troupes were
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invited to submit for the prize, one for each state, which Ziyād claimed amounted to some 50,000
OMR (129,861.70 USD).
“Wow, that’s a lot of money,” I said, rocking back.
“Yes… of course, it’s nothing to the Sultan.” He rubbed his short, jowly beard and fixed
his hazel eyes on me.
“I didn’t compose this ‘āzī for money, doctor, it could be five riyāl and I would be
pleased and honored to win.”
“Of course, bā.”
“This [prize] is a gift from the Sultan, God lengthen his life and bring him health. He
supports the arts, poetry, the traditions of the Omani people. You see this in the festivals, in the
celebrations and the rest. That is the role of the leader (ḥākim): he must hold the nation (yumassik
al-waṭan) and he must have an open palm, then the people will respect him. What a generous
man the Sultan is! He gives liberally, him (yusakhkhī huwā), but he is no fool.”
“Yes,” I interjected, “you know I’ve heard that the shaykh is the ‘sayf wa-mansaf’, the
sword and the meal, is that not so?”
“Yes,” he laughed,
“Yes. I’m laughing because that’s the way Bedouin talk, country folk, you know, old
Bedouins and those long in the tooth talk that way. Why did they say that? They said that
because in the old days, everything came from the shaykhs, the shaykh-s held the country
for the Imam. In the time of the last Imam, it was harsh, there were no drums except in
the festival days and for war. This was a bit before my time, but if you were hungry, you
could go to the sabla or the fort up there and the shaykh or the wālī would have a meal
and he would share with anyone who came. It was open, it was democratic like you
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Americans. Now, yes, we wanted to play drums and do razḥa, but the Imam forbade
those things. Perhaps he was wrong, perhaps he was right—I don’t want to enter into that
[issue, ḥayn mū abī dākhiluh).
“Now, with Qābūs, I arranged this ‘āzī as praise for the Sultan. Why? Who has
been a better leader (ḥākim) for Oman and for Omanis? He brought about the
renaissance, he brought everything. We had nothing before him. Nothing, it was nothing.
Do you know why the Sultan is the most generous leader? He brought cars, trucks, you
know, these things. Why is this so important? Because this is not just for humans, no, no,
no, no, no. No, it was also for the animals, the donkeys, the camels, the horses, God
lengthen your life. Imagine, in the days before Qābūs, we had a donkey, and we had all
these things, piles and piles of things, clothes, baskets, everything was on this donkey.
And me, right on top! I feared I would fall off, you know. But at night I wept, I wept! I
was small. I said to my uncle, why do we have to tire the donkey so, she works so hard
and carries so much? And he said to me, “look, every day a hundred donkeys go up and
down the Jabal ’Akhḍar, carrying more than that. They know the work they must do, and
we feed them and care for them. They have no tongue to speak pain, so we must treat
them well as Muslims and we do.” Then I understood, but I am glad now that they don’t
have to do such work, that’s why I say in the poem that Qābūs was generous to everyone,
to the animals and the humans. That’s how generous he is. Who is happier for Qābūs and
his rule? Us or the animals? I don’t know, I don’t know.”
Note that this conversation moved from performance to the personal acceptance of
money from a government culture prize to the generosity of minor shaykh-s to the generosity of
the Sultan. Such ideas are linked and circulate through class positions. If leaders are generous,
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bigger, greater leaders are yet more so. The Sultan’s generosity, for example, expands even to
the non-human. Had anyone claimed that Qābūs’s generosity extended past humans and to
animals but the poets? Praise, in turn, must recognize this greatness—not merely because of
money, but because of the social benefits it demonstrably brings. Authority well enacted and
demonstrated is praised, which, in turn, is a basis of legitimacy. It is, in the minds of Omani
praise poets, their poetry that augments the honor and reputation of those they praise. Poetry
augments leaders as it guides them. Part of that guidance is the promotion and inculcation of
generosity.
Two Linked Social Mechanisms
Due to these social tensions and the values that variously undergird them, I model the
case of praise for good leadership manifested in generosity as one in which two social
mechanisms are operant. Importantly, mechanisms and their effects are dependent on culturally
learned understandings and expectations of sociality.67 I will briefly explain the two models here.
The first mechanism refers to the long-standing obligation of redistributive generosity for
Arabian leaders, manifest in small- and large-scale social organization (Karateke and
Reinkowski 2005; Al-Rasheed 1991). Such generosity is both obligatory and understood to
secure the legitimacy of the giver. However, because of norms of reciprocity, this mechanism
also produces social uncertainty by putting social ideals like egalitarianism and autonomy in
tension. I call this the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism, and it is the focus of this chapter.
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In this case, mechanisms explain these interactions better than framing them as processes that occur
within “ideal models” (Gibson 2007), “cultural models” (D’Andrade and Strauss 1992) or “cultural
schemas” (Karateke and Reinkowski 2005; Strauss and Quinn 1997) of authority because mechanisms refer
to cause and effect processes rather than dispositions. Whether we call this set of dispositions or norms a
habitus with Bourdieu or a schema with cognitive anthropologists or habits with pragmatists is a,
theoretically speaking, relatively fine issue that is not crucial to the discussion here.
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The second mechanism is the way in which razḥa performance intervenes in the
Generosity/Legitimacy Mechanism. It does so by managing the social uncertainty produced by
elite giving and framing givers and praisers as part of a mutual moral economy. I refer to this as
the Razḥa Integration Mechanism, and it is covered in the next chapter.
Let’s now turn to the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism.
Swords and Gold: The Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism
"A tribal leader," claimed [Shaykh] Zayid [bin Sulṭān al-Nahyān] of Abu Dhabi, "should
have a sword in one hand and gold in the other and know when to use either inducement" (Rabi
2011, 124). While it’s possible that Shaykh Zayed read Gramsci, it’s more likely that Zayid was
just a very astute leader who knew his cultural milieu very well. Here, we’re going to focus on
one of Zayid’s hands: the one with gold in it.
In this section, I give an overview of the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism. The
Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism is a widespread and ancient Middle Eastern practice wherein
leaders display generosity in order to legitimate their own authority, solidify relationships to their
followers, and the demonstrate the efficacy of their rule. Note that this is just one of the
mechanisms that rulers use to legitimize their rule (Karateke and Reinkowski 2005). This
particular model, however, is one that is most likely to be connected with praise and
performance, which is why it is highlighted here.
This link, I contend, is not random, but deeply structured by the values and institutions
that operate within this mechanism. Generosity, often seen as a personal quality, may seem a
strange thing to attribute to state practice. As classicist Paul Veyne claims in his Bread and
Circuses, however, while Imperial Roman leaders were compelled to provide welfare in order to
sustain their position, “people did not talk about the craft of kingship, instead they exalted the

192
virtues of the reigning prince” (1990, 37). It is the personal qualities of the prince, like
generosity, rather than effective statecraft, that are praised. States cannot have personal qualities
like generosity but can be praised as if they do.
Such a mechanism, or something substantially like it, may be familiar in other parts of
the world. It is a way of framing that is available to leaders in many times and places.
Anthropologist Emily T. Yeh shows, in her ethnography of Chinese development in Tibet, that
“since the 1980s… the Chinese state has staked the legitimization of its sovereignty over Tibet
on Tibetan gratitude for the gift of development” (2013, 231). If anything makes the Omani and
Arabian Peninsular context unique it is the time-depth of this practice, its connection to praise
practices, and its co-occurrence on multiple social scales, from the smallest tribal units to modern
states.
I choose to frame this discussion as analyzing “generosity” as opposed to “patronage.”
Patronage is well-studied in the case of Arabic poetics (e.g., Sharlet 2011) and in social science
in general (e.g., Gellner 1977). However, framing this discussion as generosity allows two
important facets of the relationship between performance and authority to emerge. The first is
that “generosity” is a trait that is valorized within different social classes in largely the same
way. Just as individual people are praised for generosity, so is the Sultan. This co-presence at
differing social scales shows how “generosity” compels praise responses regardless of the
provenance of the generosity. Secondly, generosity is sufficiently generalized in Omani and Arab
society so as to include charity, personality, building infrastructure, hosting feasts, gifts, a moral
stance, and a variety of other practices and dispositions that are picked out for praise. The patron
is praised for his actions, many of which are glossed as generosity. Certainly, “patronage” can
and should be analyzed in the Arabian Gulf, especially in the case of actors peripheral to the
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“state” itself. In other contexts, Lisa Gilman (2009) fruitfully characterizes the gifting practices
of Malawian politicians as “patronage,” as does Wenner in Sri Lanka (2015). These are analyses
of the ways in which particular personalities draw followers into their sphere of influence
through gifting. In this sense, “patronage” is a style of pragmatically exhibiting the wider norm
of generosity. In this section, I analyze how widespread discourses of “generosity” and embodied
praise responses to it form a basis of legitimate rulership in Oman.
a. Authority and Legitimacy: Distinctions and definitions
In order to understand why “good deeds” like generosity on the part of leaders work to
promote legitimacy, we need to understand how notions of authority, leadership, praise, and
generosity interact. If generosity produces legitimacy, one important way it does so is through
public praise for figures of authority. In short, generosity is an ideal obligation and a concrete
practice that reinforces the claims of individuals to authority in the Middle East. Such an
investigation will also show why praise is seen as an obligation of the ruled. Due to the paucity
of sources on this relationship directly dealing with Omani material, we will need to look at
nearby related social forms in other Arabic-speaking regions. While there is by no means a large
literature on the topic, we can sketch a fairly coherent picture of the ways in which authority has
been understood by rulers and ruled in the Arabian Peninsula for the past few hundred years by
looking at a range of historical and ethnographic research.
First, we should briefly address the definitions of “legitimacy” and “authority.” These
ideas are tightly interlinked. Hakan Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski open their volume
Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power with the statement that “authority
and legitimacy are closely related concepts” (2005, 1). “Authority,” they write, “signifies the
claim by a group, an individual or an institution to the right to rule… whereas legitimacy must be
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understood as a form of ‘belief’, ascribed as a distinctive feature by the subjects to those in
power” (2005, 1). We can contrast this with anthropologist Ilana Feldman’s (2008) research into
the differences between authority and legitimacy in the bureaucracies of British Mandate and
Egyptian-administered Gaza (1917-67). Citing sociologist Richard Sennett’s 1980 monograph
Authority, she refers to authority as a “process of interpreting power” in the functioning of
government (Feldman 2008, 14-5).68 The government in Gaza, like other colonial situations,
could make little claim to “authenticity,” and so claims to its authority “could not provide a
stable ground” for governing (2008, 15). It was instead the reiterative and quotidian aspects of
bureaucracy that formed a basis of authority, drawing people in to participating in the everyday
“work of rule” (2008, 17-8). This participation, however, did not instill a “belief” in the
legitimacy of these administrations in ordinary Gazans. Gazans did not believe that these nonnative administrations had to be (or perhaps even could be) evaluated in terms of the “rightness
of a political pattern” (Apter 1965, 236) but rather that they were simply able to get things done
in a limited, circumscribed fashion—what Feldman calls “tactical government” (Feldman 2008,
18).
So what do we make of these terms? I want to specify what I mean by “legitimacy” and
“authority” in the following two brief sections.
b. Legitimacy as belief and evaluation

We should note here that Sennett sees authority as a kind of “emotional bond” (1980, 3), arguing that
authority “can become a process, a making and breaking, a remaking of meanings. It can be visible and
legible” in his conclusion (1980, 168). Sennett’s definition of authority is much less firm than Feldman’s
citation implies, but this reflects more on the weakness of Sennett’s argument than on her use of it.
Authority remains practice-based and iterative in something we can identify as a process, even if Sennett
fails to recognize it.
68
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Hakan Karateke bases his study of Ottoman legitimacy on two interrelated aspects of
“legitimacy”: the normative schema and factual measures of legitimacy (2005, 17). A
“normative schema” of legitimacy refers to the established legal apparatuses, norms, and
institutions that legitimate a particular leader: heredity (“I come from a long line of Sultans”),
claims to the divine (“I have divine right”), or tradition (“We have always been ruled by a
Sultan”). Karateke claims that such normative schemas of legitimacy are of primary importance
to other political elites (2005, 18-9). Factual measures of legitimacy refer to the actual concrete
practices and results of those practices: building hospitals, offering welfare, distributing clothing,
food, weapons, horses, and the like. In Karateke’s view, these forms of legitimacy operate on
different social classes: political elites are often interested in normative legitimacy, while
subordinated classes are drawn to factual measures.
A similar perspective on “legitimacy” as a belief was put forth most rigorously by Ronald
Cohen in the introduction to the 1988 volume State Formation and Political Legitimacy that he
co-edited with Judith D. Toland. Here, Cohen formulates a “synthetic” definition of legitimacy
as a “function of its [1] coercive capacities,69 [2] the benefits derived from compliance, [3] the
moral validity of governmental practices, and [4] the continuing evaluation of these practices by
the polity members” (1988, xxx). Legitimacy is a belief that is predicated on practices, both of
authorities and of polity members. In this view, generosity from leaders produces legitimacy by
operating through propositions [2] and [3], while the praise response operates on [3] and [4] by
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This is an important aspect that is overlooked in this chapter and taken up partially in chapter 6.
However, a similar argument could be produced by evaluating Omani performers’ understanding of
Sultan Qābūs’s success in curbing tribal conflict and making Oman “an oasis of peace and security,”
another crucial aspect of Arabian peninsular authority. The razḥa was without a doubt a war-song in the
past, thought this is not retained in current practice. Indeed, as Allen, Jr. and Rigsbee (2000) point out,
Qābūs understood himself, at least through the 1980s, as a war-leader whose chief success was ensuring
peace through force of arms and widespread generosity and amnesty.
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commenting on [2]. More directly, generosity provides benefits [2] that are enacted through
morally valid practices of hospitality and obligation [3]. Praise evaluates these practices [4] in
light of their putative benefits [2] and their moral validity [3]. Where Cohen can fruitfully be
combined with Karateke’s account is in recognizing the ways in which people evaluate leaders
not just in terms of practical effects, but also the ways that these practical effects conform to
widely shared moral norms.
Put another way, legitimacy also means that there are rules constraining those in authority
from the arbitrary use of the power or office. These rules constrain kings as well as their
subjects, governors as well as those they govern. Authority (or the powers distributed to
offices and statuses by tradition) formally relates officials, rulers, and other authorities to
one another and to their subjects; authority ‘structures’ (i.e. arranges) the way power is to
be used… in other words, all human societies contain inequities fostered by authority
relations that are culturally approved and morally valid. The study of how and why this
develops and changes is encompassed in the concept of legitimacy. (Cohen 1988, xviii)
Following Orlando Patterson’s view in his 1982 Slavery and Social Death that “legitimacy is a
process involving incorporation of power relations into a moral order or a system of beliefs about
how things ‘ought’ to be done,” Cohen’s perspective shows how praise figures into structures of
power that are, at root, coercive (Cohen 1988, xvi). Here, Gramsci would agree: arguably, the
Euro-American concept of “legitimacy” is just the liberal figleaf affixed to his wider concept of
hegemony. “Legitimacy” and “hegemony” both probe how “inequities fostered by authority
relations” come to be considered “culturally approved and morally valid” (Cohen 1988, xviii).
So, if praise is a belief that is constantly evaluated with reference to some shared norms,
praise and blame is one way that this might be accomplished. And yet praise is a response in
some places and times and not in others. Praise exists, as Gould (2015) contends, at the
ambiguous juncture between speaking to and speaking against power. As we saw in the last
chapter, outright “blame” precludes this productive ambiguity. “In other words,” Cohen writes,
“it is never altogether clear whether the acceptance of a political order involves grudging or

197
whole-hearted acceptance” (1988, xvi). Such a position allows for both the inclusion of the
individual (and the community) within a shared, if contested, moral economy with leaders, along
with a capacity to speak and act. In Oman, praise is a medium of communication between leaders
that saves the honor and dignity of all those involved by acknowledging their interdependence.
Practices such as praise are a useful vehicle for the evaluation of legitimacy because they
span both ideal beliefs and concrete realities. Geographers Alex Jeffrey and Fiona McConnell
and anthropologist Alice Wilson (2015) similarly view legitimacy as a belief based on practices
evaluated through some “system of beliefs” regarding the right exercise of authority. In their
introduction to a special volume on the concept of legitimacy in the journal Geoforum, they note
how renewed interest in state theory examines the legitimation of particular structures of
authority by “focusing on the practices and performances through which legitimacy is secured”
(2015, 178). Expanding on this, however, they want to understand how legitimacy operates both
as normative (“under what circumstance can a governing authority be considered valid?”) and as
processual (“a technique of governance rather than an achieved status”) in order to destabilize
the state as the sole holder of legitimacy (2015, 179-80). Such a perspective, they argue, allows
scholars to “move beyond the unidirectional idea that legitimacy emanates from the state” and
adopt a “more nuanced and critically attuned engagement with the notion of legitimacy” (2015,
179-80). Such a perspective, they hope, will help illuminate how legitimacy is produced and
sustained in what they call “anomalous political spaces” like refugee camps, government-inexile, and the like (2015, 180).
I use legitimacy in Cohen’s sense, but I will occasionally borrow Karateke’s useful
terminology (specifically factual measures of legitimacy) and Jeffrey, McConnell, and Wilson’s
deliberate juxtaposition of normative and processual approaches.
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c. Authority as a role and a practice
If framing “legitimacy” as a process that is constantly undergoing revision and adaptation
has proved useful, it has been no less so for the concept of authority. While classic essays on
authority have considered it a basis from which to give orders and have them obeyed, as we shall
see, this only accounts for part of the Omani and Arabian Peninsular case. Authority is a slippery
concept because it has two broad meanings. It can refer to a positional role or to a basis upon
which advice or orders can be given.
In Hussein Ali Agrama’s investigation of authority in relation to ethical practice in alAzhār’s fatwā council, he writes that his “concern is not the source of authority, not the question
‘why does it bind?’ but, rather, its mode, that is, to ask, ‘what kind of binding is it?’ ” (2010, 4).
Agrama is skeptical of the notion that authority “binds” because it has some unassailable basis
that we can point to, but is rather interested in what actions it impels, its effects, the relationships
it produces. Authority, in the fatwā council, does not imply that orders will be followed, or even
that they can be given (Agrama 2010, 4). A similar notion holds in Oman and the Arabian
Peninsula. Arabist Clinton Bailey records a common saying amongst the Bedouin of the Sinai
that was also recognized by Omanis: “ ‘a hand forced to grip the sword will not strike” (al-yid illī
ma‘sawbā a‘-l-sayf lā taḍrub). Thus, every chief understands that it is inviting trouble to try and
force a tribesman to do what is not in his interest” (Bailey 2009, 14). This is certainly the
perspective of many groups in the Interior with reference to the state: they are invited to perform,
not commanded.
Following such recent anthropological research into the concept of “authority” and the
anthropology of the state, I see authority not as a finalized achievement that is secured prior to
governance, but as constantly reiterated via social practices (Feldman 2008). Such practices can
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help to establish both the claim to authority (Karateke and Reinkowski 2005) and also
demonstrate the range of proper actions accorded to that status. As noted above, Feldman rightly
contends that “authority” should be distinguished from “legitimacy” (2008, 12-17). Such a
distinction is contrasted to Weber’s claim that authority is “legitimated domination”—a notion
that fails to account for the situation she found in Gaza. Whatever authority that Gazan
administrators enjoyed was not legitimate nor legitimated (2008, 17-18). A role and its powers
can be recognized, while any individual holder may be legitimate or illegitimate. Feldman claims
that Gazan administrators were authoritative largely through their own “self-referential”
bureaucratic practices, through their capacity to draw ordinary Gazans into participating with
them in governance. They did not simply “hold” authority, they were authoritative insofar as
they were effective in deploying governmental resources “tactically.” This is why Cohen refers
to authority as the “powers distributed to offices and statuses” (Cohen 1988, xviii). In this study,
“authority” refers to the position of leadership (be it shaykh, Imam, or Sultan) and the array of
historically and culturally variable practices available to that position. These range from taxation
to giving advice to imposing capital punishment. Different leaders seize more authority, others
less. For example, in the past, religiously minded Imams often discontinued lucrative taxes when
they were not justified by Islamic law.70 Such rights also come with obligations and expectations,
and here is where authorities and their practices come to be seen as legitimate or not. I also often
use the term “authority structures,” which refers to an idealized understanding of the various
roles and statuses and their capabilities that are associated with some polity. Hence, the
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See the example of Imam Muhanna, secretly elected against the wishes of the more powerful tribal
confederations in the early 18th century. In his brief stint as Imam, he cancelled custom taxes at the port of
Muscat because they were higher than stipulated in Islamic law, clearly within his authority as Imam. The
move did not gain him any legitimacy, however, and he was murdered soon afterward (Bathurst 1972).
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“authority structure” of a tribally organized polity might accord shaykh-s high status and a large
range of capabilities, whereas in state-organized polities such capabilities would be highly
constrained.
d. A Word on Ideal Models
The complexity of thinking about authority and legitimacy is in what Karateke refers to
as “normative aspects” and what Cohen calls “systems of beliefs.” Thomas Gibson (2007) refers
to these developed, symbolically dense, and historically contingent sets of expectations and
practices with which leaders are evaluated and political goals are framed as “ideal models” of
authority. “I use the term ‘ideal model’ [in Makassar],” Gibson explains,
for the way the experiences and relationships generated by the symbolic complexes
present in a social formation are brought to consciousness and synthesized into an
explicit model, which then becomes the goal of political action. The power of rulers
within a social formation largely depends upon the legitimate authority that is granted to
them by their subjects when they act in accordance with a widely accepted ideal model.
(Gibson 2007, 5)
Such an approach is well-formed for the Omani case, in which social organization is extremely
fluid and yet shares many basic ideals and practices. These models are flexible enough to admit
of different forms of rulership, whose legitimacy is demonstrated and evaluated according to the
model. This helps to explain why tribal, religious, Sultanic, and state-based social organizations
can be legitimated through the same suite of practices: in our case, generosity and praise in
razḥa. Ideals often outlast the political order in which they operate, though they are always
reshaped in the present.
One of the reasons that Gibson insists on the “ideal model” as opposed to “ideal type” or
any other such construction is because he recognizes that ideal models are constantly updated
and re-evaluated, and therefore can inform different modes of social organization. They assume
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very little about the mind, psychology, cognition, biology, or whatever else. They are not fullyformed and inherited, but rather cobbled together and unsystematic. This conforms with
Wilkinson’s (1987) convincing argument that the ideological rationalization of the Imamate was
a kind of “Islamization” of a pre-existing tribally based authority structure. Eickelman’s (1985)
study of authority and legitimacy in Inner Oman concurs. He makes the case that, in 1955, after
the Sultan seized the cities of the Interior, the former Imamate populace did not consider him to
be prima facie an illegitimate leader for them (1985). To the contrary, insofar as he fulfilled his
duties as a leader—duties that are similarly idealized in theocratic and monarchic form—he was
not rejected. The Imamate and the Sultanate, as different ideal models of authority, nevertheless
shared a wide array of features and expectations. Even predating the military takeover of the
Interior, qāḍī-s trained and working in Imamate towns were allowed to transfer to Sultanate
towns with the Imam’s blessing. Imam al-Khalīlī wrote to one such transfer applicant that he
“could serve Islam equally well by working for the sultan” (1985, 11). From these kinds of social
exchanges (and from reports of oil wealth in other Gulf states), several tribal tamīma-s pressed
other notables to accept absorption into the Sultanate in order to benefit from the modernization
campaign they thought Sultan Sa‘īd bin Ṭaymūr would initiate with oil resources discovered
further inland. After 18 months, however, elites mobilized a popular rebellion against the
Sultanate due to repeated failures to conform to expected models of leadership.71

Though see Rabi (2011) for Sultan Sa‘īd bin Ṭaymūr’s apparent anxiety over his claim to any Islamic
authority. He immediately, for example, refused to be called sulṭān al-muslimīn (“Sultan of the Muslims,”
a portmanteau of sulṭān and imam al-muslimīn, “Imam of the Muslims” and a clear example of the
“cannibalization” of one political system by another) because he knew he lacked the proper Islamic
credentials (Eickelman 1985, 17; Rabi 2011, 87, 100-1). His piecemeal efforts from 1955 onward to
demonstrate that he would promote putatively Islamic social values (such as limiting the playing of “music”
and personally ordering the flogging of tobacco smokers “caught” in Maṭraḥ square) were more an attempt
to “forestall criticism from Ibadhi circles in the interior” than a grand gesture to Islamic legitimacy (Rabi
2011, 88).
71
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e. Thinking about “ideal models” of authority at different scales through history
With these definitions and evaluation through ideal models in mind, we can start to trace
how the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism has worked over time. Rather than soliciting a fullfledged “ideal model” of authority from interlocutors, I take praise poetry as one way that these
models are shaped, communicated, and learned by Omanis. Before we look at praise, however, I
want to look at areas of convergence between different historical descriptions of tribally based
social authority furnished by researchers on several social levels and from several class
perspectives throughout the Arabian Peninsula. This will give us a sufficiently broad
understanding of authority from which to analyze specific mechanisms of generosity and praise.
These descriptions range from small-scale Bedouin society,72 to towns and shaykhdoms,73 to
regional and state levels.74 Of course, not all these accounts focus directly on authority at the
same social level or agree in all respects. However, there are important features of Omani social
organization that make such comparisons more acceptable. “In the Trucial Coast,” Lienhardt
points out, “one finds no such strongly marked division between the life of the bedouin and the
life of the settled people as exists in the more fertile parts of the Middle East" (2001, 81).
Keeping in mind that the Peninsula is extremely diverse, we can still note certain regularities in
political structure amongst Arab groups.

72

Abu Lughod 1986; Chatty 1996; Cole 1975; Janzen 1986; Lancaster 1981; Lancaster and
Lancaster 1999; Young 1996.
73

Al-Torki and Cole 1989; C. Eickelman 1984; al-Rasheed 1991; Lienhardt 2001; Limbert 2010;
Meneley 1996; Wikan 1982.
74

Adra 2001; Caton 1990; Dresch 1989; D. Eickelman 1985; Meeker 1979; Miller 2007; AlRasheed 2002; Sowayan 1985; Vasiliev 2000; Wilkinson 1987.
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As William and Felicity Lancaster put it, the basis of social authority in the Arabian
Peninsula is “ḥukma, from the [Arabic trilateral] root ḥ-k-m, basically, ‘arbitration’ ” (Lancasters
2011, 298). Rulers at all scales were respected and legitimate insofar as they were successful
arbiters of disputes, keepers of peace, knowledgeable of customary law, honorable, generous,
and open and available (Lancasters 2011, 298-309; Onley and Khalaf 2006). Historian James
Onley and sociologist Sulayman Khalaf conclude their article on shaykh-ly authority in the preoil Arabian Gulf by noting that it was “frail, vulnerable, and precarious” (2006, 204).75 Such
frailty was predicated on the basic ideal models that informed political authority, namely, that
“the entire premise of organization is equality, autonomy, and the acquisition of reputation” in
which the “only political power available is the ability to influence the decisions of others”
(Lancaster 1981, 73).
Note that coercion, violence, was not a part of these most basic assumptions. Other than
keeping the peace, there is little sense in which leaders were able to coerce action. Caton (1987)
has argued that we recognize the limited role of coercion as basic to the play of power in tribal
societies in the Arabian Peninsula. It is “persuasion” based on dialogue, rather than violence, that
is the crucial form of power within these systems. “The leader in tribal society is a man who
must know how to persuade an audience by rhetorical means as opposed to coercing them by the
use or the threat of force,” Caton argues (1987, 93). Such a system, he concludes, “must be
explained in light of cultural notions such as autonomy because an actor would only try to
persuade someone whom he could not or should not compel” (1987, 96). I believe that the
ethnographic record supports such statements. However, how do these ideal models of authority
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An idea developed by Max Gluckman (1956) and refined by Aronoff and his collaborators in the 1986
edited volume The Frailty of Authority.
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and “cultural notions” of autonomy, equality, and reputation function in the context of
centralizing states? Or in the contexts of strong patriarchy, ethnic border maintenance, and
authoritarian governments? The answer is that such frailty could be overcome by ambitious
leaders in various ways, through appeals to religious unity, alliances with merchant families,
relations to outside powers (Western and Ottoman), or oil revenues. These latter examples,
especially, show the importance of the generosity/legitimacy mechanism.
f. Ideal models of authority and generosity across class
Ideal models of authority, as Karateke noted, may vary with class distinctions. While
elites require justifications for one elite to claim the throne—however modern it seems—most
non-elites find little difference between one leader and another. As the Lancasters point out,
while the lack of primogeniture in Arab polities in the Oman Peninsula may shock Europeans
and lead to bloodshed amongst elites, non-elites show little concern. They paid the same tax, it
just went to someone else. It was action that has differentiated one predatory elite from his
similarly well-heeled doubles. Generosity is a virtue that relies on both concrete action and
reputation. Giving generously is an action that has salience for everyone, and everyone can judge
it, read it, and praise it. Later, we will both discuss how generosity’s mutual valuation is a tool of
hegemony construction and how it might function as “small arms in the class war,” as James
Scott put it. Keeping the virtue of generosity circulating as a virtue amongst elites might be a
more efficient tactic in “class warfare” than burning a police station or robbing an elite’s date
store.
Here, we turn to a discussion of how generosity has been a mechanism for legitimation
on multiple social scales and across different class lines. As noted in Chapter 1, social
organization in Oman has historically ranged from loosely organized Bedouin family groups to
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tribal chieftaincies right through to centralized states and empire. Al-Rasheed refers to this range
in the Northern Arabian emirate of Hail [Ḥā’il] as being between “two leaderships” (1991, ch. 3).
The first is manifested in the smaller-scale shaykh and the second in the larger scale ’amīr (1991,
82). Shammar shaykh-s led small-scale, autonomous groups and worked within a “decentralized
political structure ideology” which allowed them limited authority in mediation, resolution,
settlement disputes, and redistribution of resources (1991, 77, 81). In her view, ’amīr-s were
leaders of states composed hierarchically of shaykh-s related within one tribal confederation (in
Inner Oman over the last few centuries the role of ’amīr would be called tamīma), the settled
oasis population, and nomadic groups (1991, 78-82). The crucial difference is the ’amīr’s ability
to coerce individuals and inflict punishment by way of access to a militia predicated on their
expanded economic base. While some scholars (notably those who have generalized from
Bedouin data i.e., Bailey 2009; Cole 1975; the Lancasters, 1981, 1999, 2011) have
overemphasized the practical reality of the strong egalitarian strain in Arabian ideal models of
authority, Al-Rasheed notes that the two leaderships were in constant tension, fluctuating
between, in Robinson’s (1980) terms, the “political” and the “anti-political”:
The growing tendency towards greater centralization and the creation of more stable
forms of government was constantly being checked by the decentralizing tendencies of
the Shammar tribal system [the tribal confederation to which the Rashīdī ‘amīr-s
belonged]. This system was not favorable to the maintenance of permanent political
relations and alliances. It was based on the principle of local group autonomy at the
political, military and economic levels… the tension between the two tendencies was
dispersed, encompassed and partially overcome through the system of subsidies to tribal
sheikhs. The amirs maintained a tradition of subsidizing these sheikhs through the
continuous distribution of cash and gifts of rice, coffee, sugar, camels, and weapons.
These gifts operated as a bribe to maintain the allegiance of the sheikhs, who remained to
a great extent autonomous. The subsidies cemented, enforced and strengthened what
would otherwise have been a loose, fragile, and weak political relationship between the
Hail leadership [the Rashīdī ‘amīr-s] and the Shammar. The system remained operative
as long as the amirs were able to provide these subsidies and as long as their interests
coincided with those of the Shammar. (Al-Rasheed 1991, 81-2)

206
What these two modes of leadership have in common is the ways in which they are
legitimated through the practice of generosity. Generosity is a general expectation for properly
socialized and honorable individuals, but it is a critical lynchpin of legitimacy when it comes to
leaders. The same notion of generosity is operant in both “leaderships.” If authority is predicated
on autonomy and equality, generosity and hospitality are mechanisms of integrating, persuading,
and drawing these autonomous units together.
“The Sultan’s influence,” writes Bannerman on the Omani state in the late 19th century,
was spread by the same mechanisms that the shaikhs used, but on a grander scale… he
dispensed a regular and substantial supply of gifts and money to local shaikhs. These
payments were very important as tribal leaders became dependent on the Sultan for the
revenue necessary to maintain their own positions. In this manner a hierarchy of wealth
was established whereby the Sultan increased his own prestige and influence through
giving or withholding gifts from shaikhs who pleased or displeased him. (Bannerman
1976, 28)
This is not to say that financial outlays cannot be perceived as “bribes”—the case of
Yemen (Phillips 2008) make this extremely clear—but only that this outlay is not illicit. It is an
expectation for how things work, even though it can be framed in different ways. What is
important to note in the case of the new states in the Gulf is why and how these states have been
able to utilize the same mechanisms of legitimacy as those on much smaller scales. The question
of why this mechanism works and why it is praised in the way that it is in Oman depends on
understanding the various roles it takes in Middle Eastern societies.
g. Killing Horses for Dinner: Generosity as a Social Premise
Now we can turn to the ways in which generosity is understood and inculcated as a value
in individuals from various class backgrounds.
Generosity is, as the Lancasters put it, a premise of Arabian Peninsular society, “the
cement of social practice” (2011, 10). “There is no option,” they conclude, social premises like
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generosity “have to be done” and are expected as much between equals as between those of
differing status (2011, 10). James Onley and Sulayman Khalaf concur, noting that “tremendous
importance is attached to a ruler’s reputation for generosity” (2006, 199). Wedeen similarly cites
generosity as a prerequisite of the North Yemeni Imams (2006, 33). Lienhardt agrees:
The members of any bedouin groups would be easy prey to human enemies and a harsh
environment were they not bound together by very strong ties of social and political
solidarity. The bedouin ethos sets a high value on generosity and the right to expect and
demand help from each other. A bedouin who is generous to her cousins does no more
than the bedouin ethos requires of her. Private resources are only private in a limited way:
they are subject to many and strong communal demands. (Lienhardt 2001, 41)
Generosity and its virtues are well reported in the Bedouin literature. Thesiger (1959)
records that his Omani companion Bin Kabina marveled at the stupefying generosity of Bakhit, a
visitor warmly welcomed to their camp one night:
He had rheumy eyes, a long nose, and a thatch of grey hair. The skin sagged in folds over
the cavity of his stomach. I thought, ‘He looks like a proper old beggar. I bet he asks for
something.’ Later in the evening he did and I gave him five riyals, but by then I had
changed my opinion. Bin Kabina said to me: ‘He is of the Bait Imani and famous.’ I
asked, ‘What for?’ and he answered, ‘His generosity.’ I said, ‘I should not have thought
he owned anything to be generous with’, and Bin Kabina said, ‘He hasn’t now. He hasn’t
got a single camel. He hasn’t even got a wife. His son, a fine boy, was killed two years
ago by the Dahm. Once he was one of the richest men in the tribe, now he has nothing
except a few goats.’ I asked: ‘What happened to his camels? Did raiders take them, or did
they die of disease?’ and Bin Kabina answered, ‘No. His generosity ruined him. No one
ever came to his tents but he killed a camel to feed them. By God, he is generous!’ I
could hear the envy in his voice. (Thesiger 1959, 71)
Such reports are familiar and can be multiplied. John Lewis Burckhardt recounted a story
circulating amongst the Bedouin he traveled with concerning “Djerba, the present powerful
sheikh of Beni Shammar in Mesopotamia,” who agreed to slaughter his prized horse to feed two
hungry guests (1831, 195-6). As he tied the poor beast’s feet to do so, he heard camels
approaching bearing sacks of rice that had been sent as a gift from Qāsim, saving his horse from
the cook-pot. This story harkens back to Ḥātim al-Ṭā’ī, the semi-legendary pre-Islamic figure
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famed for his generosity. Here’s his story narrated by a young Omani in Nizwā, proud to tell me
the story in front of his uncle:
Storyteller: Ḥātim was a shaykh of the Ṭā’ī of the Qaḥṭānī. He was the most generous (akram)
shaykh, anyone who had a request he fulfilled it. His generosity (gawdu) was [so] great that
when another shaykh demanded his territory and title from him, he just gave them away and
lived in the desert. Just like that! So, he lived there for many years with nothing. A man heard of
his famous generosity (nadā), and so came to the evil shaykh and said, “I am looking for Ḥātim,
the great shaykh, for aid.” The evil shaykh was greedy, he didn’t help anyone but himself (lā
yibūl ‘alā garaḥ).76 So [the man] returned home, and he saw a poor man in the desert, and this
was Ḥātim but he did not know. So he said, “I am searching for this Ḥātim, because I need aid.”
Storyteller’s uncle: And Ḥātim, what did he say?
ST: He said, “I am Ḥātim, and I know the evil shaykh is looking for me (yibānī) and will pay you
for me. Bring me to him, and he will reward you (bayasakhkhī ‘alayk).”
STU: That’s generosity (dhak al-ṣakhāwa)! That’s generosity, he gave himself up (yistislim
ḥiyātu), is that true or what?
ST: Yes. The evil shaykh was sad when he saw Ḥātim come to give himself in to help this man,
and when he saw how Ḥātim held himself together in the face of this (kayf Ḥātim masika nafsu
imam kullu hadha), he gave everything back to [Ḥātim].
BJG: Wow, what a story.
STU: Yes, there is another part. There are many stories.

I triple checked this translation, because this phrase literally means “he did not or would not
urinate on a wound.” This refers to extreme stinginess, and in this sense, didn’t elicit laughter
from anyone but me, which I have omitted here to keep the story intact. Others I discussed this
term with considered it a Bedouin-derived expression or extremely old-fashioned, and so it
would fit the context of the story.
76
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BJG: Please, please.
STU: Now, listen [nephew], I don’t think you heard this one in school. One day, long ago, a king
heard of Ḥāṭim and said, “I am more generous than he (askha’ minnuh). I will ask him for the
best of his horses.” He asked for this because Ḥātim loved his horses. So, the king sent a
messenger to Ḥātim, and [the messenger] spent the night in his tent and they had a meal, this was
the custom… In the morning, the messenger said, “I have come from King so-and-so, to ask
from you your favorite horse.” What did Ḥātim say? He said, “I wish you had told me last night,
for I killed my favorite horse last night for our dinner.” Imagine! Now, you wanted examples of
generosity (al-sakhāwa), he is the most generous of Arabs. And he was a Christian; later the Ṭā’ī
became Muslims of course.77
Generosity is likewise among the four “cardinal” virtues used to evaluate Shlaywīḥ al‘Aṭāwī, the famed raid-leader and “Desert Knight,” according to Kurpershoek (1995, 86). These
virtues were the same as those picked out by the Medieval scholar Qudāma bin Ja‘afar alBaghdādī (d. ~377/948) in his Naqd al-shi‘r, which included generosity, courage, intelligence,
and temperance (Kurpershoek 1995, 85n114). In the poems that record his life,
These cardinal virtues are stressed as the key to Šlēwīḥ’s success as a leader: in
dangerous situations he personally takes the greatest risks; he is the one who climbs
mountains in order to spy out the country, but he is generous in letting the others share in
the booty and modest in his own demands; and if the group is hard pressed by hunger or
thirst he chooses to abstain and voluntarily renounces his legitimate part of the remaining
rations in favour of his comrades. As Šlēwīḥ’s famous verse put it, ‘When the water-skins
are dry except for a few last drops, I leave my share of water to the others, proud to
abstain’. (Kurpershoek 1995, 86)
Abdulla El Tayib cites Ḥātim’s poetry as emblematic of a particular moral stance on generosity and its
relationship to fame in pre-Islamic Arabia, one mirrored all over Eurasia: “O, Mawiya [Ḥātim’s wife],
wealth comes and goes. What lasts of wealth is to be well spoken of and leave a good memory” (1983,
31). Irish mythic hero Cu Chulainn adds: “‘Little care I,’ said Cu Chulainn, ‘nor though I were but one
day or one night in being, so long as after me the history of myself and doings may endure” (Greene
1985, 51).
77
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Just as Shlaywīḥ is considered a good leader for his generosity in sharing his food and
“abstaining with pride,” so are the shaykh-s who routinely spend their entire fortune in the name
of their community. Lancaster (1981) reacts with a mixture of annoyance and admiration when
he writes that:
one of the sheikhs [of the Ruwāla), through whose hands tens of thousands of pounds
sterling passed annually, was frequently strapped for cash and used to borrow £50 off me
to pay for repairs to a truck. On the other hand, when money was available he would
hand out hundreds with gay abandon or buy a new car (which was given away in a few
weeks). This insouciant attitude is attractive but it makes it almost impossible to maintain
accounts… this carefree attitude to money is in part genuine and in part impression
management… the women, who are equally generous, keep household accounts fairly
carefully and are keen on the value of money. (Lancaster 1981, 97-8)
Similarly, Lienhardt recounts a tragic story between two brothers, Ḥamdān and Sulṭān bin Zayid.
Ḥamdān ruled Dubai from 1912-22.
Hamdan was a man of extreme generosity, giving away all he had to those who asked for
it and therefore extremely poor. Thus he was not able to give his brother the sums of
money which the brother and his wife thought he should. They appear to have imagined
that he was much richer than he was, because he was generous, and that he was
intentionally depriving them of money. When Sultan killed Hamdan, quite suddenly and
unexpectedly with his own hand, he is said to have immediately opened the treasury
where he found nothing, and then to have turned and wept. (Lienhardt 2001, 180)
Vasiliev notes that generosity was a basis of Sa‘ūdī rulership since the times of the
Emirate of al-Dir‘iyya (1745-1818 CE), when Sa‘ūd bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (r. 1803-1814) hosted
“several hundred guests a day” and perhaps some 50% of state expenditure was for
“entertainment of guests,” the “relief of paupers,” and infrastructure (2000, 119-21). “The money
thus allowed for guests,” Vasiliev writes, citing Burckhardt, “is paid into the hands of sheikhs,
who keep a sort of public house, where all strangers may halt and be fed gratis; it is thought just
that the whole community should contribute toward their expenses” (2000, 119-21). Ibn Bishr, a
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historian of Najd, claimed that the budget of al-Ḥāsa was divided into three parts, with one
allotment going directly for “gifts and monetary allotments” to local shaykh-s (2000, 121-2).
‘Abd al-‘Azīz (r. 1765-1803), according to Ibn Bishr, once “pricked [one of 25 sacks of riyāl-s
that came to the palace as revenue) with his sabre and said, ‘The Lord has given me power over
this, but He has not given this any power over me!’ and started distributing the money” (2000,
122).
Gifts that Flatten Houses: Generosity and Dependency
In the opening of this chapter, I noted that I would take two approaches to generosity: one
investigating mechanisms of political legitimacy, and one involving the gift. While we will see
many more examples of the ways that ideal models of authority and generosity are textually
exchanged in verse and speech, we can turn now to the literature on the “gift” to see the more
dangerous aspect of such giving, especially as manifested in strict power differentials.
Anthropologists have long applied Mauss’s (1950) unexpected insight into the mutual
obligations incited by gifting in his 1923 Essai sur le don to describe the ways in which the
movement of goods helps to weave a social fabric. Mauss’s key discovery was that in many
societies, gifts are not freely given, but are obligatory: “one gives because one is compelled to do
so, because the recipient possesses some kind of right of property over anything that belongs to
the donor” (1990, 13). Leaders give, partially, because they have no choice. Socrates made a
similar point in Xenophon’s Oeconomicus about the endless duties and obligations of the
wealthy—to fund wars, receive guests, raise horses, and organize choruses—warning that
“wherever you seem to do any of these things inadequately, I know that the Athenians will
punish you no less than if they had caught you stealing their own property” (cited in Kurke 2013,
147-8). The obligation to give further catalyzes a chain of obligations—to receive the gift and to
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return the gift (Mauss 1990, 8-14).78 The “potlatch,” the ritual giving, consumption, and
destruction of goods in the native Pacific Northwest, is a paradigmatic example. In the potlatch,
X̱aayda (Haïda) and Kwakwaka’wakw (Kwakiutl) elites sought to draw others into their sphere
of influence by giving so generously that the humiliated recipients, unable to reciprocate, were
put “‘in the shadow of [the giver’s) name” (Mauss 1990, 39). This, in Mauss’s terms, is one way
that rivalrous givers “transform into persons having an obligation those that have placed [them)
under a similar obligation” (1990, 37). Nobles engaged each other ritually and economically
through agonistically competitive generosity in order to gain followers and to avoid having their
name and house “flattened” by failure (Mauss 1990, 39).
Scholars such as Mary Douglas (1990), Anne Meneley (1997), Florence Weber (1989),
Annette B. Weiner (1992), Margaret Wilson (1989), and Emily T. Yeh (2013; 2014) have shown
us the ways in which what is glossed as gift exchange creates, regulates, and manages social
relationships. While many anthropologists have taken for granted that Mauss was describing the
history of the contract through “a theory of exchange whose primary feature is the identification
of the gift with the spirit of the donor,” Lygia Sigaud argues that Mauss’s primary lesson is that
gifting produces obligations and social relationships (2002, 335). In light of such data, Mary
Douglas states that “a gift that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction” (1990, vii).
In this sense, generosity, gifting, and reciprocity have the capacity to produce social relationships
of equality and inequality, that is, they are capable of affirming equality or of creating and
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Though see Campergue 2015; Caple 2015; Corderey 2015; de la Perrière 2015; Godelier 1996;
Heim 2004; Sihlé 2015; Testart 1997, 1998, 2007, 2013; Testart, Lécrivain, and Govoroff 2002;
Weber 1989, 2000 for a substantial Francophone critique of these interpretations of the “gift,”
“exchange,” and “reciprocity.”
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sustaining hierarchy. As Jacques Godbout concludes, “the gift between equals gives rise to
equality, the gift between those who are unequal gives rise to inequality” (1998, 137).
In the context of the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism, goods and praise are circulated
but not merely equated—rather, a social relationship is confirmed. The failure of either party to
“play their part” promises a failure of the system. “The relationship established” through gifting,
as Weber shows in her study of French peasant life, “is more important than what occasioned it”
(1989, 81). Lancaster reports a similar finding among the Ruwāla Bedouin. A display of
generosity from a Ruwāla shaykh “is not wholly disinterested,” but rather “is, in itself, a political
statement of autonomy and a means of spreading reputation and gathering information” (1981,
94-5). It is not the livestock, ammunition, trucks, or cash that is important, it is that the act of
giving, receiving, and recognition of mutual obligation is an active claim to community as much
as it is a claim to the capacity to sustain its autonomy via distribution.
a.

With Friends Like These…: Women’s Visitation Networks

In the Middle East, the most in-depth and nuanced discussions of the ways in which
generosity, hospitality, and gift exchange manipulate social relationships is found in the
ethnographic record on women’s visitation networks (Al-Torki and Cole 1989; Eickelman 1984;
Kanafani-Zahar 1983; Limbert 2010; Meneley 1996; Wikan 1982). Neighbors and the neighbor
group hold special status in Islamic thought, but its patterns and conception are historically
contingent and variable (Limbert 2010, 54-7). Nevertheless, visitation and the quotidian
exchange of gifts and hospitality are the focus of women’s intense scrutiny and evaluation. Any
inequality or failure of reciprocal relations is evidenced both as a moral and as a material one,
and hence can lead to social ostracization, weakness, and dependency.
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Meneley’s Tournaments of Value (1996) is one of the most sustained analyses of the
topic, focusing on the intense and strategic practice of khurūj, “going out,” amongst women of
the nās (respectable people) and kibār (landowning elites) in Zabid, Yemen in the 1980s and
1990s. “Exchange of hospitality in Zabid,” she writes, “like in other ethnographically known
forms of exchange, has both unifying and divisive aspects” (Meneley 1996, 4). Among Zabidi
women, the exchange of visits and hospitality defines the borders of their community of
interrelated bayt-s (family households), partially through the financial outlay required to throw a
respectable event. Wealth does not mean honor for a bayt in and of itself, rather, “their
honourable status is contingent upon the appropriate distribution and consumption of resources”
(1996, 57). Eickelman (1984), Limbert (2010), and Wikan (1982) report similar processes of
social differentiation in Oman, resulting in a pattern of distinction between elite shaykh-ly and
non-shaykh-ly families circulating in different but partially overlapping circles. Material wealth,
in Zabid, should be shown off through hospitality, since such generosity is a “glorious deed” that
builds honor (1996, 3-4, 37). However, Meneley shows us a paradox built into this system.
While the visitor adds to the honor of the host by the host’s “aggressive welcoming” whereby the
guest is subordinated, visitors also delight in making hosts fetch them things—food, drink, better
pillows (1996, 101). Kanafani-Zahar adds that in the United Arab Emirates, the host and guest
try to assert their dominance over each other—in Zabid, these demands on the host are a way to
“tilt the balance” a bit back in the favor of the visitor (Kanafani-Zahar 1983, 98). While lowerstatus women visit higher-status women more often, patterns of visitation are remembered for a
long time and unreciprocated visits are not forgotten. Such long memories are activated through
the attribution of praise and blame: good hosts are praised, bad ones are criticized mercilessly,
mostly in gossip (1996, 97-101). Such constant comment and jockeying typifies Zabidi social
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life because hierarchy is “continually re-enacted or altered through the process of recognition
inherent in the exchange of hospitality” (1996, 180). Meneley highlights the crucial feature of
this Zabidi visiting network in the dual nature of generosity: “generosity is a positive quality,
but, by being generous, one is attempting to encompass, at least temporarily, those to whom one
is being generous”—in other words, to flatten them (1997, 194).
Another important aspect that these scholars point out are the mutual benefits derived
from visiting, hospitality, and generosity. As Kanafani-Zahar, Wikan, Eickelman, and Meneley
all stress, honor accrues to the guest as well as the host. “To honor a guest is a duty (wajib) of the
hostess: if a woman honors her guest she honors herself and if she does not, she demeans
herself” (Kanafani-Zahar 1983, 101). Such a mutual benefit does not mean that interaction in
Oman is always as smooth as it appears to be (Eickelman 1984, ch. 4, 6). In Zabid, for example,
Meneley points out that “the solicitous insistence of the hostess is in contrast with the stylized,
decorous refusal of the guest,” who seeks to represent herself as controlled and not dependent,
greedy, or vulgar (1997, 103). Such a personal display brings honor to the guest and tests the
commitment of the host. This mutual benefit is also understood to be at work in explaining why
Zabidi women adorn themselves with jewelry. Adornment brings honor to the wearer and to the
viewer, though it may risk the “evil eye,” and displays the generosity of the wearer’s bayt (1996,
117). I was personally struck by the amount and intensity of personal grooming before praise
performances in Oman, sometimes taking a full two hours before an event was scheduled.
Groups of men would help each other fasten belts, arrange daggers and cellphones, and
straighten dishdāsha-s. Men would stare into the reflections of car windows for minutes on end
arranging the folds of their maṣar headwrap so that they would be perfectly straight and crisp.

216
These kinds of behaviors need to be understood in the context of the mutual accrual of honor and
in the ways that obligations of sociality operate with the tensions of equality and encompassing.
b. “A Wilderness of Hearts”: Generosity and the State
[The Ottoman Sultan) was the one who bestowed, and every act of bestowing
reaffirmed his prosperity. “Man is a slave of benevolence,” declares the 17th-century
scholar Katib Çelebi, describing the desperate situation of soldiers in Erzurum during
the Yerevan campaign. “A shortage in generosity and bounty can result in a
wilderness of hearts.” (Karateke 2005, 47)
If generosity is a strongly felt obligation within families and an important part of ideal
models of authority, it is no less so in the context of the state. And, just as generosity can
produce legitimacy, a shortage of it is dangerous, as Çelebi shows. Anthropologists of the state
have recently adopted a practice-oriented approach to the state-form, just as they have towards
its ideological basis of authority and legitimacy (Akhil and Gupta 2006). Such social practices,
as we have seen, can range from the quotidian—filing (Feldman 2008), paperwork (Gupta 2012;
Hull 2012), rituals of voting (Wedeen 2007)—to the spectacular (Adams 2012; Chatty 2009;
Rasmussen and al-Harthy 2012). As we have seen, generosity as a practice can be small-scale
and personal (such as handing out cash or slaughtering animals) or spectacular (massive
development projects). Generosity and its symbolic construction is vital to the construction of
state dependency, and hence hegemony, in the Arabian Gulf.
Karateke’s (2005) essay on the legitimating practices of the Ottoman sultans reveals the
logic of this mechanism for the state. In the distribution of welfare services and the deployment
of symbols, the maintenance of “order,” and other such concretized demonstrations of
generosity, Ottoman sultans demonstrated the efficacy of their leadership. This is Karateke’s
factual legitimacy, or what Cohen calls “the benefits of compliance.” These practices were
variegated and situational but always predicated on asymmetry. “Since the lands the Ottoman
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sultan ruled belonged to him personally,” Karateke notes, “he was materially beyond compare
relative to his subjects” (2005, 46). Such prosperity made a “positive impression only insofar as
its possessor was generous” and so “generosity and charity figured high on the list of
characteristics of the ideal sultan” (47). For common folk, Ottoman sultans fulfilled requests for
cash, distributed meat on Fridays, established welfare programs, funded charitable buildings
(bath-houses, caravanserais, schools, dervish lodges, bridges, public fountains), held public
celebrations, cancelled taxes, abolished debts, and made charitable donations to hospitals or for
natural disasters (37-53). By 1831, such charity was routinely published in the official newspaper
Taqvim-i veqayi (51). Directed at other elites, this generosity took the form of subsidies given in
order to “undermine potential opposition or critical voices” (47). “Expensive horses, precious
clocks, jewelry, swords, orders, and many kinds of robes of honor” were distributed amongst
bureaucrats, doctors, and other intellectuals to secure their loyalty through unmatchable gifts (478).
Unmatchable “gifts” become the basis for a more coercive form of generosity.
Lienhardt’s account of the practice of shūfa in the Trucial Shaykhdoms is just one example
(2001, 200-1). According to Lienhardt, shaykh-s in need of cash would inform merchants that
they would be paying them a formal visit, with all their retainers in tow—certainly a high honor.
However, they expected not only a meal for dozens or hundreds of participants, but a large sum
of cash as well. Failure to give over the cash could result in legal actions, beatings, or worse. I
was told tales of the same practice of agonistic visiting by Omani leaders—if an up-and-coming
shaykh was too ambitious, a formal visit from a higher authority would show him what the
burden of rulership really meant. The sheer outlay of generosity expected by the higher authority
from the presumptuous shaykh would bankrupt the lesser over the course of single feast.
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If the dangers of dependency and encompassment are understood in women’s visiting
networks, they are no less a threat in state and community relations. The capacity for the gift to
be used to foster dependency is manifested in the context of structured unequal access to
resources. “Generosity” can help produce social arrangements by manipulating the way this
gifting is framed by actors. For states like Oman, development can be framed as generosity by
drawing on long histories of the practice and on idealized models of authority and distribution.
Even if such a framing is resisted or contested by Omanis (which it sometimes is), various state
apparatuses can draw on both traditional and developmental discourses to justify their programs.
In other contexts, re-framing can be considerably more contested. Emily T. Yeh’s
ethnography Taming Tibet (2013) takes the “Janus-faced nature of the gift” as a way to
understand divergent responses to the development practices of the People’s Republic of China
in the autonomous region of Tibet (2013, 15). “Gifts always establish relationships or bonds,”
Yeh writes, “as well as their accompanying obligations to give, receive, and reciprocate. Thus,
the act of giving contains within it two opposite movements: it is an act of both generosity and
violence, of sharing and debt. To be given a gift is also to lose some measure of autonomy and
freedom” (2013, 15). Drawing on Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic domination, a form of
domination that naturalizes existing exploitative relations, she shows how Chinese perceptions of
development are framed as a generous gift that requires appreciation. The transnational Tibet
movement, however, “rejects the idea that development has been a pure gift” (2013, 14). One
example of such gift-giving was The Comfortable Housing Project, begun in 2006, in which the
Chinese state spent some 13.3 billion yuan ($1.95 billion) to build “socialist villages” for over
23,000 families in Western Tibet (2013, 232). This gift, for Yeh, amounts to “a form of
indebtedness engineering” in which the giver is primarily interested in drawing the recipient into
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a relationship of dependency. Tibetans are expected to show gratitude and appreciation,
acknowledging their “indebtedness” to the Chinese state (2013, ch.7). Yeh shows that
“development as gift” really hinges on the creation of the “identities of the subjects involved,” as
“giver and receiver” (magister and minister, for Mauss). It is in the framing of development as
gift that the Chinese “state” becomes, in Yeh’s word, “ontologically” real—by drawing
individuals into the deeply human relationship of giving, reciprocity, and obligation, the “state
comes to be recognized as if it were a concrete entity” (2013, 16).
Yeh’s ethnography offers an orientation to the ways in which cultural norms of
generosity and good leadership are brought into the era of the current state-form. Tracking this
translation of a historical ideal model, sociologist Sulayman Khalaf and economist Hassan
Hammoud have described Persian Gulf states as “oil welfare states” (1988). Such states are
based on the state’s control over oil wealth and its redistribution. As opposed to “welfare
societies,” wherein political rights (suffrage, representation, citizenship, etc.) precede the
attainment of social rights (welfare, healthcare, stipends, etc.), “oil welfare states” fulfill social
rights before political ones (1988, 345-350). “One of the first and most significant changes,” they
write,
is the emergence of a new economic configuration within the old pre-oil traditional
support structure of the Shaikhs’ authority. …through their control of the government
executive apparatus the shaikhs found themselves in control of the flow of wealth in
society.79 This direct control aided the ruling and traditional forms of tribal allegiances.
This new structural disarticulation, in a sense, helped the state to come closer to the
masses of society. This was achieved simply through the ruler’s new economic capacity
and commitment to modernize state and society. Modernization has meant the building
up of a modern institutional infrastructure, through which wealth and lavish welfare
services have begun to be distributed among the population. However, this process of
distribution is done with some measure of calculated care and, until now, it seems at the
expense of the population's political rights. (Khalaf and Hammoud 1988, 350)
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I would add that this is not new, but is an increase in both access and in quantity due to flows of
international capital.
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Khalaf and Hammoud point out that this new politics of allocation is represented as a kind of
paternalism, with the leader as a symbolic “father” to the nation (1988, 351; see also AbuHakima 1972).80 “The right of rulership of the Shaikhly aristocratic families,” they conclude,
“who are linked to notable tribal origins, is still legitimated in part by shared beliefs in old values
and traditions” (1988, 351). One of these “old values” is the notion of generosity and its links to
legitimacy and right leadership, built into ideal models of authority. This generosity-cum-welfare
is so extreme, and its existence so crucial to legitimacy, that Khalaf later described it as “the
image of unlimited good,” wherein the state is a never-ending source of wealth, security, and
privilege (1992).
Yemen, in contrast, offers a good example of the limitations of this mechanism. In the
fractious Yemeni political scene, many scholars have noted how the state has attempted to
maintain control by both relying on tribal legitimacy while simultaneously undermining its
political potential. In this manner “the state remains slightly stronger than the fractured society
over which it presides” (Phillips 2008, 93). The Yemeni government, through the current
Department of Tribal Affairs (which has gone through many permutations and names since its
establishment in 1963) distributes a variety of gifts to some 4-5000 “significant sheikhs”
throughout the country (Stephen Day estimates it at “as much as half the government’s total
outlays”) (cited in Phillips 2008, 96, 104-5). “The DTA works on a simple carrot-and-stick
principle: in the first instance, the government pays the sheikh a monthly stipend… the more [the
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Blending kinship and political terminology as a tactic of normalizing governance is common in nationbuilding rhetoric throughout the world. One example will suffice: Gilman notes that dictator Hastings
Kamuzu Banda fashioned himself the nkhoswe, an authoritative male figure that women consult in times
of crisis, to all women in Malawi (2009, 47-8).
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sheikhs) get from the government the more support they provide the government in doing what is
asked of them” (2008, 104).
In this vein, Caton has observed that, while the role of Yemeni shaykhs has remained
stable over the last twenty years:
what was different was their newfound wealth, resulting from government subsidy and
capital accumulations, evident in their big cars, expensive guns, and many retainers. How
long tribals leaders in Yemen would continue to be primus inter pares and deal with their
constituents in direct, face-to-face communication was an interesting question… a good
sheikh has to perform a delicate balancing act between his obligations to his followers
and the demands of the state, which put a strain on him that might have always been but
never in so acute a form. (Caton 2001, 331-2)
In Sarah Phillips’s view, financial outlays to shaykh-s are tactical because they cannot co-opt all
challengers to state authority: “while the Yemeni regime might like to co-opt all potential
dissenters into its patronage system, it simply does not have the financial resources to do so”
(2008, 7).81 As state revenues have dwindled, political fault lines have emerged, since conversely
“legitimacy that is gained through the ability to distribute wealth is compromised when that
capacity deteriorates” (2008, 93). Due to this, the Yemeni state needs to marshal many other
complementary “legitimacy enhancing” mechanisms, including piecemeal democratic reforms
(2008, 4-5).

In the Yemeni case, “patronage” is an appropriate term to describe this system, because it refers to
“state-adjacent” individuals producing their own power bases. These individuals might mostly funnel
state generosity but they do so for their own sakes, rather than for the state.
81
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c.

“It does not become the generous to forget benefits”: Generosity in Omani
Statecraft

In the Omani case, a similar argument can be made. For as far back as we have records,
historical patterns of authority amongst sedentary and nomadic leaders (shaykh-s, imām-s,
sulṭān-s, malik-s, and amīr-s) in Oman (and the Arabian Peninsula) have relied on these leaders
being perceived as generous (Badger 1871). Ḥumayd bin Muḥammad bin Razīq’s late 1800s
histories Al-shu‘ā‘ al-shā’i‘ bi-l-lam‘ān fī dhikr ’asmā’ ’I’ma ‘Umān (Well-known Rays of
Brightness for Remembering the Names of the Imams of Oman, a mnemonic poem and history
of the Imams until the rise of the Āl Bū Sa‘īd dynasty, 1978) and the Al-fatḥ al-mubayn fī sīra alsāda āl Bū Sa’īdiyīn (The Clear Conquest concerning the Tale of the Sayyids of the Āl Bū Sa‘īd,
1977) both document the close link between generosity and legitimacy. These works were
compiled, editied, and translated into English by Badger (1871) as The History of the Imams and
Seyyids of Oman.
The first Omani Imam, Julānda bin Mas‘ūd, (r.132/749-134/751) is described by bin
Razīq as “just, generous, and pious” (fāḍilan, ‘ādilan ḥilmian, taqīyan ‘āliman) (bin Razīq 1978,
21; Badger 1871, 7). In fact, virtually every Imam and Sayyid covered in bin Razīq’s chronicle is
distinguished by the retelling of a number of examples of his generosity and the praise that it
deserves (written in CLA as madḥ, ḥamd, thinā’; see bin Razīq 1978, 69 for example). Such
generosity was manifest in gifts (like fruit trees, goods, horses, robes, cash, saddles, gold, houses,
hospitality, and administrative positions), stipends distributed amongst tribespeople,82 along with
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Of course, the opposite movement of goods was possible and institutionalized. See Vasiliev (2000, 45)
and Lienhardt (2001, 105) for wisaya, money paid by some individual seeking protections (dākhila or zabīn)
from a shaykh, and Vassiliev (2000, 47-8) and Lancaster (1997, 120-5) for the famous khuwā, or payments
that excluded a group, village, or caravan from Bedouin depredations.
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repairing and expanding falaj-s (Badger 1871; Bathurst 1972; bin Razīq 1978; Rabi 2011; AlRasheed 1991; Wilkinson 1987). Infrastructure, such as the maintenance of falaj-s, roads,
markets, orchards, masjid-s and jāmi‘-s, courts, sabla-s, feasts, and the like, was also the
province of local and regional leaders (Wilkinson 1987, 38-9).
The obligations of generosity were directed and situational. Imams and sultans routinely
gave gifts of land and employment to politically active elites with an eye to coopting threats to
the state. Those same elites conspired to host rulers as they moved around the country on
business, incurring useful debts. Throughout bin Razīq’s chronicle, he makes mention of the
ways in which Imams, kings, and shaykh-s were able to gain legitimacy in the eyes of common
people through generosity (see Badger 1871, 7, 41-2, 90, 134, 158-88, 193, 241). Further,
regional leaders often tried to win the favor of Omanis with gifts. One example is the ’amīr of
Hormuz, who in the 1270s sought to extract tribute from the Omani coast and distributed robes
(and likely food) amongst various leaders to secure it (bin Razīq 1978, 72).
Many of the great castles, forts, and mansions that dot the Omani landscape are the work
of one or another Imam, King, or other ruler. In Bahrain, historian Nelida Fuccaro recounts that
the residences that the Āl Khalīfa built around 1900 “became powerful symbols of tribal
authority” (Fuccaro 2009, 38). “In this period,” she continues, “the consolidation of dynastic rule
led to the emergence of a new type of public architecture which affirmed the tribal pedigree of
the ruling family and celebrated the Bedouin arts of generosity, hospitality, and physical
prowess” (2009, 38). As noted in Chapter 1, certain Omani leaders like the later Ya‘arūbī Sayf
bin Sulṭān I (cousin of Nāṣir) attempted to revive and renew the agricultural and architectural
base of Oman, but most leaders could not support such grand efforts (Wilkinson 1987, 220-1).
By the time of the 19th and 20th century Imamates, the issue of wealth (and its distribution) put
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pressure on the Imam. While he could reward his followers with relatively lucrative
administrative positions in certain circumstances, especially in periods of greater centralization,
it was the Sultan whose economic power allowed for greater latitude in gifting and payments
(recall the above discussion of the transferal of qāḍī-s from the Imamate to the Sultanate offered
by Eickelman 1985).
For the Ya‘arūbī Imam Nāṣir bin Murshid (r. 1033-59/1624-49), for example, who
successfully forced the Portuguese from the Omani coast, gifts and generosity secured political
alliances. Historian R.D. Bathurst writes that
the election of an imam is not sufficient in itself to guarantee a return to law and order.
Nasir bin Murshid, the first Ya‘rubi imam, elected in al-Rustaq, had first to gain control
of one of the traditional seats of imamate rule in Oman proper, the forts of Nizwa or
Bahla. Thenceforth the success of his campaigns would depend on raising forces strong
enough to defeat the powerful provincial muluk (mulūk, “kings”)… He could only
persuade the tribal leaders by appealing to their piety, by offering them governorships of
provincial towns captured, or by holding out opportunity of plundering territory overrun.
By these methods, in approximately 8 years, the entire country was subdued. (Bathurst
1972, 95)
It was by extending gifts that the Ya‘rībī dynasty was able to centralize and strengthen the
Imamate state apparatus. If early on Nāṣir had little to give, denied profits from coastal trade by
the Portuguese, by the later 11th/17th century his dynasty was able to fully benefit from maritime
links. Nevertheless, Nāṣir’s successful attacks on the Portuguese outposts on the coast were able
to furnish him with enough booty to construct the massive cylindrical fort at Nizwā, secure trade
relations, and dispense horses and arms to his followers as well as repair a variety of falaj-s
between his capital and ’Izkī (Badger 1871, 88-9). “Once full involvement in maritime trade had
become possible,” Bathurst writes, “patronage dispensed by successive imams far exceeded
anything experienced before” (Bathurst 1972, 106).
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Resorting simply to extensive generosity and largesse was not enough to prop up the
legitimacy of the later hereditary Imams of the Ya‘arībī, who, despite huge gains in economic
and imperial development, faced opposition on religious grounds (Ghubash 2006, 60-5). This
massive outlay of generosity-qua-patronage could not stave off internal conflict and what can
fairly be termed a “legitimacy crisis” sparked the the Hināwī-Ghāfirī civil war of c. 113061/1718-1737, which “debased the office [of the Imamate] by making it a trophy to be won by
force of arms” (Kelly 1972, 108). The lack of centralized authority and number of pretender
Imams over this period point to a lack of legitimacy accruing to any particular leader: the
Ya‘arībī family was wealthy and had hereditary claims to the Imamate which were not
recognized by other tribal groups or large swathes of the ‘ulamā’.
In this account, it is no coincidence that the first Āl Bū Sa‘īd Imam, Aḥmad bin Sa‘īd Āl
Bū Sa‘īdī (1154-1197/1741-1783), seized power from his base as the governor of the richest
Omani coastal port of the time, Ṣuḥār. Aḥmad distinguished himself by repelling the Persian
army of Nadir Shah, invited by the desperate Sayf bin Sulṭān II to fight Imamate “pretenders”
during the civil war. The Shah saw a golden opportunity to extend his hegemony over the Omani
coast and his armies refused to leave, eventually seizing control of Muscat and imposing a poll
tax on other coastal cities (Ghubash 2006, 65-7). Aḥmad eventually tricked and repelled the
Persians and took Muscat for himself, which led to his quick election as Imam. Aḥmad’s
subsequent consolidation cemented his place in Omani history as a shrewd and effective leader.
Even though bin Razīq’s chronicle is often considered overly laudatory of the Āl Bū Sa‘īdī
dynasty, his stories of the generosity of Imam Aḥmad are telling. Even before he seized the
Imamate, Aḥmad the governor was dispensing generosity as befit a leader:
Ahmed carried on the government entrusted to him with justice and equity, and was
exceedingly liberal to the inhabitants, by whom he was greatly beloved. The tribes of esh-
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Shamâl and ezh-Zhâhirah also came to him, sometimes in crowds and sometimes singly
and in couples, and he entertained them with profuce hospitality. He was urbane to rich
and poor, to the learned and ignorant, and his condescension to all ranks raised him in
general estimation. The sheikhs of the el-Jibûr, also, from el-Hufry, and el-Harâdy, and
Hai-’âsim paid their respects to him, and he treated them most munificently, so that his
renown spread far and wide, all the people obeyed him gladly, and all tongues extolled
the justice of his administration… when Seif-bin-Sultan (the nominal reigning Imam that
appointed Aḥmad to his post in Ṣuḥār] heard of these proceedings he said to some of his
officers: “Ahmed-bin-Saîd acts in this way in order to estrange the people and draw them
to himself, his object being to make his what is now mine.” (Badger 1871, 134, his
translation of bin Razīq 2001, 291)
Such a tactic was common and his rivals were quite aware of its efficacy. Later in the
chronicle, Aḥmad is especially praised for his generosity to the author’s father and grandfather
(Badger 1871, 158-9), whereupon the author then lists the gifts that Imam Ahmad sent out to
recognize loyalty shown to him before his ascent (159). He was specifically praised in poetry for
drawing out the good virtues in the people, dealing defeat to stinginess (Bin Razīq 2001, 323).
Aḥmad even went out of his way to find and water a then-withered tree that he had taken shade
under years before. A qāḍī in Nizwā questioned his wisdom, to which Aḥmad reportedly replied:
“ ‘It does not become the generous (ḥurr83)… to forget benefits: he who does so is not generous.
The generous should recognize benefits received either from the animate or the inanimate.’ ‘I
think it is a wise precept,’ rejoined the Kadhî; ‘the generous and noble ought not to forget such
recognition’ ” (1871, 160; Bin Razīq 2001 311-12). In the later provenanced section, which
updates the work through the mid-19th century, the author writes:
The Imâm Ahmed was a most liberal man in every respect: he never listened to
those who slandered his friends, and he never questioned the accounts of any of his
Wakîls [agents]. The bare statement of the latter that they had expended so much and had
received kharâj [generally a land tax but see Wilkinson (1987, 180-1)] to such an amount
was accepted by him; if any thing was due by him he paid it at once. One of his Wakîls, a
The word ḥurr here refers to being “free,” noble, and generous, as well as implications of
purity and lack of external restraint. Freedom here is predicated on the capacity to give and
recognize social obligations—even to a tree.
83
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man of er-Rastâk [al-Rustāq]—I think he was of the family of el-Hally—came to him on
a certain occasion… and reported he had expended one thousand silver Mahmûdis for his,
the Imâm’s household. The Imâm forthwith ordered one of his servants to go to the house
and bring him one of the bags labelled one thousand silver Mahmûdis; the man went and
brought a bag which contained one thousand Mashkhases [Venetian zecchino; gold
ducats] in gold. When the Wakîl opened it and found that a mistake had been made he
returned with it to the Imâm, whereupon the latter inquired how much the bag contained.
On being told that it contained one thousand gold Mashkhases, he said: “It is God’s
bounty; therefore, be grateful to Him for the gift.” So the Wakîl retained the money and
thanked the Imâm for his liberality.
Another instance to the same effect is as follows:—The Imâm had appointed
Rabîaah-bin-Ahmed, el-Ruwâhy, who was a poor man at the time, Wakîl over the
property of Nuamân-Barkah. Two years after, Rabîaah began to purchase property on his
own account, as also date-trees at Barkah and el-Jau. This fact having been reported to
the Imâm, when the letter came to Nuamân from er-Rustâk on his way to Máskat
[Muscat], he said to Rabîaah: “Is it true as people say that out of this agency you have
managed to purchase property in the town of Barkah and in the towns of el-Jau and
Nakhl?” The other replied: “O Imâm, I found a treasure and with it was enabled to
purchase property.” “Where did you find it?” rejoined the Imâm. “Just where you are
standing,” replied Rabîaah. The Imâm, comprehending at once the figurative speech,
smiled and said, “It is God’s bounty towards you; so thank God for it and praise Him for
His goodness to you.” (Badger 1871, 186-7)
Later dynasts of the Āl Bū Sa‘īd would wield generosity in precisely the same way, and
extensive holdings in East Africa and later oil revenues would expand this capacity many times
over (Owtram 1999,125). However, due in part to their lack of religious legitimacy and in part to
the greater profits promised overseas, successive Āl Bū Sa‘īdī sayyid-s and sultans focused on
building their Omani empire abroad, directly leading to the election of a family rival ‘Azzān bin
Qays as Imam in 1868. As many scholars have noted, from the early decades of the 1800s the
coast and the Interior of Oman began to separate administratively. Largely, the coastal sultans
ignored Inner Oman, whose inhabitants were repeatedly harassed by the expanding Saudi
emirate of al-Dir‘iya. After the immensely successful reign of Sultan Sa‘īd, the Omani empire
was divided by the British into the Omani and Zanzibari portions in 1856. The reigns of the next
Omani sultans, Faysal and Tūrkī, were plagued by British interests, restive tribes, and resistance
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from the ‘ulamā’, ultimately resulting in the election of the Imam Sālim ibn Rāshid al-Kharūsī as
Imam and the nominal deposition of Tūrkī in 1913 (Wilkinson 1987, 249).
However, as Wilkinson (1987) and al-Hashimy (1994) have shown, the financial
situation of any claimant to the Imamate was dire. Imam ‘Azzān (r. 1868-1870) and his branch
were related to the Sultanic family, but despite shrewd leadership he could not consolidate power
with his meager tax base (Wilkinson 1987, 238-40). Imam Sālim’s (r. 1913-1920) economic
situation was no less dire, as al-Hashimy shows—for example, he began his reign with 300
Maria Theresa dollars and nearly all of his many military expenditures were covered by tribal
shaykh-s, couched in the terms of hibāt, or donations “with the intention of helping the State
meet its obligations” (al-Hashimy 1994, 250-9). Sālim also combined the role of wālī and qāḍī in
several towns, in order to save money on salaries (al-Hashimy 1994, 236). The split between
Oman and Zanzibar, and later Oman and Muscat, would prove disastrous for the Omani people.
Historian Robert Landen, writing in 1967, could claim that in the early 1860s, in the midst of a
cotton boom lifting other Gulf states,
Oman plummeted into a depression from which it never recovered… [From the early
1860s] Oman dropped into insignificance within the space of a few years. Unlike other
areas of the Gulf, Oman has yet to experience an oil boom. She exists as an example of a
country which has suffered but has not benefitted from modernization. (1967, 89-90,
italics mine)
Obviously, in a few years an “oil boom” and its attendant economic growth would be secured
under Sa‘īd bin Ṭaymūr and his son, Qābūs. The profits derived from oil would lift Sa‘īd’s last
few years, but early on he had to maintain a fairly strict budget. Nevertheless, Bierschenk writes
that Sultan Sa‘īd bin Ṭaymūr’s
policy to outbuy the Imam, who was unable to compete with it financially, was
remarkably successful. Between 1937 and 1939, the Sultan of Muscat was visited by the
two leading sheikhs of the Eastern Province (al-sharqiya), Ali Abdullah al-Hamuda of the
Bani Bu Ali and Isa Salih al-Harthi, leader of the Hinawi faction of the Omani tribes,
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Sheikh Ahmad Muhammad, the son-in-law of the Imam, as well as by the leading men of
the Dhahirah tribes. They all left Muscat showered with gifts and arms. (Bierschenk
1989, 213)
Historians Francis Owtram and Uzi Rabi have shown that Sultan Sa‘īd did, however,
operate a tight budget at the time—showing that such payouts were crucial to maintaining rule,
rather than an extravagance (Owtram 1999; Rabi 2011). The Sultan was notorious even for
remaining aloof from Omanis: according to Owtram “this helped him avoid expenditure: by
refusing to see the many supplicants for aid at his palace in Muscat and by spending ever more of
his time in Salalah he reduced the need to pay out subsidies unless it suited him” (1999, 126).
Such a policy may have made Sultan Sa‘īd a fiscally responsible Sultan, but he was not a popular
one, with all manner of cruelties attributed to him (Rabi 2011). If Sa‘īd bin Ṭaymūr’s efforts at
political unification often involved engaging in practices of generosity to secure his legitimacy
(doling out positions and gifts amongst tribal leaders in Inner Oman) this was no innovation, but
a standard mechanism of rule (Rabi 2011, 165-74). It was not forgone by his son, Qābūs, the
modern “father of the nation,” either. On the paternalistic aspect of Omani political authority,
historian J.E. Peterson concurs with Khalaf and Hammoud’s description:
The ruler, like the shaykh of the tribe, like the father of the family, is the father of the
country. He demands respect, obedience, and total loyalty. In exchange, he assumes
responsibility for the protection and welfare of his constituents… This traditional pattern
of patriarchy has been reinforced in Oman, as well as to an even greater degree in the
other Gulf states, by the accrual of oil revenues to the state and thus to the ruler as the
guardian of the state… It also produces a social dependence on the state as employer
(including both the civil service and the security services), provider of social welfare
programs, arbiter of propriety and acceptability, and definer of cultural, social and
political values. Just as the members of a patriarchal family depend on the father to take
care of them, so Omanis display an expectation that the state must initiate and supervise
action in nearly all spheres and to guarantee the results. (Peterson 2005, 8)
There are several points to critique in this formulation (see Chapter 6) but for now, the
general frame is accurate. Nearly all works on Oman, scholarly and popular, remark upon the
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Omani “renaissance” orchestrated by Sultan Qābūs. However, when compared to other Gulf
states, Oman is relatively poor, “barely [producing] enough oil to cover its development costs”
(Allen, Jr. and Rigsbee 2000, 108). Calvin Allen, Jr. and W. Lynn Rigsbee have shown that
“while the commercial and tribal elite sought domination in revenue-producing economic
development, infrastructure and human resource development were left largely to technocrats
and central government control” (2000, 155). Sectors where profit was more difficult to obtain
were left to the state, whereas other sectors (industry, fisheries, finance, tourism) were privatized.
This pragmatic generosity, coupled with increased efforts to extend benefits like healthcare and
transportation networks, allowed the Sultan to extend his authority over larger and larger areas.
This policy allowed the Sultan, and the state apparatus of which he was the figurehead, a reason
to intervene in tribal structures of authority throughout Oman—to provide welfare for Omanis
(Rabi 2011, 158-60). Sa‘īd extended centralized control over Inner Oman by building a main
access road from Muscat through the Sumā’il Gap and extended the benefits of scientific
agriculture by establishing a model farm outside of Nizwā. He laid plans for multiple schools,
communication networks, and hospitals, which would remain unfulfilled until his son ascended
to the throne. This same policy of generosity-cum-development was adopted by Qābūs after his
1970 ascension. One such example is the extension of healthcare to the Ḥarāsīs tribe of the alWusṭa region in 1980, documented by anthropologist Dawn Chatty:
Several days into our journey and halfway across our proposed itinerary, we came upon a
small group of nomadic pastoral Harasiis tribe families preparing to attend a wedding.
We stopped and asked their permission to begin vaccinating their children. We were
asked why we wanted to do this.
We said, “The Sultan of Oman wishes to see all Omanis immunized against these
diseases.”
“Why should he want to do this for us?” they persisted.
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We were initially at a loss for an answer. We had assumed that the sense of
belonging to one nation and of the obligations of leadership had reached this part of the
country. It had not. (Chatty 2009, 39)
If it had not in 1980, the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism was still available. In fact, Chatty’s
convoy was instrumental in that mechanism.
However successful this approach has been, it is also costly. In Sulaiman al-Farsi’s study
of democratization in Oman, he shows that, like other states that rely on the
generosity/legitimacy mechanism, state distribution of wealth has a limited horizon (2013, 5).
One of al-Farsi’s interlocutors reflected that gifts and wealth distribution
has left no chance for a real political opposition to coalesce. But he also argues that this
positivity from the government needs appreciation not confrontation. Indeed, [the
interviewee] refers here to the implicit social contract and political initiatives that come
as gifts from the government, but the question that must be answered here is, ‘Will the
government be able to continue with the rentier state model in the post-oil era?’ (al-Farsi
2013, 203)
Certain scholars take yet a more critical approach. Political scientist Marc Valeri, for example,
has documented this same division in development planning (and the frequency with which the
Omani state has been forced to cut social programs) as having serious drawbacks for political
stability (Valeri 2007, 2013). It is no coincidence—from the perspective of Valeri—that Qābūs
has turned oil revenues toward social development:
Early on, Sultan Qābūs had to broaden his base of allies and forge personal ties with the
population that were no longer dependent on a unique social force. To do so, he will
utilize for his own account the homogenizing power of the state. The exploitation of a
nascent oil rent makes possible an economic and social development without precedent,
in which the state, in expanding over the territory, will be the pivot. In sum, the objective
of the Sultan is the rendering of Omanis individually as dependent for their daily lives,
not on ‘aṣṣabiyya (CLA, “tribal cohesion”), but the state. (Valeri 2007, 111-2)84
84

Très tôt, le sultan Qabous se doit donc d'élargir la base de ses alliés et tisser des liens
personnels avec le population qui ne le rendent plus aussi dependent à une force sociale
particulière. Pour ce faire, il va utiliser à son compte la puissance homogénéisatrice de l'état.
L'exploitation d'une rente pétrolière naissante, mais croissant de manière exponentielle, rend
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This drawing in, what Valeri and Peterson (and many others) refer to as a production of
dependency, is the generosity/legitimacy mechanism at work. Such a perspective bring us back
to the more socially detrimental aspects of generosity and gift-giving, so often exploited by
elites. Gifts that, as Mauss said, can “flatten.” Gifts that reproduce inequality while ostensibly
recognizing equality.
By showing these shared ideals operating on different levels of society, I argue, along
with Al-Rasheed and Khalaf and Hammoud, that “the amir’s basis of legitimacy was to a great
extent similar to the sheikh’s” from small to state scales, in terms of both the practical effect and
the symbolic weight attached to certain practices: in this case, the obligatory generosity of the
leader (Al-Rasheed 1991, 78). Generosity does, however, form a common logic. For shaykh-s on
the smaller end of social structure, generosity refers to the redistribution of wealth created by the
community. On the larger scale, the ’amīr was not only expected to perform this function, but
also to distribute yet greater wealth and infrastructure for the benefit of townspeople,
agriculturalists, and pastoralists. He was also motivated to extend his generosity to co-opt
political rivals, smaller shaykh-led political units, and the ‘ulamā’. Gestures like holding feasts
on festival days and funding the construction of communal buildings (masjid-s, markets, and the
like) were symbolic manifestations and demonstrations of the leader’s generosity. And
generosity, as we have seen, is valued all across the class spectrum.
In the Persian Gulf states that emerged from the rapid decay of British colonial power
after the Second World War, the expansion of the power of the traditional elites was dramatic, if

possible un développement économique et social sans précédent, dont l'état, en expansion tous
azimuts sur le territoire, sera la pivot. En somme, l'objectif du Sultan est de rendre les Omanais
individuellement tributaires pour leur vie de tous les jours, non plus de la 'assabiyya, mais de
l'état.
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not unprecedented. Valeri’s claim that the Omani state was a “development without precedent”
should be interpreted as referring to scale, not organization or cultural model (2007, 112). A
delicate balance between claims to modernization and to traditionalism has animated the political
destinies of new political elites and informed their symbolic and historical mythologies. Gibson’s
“ideal model” takes seriously the symbolic aspects of authority and politics and accords well
with research that investigates the role of ritual (Geertz 1980; Kertzer 1988) and “aesthetic”
practices in the construction of the nation-state (Adams 2010; Mookherjee 2011). The political
symbolism manifest in performance, as many scholars have pointed out, shifts and changes with
changes in social organization (Atkinson 1989; Bloch 1986; Guss 2000; Gilman 2009; Leach
1954; Reed 2010). However, as I have shown, the same kinds of ideals are drawn on to justify
the social order on multiple social scales. In some ways, this is reminiscent of the ways in which
kinship terminology is co-opted by the state in hopes of manifesting within state-society relations
the same kinds of relations that are manifest in the family unit. The symbol of the leader’s
generosity and the praise response it engenders has been often utilized in legitimating state
power.
Encompassing Relations: A circuit of Generosity and Praise in the context of the “gift”
In this final section, we turn to the performance of praise, the other half of the circuit of
exchange between rulers and ruled, and evaluate its form in Oman in relation to insights drawn
from studying gift exchange. The sense that generosity is an obligation of leadership is, as we’ve
seen, a widely held ideal. A leader of a razḥa group in Bahlā’ remarked that, as the leader (ra’īs),
it was his responsibility to feed and clothe every member at each performance, even those that
only rarely showed up. “None can razḥa with us without a belt-dagger khangar, without the
same maṣar, without a neat dishdāsha, a sword and buckler, and all this.” He pointed to cases of
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bottled water on the ground in the middle of the dancing circle. “I bring him water,85 I will bring
him food if he needs it. Anything he asks, it honors me to be available [to him].” All leaders of
groups made similar statements to me, though some were more interested in expressing the
communal aspect of group life. “Some people from towns like Bahlā’, Nizwā, [he] manages
razḥa troupes like he is the Sultan, like he can take command (mithl yirūm yahbish al-amr),”
responded a performer from Firqat al-Bilād in Manaḥ. “Here, we’re more like people in alSharqiyya,” he continued, waving at the group, “everyone participates as they like.” In fact, most
groups do have a rotating leadership role, which carries little importance other than the title. The
same performer in the Firqat Ḥārat al-Bilād joked with me that “if the group had anything at all,
we would share it all among us—luckily, we have nothing like the rich groups.”
A similar sense of obligation informs praise performance responses to leaders’
generosity. Performers consider generosity to be a “good deed”—fulfilling a social obligation—
and as such obliges a response in praise, which strengthens the leader’s reputation (cf. Caton
1985 for a broader discussion). The inducement to respond with praise was, in my interlocutors’
terms, “incumbent upon us” (‘alā ‘ātiqunā, lit. “[to be] upon our shoulders”), or simply “upon
us” (‘alaynā). “If he [an authority figure] comes to our hometown,” reflected one performer from
Manaḥ, “we must go out (‘alaynā naṭla‘) and meet him with the razḥa. If we do not, we have not
done well, this is a great shame; when someone comes you have to represent yourself… as a
community. We appreciate his coming (naqaddar ḥuḍūruh).” Praise is seen as a “turn” in the
relation between rulers and the ruled. “The poet praises the king for justice, generosity, acuity,
and might,” writes Arabist Suzanne Stekevych, “but the poem at the same time challenges the
king to prove or confirm this praise through an immediate action that all present will witness as
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See Limbert (2010, ch. 5) for a discussion of norms of generosity regarding water in Bahlā’.
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proof of his authority and legitimacy” (2002, 34). Indeed, it can be seen as a guarantee for further
generosity from rulers. According to an older performer, Sulṭān:
The Sultan is very generous to Manaḥ. Why? Because we are true sons of Oman, and we
hold our traditions and he knows this when we snap and buzz the blades (lamma nihizz
al-asyāf, “when he sees us razḥa”). You know, he brought the ḥuṣn al-shamūkh, he
brought the language school [the SQU extension for teaching Arabic as a second
language], there is a new museum, he is rebuilding the Old Quarter of Bilād. These are
true treasures of Omani heritage, and soon Manaḥ will be a center of tourism and all this.
Wallahi, he knows that everything he does in Manaḥ we welcome [it] and we respond [to
it].
Generosity that is not responded to with praise might disappear, as well. Sulṭān continued by
saying that “If we don’t do the razḥa to welcome our guests, the big and the small, how are we
any different from the Indians and Bangladeshis? We are no different. If we are from Manaḥ,
then it is upon us that we razḥa, just as it is upon the Sulṭān to aid [us].” In this framing, Sulṭān
points out the direct and deep link between regional and national identity and the obligations to
perform. This circuit of obligation between authority and praise is clear to him as a properly
socialized member of a broader moral economy, a functioning social order. Such a social order is
composed of people who contribute different things to maintain it.
There is no question that people in Manaḥ, not just performers, recognize that these
different contributions are unequal. Anthropologist David Graeber refers to this kind of
economic relation as a moral relation of hierarchy, as opposed to communal relations (which
involve giving freely) and exchange relations (which are “tit-for-tat” exchanges between equals)
(Graeber 2014, ch. 5). Such a hierarchical relationship does engage widespread human norms
about reciprocity, even though in this case a return gift is totally impossible (Graeber 2014, 10913). A small agricultural community—even a prosperous multi-tribal market town—cannot give
an electrical transfer station, generous loans for house construction, a highway off-ramp, or a
new soccer pitch to the Sultan, let alone the apparatuses of the state. “When gifts cannot be fully

236
reciprocated,” writes Yeh, “they establish, express, or legitimize relationships of power and
inequality” (2013, 15). Such a response would be plainly absurd—I diligently asked about it
anyway, to the derision of my Omani interlocutors.
We were discussing an upcoming performance in ‘Izz, a small town near Manaḥ, over
tiny cups of milky karak tea. Standing near the idling car, I asked where the drummers were.
Ḥamad stared out over a low wall dividing the café from a small masjid prayer room. “Oh, they
heard the Sultan was arriving at the Ḥuṣn al-Shamūkh and so they are looking for a little money.
And so they’re late.” The Ḥuṣn al-Shamūkh is the Sultan’s gigantic and opulent palace just
outside Manaḥ, where he has held court more and more as his health has declined. It is
surrounded by a tremendous wall and houses many complexes, including a wonderful and
wholly under-utilized library.
“The Sultan hands out money? We should go,” I laughed.
“No, it’s the guards who do it. Also, I don’t think you’d get any, O Englishman,” said
Ṭalāl, turning his sleepy eyes towards me. He shaded them with his hand, pushing his light blue
kimma back on his head and breaking into a slow smile.
“Well, what if I recite a poem? Does anyone know one I can use? Does anyone remember
the ‘āzī Ḥuṣn al-Shamūkh by al-Marzūqī? That was given at the opening of the ḥuṣn, no?”
“Yes, that’s right, it’s a really beautiful ‘āzī, and the razḥa-s were the real thing (wāgid
’aṣīla). It’s a great honor to have it here in Manaḥ, and it brought jobs. The Sultan gifted us with
the construction of the ḥuṣn in Manaḥ because he knew that we are true sons of Oman, he feels
comfort among us.” Ḥamad finished the cup of karak and threw it almost into the nearby trash
can. He smacked his lips and said to himself, “The Nescafe is better here.”
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“You said it was a gift? Is it not so that you should respond to gifts, you should give an
equal gift, or something like that?” I asked, expecting the performers to talk about their role in
the opening of the ḥuṣn.
“Yes, doctor,” replied Ṭalāl, “we gave another Ḥuṣn al-Shamūkh to His Majesty
(naqaddam li-l-galāla ḥuṣn thānī) in Ṣalāla, you see.”
“Don’t mind him,” his brother replied, “he’s being sarcastic. The ḥusn is a great symbol
of the renaissance and of the glories of Oman (amgād ‘umān). That’s why it’s called ‘Fort of
Glory/Loftiness.”
Ṭalāl’s is an important joke. The very notion that the group—and by extension, the moral
community that they represent—might respond to the generosity of the Sultan in kind is so
ridiculous that it is openly mocked. Material social relations forbid it. Rather, it is the obligation
of good leadership to provide such things. The receivers of generosity expect such dispensations
based on their being part of a community with a leader who acts according to their expectations,
and not, as many political scientists have it, because they pay taxes. In fact, such a simplistic
cause-and-effect relation is precisely what leaders want who they “lead” to think.86 The
Lancasters describe the situation this way:
Participation by tribal and rural groups or notables in the activities of decentralised or recentralised states is often seen by historians and political scientists to be as clients of the
86

The vagaries of taxes, payments, dispensations, stipends, paid services, religious charity (ṣadaqā and
zakā, not an exact analogy to Christian tithe systems), and the state’s or shaykh’s treasury cannot be fully
analyzed here. Suffice it so say that while Al-Rasheed (1991) finds “bribes” an appropriate translation for
stipendary payments issuing from the Rashīdī shaykh-s in Hail, my use of the CLA term rashwa to describe
pay for performance was met with strong disagreement. Further, Eickelman (1985), Wilkinson (1987) and
Rabi (2011) note that a shaykh’s acceptance of stipends from the state treasury was not in any way a contract
or pledge of allegiance to that leader. A perfect example of this is the shaykh of the ‘Abriyīn tribe (based
in al-Ḥamrā’) accepting a stipend from Sultan Taymūr in the 1950s but not aiding the Sultan’s armed forces
as they marched to confront the former Imam’s brother Ṭālib in Balad Sayt at the outset of the Jabal Akhḍar
War in 1957 (Allfree 1968, 55-6). This withdrawal of support was not a failure of morale, resolve, or
breaking a promise or contract on the part of the ‘Abriyīn and their shaykh. Rather, it was a pragmatic move
based on evaluating the jeopardized strength of the Sultan.
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patron state/polity or as being tributarised by the state (e.g. al-Azmeh 1986:82, 86; al
Rasheed 1989: 232; Kostiner 1991: 225; Velud 1995). Central government may intend
such a dependency. Locally, payments of subventions by the Ottoman Empire, the
Mandate governments, the early and modern bin Sa'ud rulers are seen by tribal leaders
and tribespeople as a return for their help in keeping the peace. (Lancasters 1999, 345-6)
In other words, local groups do not see the acceptance of pay as a promise or a contract
for future behavior, but rather as a fulfillment of an existing relationship. The mutual obligations
examined here—to give and to praise—are not framed as debts, requirements, duties, coercion,
economic exchanges, bribes, services, or paid labor. Rather, they are the evidence of a
functioning relationship between rulers and ruled, a continuing circuit of goods and recognition
predicated on shared notions of the good. The way that Omani Arabs explained razḥa as a
“response” (CLA, radd) indicates to me that they saw it not only as linked to generosity, but also
as engaging it, meeting it in some equal way. It is the quality of that relationship—egalitarian,
hierarchical, critical, respectful, dignified or humiliating—that razḥa operates on, as we shall see
in the next chapter.
a. Why praise is not saying ‘Thank you’
Performance groups present themselves as dignified, historically “located” collectives
when they praise because generosity is not free from ulterior motives. Florence Weber writes
that the gift “masks” other goals and relationships (1989, 74). This is in fact what makes
generosity and praise so compelling—it is potentially dangerous to the social order. This is
especially the case when it is hierarchical. “Gifts” that come from the Omani government are
given to those who deserve them—Omanis, ostensibly equals with any other—but
simultaneously put them in danger of signaling dependency.
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I asked several times whether or not the razḥa was a way of saying “thank you” to the
Sultan—to my mind, the proper response to a gift. None agreed with this interpretation. Aḥmad,
the nephew of Sālim bin Sulaymān al-Shukaylī of Bahlā’, replied that “when you do something
that is your role [to do so], what do we say?” I answered, “we say ‘lā shukr ‘alā wāgib’, is that
not so?” “Exactly,” he responded,
…we say ‘No thanks [are necessary] for [performing one’s] duty. Saying ‘Thank you” is
not necessary (mū lāzim). We also often say, ‘you’ve done well’ (aḥsant) instead of
‘thank you’, in Oman. Or ‘[‘you are’ or perhaps ‘that is’) ‘praiseworthy’ (mashkūr/a).
Now why do we say that? Because you’ve done well, you’ve done the correct thing. I
don’t thank my father for giving me food, a home. That’s his role. ‘Thank you’ is not
expected. I will say, aḥsant, ‘you’ve done well’… if I say anything.
The difference between a duty or an obligation and the kinds of activities for which
thanks are necessary is delineated here clearly. Graeber, reflecting on the super-abundance of
“pleases” and “thank-yous” in American sociality, refers to it as the “quintessence of middleclass morality” (2014, 123). Such a morality asserts a kind of false equality that is, in his view,
based on the imputation of norms regarding exchange (the tit-for-tat trade of goods among
equals) to those that properly involve what he terms “baseline communism” (the free movement
of goods as people need them) (123-4). He notes that in contexts where it is assumed that people
will take care of one another, people “often find it insulting to constantly be told, in effect, that
there is some chance that they might not do their job as a waiter or taxi driver correctly, or
provide house guests with tea” (124).87 Anthropologist Jacques Godbout reads the French

Anecdotally, I was told on several separate occasions to stop saying “thank you” in English and
“shukran” in Arabic so very much. Ḥamad in Manaḥ had to tell me privately to stop thanking everyone
when meeting folks or drinking tea or coffee with them. I also made a habit of thanking the invariably
South Asian waitstaff that were subjected to endless torment from the performance troupes when we ate
together. This too was taken to be incorrect. My wife and I were also corrected by a couple from Kerala
that hosted us for a period in Muscat. The implication in each occasion was that my effusive thanks for
the most basic hospitality was at the least annoying, perhaps showing weakness, and at the worst
insulting.
87
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“merci” (thank you) against the literature of the gift. Gifts, he thinks, are dangerous. “For
instance,” he writes, “the word ‘thank you’—in French merci—may be seen as an indirect way
of saying that the very fact of receiving a gift can make one in some sense dependent, can put
one at the “mercy” (merci in French) of the giver” (1998, 8). Such a perspective on attributing
generosity is presented by Wilson in her work on Chinese traders in Papua:
I asked a young PNG-Chinese boy what he thought of his mother. “She knows how to
survive,” he said. He smiled. “I’m like that too.” He offered me half of the cocoa pod he
had stolen off a tree. “You’re lucky to have me with you, huh? Otherwise you’d get lost.
And I can climb the trees and get you all (the cocoa pods) you want.” I thanked him.
“You’re very generous.” He looked at me with scorn. “Of course.” What else did I
expect? As his mother later explained to me, PNG-Chinese are, by definition, generous to
each other, otherwise they never would have survived their history. (Wilson 1989, 77)
Certainly the same can be said for Omanis.
Conclusion
This chapter has posited the first of two linked mechanisms that help show how praise
and political authority are linked: the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism. In this chapter, I
outlined a “macro” process: that is, the linkage between two broad social behaviors and beliefs:
the generosity of leaders and their perceived legitimacy. This was complicated by the reciprocal
mutuality of the “gift,” analyzed in several places and on several scales. While many other
factors and practices also play into this process, generosity is an important one for our purposes
because, as I have shown, Omanis recognize that praise is an appropriate response to such
generosity. For some Omanis, their praise involves performing razḥa and ‘āzī, linked
performance practices that have a long history of mediating political relationships in Oman. In
the next chapter, I show how the form and practice of razḥa, as a collective dance and song
practice, has particular implications in performers’ understandings of praise and their role in
praising.
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Chapter 4: A Moral Economy of Praise: How Razḥa Integrates Power into Community

كل دار تبنئ بالرجال
لما تتعاضد بالرجال
أما الكسل ماله مجال
ال من بعيد وال قريب
Every homeland is built by men,
when those men work hand in hand.
As for laziness, it has no place
neither near nor far.
Rabī‘al-Millāḥ bin al-Murr al-Hidayfī,
‘āzī for the Firqat Ḥārat al-Bilād li-l-funūn al-sha‘abiyya
In this chapter, I investigate collective performance responses to the
Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism described in chapter 2. There are many kinds of responses to
the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism, but the one we will focus on here is collective praise
performance in the sung-poetry and dance complex called razḥa. This chapter presents razḥa
performance as another potential mechanism, what I call the Razḥa Integration mechanism.
Integration in this context refers to two processes: 1) the pulling together and mutual expression
of both dependency and power on the part of performers; and 2) the socially and culturally
realized public reception and recognition of generosity. Thinking abstractly, we can conceive of
this mechanism as working during or within the overall process of the Generosity/Legitimacy
mechanism. During this overall mechanism, the specific ways that razḥa are performed is
understood to signal not only dependency, but also power, cultural authority, strength, Omani
identity, dignity, masculinity, communal bonds, and other positively evaluated qualities. My data
suggest that razḥa is a social mechanism that mediates a central social uncertainty that emerges
in the context of leaders’ gifts—generosity’s potential for both equality and inequality.
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This hypothesis relies on the ambiguity of the social processes involved in the
Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism. If the general mechanism of “generosity produces
legitimacy” holds in Oman, we can see that it has taken a variety of courses throughout history.
Direct disbursal of cash and goods to tribal leaders is qualitatively and quantitatively different
from disbursements to patronize poets, which differs yet again from the expansion of
infrastructure and other social welfare benefits and the ensuing collective praise response. Each
of these can be conceived to be operating according to its own cultural logic, although some
elements are shared.
a. Experimenting with the “Alchemy” of Generosity: A Theoretical Détente
Before showing how this proposed mechanism functions, we should draw the focus to an
argument latent in the last chapter. In it, I briefly pointed out that the mutual valuation of
generosity amongst elites and non-elites means that “generosity” as a concept and practice might
be a potential source of hegemony construction. Similarly, I intimated that the obligation of elites
to be generous was both a specific strategy of rule as well as an emblem of their commitment to
a reciprocal moral economy. While I explored community- and state-based generosity as
interacting with the vicissitudes of gift exchange, it bears repeating that anthropologists have
largely confined their analyses of gift exchange to small-scale societies. While this is thankfully
changing, Katherine Bowie’s concern that “the significance of gift giving in the political
economy of complex societies deserves more attention” remains salient (1998, 476; but see Yeh
2013). In her study of the “alchemy” of charitable giving as a way of tham bun (making merit) in
Theravada Buddhist Thai villages, Bowie shows that a variety of interpretations undergird
different acts of giving and receiving. Even though monks and temples are considered the
worthiest recipients of gifts, the practices of beggars are understood to be “making merit by
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allowing those who are better off to part with material possessions and thus practice nonattachment” (471-72). By focusing on class in this way, Bowie is able to point out how “the role
of the poor in shaping the behavior of the wealthier has been ignored” in scholarship on the gift.
“Morality,” she writes, “is responsive to social context” and givers and receivers are mutually
constituted along moral valences as well as political economic ones (474). While merit-making
“masked inequality with a veil of legitimacy,” it was nevertheless a “weapon of the weak,”
wherein apparently voluntarist giving was subtly coerced from the wealthy by ever-present
threats of theft, violence, and looting (474-76). Bowie argues that charity qua merit-making
developed as a kind of class détente: it eased class tensions by generating charity from the
wealthy to provide for the needy while never calamitously upsetting the status quo. Bowie seems
to conclude that non-elites regard violence as the unspoken potential response to failures of
continued charity.
While we often imagine the wealthy patron giving out goods, we rarely imagine how
such giving is interpretively shaped, meaningfully intervened on, and constrained by the actions
of the receiver. Further, as Bowie points out, there may be negative consequences to not
giving—basically, Thai non-elites compel elites to give at least in part by threatening violence if
it does not continue. Hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, might be best conceived of not as a
temporary alliance, or coincidence of interests, but instead as a détente, as Bowie claims.
“Hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups
over which hegemony is to be exercised,” wrote Gramsci, so “that a certain compromise
equilibrium should be formed” (1971:161). It is this compromise, this class standoff, that I think
is enacted in performed responses of praise. As I noted in the last chapter, while there has been
some attention given to elites’ practices of directed generosity, there has been little effective
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attention to the responses that non-elites return. In that vein, this chapter not only analyzes those
responses, but attempts to show that those responses are not merely the expression of gratitude,
but are attempts to speak back, to intervene, to provoke. Omani praisers, when they razḥa, do not
simply “receive” gifts.
It is here where I think we can usefully extend Bowie’s work. Focusing closely on the
responses of non-elites shows how non-elites can compel giving through negative means—“give
generously or we’ll kill you”—and through positive means.88 Praise might be an example of a
positive means. Rather than the implied threat of violence, praise is a concrete action that ties
acts of giving with a particular set of ideals of authority, moral action, and a community. As we
saw in out discussion of ethnomusicologists’ study of praise, praise has an explicit normative
component. While hegemony might be a détente rather than an alliance, praise is a way of
ensuring the continuation of that détente in a way that benefits non-elites at the same time as it
benefits elites by insisting on and disseminating norms that achieve that goal. In short, praise as
manifest in razḥa and ‘āzī is a way of turning acts of giving into relations of obligation—it turns
acts of giving into a moral economy.
I argue that this Razḥa Integration mechanism operates through praise performance in
such a way that it circumvents and modifies the relationship between performers and elites from
one of dependency and encompassment to one of obligation and reciprocity. Generosity is not
just a good deed, it is a good deed because it helps specific communities. Rather than producing
one-way relations of patronage dependency like those of the Islamic Middle East surveyed by
Sharlet (2014), razḥa performance instantiates renewed and reaffirmed relations of mutuality

I do not mean to imply moral valences here, equating “positive” with “good”, just that one is a
concrete action and the other is the lack of action.
88
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between performers and elites, changing the way that the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism
operates. This sustains the integrity and solidarity of the community in the face of a sometimes
overwhelmingly powerful state apparatus of development and giving. What I mean by this is that
the form, presentation, and texts of razḥa and ‘āzī and what these forms, presentations, and texts
mean to performers prevent or diminish the social effects of dependency that can arise in unequal
gift exchange. They do not obliterate unequal power relations, but they might transform them,
tame them, reduce them to mutual obligations cycling throughout a community built of locals
and the ruling classes. Performers assert that their communities and elites are part of a network
of trust and mutual obligation—a moral economy. In razḥa, community members display their
reception of gifts and represent the community as morally deserving of the gifts along several
axes: because they are dignified, because they are part of an egalitarian society, because they are
Omani, and importantly, because praise is a form of civic labor that deserves recognition. I do
not think it obscures the deeply unequal social and material relations between these vastly
different class positions. It does not “produce” egalitarianism. Performance does, however,
demonstrate and display graciousness, dignity, communality, sociality, and Omani heritage while
also enacting the reception of generosity that ultimately cannot be returned.
b. The Razḥa Integration mechanism
In chapter 2 I proposed five principles of praise that would be investigated. In this chapter
I analyze principles 3—5:
3) that praise is addressed to power and aimed at integrating power into community;
4) that praise manages power relationships by manipulating fame, name, and reputation;
5) that praise is civic labor, an obligatory response to generosity and an inducement to
further giving.
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When we think about praise and generosity as being mutual obligations, as being linked in a
moral economy, we can see how principles 3—5 are not only responses to praiseworthy
behavior, but responses that intervene in those relationships. For performers and communities,
praise is not a straightforward exchange, but a way of doing something to achieve certain ends.
Such ends can be material—indeed they often are—but can also point to the production or
maintenance of certain kinds of social relationships and identities. These are not opposed ends.
Rather, these principles show how praisers manipulate context, social status differentials, shared
mythopoetic histories, imagery, reputation, and notions of equality in order to draw elites into a
shared moral economy, and to fix them there.
This drawing in is achieved in several ways, and I think that it must be continuously reperformed. Surely, elites would prefer not to give and enjoy the same benefits of hegemonic
control. Preventing the moral economy’s dissolution into a market economy requires continual
intervention. The reason I argue that praise intervenes in social relationships of praise is that
performers often explain that razḥa is a response (CLA. radd) to praiseworthy deeds (variously
referred to as O. Ar. makrūma/makrūmāt, mafkhara/mafākhir, or CLA. khayrāt, ḥasānāt) or
noble virtues (O. Ar. faḍīla/faḍā’il, maziyya/mazāyā). Praise in the Omani context is a claim on
ruling classes: that they are caught in mutual obligation relations with local communities—that
they constitute a shared moral economy. Giving and praising, while not transactions, are
reciprocally arranged and produce certain social relationships. I trace this mechanism though
analyses of performance and the way that performers motivate four discourses:
1. Communities are necessary to complete circuits of praise. Performers frame
themselves as necessary to the completion of exchange circuits of praise and goods by
being a crucial source of praise and representation, initiated through invitations and
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consultation. Further, they present themselves as a community that is a worthy and
correct recipient of gifts from leaders by mythopoetically presenting a shared history
between their community and leaders, that is, as Omani Arabs. Since it is also an
obligation on givers to receive praise, the context of receiving collective praise is used by
performers to represent their communality. Leaders, in turn, regard engaging razḥa
groups as a way to produce interest in their activities. Performance is then a way of
“encompassing” the praised, just as the generous giver “encompasses” the recipient. They
are obliged to listen, to pay attention, and to remunerate.
2. Performers present themselves as dignified and proud. Performers graciously receive
gifts in a way that does not demean them and also asserts their autonomy, pride, and
dignity through bodily comportment, adornment, and dignified communal movement.
Dignity and pride are embodied through bodily states like ḥamās,
(enthusiasm/excitement, fervor, élan); shugā‘a, (bravery, courage, also encouragement);
and rigūla, (masculinity, manliness). By “accepting” or “integrating” gifts into a
community by acting as representatives of the community, they obscure direct
relationships of dependence that might obtain in dyadic gift relations.
3. Performers see praise as labor that is necessary to building community. Since
performers generally conceive of praise in moral and sociable terms as outlined in
Chapter 2 and are obligated to respond to generous giving, they frame their praise,
communal charity, and male sociability as Omanis as a kind of labor in service of the
nation and community. This framing signals that they do not receive gifts for “nothing.”
Both the performance practices and the labor involved in maintaining a community are
often compared to work and operates as a kind of maintenance of sociality.
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4. Performers understand praise performance and gifts to be necessarily communally
oriented. Omani razḥa and ‘āzī differ from other forms of the Generosity/Legitimacy
mechanism because they are necessarily communal and collective, recognizing
obligations not between patrons and clients, but between rulers and communities. Since
gifts of development and infrastructure are given not to individuals but for communal
use, the praise response must also be communal. The forms of performance themselves
are necessarily communal and are taken as evidence of the ways in which performance
necessarily implicates the entire community.
c. Outline
Much of this chapter follows one performance over the course of an afternoon and the
days of planning before it and shows how different discourses animate the ways in which form,
presentation, and text confront and subvert the dangers of dependency. The framing event of this
chapter was a festival arranged in the wilāya of Manaḥ in the Interior which was organized by
the wālī on October 6th, 2017. The festival, entitled “fī ḥubb Qābūs” (“For the love of [Sultan]
Qābūs”), was planned for the evening of the Friday at the end of a week that witnessed new
photos and videos of the Sultan being released on Omani state media after no such pictures or
videos had been seen of him for several months. The Sultan was in fact in residence at his palace
in Manaḥ, the Ḥuṣn al-Shamūkh mentioned previously. Ḥamad, the manager of the Firqat al‘Arabī in al-Ma’arā, informed me that the appearance of the Sultan was very reassuring to the
people of Oman, who did not know whether he was alive or dead. His appearance caused many
groups and governmental bodies to plan celebrations for the weekend. In the days leading up to
Friday night, the group was busy consulting with the office of the wālī to hammer out the details
of their performance. As I discuss certain features of this performance and the events leading up
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to it, I will show how these four discourses come into play when performance is addressed to
power.
Over the course of this chapter, I document two related threads: how performers use
razḥa to skirt the potential that generosity would render them as weak or dependent, and how
performers actively draw elites into relations of mutual dependence in a moral economy.
“Transforming power into community”: Praise as a Necessity
The organization and the planning of the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival was mostly undertaken in
the few days between the appearance of the Sultan in various media and the next available day
off, Friday. I asked the performance groups and later the wālī whether they could have a festival
without the performance groups. “Never,” replied the wālī, “they are a necessary part of our
community and they present our unity and our pride (humā giza’ ḍurūrī min mugtam‘anā wayubayyinū waḥdatunā wa-‘izzunā).”89 When I relayed this to some of the groups, one member
memorably replied: “that’s true, we’ve heard that before, but I tell you no one would come if it
wasn’t for us.”
“How do you mean?” I asked.
“If it was just speeches and odes? No, that won’t work (mā yaṣlaḥ), no one would come.
He [the wālī) knows what brings crowds, and he wants crowds. The wālī is good, brings
beneficial things to us from his virtuous nature (yigīb al-ashiyā’ al-mufīda min faḍā’iluh), and
we do razḥa. If we are invited, there will be crowds. Simple.”

89

Some of his enthusiasm must be attributed to his speaking to me and his knowledge of my
project. Performance groups in Manaḥ have noted that former wālī-s have not taken really any
personal interest in the groups at all, simply delegating lower officials to make sure they are
present. Certainly some celebrations and events from the past did not involve one or more of the
groups, to their chagrin.
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“I see. And are those things equal? Is that an equal exchange (tabādul90 mustāwī)
between the good things and the razḥa?”
“No,” he replied, “there is no exchange. We do razḥa today for Qābūs, and the wālī is
recognized because he brought us together. He hosts the event—each contributes to the event in
[their own] way (yasāham fī al-mushārika kulli ḥad bi-ṭarīqu).”
This is an example of the first discourse I present here: that of the way that performers
and hosts see their praise as essential or necessary to the completion of the circuit of exchange
and praise. If performers are keen on seeing the razḥa as a kind of necessary part of a circuit of
mutual obligation, it is because the danger of dependency is at least tacitly understood.
Performers are not merely paying a debt or thanking a patron. From the perspective of razḥa
performers, generosity and praise in the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism form a circuit
between equals of different capacities. It is not a squaring of accounts because there is no way to
“account” for the things which are exchanged. The fact of their exchange, and the different and
incommensurable “value” that is attributed to the exchanged praise and goods, are enough to
make the claim that this circuit is one of mutual concern and commitment. If it was just an
equitable exchange, a contract, a debt to be repaid, then the logic of thanks and accounting would
operate. But it is not. Rather, this circuit of goods and praise is a sort of expectation based on the
mutual fulfillment of different but linked obligations. It is the fulfillment of an obligation
pursuant to previously fulfilled obligations. Just as performers and the communities they
represent cannot fund the building of palaces and hospitals, leaders cannot praise themselves.

It should be noted here that tabādul is a word that does not in itself imply any equality in
quantity, just participation in some kind of transfer, as “exchange” does in English. In Arabic,
the word does not necessarily imply an economic focus, though see chapter 6 in Lancasters
(2011) for their take on concepts of exchange in the Oman Peninsula.
90
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Good deeds require the praise of a moral community that matters to the doer of the deed. For
Omani celebrations of development, good rule, and infrastructure, praise poetry operates as it
does in South Africa: “the recitation of praise poetry is a constitutive element of the event
itself”—it forms the basis of the entire affair (Kresse 1998, 188). That praise is central to these
gatherings is important because it fulfills the need for deeds to be recognized unambiguously in
appropriate praise.
Classicist Leslie Kurke (2013) explains the necessity of praise in Ancient Greece when
she quotes one of Pindar’s lines, “For praise from home is mixed with blame” (2001, 76). In her
interpretation,
the same house that produces achievements cannot also manufacture their glorification.
Praise must come from outside in order that the surrounding community not be alienated,
or put positively, the value of the achievement is the prestige it has in the eyes of the
community, so the praise must come from the larger group. (Kurke 2013, 76)
Kurke’s argument throughout her monograph The Traffic in Praise is that Ancient Greek praise
poetry, epinikia, was part of an “economy” of praise and good deeds that constantly circulated
amongst houses, patrons, poets, and communities. Aristocrats, participating in the earliest
Olympic games, were praised for their victories in order “to match the deed in words” (2013,
86). In a sense, victory and good deeds set individuals apart from society, and praise poetry
reincorporated them by reminding them why the deeds performed were good and praiseworthy:
because they served the community. Indeed, in the 5th century BCE context of shifting political
power from influential independent aristocratic households to the mixed urban city-state polis,
drawing aristocrats into the moral community of the polis was “the condition of its survival”
(2013, 225). Elites’ contributions to mutual defense, festivals, taxes, and other social goods were
necessary to the continuing viability of the city-state social structure. The fear that aristocrats
might “absent themselves from the polis” could be avoided by mollifying them with praise
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(2013, 225). Rather than allowing aristocrats to distance themselves from the everyday life of the
community, community members sought ways to link aristocrats to the life and future of the
polis itself. Von Hallberg summarizes Kurke’s argument as showing how “[Pindar’s] poems
produce power by giving an athlete, a household, and a city recognition from outside the city’s
borders” (2014, 46). In such a condition, praise poetry “sets out to produce general value for a
wide audience to share” and is therefore part of a system that “transforms power into
community” (2014, 47). Power—in this case, power that inheres in fame, name, and reputation—
brings a person, family, or deed into direct mythopoetic contact with a real, discrete community.
Power in the ancient Greek polis was held by independent noble houses (at least at first),
who were drawn into the civic life of the city to ensure their collective survival. Being “drawn
in” means that the noble houses were convinced in one way or another to use their economic
capital for the general benefit of the polis rather than merely for themselves. In the contemporary
Middle East, the state-form and those that control its institutions hold similar constitutive power.
Since praise is “addressed to power” (per the 3rd principle of praise I outlined above), we find
that Omani praise practices often deal with relationships between rulers and ruled.
Older extant razḥa-s were directed at shaykh-s and qāḍī-s. For example:

بالروف بالروف يالقاضي بالروف خلي المشاكل تاخذ مجاريه
تاخذ مجاريه والحج مبرور وكرسي الحكومه كل حد وينضيه
Bi-l-rūf, bi-l-rūf yā qāḍī, bi-l-rūf
khulī al-mushākil, ta’khudh migāriyya;
Ta’khudh migāriyya wa al-ḥagg al-mabrūr
wa kursī al-ḥikūma kulli ḥadd yanḍīu.
Take it easy, O qāḍī, take it easy,
leave your problems and take a trip.
Take a trip—the ḥajj pilgrimage:
the seat of government is all of us and life goes on.
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Another refers to the shaykh and his role within the community as a kind of shepherd (see Music
Example 5).

Music example 5. Razḥa melody from a performance in al-Ma‘arā and al-‘Izz in wilayāt
Manaḥ.
The shaykh mentioned here quickly comes to be understood as the Sultan in conversation. Newer
razḥa-s, of course, are almost always directed at Sultan Qābūs, like this example from the fī ḥubb
Qābūs festival:
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Music example 6. Razḥa melody from the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival, written by Khalfān of alMa‘amad.

Matā yarga‘ linā ha-al-qā’id al-baṭal,
Min dīrat al-’Ālmān matā yarga‘ ‘alaynā;
Kull ‘Umān al-yawm mishtāqa li-shūftak
Yā sayyid sulṭān ’inta linā dukhr
When he returns to us, this heroic leader
from the land of Germany, when he returns to us
All of Oman today misses seeing you
O lord Sultan, you are a treasure to us.
a. Praise, Power, and Relationality
Insofar as praise is addressed to power, it is relational. Because it often moves from lower
to higher status individuals, it can index relations of weakness as well as strength. Shryock and
Howell’s (2001) investigations of karam (CLA. generosity, hospitality) in the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan confirm this fact. Their discussion of the ways in which the ‘Adwani tribe
has positioned themselves vis-à-vis the ruling Hashemites reveal, to them, the strength and the
weakness of their position. When they were told the names of the “who’s who” of ‘Adwani
notables over the course of their research, they found that the lists were often given to Shryock in
confidence. Not only could these lists provoke envy in other families, but:
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a mood of insecurity accompanies the construction of these lists, because they show
beyond all doubt that the power to make (or break) an ‘Adwani notable now lies securely
in government hands. Rhetorically, the lists create a double bind: they stand as proof of
the “good relations” between the ‘Adwan, a shaykhly house, and the Hashemites,
Jordan’s ruling house, but they simultaneously betray a spirit of calculated self-promotion
that should never trouble the heads of the truly powerful, who bestow favors on others
and rely on status inferiors to praise them for it. As the proverb says, “He who praises
himself is a liar” (man ḥamad nafs-u fa-howa kādhib). (Shryock 2001:253-4)
Shryock and Howell’s report shows two important facets of the relationships between praise and
power: first, praise marks unequal relations. Since “real power” in some sense cannot be
dependent, showing unambiguous dependency signals weakness. The ‘Adwani can only claim
power through their dependence on the Hashemite state, and so can make only a limited and
circumscribed claim on power. More importantly for our case here, however, is the fact that
power can secure praise, but cannot praise itself. Self-praise makes one “a liar”; it is a praise that
cannot be trusted. Proper praise, believable praise, requires “status inferiors” to produce and
disseminate. This situation is partly what prompts the distribution of goods—economic power
cannot be directly transformed into hegemonic power without human performance. Praise is
necessary, but it cannot be produced by those who are praised—therefore, praisers are necessary
as well. If praisers depend on giving, givers depend on praise.
b. Offering Invitations, Acknowledging Mutuality
The more time I spent with Omani performers of praise poetry, the more I realized that
they knew that they were necessary and were proud of it. This does not mean that they were
haughty. Instead, they had a sense of purpose as valued members of the community, even though
this perception could be shaken in various ways. Performers think that their praise is not only an
obligation but is necessary to the function of the overall Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism.
However, the way that performers’ participation is realized changes the way in which
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participants in the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism perceive their relationship. One practice
that performers point to as evidence of their necessity is the formal invitation. My research
concurs with Christensen and Castelo-Branco’s survey of Ṣuḥār insofar as performers expect to
be invited to perform, and not commanded (2009, 218-9).
As a contrast, in medieval examples of poetic patronage we see that poets took advantage
of the presence of the king, shah, or caliph in his court to attempt to solicit patronage. This is
similarly a way for praisers to affirm their necessary role in the “economy of praise” (Kurke
2013). However, poets were not necessarily invited to give praise poetry in the courts of caliphs,
they simply showed up and expected an informed audience. For example, in Kumiko
Yamamoto’s The Oral Background of Persian Epics: Storytelling and Poetry (2003), she
presents Persian courts as having been relatively open to poets, with rulers distributing largesse
in anticipation of the arrival of praisers at festivals. The poets, reciting praise and epics, were a
kind of entertainment. She cites a courtly text on such an exchange:
[Mas'ūd I] sat down to the feast of nowruz. He had brought many presents and taken a lot
of trouble [in preparing the feast]. He heard poems (še'r) recited by poets (šo'arā'), to
enjoy himself in this time of winter, and unwind and relax. [When the poets finished
reciting,] he gave them presents. (2003, 54)
Present-day Omanis, on the other hand, do not perceive their razḥa poetry in praise contexts as
being for entertainment and would not imagine performing without explicit permission. One
important way that performance groups demonstrate their necessity to the praised is by only
performing for an invitation (da‘wa, Christensen and Castelo-Branco (2009) also report
barwah91).While many performances involve the direct transfer of cash, groups leaders made

91

When I asked the troupe about the term barwah, several respondents were surprised that it was
in use in Ṣuḥār in between the 1980s and 2005. One described barwah this way: “barwah means
a letter from the wālī, a letter with a seal from the wālī that says something, I don’t know what. I
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sure to tell me that they would not perform for leaders without express invitation from some
involved representative.
The invitation for performance at these kinds of events always moves from the powerful
to the less powerful. Making a request makes one vulnerable. Thus, when local leaders (like the
wālī of Manaḥ in the case of the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival) call a meeting to solicit the performance
groups and invite them to participate, groups perceive this as a proper way in which the leader
subtly lowers himself in order to secure their involvement. The invitation is a potential signal of
dependency because it shows how the festival requires the participation of status inferiors. This
is a major way in which groups point to their necessity in this circuit of exchange—they could
not be ordered, but only invited by leaders, just as one would approach an equal—even if this
equality is temporary.
Aḥmad, the ‘āzī and Vice President of the group in al-Ma‘arā, related that he was
summoned (along with the leaders of the other performance groups in Manaḥ) to the office of the
wālī in order to discuss setting up the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival to celebrate. He emphasized that this
was a formal invitation, not a command. “It was consultation (shūrā),” he pointed out,
it was not a command (’amr). In fact, this was a very good meeting and the first in a long
time. We have been invited to come to the office of the wālī before to discuss
performances. This was different. All the groups came, and the wālī said he wanted a big
performance. Māshāllah, you saw the crowd (al-gumhūr), it was a big event. I have never
seen this in my time in the group, it was the largest in Manaḥ that I can remember.
The fact that Aḥmad considers this consultation reflects how important the notions of an
invitation and collaboration are for the praise groups. The notion of consultation is a crucial one
for Omani political and social life (Ghubash 2001). In this case, the wālī’s invitation brought

have never seen a real barwah but that’s how things were done in the old days. If he [the wālī]
announced something, if he made a ruling, then there would be barwah.”
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together the four different neighborhood groups in Manaḥ, which impressed many Manḥī-s. In a
conversation after the conclusion of the event, I asked a few members about the cooperation they
saw:
BJG: Have the four groups ever worked together before this? This was a very large number of
performers today, I think.
Ḥamad: This is the biggest number I have seen. This is why al-Waḥshī [the wālī of Manaḥ] is
respected, because he does consultation with all the groups.
BJG: And not all the groups get along, you might say. They don’t all agree.
Salām: “We say ‘bull’, and they say milk it.”92 [laughter]
Ḥ: That’s true. But this is what al-Waḥshī does, this is why he is loved. He brings us together,
brings everyone [together] and brings a big participation. His invitation is heard.
The wālī’s ability to draw together the disparate groups—to persuade, to arbitrate—is a
critical ability of “the shaykh” in Arabian political culture. Part of this comes from knowing
when to issue invitations and to whom. For Ṣuḥāris, such an invitation is crucial to the
organization and proper reception of performance, especially when the performance is addressed
to power in front of the wālī’s office (Christensen and Castelo-Branco 2009, 218-9). It is no less
so for Manḥī-s, who take the invitation as a kind of solicitation and the beginning of an
obligation. “Without an invitation, how could we razḥa?” another performer remarked when I

Naqūl thūr, yiqūlū ḥilbuh. This is an old saying, perhaps not so commonly used anymore.
Salām and I enjoyed talking about old sayings and idioms and he had brought this one up in a
group conversation earlier that day. The phrase refers to disagreement or two people who do not
see something the same way. Usually it is applied to people who ignore advice or incorrectly
assess a situation. In this case, it can refer to obstinate disagreement or contradiction stemming
from dislike.
92
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asked. “[Would] we just go and take their space, be annoying, sing and dance for money just like
that? No, never, doctor, that would be no good.”
Though invitations always move from the powerful to the less powerful, this “power” can
be situational. For example, oftentimes members of the performance troupes will expect direct
invitations to perform, rather than general requests from troupe leadership. The “administration”
(O. Ar. ’idāra or mudīriya) of the troupe often announces group events by sending a written
invitation that stipulates location, uniform, event type, and whether or not group members should
bring antique rifles. Here is the invitation to the festival sent to members of the Firqat al-‘Arabī:
“For the Love of Qābūs” festival:
Delighting in the high station and radiating benevolence of His Highness and
being aware of his generous favors (makrūmāt) and the gifts (‘aṭā’āt) of the renaissance
and its continuing progress over 47 years, the sons of Manaḥ are honored to hold the “For
the Love of Qābūs” festival at 4:00 pm next Friday afternoon 06/10/2017 at the racetrack
of the Dressage Club near the Manaḥ Health Center. The festival will include: 1) Men’s
Arts; 2) Women’s Arts; 3) Horse and Camel shows; 4) Drone aviation; 5) Unfurling of
the colors of the flag of the Sultanate and pictures of His Majesty; 6) Closing ceremony
(al-‘āzī). The invitation is open to all.
In the name of [local shaykh] and by his request I present to you an invitation to
participate in the festival in the Governate of Manaḥ and in the neighborhood of alMa‘amad near the Manaḥ Health Center. We ask of you that you participate alongside
your brothers in the 4 performance troupes of Manaḥ in the mid-afternoon and into the
evening and we would be honored by your attendance and presence. You are welcome as
honored guests or as participants and may God grant you a thousand blessings in bond
and wealth to raise the level of the arts in our Governate by your presence and
attendance.
The date is Friday 06/10/2017 and we will begin in the mid-afternoon, from the
‘Aṣr prayer until the ‘Ashā’ prayer and afterwards God willing we will eat dinner (we
will tell you if it’s cancelled). Your attendance in any number will be most welcome, an
honor and a pleasure from you all, but as always the largest number of participants is the
best. We ask especially for the participation of the youth; please listen and respond to this
message. Your participation is most welcome.
In regard to uniforms, please wear a white dishdāsha and a maṣar and khanjar of
your own. If you do not have a khanjar with you, they will be provided and available for
you from the common supply. Guns are not permitted at the event.
Please accept my sincerest regards and most beautiful greetings, and may your
days pass in health and good fortune.
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c. How Invitations Avoid “Praise from Home”
Invitations are also crucial because they make praise a voluntary engagement, at least
nominally. Two other proverbs make this clear: a pan-Arab caution that “Only the Devil praises
himself” (lā yashukkar nafsu illā ’Iblīs) and the delightfully Omani colloquial “He who praises
himself deserves a kick” (Bū maddāḥ nafsu yibālu rafsa). Praisers are necessary to the proper
functioning of the circuit of exchange that animates the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism, but
“praise from home is mixed with blame” and self-praisers are “liars.” This means that forced
praise is just as tainted as self-praise. This puts pressure on leaders to make praise look as
voluntary as possible. Hence the importance of the invitation, even if this invitation cannot really
be ignored. Elites must seek out praisers. That said, leaders do maintain a distance between
themselves and performers during the event. For example, at the fī ḥubb Qābūs event, despite the
large number of participants and the successful round of invitations, all the invited guests sat in a
long row in front of the dancing and parade ground. None of these important guests, including
members of the Bū Sa‘īd family, performed praise for the Sultan. In an interview about why
leaders do not perform the razḥa in Oman the way Saudi royalty perform al-‘arḍa al-najdiyya,
one respondent replied that:
Respondent: It’s really rare that a shaykh might do razḥa; but in Saudi it could be that
they do it because they need to make more confidence in the leaders, you know? Here we
have confidence in our leader and in our society (‘andnā thiqqa baynunā wa-as-sulṭān
wa-al-mugtama‘) so why would he come and razḥa? He knows that we will do razḥa
even if he was not there among us, but I don’t know about in Saudi. I wonder if they
would do it without him, because you know you will be rewarded for doing [it]. Us, no,
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there’s no reward, there’s no money. We do it because we are proud, and there is a
request. How could we refuse an invitation to show our pride?
BJG: There is a line from the group in Bahlā, “sayyidnā fī al-‘amr wa-ṭā‘a” (Our leader
[we’re with you] whether ordered or voluntarily obedient).
R: Yeeeeesssss, exactly. We would do razḥa if there was an order [to do so] and
voluntarily, as well. Exactly.
This respondent muses that the political situation in Saudi Arabia may make the façade of
equality more important, which leads to shared performance with leaders. While Omanis of high
social rank might write praise poetry, they rarely perform it. I myself have never seen a “leader”
or host of any description participate in the razḥa, much less an ‘āzī, but this does not mean that
this never occurred. When we look at the written history of razḥa-s in chapter 5, in fact, we will
see that leaders are at least recorded to have participated. The changes in the social rank and role
of participants reveal some important changes in Omani society over the last 50 years that will be
investigated in chapter 6.
Praise from a Second “Home”: Locating the Moral Economy
After an invitation, groups start to plan their performances, write poetry, and choose their
uniforms. This is the point at which praisers begin to (re)construct their moral economy, to insist
once again on the reciprocal relations that tie giving and praising. Once the groups in Manaḥ
were invited to perform for the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival, many began to write razḥa-s for the event.
Once again, the poet who gave the ‘āzī at the soccer pitch, Rabī‘, volunteered himself for the
performance of this ‘āzī, and the expectation of the other groups was that he would write a new
qaṣīda for the event. The types of poems that the groups wrote will occupy us here insofar as
they represent themselves as a proper community to offer praise, and reciprocally, to accept
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generosity from leaders. One crucial social function that performance groups accomplish in
performance is to help identify the community that they represent as morally and culturally
correct recipients of generosity. This means that performers recognize the circuit of generosity
not as a general pattern of exchange that obtains between givers and receivers or leaders and
followers, but specifically within their communities. Praise is discursively realized as a necessity
chiefly because of what it does within the specific moral, political, and cultural community in
which it is sung.
In Oman, the Sultan, various local or national patrons, and families are praised for their
traits or actions, but always from a certain person from a certain location. Omanis see this as a
necessary way in which specific deeds are recognized by specific communities, be they regional,
ethnic, or religious. Omani praise practices are always tied in one way or another to a discrete
location. This is partially accomplished by the way the performance groups are named after a
particular town, region or even neighborhood. All groups are officially connected by way of
name and by formal governmental registration with a particular locale. For example, the four
groups that were invited to the festival represented four large neighborhoods in Manaḥ. They
were: 1) The Firqat Ḥārat al-Bilād li-l-funūn al-sha‘biyya; 2) The Firqat al-‘Arabī li-l-funūn alsha‘biyya; 3) The Firqat al-Ma‘amad li-l-funūn al-sha‘biyya; and 4) the new Firqat al-Fīqīn li-lfunūn al-sha‘biyya, representing, respectively, the Ḥārat al-Bilād neighborhood, the al-Ma‘arā
neighborhood, the Ma‘amad neighborhood, and the Fīqīn neighborhood. Praise rarely occurs
without also mentioning the nation, a state, or even a village, though this is more common in ‘āzī
than it is in razḥa. Due to the shorter form of razḥa poems, they often require tacit knowledge of
the present event and its surroundings to be fully understood. A good example of the way that
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poetry frames the relationship between generous givers and praisers is a razḥa written and then
sung by Khalfān, an older and founding member of the Firqat al-Ma‘amad, at the festival.
‘Awal salām allah li-Qābūs al-mu‘aẓẓam
Yalī ‘alaynā fāḍ bigūd wa makrūmāt,
Ṣabaḥt ‘umān al-yawm fī khabr al-nu‘am
Wa yā allah ‘amru madīd sanīn (fī) ṭā’ilāt
First, God’s greeting to Qābūs the great,
He rules over us, overflowing with generous gifts and benefits,
Oman awoke today to blessed news,
O God, his age great, years of glory.

Figure 21. Khalfān and another performer holding a copy of the razḥa-s Khalfān had
written for the Fī ḥubb Qābūs festival. The first is discussed above—in conversation,
everyone agreed that he had forgotten a “fī” in his writing in the last line. “It rides better
that way,” a younger poet remarked.

Part of this poem is clear, but the “blessed news” refers to the appearance of Qābūs on
television—the reason for the festival. This kind of poem marks the distribution of goods
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because the “generous gifts and benefits” (gūd wa makrūmāt) specifically refers to goods and
services delivered by a patron to various clients (also from the root of the word used here for
“generosity” or “hospitality,” karam) as a deed to be recognized by the “first greeting.”93 It is
also important to note that while no location is verbally encoded in the text, Khalfān is so famous
in Manaḥ that the poem is automatically associated with Ma‘amad and its community. The
community recognizes the good deed of the Sultan, the “blessed news” of his continued health,
and wishes for yet more. It is a recognition of a particular social relationship as well as a plea for
it to continue, from a certain poet, in a certain place, and at a certain time. The wish for his long
life is implicitly a wish for these same kinds of social relations to continue, where a powerful
figure is morally obligated to help his own community.
While much of this locational marking is accomplished pragmatically and deictically in
razḥa, that is, through the people, group, grammar, and location of performance, in ‘āzī these
markers are often verbalized. Recall the ‘āzī presented for the soccer pitch in al-Ma‘arā:
These are our benefits in Manaḥ / We salute the designs that are in good order,
[Those] that Qābūs taught us and acts in good faith / Qābūs is a physician to the 'umma.
O my homeland al-Ma'arā, peace! / You gave me pride, you gave me respect.
First the poet mentions the town and governate of Manaḥ, followed by the larger (potentially
transnational) notion of the ‘umma, the religious community of Muslims. After this, he mentions
the small neighborhood of al-Ma‘arā, the location of the performance and the home of most of
the participants.

93

See Caton 1986 for a discussion of the importance of greeting. In Oman as well there exists an
elaborate culture of greeting with various registers and requirements stemming from cultural and
religious sources.
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The ‘āzī written for the festival mentions the Sultan alongside various cities and
landmarks associated with state power:
… / And with one tongue94 they all spoke
With one tongue, all of them [spoke] / and the results and blessings came,
Witnessed by the Qaṣr al-‘Alam95 / In Muscat, the fine, the unshakeable.
In Muscat and the rest of the cities / and in every inch of the nation,
We thank [Qābūs] happily and publicly / God loves those who are grateful.
Ziyād al-Shukaylī also incorporates location-specific lines into his 2016 ‘āzī, in direct speech to
the Sultan.
BJG: Often, bā, you say “You have Sumay’il, you have Ḥazim, your glory stretched from the
lands of the Persians to Zanzibar, you have Buraymī and Ṣuḥār.” I’m not quoting the lines, the
poetic lines exactly but that is the construction, with “you have” (‘indak). Why is that so, why do
you say the cities as a list like that?
Ziyād: Yes. Well, I do that to, to list the glories of Oman (amgād ‘Umān). I do that so that all
know the breadth of Oman (misāfat ‘Umān), and the great cities that it is composed of. I also do
this for Bahlā’, you didn’t mention Bahlā’, but I also do this for Bahlā’. So it is known, we are
also a part of Oman and we are Omanis.
BJG: But you use the “you/your” pronoun (-ak). Why do you do this?
Z: That’s because I am speaking to His Highness. I am speaking to him. If I am speaking with
you, I say “you” is that not so? He knows me, and I know him. He needs to know who I am and I
am from Bahlā’ and I am of the Shukayl and like this. I’m not just someone from nowhere, or

94

Referring here to Sultan Qābūs acting on behalf of all Omanis.

95

The royal palace built by Qābūs in Muscat, after demolishing his father’s.
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asking for money or help or aid with no right or basis (min ghayr haqq wala ‘asās). In the old
days, as I told you before, the ‘āzī informed people about news and it was also a form of
requesting aid. If you request aid, there must be a relationship, it’s on the basis of something [or
“it’s because of something,” (lāzim hunāk ‘alāqa fa-huwa ‘alā ‘asās shay). And what is the
basis? It’s because of help from you, you supported them, you stood by them, and they
reciprocate (Wa-al-‘asās mū? Al-‘asās huwa al-rifid mink. Tarfidhū, tugīrhū96, wa-b‘ad yiraddū
lak).
In this case, Ziyād makes clear the ways in which support relies on mutual relations and
reputation. He is not just any poet, but rather an Omani Arab Muslim poet from Bahlā’, with a
historical relationship with Muscat, the Sultan, and the various cities of Oman. The cities belong
to the Sultan, and insofar as they do, he is beholden to consult with them. Whether he does so is
a different matter. What Ziyād is saying here, with the tact of a “status inferior” and praiser, is
that there is a certain relationship between good, moral, Omani people and a good, moral leader.
He is drawing a socially realized circle around a particular moral economy. The praiser is using
the elite’s reputation for providing help to secure help in the present.
Marshall Sahlins has pointed out that kinship distance often recapitulates the moral stakes
of exchange relationships: kin are given things freely, community members are given gifts (to be
returned), and strangers are only engaged with in impersonal market exchange (1972, 190ff.).
While this can be complicated, praise from non-elites to elites might be conceived as a way of
mediating the enormous social distance between praisers and the praised by ensuring that the
praised are kept as intimates in exchange, if not in kinship distance. Praise calls on powerful

From the form IV verb ’ajār from the root j-ā/ū-r, “to stand by or aid.” Other verbs from this
root include “to be neighbors with” and “to support, shelter, or protect.”
96
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social elites and attempts to embed them within such a fictive kinship proximity just as it seeks
to embed them within a moral economy—the two are linked.
Praisers mythopoetically create a morally valenced relationship. This not only draws
some of the power of the poetry back to the poet (the praiser reminds the praised where he is
from or where he is) but he also in some way binds the praised to the place or community. Von
Hallberg writes, “the casual modern view is that praise is a gift to a deserving or undeserving
recipient. The ancient one was rather that praise circulates through a culture, justly binding
people in a network of obligations” (2014, 48). The praiser draws the praised into a “network of
obligations” that involves forming social relationships with the praiser and his community,
however brief. The crucial resource that is manipulated by poets here is fame, name, or
reputation. Poets use the potency of having a good reputation in both positive and negative sense.
In a positive sense, they praise good deeds to add to the reputation and fame of the praised. In the
negative sense, they provide models for kinds of good behavior that would be praised. It is this
kind of negative praise that helps to manipulate leaders. Interpreting what Khalfān sang to the
wālī and to the Sultan: “God lengthens the life of those who give generously… you do give
generously, don’t you?”
a. In and Out of the Moral Economy: Proper and Improper Praisers
While it is the case that praise comes from proper sources, it is also true that Arab
Omanis praise the Sultan and local leaders for things that all manner of people use. For example,
praisers often mention the generosity of the Sultan with regard to rebuilding and restoring “Old
Towns” (referring to the sections of abandoned houses and living spaces adjacent to modern
housing built by the state in one way or another), highways, hospitals, modern amenities, power
transformers, and water resources. All of these “good deeds” are of general social benefit. South
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Asian and European guest workers, as well as tourists, benefit just as much if not more from
these infrastructural investments, and yet they (and I) are not expected to praise the Sultan for
them, certainly not in Omani poetic idioms. So why should Omani Arabs continue to praise these
general benefits?
Asking about why only Omanis praise things that everyone uses, I recorded several
different answers.
Respondent 1: How could anyone else praise the Sultan for these things? You say
everyone uses the highway, yes, this is the reality. But how could you Englishmen praise the
sultan for this? No, it’s not your place, you cannot. You use it, yes, but it is for development, part
of the renaissance.
Another:
R2: We praise, as I told you, on the basis of our duty, it’s upon us (‘alā asās al-wājib
‘alaynā). It is not upon you, or the Indians, or anyone else.
A third replied:
BJG: So, just imagine that you never performed for the opening of the soccer pitch or
anything like that. Could you use the soccer pitch? For example, the players didn’t do razḥa but
they use it the most of course.
R3: Of course they didn’t need to razḥa in order to use the pitch. But I tell you, if no one
came to recognize and honor the shaykh-s that helped build the pitch, that would be a great
shame.
BJG: You mean that you couldn’t use it?
R3: … No, no, I don’t think so, I mean, it would be a great shame.
BJG: But it is for you, I mean, it is built for your sake.
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R3: Yes, also [Bank Muscat, who funded the construction] and the state, I mean, the
health ministry. They [all have] plans. It is for our sake but we have… to accept it in an
appropriate way (al-mafrūḍ annu nataqabiluh bi-ṭarīqa munāsiba).
And finally:
R4: I tell you, now we rely on foreigners. But they will not be here forever, we don’t
need them. We are strong and we don’t need them, soon they will all be gone.
BJG: They will be gone? I’m a foreigner.
R4: Yes, that is true. I mean the Indians will be gone. We have given them enough
already.
BJG: And we foreigners are not able to praise the Sultan for these benefits, as you say.
R4: They cannot even speak Arabic, or English, God knows. They wouldn’t know who
to praise, who to respect.
An appropriate response, it is clear, is a praise response. In addition, it is not just a praise
response, but praise coming from certain sources and bodies. In our case, it is from Omani Arab
Muslim men from the rural Interior region of Oman. Indian guest workers, foreigners, and
ethnographers are not fully able to participate in the shared moral economy that performers call
into being as they praise.
However, as we’ve seen, their praise is not a kind of reflex, an automatic recognition of
good deeds, but rather an orchestrated and mutual realization of a social relationship with known
parties. Foreigners are both shamed and symbolically excised from the social fabric by their
inability to praise and “know” who to respect. Omani praisers not only have the ability to praise
in socially acceptable ways, but also know what relationships are important and what
personalities and activities require praising. Even for appropriately positioned praisers, however,
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simply showing up to opening day festivities with praise poems comes from a place a weakness.
Likewise, buying praise outright is questionable. Being invited to accept and recognize the good
leadership of the Sultan’s development programs through poetry and performance is quite a
different relationship than showing up uninvited with sycophantic verse in hand, certainly to
Omanis. Further, this kind of location- and community-specific praise reveals the ways in which
power has circulated in Oman, that is, in a relatively small-scale but modular rulership. Most
importantly, however, this kind of praise poetry seeks to draw the praised into a moral
community with the praisers. Rabī‘’s ‘āzī for the event concludes by recognizing this:
This is our way and our path / O God, we ask, all of us
Preserve for us our Sultan / And extend his life for years.
b. Grabbed by Praise: Encompassing the Giver
Earlier in this section, I indicated that praisers know that they are necessary, and that the
praised are partly dependent on them for praise. One way that they identify this, I showed, was
by accepting invitations, and another was identifying themselves as part of a specific community
with the praised. Another way that praisers see themselves as having some power over the
praised is the fact that the praised must pay attention to the praiser. 97 This is especially obvious
when praisers speculate on the emotional states of the praised, whether they induce tears or an
assortment of other emotional states that are more specific to Omani emotional registers.
I want to cite here an explanation of this viewpoint put forward in a group interview in
Manaḥ. Late in my fieldwork, I had started to focus on why razḥa was a group performance
activity, and why it was necessary in addition to the qaṣīda. I spoke with the young ‘āzī of the
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Earlier I referred to this as “encompassing” the praised, following Meneley 1996.
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Firqa al-‘Arabī troupe in his new home (fīllā, “villa”) on the outskirts of al-Ma‘arā. As I drove
up with Ḥamad, he noted the new garden. “I haven’t been to his new house yet.” He playfully
grabbed my arm as he turned the car off. “I’m sorry, villa!” He laughed at the term used for these
kinds of homes, separated off from one another and surrounded by a 2.5m high wall. Ḥamad
lived in an older home, tucked tightly together with others on the main road, a secondary stage in
the move out of the old walled quarters of Omani towns filled with ḥayyān, mud-brick and datepalm trunk houses that accommodated large families.
Aḥmad began to slide the metal gate open to greet us after Ḥamad honked the car horn.
Ḥamad elbowed me as I was opening the car door and smiled again, pointing with his nose to the
gate. I knew he wanted me to shout, “hawd, hawd!,” a type of greeting and warning to homeowners, which announced guests, that meant something like “knock-knock!” This was not
considered very refined behavior and Omani were delighted whenever I could be cajoled enough
to do it. I was saved by Aḥmad simply waving us in. We walked into the courtyard and Aḥmad
showed us some new gardens, low against the cement wall. I was encouraged to take a seat and
prepare my recorder in the majlis, a separated room to host guests. Aḥmad’s was air conditioned,
I immediately noticed, to a bone-chilling 16C. When the friends re-entered, I rose to greet them
and we exchanged pleasantries again. Aḥmad, who had rather infamously (within the group,
anyway) ignored my WhatsApp messages for a few days, pointed to a deep cut on his palm as an
explanation. “I’m telling you, the phone beeped, and I reached to grab it and pow! I wounded my
hand on the fence I was working on, there was blood everywhere. I went right to the hospital and
I forgot about it, doctor, wallahi.”
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“It’s no matter,” I said, waving it off, “as long as you’re well.” We settled into the
interview session after sharing coffee, dates, and fruit. As the interview continued, I asked about
qaṣīda and ‘āzī:
BJG: I’ve heard that you can ask for things in poetry, for example, you can ask for money, or
help, or what have you.
A: Yes, I’ve heard that. That is so.
BJG: Can you do the same in ‘āzī? Can you ask for…
A: Oh, no no…
Ḥ: No, I’ve never heard of that…
A: I’ve never heard of, yeah, right, I’ve never heard of that. No I don’t think so.
BJG: Why is that?
A: [scratches his beard and looks up to the ceiling and over to Ḥ] Eh…
Ḥ: Eh, well I think…
A: It’s not done, it’s not done.
Ḥ: [shakes his head vigorously] It’s not done.
A: That is the qaṣīda in which you request things. It’s a great shame to not fulfill a request when
it’s asked from a shaykh in a qaṣīda, a great shame (wāgid ‘ayb). You don’t ask in ‘āzī; in ‘āzī,
you need to show strength, manliness (al-rigūla), I mean, your pride and heritage. You represent
your community, so you need to bring enthusiasm/vigor (al-ḥamās).
BJG: Is there no enthusiasm/vigor in qaṣīda?
A: In razḥa there is more, much more, no doubt, māshāllah. As you know, doctor, razḥa is
unique to Oman, and so it touches the heart of all Omanis.
BJG: Even leaders and others who have authority?
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A: Everyone in the same way. Do you remember, yā ’akhī [turning to Ḥ] the al-Marzūqī ‘āzī
when the Sultan shed one tear? You can see it, doctor, go on YouTube or the internet. We could
see it now. He was just a boy, he was so young, but he had, māshāllah, he had a voice. [the
conversation continues as he searches for it.] … Ah, here, here, look… there, there’s the tear.
Look at him, [sitting] steadfast on the throne, and even then see how the arts grab him (wa b‘ad
shūf kayf al-funūn tamsikuh)!98
BJG: Yes, I see that. Have you ever seen anyone cry at one of your events?
Ḥ: No, no, but I have spoken to people afterwards and they know us because we always bring
masculinity and enthusiasm/vigor. You can see the ṭarab overtake them (tirūm tushāhid kayf
yista‘iz al-ṭarab ‘alayhum).
BJG: Ṭarab? The way other Arabs talk about ṭarab, that’s what you mean?
Ḥ: Yeah, you know about ṭarab I think. It’s very important…
BJG: Wait, what’s ṭarab, how do you see…
A: …ṭarab is, I mean, a strong emotion, it’s a strong feeling from someone who listens to the
arts. They are grabbed, they are grabbed [by the arts].
BJG: How do you see that?
A: How do you see ṭarab? Well, maybe they move in their chair, they move their arms, they
can’t look away. This is ṭarab. Then they are with you.
A few days later, I brought up the conversation with another group of performers:

Safeer Oman. “Nizūl dam‘a al-sulṭān Qābūs ’ithnā’ tā’thīruhu bi-l-‘āzī” [Sultan Qābūs
shedding a tear while he is affected by the ‘āzī]. Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 19 July
2015. Web. 13 July 2017.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7NkgcabviCs&t=0s&index=13&list=PLtxUcpgmZ5So0KE
9u3lfkoGutVDSO0Ofq
98
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BJG: So, do you think it is good when you grab the shaykh-s and guests? Emotionally, I mean,
when they are caught up in ṭarab?
R: Is it good? Yes, it is good that they listen, and if they listen they will feel the emotions of the
arts. All this ṭarab talk you are telling us about, I don’t know. If they invite a group, they must
listen, it’s a great shame if they don’t listen or look at their phone or any of this. If they are a
romantic type, I suppose they might be grabbed, but at the least they must listen.
BJG: Why must they listen?
R: They must listen to them (lāzim yistami‘ūn’ilayhum) because they invited the group. If you
invite the group and treat them poorly, they will know and not listen to your invitation a second
time. Listening to them is respect, even if it is boring, [laughter].99
These conversations show how performers consider the ability of the arts to “grab” the
praised an important display of their power. They do not have many examples of the ways in
which specific political goals or aims are achieved by the arts (though such stories are common
in the genre of qaṣīda). Rather, they point out the important way in which leaders are brought
into the moral and emotional community of the performers through the emotional displays of the
praised. The praised are “with” the praisers when they are emotionally “grabbed.” Those who are
praised are obligated to listen to the praise and may be strongly affected by it. Though this effect
may be unpredictable, it does indicate how histories of performance and language can mark the
boundaries of communities.

This position recalls Wellstead’s comment on Omani performers: “I found no surer way of
exciting a kindly feeling towards myself, when among this rude people, than by listening with
apparent interest to these performances [songs and dances]” (Wellstead 1837, 75).
99
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Order and Chaos, Pride and Disgrace: Embodying Power as Emotional Display
If praisers from a certain place and group are necessary to this circulation, they are not
neutral mediators of praise and generosity. Instead, they actively shape their own roles within
this circuit by managing their comportment and presenting themselves in a certain way. They do
so by embodying power through manifesting dignity (al-kirāma), honor (al-sharaf100), and pride
(al-fakhr) along with a number of other potent emotional and physical states. In this section, I
want to highlight the ways in which Omani performers of razḥa and ‘āzī present themselves in
such a way that displays power as dignity, honor, and pride rather than dependency. It is very
important that performers of razḥa and ‘āzī do not project weakness, fear, or helplessness, which
is disgraceful. Much like the Manobo in the Philippines with whom Buenconsejo studied find
stinginess to be disgraceful, Omani praisers find a wide array of emotional and physical states
disgraceful in performance—undress, uncleanliness, unkempt hair, dirty clothing—and exhibit a
constant concern with grooming and scent. Loss of emotional control, uncoordination, femininity
or squeamishness, sycophancy, and a lack of tact or good manners in speech or action are
similarly considered unbecoming and ruin a performance.
The most serious flaw of a razḥa, though, is one that communicates weakness and
dependency. A razḥa that “begs” (tas’āl) is reprehensible—powerful men do not beg. As we
noted earlier, the oral qaṣīda, while an undoubtedly important genre, may in fact signal weakness
when compared to the oral ‘āzī or razḥa precisely because it might make an appeal or request.

‘irḍ (CLA, “honor”), as a legal constituent of a person inhabiting an honor system, as for
example discussed by Frank Stewart (1994), is not discussed in this section. The term al-nāmūs,
referring to a kind of personal honor and code in Oman (and heard often in ‘āzī poetry because it
rhymes with Qābūs), is also not discussed here (though see Meneley 1996, 103 for more
literature on this specific word).
100
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Performers perceive of razḥa as an extremely dignified practice, one in which “all Omanis are
equal,” including the Sultan and other leaders. Performers and elites are tentatively equal—that
is, not in a magister and minister relationship. They are equal insofar as they are members of a
moral economy, necessary to one another if not materially similar. Razḥa-s should project power,
confidence, poise, masculinity, and dignity. The three Arabic terms listed above do not exhaust
the terms used to describe the feelings of dignity, honor, and pride that are developed in the
course of razḥa, but they are the most common. Finer-grained distinctions can undoubtedly be
made, but for our purposes here these terms and translations shall suffice.
Most Omani men I worked with perceived participation in the funūn as an honorable
practice, one that displays both their heritage and the strength of their traditions. Since each
performance is not only evidence of their pride and dignity but also an expansion of it,
performers interpret razḥa not as an expression of weakness and dependency, but of strength and
autonomy. Some performers point to the fact that the government patronizes these events as
evidence of their acceptance, while others say that they are more accepted nowadays because the
government sponsors them. In any case, as opposed to other nearby regions, performance of
razḥa or ‘āzī does not denigrate Omanis. In nearby Yemen and in the Mashriq, dancers and
drummers (especially women) are considered to occupy low social strata and are accorded very
little social prestige (van Nieuwkerk 1995; Adra 2001). While Omani performers are not social
elites (as very few if any of the praised perform) they are also not specifically disparaged. They
are, in Shryock’s terms, “status inferiors” who are nevertheless necessary to elite reproduction. I
sometimes heard light criticism and playful joking about music or singing, especially mocking
certain types of voices, but discourses on Omani nationalism appear to have replaced older
assumptions about performers.
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Christine Eickelman reports some of these older perspectives when she writes that
shaykh-ly women in al-Ḥamrā’ do not sing at weddings or for religious festivals, and neither do
their male kin. Rather, it is “the descendants of slaves” who make music for the festivals (1984,
73-5). This seems to fail to distinguish between non-shaykh-ly Arabs and African-descended
enslaved populations. During my research, Arabs of the ‘Abriyīn tribe in al-Ḥamrā’, descendants
of those who Eickelman described, noted that many of their ancestors participated in the arts and
they were not necessarily descendants of enslaved populations. This is perhaps a question of
perspective: as many anthropologists have pointed out, those at the bottom of the social structure
often have a much better grasp of its nuances than those at the top. The same claim—that musicmakers were exclusively drawn from enslaved peoples—was reported by European travel writers
who noted that drummers were enslaved Arabic-speakers of African descent (Wellstead 1838,
70-1, 345-8). This is not the case today, where only 35% of participants I interviewed consider
themselves or are considered by others to be partial descendants of enslaved people and form the
majority of drummers. I draw this distinction not to diminish the role of enslaved Africans in the
development of these genres, but to show how at least today, it is not the case that only
descendants of enslaved populations perform.
The importance of expressing and embodying dignity in the razḥa is made especially
clear when it is compared with behaviors and practices that are not considered dignified. As I
was sitting in the old souq of Manaḥ one day, an older performer named ’Ismā‘īl approached me,
asking about my weekend. After obligatory pleasantries, I realized he wanted to share something
with me. He began:
“This weekend, I was out with the Sultan,” he boasted.
“Really!” I responded, suspicious. I’d heard this kind of story many times.
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“Yeah, he drove by in the area back by the Genāba [the nearby Bedouin], and I was out
there getting money, look, I was like this all weekend,” he smiled and threw himself on the
ground, scuffling his feet and miming grabbing at fluttering riyāl-s in front of him. “And
somebody elbowed me (drukunī)! Wham! And I went ‘oh!’ and fell like this!” He rolled on the
ground but still mimed grabbing at money all around him, laughing. The commotion brought
over his nephew.
“Uncle, what are you doing? What’s going on here? (Shasālifa?)”
“I’m showing the Englishman about the weekend, the money throwing.”
“All right, Uncle, that’s fine, that’s enough now. Ignore him, doctor, he’s just confused.”
His nephew helped ’Ismā‘īl to his feet. The others looked over briefly and continued in their
conversations.
I brought up ’Ismā‘īl’s actions a few days later. Ḥamad tutted.
“Yes, this is the shame of the Omanis (fiḍīḥat al-‘umāniyīn), I suppose you want to talk
about it. Yes, it is called nashḥa, this is when the Sultan’s guards drive around in a four-by-four
and throw out money randomly (bi-gizāf). There’s a crowd that follows them and snatches it up,
they run after it grabbing at money. It’s a total mess, chaos (rabsha). You can see it on Twitter
and on YouTube, I’ll show you.101 It’s a real disgrace, no honor, no dignity.”
“I’ve never heard of this,” I ventured, “why does the Sultan do this?”
“Why? He has his ways. He’s wise, there must be some reason for it. There are poor folks
who are afraid to ask for things, maybe, they need money but are ashamed. Maybe, who knows?
Poor ’Ismā‘īl has no sense, he’s old and forgets. He performs with us because he is our kin, he’s

101

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WfFDODbdLSA
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known in Manaḥ, but he degrades his dignity when he chases the nashḥa (yarakhkhaṣa nafsu
gārī b‘ad al-nashḥa).”
I saw an opportunity for a sensitive question. “So people chase after money thrown from
the Sultan’s car? Isn’t that a bit like the razḥa-s for the Sultan after he is generous? Is that like
nashḥa?”
“Ha, not at all,” Ḥamad scoffed, “razḥa has the greatest pride and honor, it shows it,
nashḥa is a disgrace. A complete shame; no, razḥa is not at all the same. One is order, the other
chaos (wāḥid lahu al-niẓām, al-thānī rabsha). It’s completely the opposite, one hundred percent
(al-‘aks bi-l-tamām, mi’a bi-l-mi’a).”
The difference between the ways generosity is recognized in razḥa and nashḥa is clearly
understood, if not articulated. The notion that razḥa and nashḥa might be the same kind of
activity is plainly absurd. One of the main ways Omanis conceive of this difference is in the way
that performance frames the former as orderly, managed, and the latter as unordered and
undignified. Razḥa is a display of dignity, pride, prestige, and honor because of the way
performers present themselves. Dignity and pride are performed in three ways: in clothing and
appearance; in bodily comportment; and in the inculcation of proper emotional states.
a. Annointing the Mirror of the Self: Material Display and Dignity
Despite any other social hardships they face, all group members in Manaḥ are sure to
present themselves with dignity (al-kirāma). This manifests visually in the great care and
attention that is given to personal appearance. No performer considers dancing without a crisp
dishdāsha, a tightly-wound and fresh maṣar (ideally made in Kashmir, with elaborate handstitched patterns), a leather belt chased with silvered thread holding a new Samsung phone and
buckled with a decorative khanjar belt dagger, prayer beads, an ‘aṣā camel stick, and an antique
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sword and buckler. Just as the Zabidi women that Meneley studied with place great value on
personal appearance (Meneley 1996), which brings honor (al-sharaf) to oneself and others, so do
Omani performers. Outward appearance is a mirror of inner value.
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Figure 22. A fully dressed dancer from the Firqat al-‘Arabī at a performance in ’Adam. He
carries an antique British Lee-Enfield rifle, multiple bullet belts, a khanjar, prayer beads, a
crisp dishdāsha and expertly wrapped maṣar.
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Figure 23. Two members of the administration of the Firqat al-‘Arabī shopping in Nizwā
wearing everyday clothing, the dishdāsha and kumma cap.
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For performers especially, looking put together is a point of pride that brings honor to the
viewer as much as the wearer. Before every performance that I saw, performers would take
twenty minutes to an hour to dress themselves, usually outside their cars using their windows as
mirrors. This period of “dressing up” was very pointedly related to the notion of al-kirāma.
“Dressing well and with fine things shows that we feel our dignity, that we show our dignity and
know that we represent more than ourselves when we razḥa,” claimed one performer from alḤamrā’. Generally speaking, performers would show up in an everyday dishdāsha and kumma
(as in Figure 22) and then change into a finer dishdāsha. With the freshly pressed dishdāsha,
they would then wrap their maṣar around their head, put on their belt and dagger, slide shell
casings into the belt loops, wrap their prayer beads around their dagger hilt, slide their phone into
their belt, affix their shoulder straps, and apply perfume to their hands, faces, and headwraps.
Afterwards, duelers would bring out their swords and bucklers and test them out. This is done, in
general, in small groups, who comment on each other’s clothing continuously. Prior to this, and
often occasioned by the upcoming performance, performers would have their hair cut and beards
trimmed into a variety of shapes102 (a poorly groomed beard is especially bad form, something I
learned the hard way). Oftentimes, one member would help wrap the maṣar of another, tightly
tucking in stray lengths of fabric to expose the maximum number of folds, embroidered designs,
and frills. The belt often requires a second pair of hands, since it is buckled in the back and is
worn very tight. After the belt is buckled, the khanjar dagger must be positioned just so, since

102

There are dozens of names for beard styles in inner Oman. A beard that is longer around the
mouth is referred to as a sa‘ūdī “Saudi” or a gifla “lock”; if the beard is squarely cut to form a
right angle on the cheek, it is a khangar; if the beard tapers to two points on the neck, reaching
the sternocleidomastoid muscle, it is a sayfiyya “sword-style” or gambiyya “dagger-style”; if the
area around the lower lip is shaved, it is a hilāl “crescent moon”; etc.
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some performers like it vertical, others jaunty, others pointed up and away from the abdomen
(see Figure 21).
The final touch for most performers is some kind of perfume. Commercial brands of
perfume are often used on dishdāsha-s and maṣar-s, but the fragrant smoke of freshly burning
frankincense, myrrh, or oud is preferred. Performances are often concluded with the distribution
of perfume and local “natural” rosewater (with a distinct smoky smell due to its mode of
production). Perfume is thought to combat the sweat and unpleasant odor that builds up through
prolonged performance, while “natural” rosewater is poured onto the hands and over the head to
“cool and comfort the heart” (yubārid al-fu‘ād), a phrase which has both literal and figurative
overtones. All of these elements are interesting to us here because they show us just how much
attention is given to a beautiful personal appearance, and also how much that personal
appearance is managed socially.
On the day of the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival, after all the invites had been accepted and plans
made, I met the Firqat al-‘Arabī at a flat gravel parking area near the Manaḥ Health Centre.
Ḥamad and I were the first to arrive and we sat awaiting the others. We chatted for a few minutes
while others began to show up. When more members of the administration for the group showed
up, they decided to check and see if some more members were out in the farm plots praying.
Several farm plots in an agricultural exclave belonging to members of the al-Ma‘arā
neighborhood are clustered near a government-dug well, equipped with a small bathroom and
prayer room. As we pulled up to it along the narrow service road that connects it to town, Ḥamad
noticed that the large steel gate that is drawn over the road to prevent people from driving down
it was open, commenting that “certainly they’re down here, because [so-and-so] always leaves
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this cursed gate open whenever he’s here.” As we pulled up along the farm plots, Ḥamad called
out the various owners of the plots and where plots had previously been.
“Here is Khamīs’s [plot],” Ḥamad said, squinting against the setting sun to our west, “and
look, his ox is out.” The ox in question was a small, Japanese 4-cycle roto-tiller, sometimes still
called a “plow” (O. Ar. ḥirth/a, CLA. miḥrāth). Since most plot-farming occurs on a small-scale
basis, these hand-pushed tillers have totally replaced the former yoked oxen.
We arrived at the end of the paved road at the small cluster of outbuildings, bathrooms,
open washbasin, and prayer rooms and spotted a few neighborhood folks out my passenger
window. Smoke billowed in from across the tiny parking lot, spreading from a number of felled
date palm trunks, being burned to be re-tilled into the soil. Through the smoke we saw the tall
figure of a performer named Muḥsin coming out of the prayer room.
“Look at this,” said someone in the car. “They’re all out here.” Indeed, several more had
been just behind Muḥsin, coming down the stairs in good spirits.
“Peace be upon you! How are you all, well I trust? Where have you all been?!” Ḥamad
called out from the driver’s seat, leaning over me on the passenger side.
“And peace be upon you as well, I’m well, we’re well. We were praying, what are you up
to?”
“What are we up to? You know what we’re doing. We’re getting ready for the event
today, and we find you out here?”
“There’s an event today?” Muḥsin feigned a shocked expression. “O, father, I hadn’t
heard!”

287
“You hadn’t heard!” continued Ḥamad. “You hadn’t heard? I told you, I told everyone, I
texted, I called, I called your brother, I sent you messages, WhatsApp, I sent you [them]. Have
you and your phone been sleeping since Monday?”
“No, I haven’t been sleeping, are you inviting us now? Is there time? I am busy today, I
have circumstances.”
“Yes,” Ḥamad replied, dryly, “yes, we all have circumstances. But you know there’s a
performance today. We need you there.”
“Well, if there’s a performance, and the doctor is coming,” he smiled at me, “then I’ll be
there to support you all.”
The others, lapsing into similar conversations around us, shouting from the car back to
the stairs of the prayer room, began to assent as a group.
“We’ll see you there!” several shouted out, walking back to their cars.
As we turned the car around to head back to the parking spot, one of the performers in the
car with us tapped my shoulder.
“Did you see that?”
“What do you mean?”
“They didn’t hear about the performance? Ha! No, they heard. They were pretending to
be on their farms this morning so we would have to come out and ask them. If they were
farming, they would be in tee-shirts and wizār-s [ankle-length waistwraps], God lengthen your
life. And they were wearing maṣar-s! Who wears a maṣar to chop down a date palm trunk? They
hadn’t heard. Huh! Phooey!”
We all laughed.
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The management and primping that occurs before each performance is an understood part
of the entire process. The laughter that this anecdote provoked was not mocking their
appearance, but rather their obvious deception, related to their desire to be formally invited
(echoing our discussion of invitations in the second section of this chapter). Their clothing, in
fact, gave them away. One of the first performances I documented was preceded by 45 minutes
of dressing and grooming prior to the event itself, and this time was planned by the
administration. Young performers are often called to task for showing up without having any of
the required items, but these are always provided by the administration of the group in question.
Old-timers are particularly apt to call out younger performers who take dozens of selfies
throughout the process of dressing up for Instagram, Snapchat, and WhatsApp. Notwithstanding
some tensions between the generations, no performer is expected to arrive at a performance
“dressed up,” and nearly all comment favorably on one another’s appearance. The well-dressed
performers pretending to be working on their farms sought to present themselves as dignified
equals with the group leaders I was riding with. Never intending to skip the performance, they
instead sought to elicit respect by dressing well and ignoring compulsions to perform. By
dressing in their best, they acknowledged their intention to perform while simultaneously
asserting their independence and autonomy.
The uniforms for performers are expensive. While dishdāsha-s and camel sticks are fairly
cheap, with even the very finest rarely exceeding twenty OMR (~fifty USD), maṣar-s vary
widely in price and quality, with truly splendid maṣar-s fetching hundreds of riyāl-s. Daggers,
while usually given as gifts or inherited, can cost thousands of dollars, and respectable pieces are
at least 2-300 OMR ($500-$750). Swords and rifles can be even more expensive and are often
decorated with silver wire even after the fact, further increasing their cost. Discussing the cost of
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items is one of the common topics of conversation in these dressing up periods, even if the item
in question is not owned by the wearer. Due to the cost of daggers and the requirement that
uniforms be at least mostly similar, groups often collectively own a few dozen maṣar-s and
perhaps a dozen presentable daggers for participants to wear in case they forget (or in rare cases)
do not own their own dagger. Collectively owned materials establish baseline equality in dress
for all members and are freely given out to the needy or forgetful.
Days after the festival I received a call from one of the managers of the Firqat al-‘Arabī,
asking me to accompany them on a trip to the souq to inquire after belts.
“Belts?” I asked, “how can I help?” I was confused as to why they might ask me along.
Anything I inquired after in the souq, they assured me, was three times more expensive than it
was for them.
“It’s part of the uniform, so you should see where they are made and what not,” he
offered, “come pick me up and we’ll go look in Manaḥ and if we have to we’ll go to Sināw or
Nizwā, ok? We want to buy enough belts for the group, so say 50 or so.”
I assented and we picked up a few more members before heading to a men’s clothing
rental shop across from the Sultan Qābūs mosque near the administrative center of Manaḥ. As
we hopped out of the car and climbed up to the second story (the first story was a women’s
clothing store), Ṭalāl noted that prices would be expensive everywhere since gasoline prices had
recently been raised. Similar to many such establishments, the clothing rental store was full of
mirrors and gleaming white marble and lined with expensive and beautiful sets of men’s clothing
hanging along each wall. After customary greetings, I walked around the walls taking in the
different patterns and types of dishdāsha.
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“This is from Ṣūr,” Ṭalāl noted, slipping up beside me. “You can tell because of how the
collar and karkūsha (a small bundle of loosely tied threads that hangs from the collar and is
typically perfumed] are sewn in and all wrinkly… and the dagger, here, look, the hilt is gold.
Yep, that’s Ṣūrī all right.” Indeed, the front collar was not only embroidered with gold thread but
had the wrinkled appearance typical of Ṣūrī style. For Ṭalāl, as for many Ibāḍīs, wearing gold
was frowned upon—not a concern for the inhabitants of the majority Sunnī coastal town.
“200 riyāl!” came a hoarse whisper from the front counter. “Yā būwī, you’ve made a
mistake. Didn’t I say “salāmu ‘alaykum” when I entered? 200 riyāl, never, no not in my life have
I heard such a thing.”
“What’s the matter? You’re looking for belts?” I asked, walking up to the counter.
“Prices are high,” came the reply from the uninterested Omani shopkeeper. He took down
an embroidered bullet belt from the wall behind him and laid it down next to the one that another
group member was fingering. “These here are designer bullets (riṣāṣī dīziyin], you know, from
China. This is cheaper.” The “designer” bullets were small, hollow metal casts that were painted
gold or silver.
“We want the real bullets, antiques. We can’t wear these. Listen, we’re buying bulk, can’t
you get us a deal?”
The shopkeeper sighed. “The problem is that each antique bullet is 5 riyāl. You will
require hundreds of bullets, I don’t even know where we can get that many. Belts I can get, but
bullets?”
“I have a friend in the army,” someone from our group piped up from the back. “Maybe
we can go to the army base and get bullets.”
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“I don’t think the army will give you bullets,” I laughed. No one seemed to agree, and
several thought that going to the army base nearby would be a great idea.
“Okay, thank you,” surrendered Ṭalāl as negotiations staggered to an impasse. “Khalla,
let’s get out of here. May god grant you plenty.”
Outside, the group gathered at the bottom of the steps. Each knew a place they could get
belts for cheap, had a mountain of bullets at home, and was related to someone who owned a
clothing rental store that could get them 40 belts by the weekend.
“Why does everyone want a belt anyway? Don’t people bring their own belts?” I asked
Ṭalal. He slowly tilted his head at me and grinned devilishly.
“Well, you see, not everyone can afford these belts. As you heard, they’re very
expensive. And someone was taking all those pictures of belts and putting them on Insta[gram].
Now everybody wants a nice belt, with antique bullets, and they’re saying they don’t look
dignified next to someone with a nice belt with bullets (mā yabdū karīm ganbū ḥadd bi-ḥazm alriṣāṣī).”
By taking pictures of the nicer dressed members of the group, who were often younger, I
had inadvertently highlighted some internal inequalities in the group. In this case, those who
lacked belts made a point of demanding them from the group administration in order to retain
their dignity, rather than to redress a particular social inequality. Expressing their inability to
maintain a dignified bodily comportment was at least as important, for the group as a whole, than
economic disparities between members.
b. Embodying Emotional States, Dangerous and Otherwise
Another factor that contributes to the way in which performance helps to partially
overcome the relations of dependency that threaten social relations between rulers and the ruled
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is bodily comportment—in this case, the bodily comportment of performers. This is, as we have
seen, deeply tied to dress and appearance for most razḥa performers. Performers not only fashion
a beautiful appearance but also strive to act in ways that reflect their self-respect and dignity.
This does not require a “stiff upper lip” or the reserved bodily comportment of guests or patrons
of the performance, who must sit still and pay attention to the performance. Rather, the
performer needs to project certain kinds of comportments (that often overlap with emotional
states, as we will see in a moment) that are appropriate to his situation. Leaders or administrative
members of groups often shade in and out of full participation in the dancing and singing,
moving around to encourage participation, take pictures, or greet honored guests. In general,
however, embodied behavior is thought to be based in and also project certain emotional states.
These emotional states are linked both to the necessity of praisers (only praisers can
safely call up these powerful emotional states) and to the ways in which praisers represent
themselves as powerful members of the moral economy. They are, after all, armed, coordinated,
virile, energized, and numerous. Razḥa has been a dance for war—and, in the opinion of some
performers, it could be again.
c. Rigūla or Masculinity
One important point, footnoted earlier, is the way in which performers embody
“masculinity” or rigūla. A masculine comportment is physically open and wide, with the chest
thrust forward and head up. It is aggressive and confident, manifesting in decisive, unhesitating
movement in dance steps. The razḥa dance steps allow for a great deal of improvisation from
dancers. Dance styles that were routinely described as projecting rigūla in feedback interviews
were those that involved a great deal of bouncing vertical trunk movement, with the spine fairly
straight, deep knee bends and shoulder hunches, and strong stomps on each footfall. Further,
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rigūla-style voices are loud, open-mouthed, and clipped as opposed to melismatic. Gentle
swaying, closed arms, downturned heads, and quiet singing are considered “womanly” and not
appropriate to the performance of razḥa. Women, when they dance, do not exhibit these features,
so we can safely assume that this dichotomy is more concerned with the maintenance of a certain
kind of hegemonic masculinity than it is with distinguishing between social genders as
experienced and embodied by Omanis.
One way that rigūla is identified is with the intransitive verb khashuna/yakhshun, “to be
rough, coarse, raw, unpolished or crude.” Importantly, the verb describes a way of doing things
in performance, not a part of performance itself. Performers say, roughly, that so-and-so “is
coarse” in dance or singing or general behavior, as suits the context, meaning that the behavior in
question is done in a tough, masculine way, unconsidered or unbeautified. For example, after a
short trip to Kachchh, India some of my friends asked what I had played and sung for my Indian
hosts. I replied that while I played a lot of Omani music for my Indian friends, I could not really
perform because one shouldn’t perform the music without dancing as well (as they had insisted
so many times). My Indian hosts were not at all interested in dancing, since they themselves
considered this unbefitting the masculine appreciation of music. They only responded positively
to a particular ‘āzī singer from ‘Izkī, who sang long, unaccompanied and untexted melismatic
lines before the Arabic couplets of the qaṣīda. When I relayed this to my friends in Oman, they
laughed, and one responded that while the singer was indeed good, he yatanaghunaghu-ed the
melody, meaning that he “cuddled” or “acted tenderly toward” or perhaps “cooed” the melody in
a way that was beautiful but unbecoming of a man, who must yakhshun a melody. Indians, they
insisted, prefer these effeminate ways of singing that are heavily melismatic and (in their
opinion) overly adorned. I should point out that the verb tanaghnaghu/yatanaghnagh is often

294
used to describe the way that men and women act towards babies, referring to a collection of
activities (cooing, holding, stroking, rocking) and a way of enacting them (softly, slowly,
warmly, tenderly). It is not a verb used only to describe women, nor is yakhshun used only for
men. My interlocutors were, in effect, comparing the qualities they valued in music to those they
imagined were valued by my Indian hosts.
Feelings of masculinity are deeply tied to senses of pride, especially as expressed in the
terms al-fakhr or, more rarely, al-‘izz, power or might. This sense of rigūla was reported by the
leader of a group in Nizwā, who recalled that when he first was invited into the razḥa by his
father, he remembered that “I was proud of my [feeling of] masculinity (kunt aftakhir birigūlatī), I was amongst the men and doing razḥa as an equal with them.” Crucially, this meant
that he was dressed completely in the way that other men were, with a real dagger in his belt.
The giving of a real dagger to a youth is an important life-cycle event for many Omanis, and his
corresponded with his full inclusion in the men’s dance performance as well. In his case, the
feeling of rigūla emerges from inhabiting a certain kind of body adorned in certain ways,
recognized by peers and superiors as being like their own male bodies.
d. Shugā‘a or Encouraged Bravery
The classical definition for shugā‘a is bravery, but Omani performers conflate its
meaning with the Form II and V verbal forms [II (=f‘a‘ala): shajja‘a/yushajja‘a; V (=taf‘a‘ala):
tashajja‘a/yatashajja‘a), referring to encouraging or heartening some other person or persons.
Hence, a performance can be “brave,” which in this context might also mean that it is
“heartening,” “encouraging,” or “emboldening.” Shugā‘a is also often used to refer to the ways
in which performers urge others into participating more actively. A common behavior for
performers is to run from one’s own line to the other to sing directly in the face of a group
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member from the facing line that the first thinks is “slacking” (yaqṣar). For example, during the
first multi-group performance at the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival, older members of the Firqat al‘Arabī ran up and sang loudly into the faces of their own younger members, to encourage them
to perform more actively. If younger members have taken out their phone or are losing focus in
some other way, older members approach these “slacking” performers to draw them back into
performing by grabbing them or lightly striking them with their camel stick. Other techniques
include grabbing a performers’ shoulders, making him bob, and shouting yallā (let’s go!), halā
(hey!), ‘āshū (feel it!) or yā shabāb (O youths!). Performances that were rated as exhibiting
shugā’a or that were described using the verbs shown above were often “marching” or “walking
razḥa-s” (razḥāt al-māshiyya). These are universally in duple rhythms, to accommodate
marching steps. Certain joint dance movements are especially associated with shugā‘a, though it
is important to realize that they do not comprise a particular dance movement that is called
shugā‘a. Rather, shugā‘a is a way of behaving that increases participation, and, as the next
section will cover, encourages ḥamās.
Many of the actions that are encouraging (tashgī‘) are thought to resemble the
movements of armies. For example, one common move during a walking razḥa is for the back
half of the parade of dancers to stop marching (but otherwise continue bobbing to the beat of the
drums) and raise their camel sticks over their heads, poised like swords. After the front half of
the parade line moves about ten meters away, they spin around as individuals and charge the
backs of the front half of the parade, yelling and waving their camel sticks as if to hit them.
Often, the performers who initiate this move will hold back their fellows until they can charge
“while they have the line,” that is, while they should be singing their half of the razḥa couplet.
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Figure 24 illustrates this pattern of dancers, but they are charging the drummers, who have
drifted ahead.
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Figure 24. In five photos, top to bottom, dancers spin in place and charge the drums, a
manifestation of shugā‘a.
e. Ḥamās, or Vigor and Enthusiasm
Shugā‘a and ḥamās are deeply interrelated emotional states and the suites of behaviors
that exhibit or develop them are similar. As we will see in the next chapter, ḥamās is the critical
emotional state for understanding the ways in which razḥa and ‘āzī have been integrated into
broader Omani political systems and Ibāḍī Islamic rulings. Classical Arabic sources define
ḥamās as “courage,” “zeal,” or “valor,” derived from the trilateral root ḥ-m-s. Among
orientalists, the word is often used to refer to themed collections of poetry (for example, Abū
Tammām’s Ḥamāsa of c. 845/230, which spawned several other such collections). These literary
collections often included militaristic or self-praise poetry that would be similar in topic and
theme to poetry written today by razḥa poets. Shi‘r ḥamāsī, “poetry of courage,” however, often
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refers to something akin to “epic” in the Arabic literary canon, though the included poems are
better referred to as “heroic.” In many ways, it is because razḥa and ‘āzī produce ḥamās that they
have been accorded some level of respect in elite Omani society.
In contemporary Oman, ḥamās refers to a heightened emotional state of vigor, excitation,
or enthusiasm. A range of behaviors are associated with ḥamās, but they are not all positive. It
can arise in sports, driving quickly, fighting and angry speech, and performance, among other
things. When Omani performers or audiences talk about ḥamās in performance, they talk about it
in two main ways. First, they talk about ways to produce it, or, in their terms, “giving” or
“bringing” it (ya‘ṭī or yigīb al-ḥamās). Second, they talk about performances that have it or
exhibit it by saying, shay ḥamās fīh (there’s ḥamās in it), ish‘ur al-ḥamās (feel103 the ḥamās) alḥamās mawgūd (ḥamās is present/here), or shūf al-ḥamās (look at the ḥamās). All these kinds of
statements might also be put into the past tense to refer to past performances. For Omanis, ḥamās
is best experienced as a collective emotional state—some group should exhibit or feel ḥamās. As
we shall see, ḥamās is more problematic if it is felt individually, especially when it is not shared
or spread to other members of the group. Ḥamās is most acceptable when it is a product of a
group experience.
When I presented videos of performances and tried to have participants show me “when”
ḥamās started or who brought it, my interlocutors were hesitant to do so. One performer, Fahd,
responded this way:
Fahd: In reality it is not that I feel ḥamās and you feel it, and he feels it… No, it is that there is
ḥamās among us… you need others to feel it as a group, maybe you need more than one person
to feel ḥamās together (ma‘ b‘aḍ). Usually ḥamās is brought by the drums (yu‘ṭī bi-l-ṭubūl) and
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“Feel” here in the sense of “emotionally experience” like one “feels” anger or sadness.
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then we feel it, but sometimes you will see it in the duelists and this is rousing for the others (wa
hadhā tashgī‘104 al-b‘aḍ).
BJG: Can you imagine a performance where one person feels ḥamās and no one else does?
F: Perhaps, perhaps. This is not a good thing though, sometimes there’s someone who feels
ḥamās strongly and the others do not and that is not good because there is no balance (mā shay
mayzān).
BJG: Balance?
F: Yes… I have seen old-timers feel ḥamās alone, and people think they act foolish. You see, in
the old days, the drums didn’t play that much, so they were powerful, razḥa was a very strong
thing, I mean. Here, one day I was in Bānī Bū Ḥaṣan…
BJG: That is in the Sharqiyya governate, no?
F: Yes, far from here but they have strong razḥa there, different, but every Friday evening they
are there. The town participates, not groups, they don’t need groups to organize things like we do
here. Anyway, I was there on the weekend, and I heard the drums so I came out to see them, they
were hundreds, really. But there were many, and I joined the line and there was no ḥamās among
us. I saw the duelists, some old greybeards, they had their swords out, I mean, bang bang bang.
Then I realized, they were really fighting! I mean, really making war, so I said to one standing
with me in the line, I said, “who are these duelists? Are they feuding, do they have a deep-rooted
hatred for one another (tashāḥin b‘aḍu al-b‘aḍ)?” “No,” he said, “they are just fighting, oldtimers cannot control their emotions (mā yisayṭirū ‘alā mashā‘ir), he thinks it’s a real war.” I tell
you, they fought like devils. Here, when we duel, you try and hit his buckler, some the thumb.
They were really trying to kill one another. I ask you, is this good? No.
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The gerund of sh-j-‘ examined as shugā‘a above.
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BJG: Might ḥamās be dangerous (iḥtimāl al-ḥamās khaṭīr)?
F: I don’t know about dangerous. Anyway, one man fell, and the other took his dagger out and
tried to slit his throat, take his head as they say. That’s how it was in the old days, things were
brutal. He tried to take this man’s head in the duel!
BJG: No!
F: Yes, I am telling you the truth, praise be to God, lord of the two worlds. He did not kill him of
course, but the one on the ground stayed there like a corpse for ten minutes.
BJG: And this is ḥamās?
F: Yes, but it’s no good. It’s no good.
This expression of ḥamās, enthusiasm and vigor, is wrong because it is not shared or does
not rouse others. The performers do not feel ḥamās to the same extent that the duelists do, and
this effects the collective emotional state of the group. The duelists take things too far, even
though (or perhaps because) they feel ḥamās. When I related this story to others, they showed me
several videos of this kind of ḥamās state in razḥa duels. Several were worried that this would be
too much for an “Englishman” (myself) to bear. Other such individual displays of ḥamās are
similarly regarded with a mixture of interest and disdain. For example, videos are often shared
on WhatsApp groups that show individual dancers falling or rolling on the ground, pulling their
daggers out to threaten one another, or vigorously swinging their heads back and forth in front of
the beating drums. These kinds of behaviors were very uncommon in Dakhiliya, but one Bahlāwī
performer related a story about one of Qābūs’s early trips to Dakhiliya in which a dancer felt
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such ḥamās that he fired his gun in the air and destroyed several power lines that had just been
installed.105
Socially acceptable ḥamās is exhibited as a group or by an individual who is then
matched by his group. The feeling of ḥamās is often reported when there is a high level of
excitement and participation from amongst the group. When ḥamās is appropriate, it is a
powerfully transformative and engaging collective emotion. When it is felt as part of a group, it
reinforces that group’s sense of themselves as a strong and masculine whole, one that demands
attention and respect. The collectively felt attainment of ḥamās affirms the unified front that
collective performance in Oman seeks to present.106
At an event organized by the Women’s Association of Manaḥ, I was invited to dance
with the Firqat al-‘Arabī to welcome about a dozen guests from Great Britain. The event was
held at the newly renovated old quarter in al-Bilād, a neighborhood of Manaḥ, and we were set
up in two lines along either side of the long central avenue leading from the northern gate. After
the welcoming razḥa-s, we sat in the central avenue for almost two hours while the Women’s
Association ran their meeting. Tempers were growing short.
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This story type is common in Dakhiliya and is often pitched to the problem being discussed: a
tribe is too rural and backward, and holds a razḥa under a newly installed power transformer and
destroys it by firing off rounds into the air; a notorious drunk shows up to a razḥa and shoots
several new power lines in his celebration; an Indian once tried to razḥa and seized a gun from
an Omani dancer and accidentally discharged it into a power line, ruining the party. The moral of
this story type is fairly straightforward.
The importance of presenting a “unified front” in Arabian peninsular societies has been
commented upon by several scholars of the region. Meneley (1996) writes that the houses of
Zabīd go to great lengths to obscure and tamp down any public perception of infighting within
them. Similarly, Dresch and Piscatori note that a “politics of closeness” (qarāba) manages means
of access between the political elite and ordinary Gulf citizens (2013, 24-5). Qarāba refers
specifically to the ways in which persons and social units manage who may speak and interact
with them, when, and under what circumstances—the management of the public face of a
corporate group.
106
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“Ḥamad, we’ve got things to do, it’s a working day,” one exasperated youth whined. “We
can’t sit here all day waiting for these ladies.” Several others agreed, but an older performer,
Layth, scolded them into performing a razḥa qaṣṣāfiyya (“fast” razḥa) in order to “encourage the
return of the group’s ḥamās” (li-tashgī‘ ‘awdat al-ḥamās). Layth pulled me off the low bench
just inside the main gate and pushed me toward the middle of one dancing line.
“Come on, doctor, let’s razḥa!” he shouted, pulling others up as well. He started giving a
rousing, fast qaṣṣāfiya, and the drummers moved to the center of the circle. Layth moved around
the circle, making sure every member understood his lines and heard the melody, insuring full
participation. As the drums thundered into the rhythm and we took turns singing the melody back
and forth, the drummers paced over to Layth’s line, stopping in front of him. Along with the
main beats, Layth slowly bobbed his shoulders and neck and bent his waist down toward the
drums. He jauntily swung his camel stick backwards and forwards, and the dancers to his left and
right began to do the same. Layth’s entire line began to “bow” to the drums, which invigorated
my line. As the opposing line raised themselves back up, they lifted their camel sticks above
their heads and began to march with the drums toward our own line. When they reached us, the
entire group was packed together within perhaps a meter, shoulder to shoulder with the
drummers. My own line began to shout “ho ho! Ha ha!” on the off-beats of the drum rhythm and
hunching and bobbing just as the first line had. The drummers followed us and we danced
backwards along with the drums, hunched almost completely over, bobbing and throwing our
shoulders into every other beat. As the first line backed away, a young member of the group
administration spread his arms out across our line next to me and said, “one more!” On the last
repetition of the melody, we shouted out on the off-beats and stomped our feet as hard as we
could. Watching the drummers and the far line, which had their camel sticks all raised above
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their heads to signal the last line of singing, we all jumped and stamped hard on the last beat. In
the silence, we all broke out laughing, panting for air. Layth beamed, sweat dripping to the end
of his nose.
“That’s ḥamās, boys, that’s ḥamās!”
“There’s no Money in this Art”: Praise as Dignified Work
The third discourse that transforms the ways that performers perceive their own praise
performance is in framing it as work or labor. Praise and performance are framed as a kind of
work on the behalf of a community. This framing draws an implicit analogy with giving—just as
giving helps a community, so does labor for it. Community work like this does not gain the
worker money, like a wage—and neither does praise. Giving, praise, and labor are at least
partially compared, but not in terms of their ability to produce money. Money is secondary to
obligation. In brief, I learned that Omanis praise performers think of razḥa the same way they
think of cleaning falaj-s, painting anti-smoking signs, and taking care of the communal
underground oven in town: it is a form of civic labor. It keeps community going. And insofar as
it keeps community going, it keeps ties with elites going.
To understand why framing praise performance as a kind of labor reframes it as a
dignified practice, we need to understand how certain kinds of labor are differently valued. 107
Amongst rural Omani Arab men, “work” (shugl or ‘aml) is highly valued, especially certain
kinds of community service and farm labor. While the menial and unglamorous labor on the farm
is performed by South Asian contract laborers, most members of the groups in Manaḥ also

107

This differential in valuation is highly racialized—devalued labor is performed by South
Asians, who are simultaneously denigrated for doing it and prevented from joining in valued
labor. See Jain and Oommen (2017) for further discussion.
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tended to their family farms in some capacity. Plant maintenance, monitoring irrigation flows,
digging galbāt, and transporting farming equipment and materials are often undertaken by
Omani Arabs, while harvesting, planting, maintaining date palms, managing irrigation canals,
weeding, cleaning equipment, and tilling are often not. The former types of labor are valorized
insofar as they are topics of conversations that speakers use to praise themselves. This is
especially the case if this farm labor cuts into time otherwise spent in wage work (dawwām). For
example, a common story trope involves the speaker listing their responsibilities on the farm,
with their family, and at their wage-paying job, but ultimately prioritizing family and productive
farm labor, which is accompanied by a wave of compliments. Even though these farms are often
small-scale, merely supplementing household pantries, they are often central to rural identities.
Similarly, community service is also considered a kind of dignified work. One way this
manifests is in the roles of performance groups within a broader network of civil organizations in
Manaḥ. This is a pattern that also obtains, to greater and lesser degrees, in the other large towns
in Dakhiliyya. In Manaḥ, the Firqat al-‘Arabī li-l-funūn al-sh‘abiyya fi wilāyat Manaḥ is part of
(tāb‘a, lit. “follows”) the older football club in Manaḥ, the Farīq al-‘Arabī. This organization,
one of the oldest civil organizations in Manaḥ, also arranges collective clean-up efforts for the
local falaj-s, Qu’rān readings and memorization competitions, wedding feasts for members and
other locals, festival celebrations, and the maintenance of the collective tanūr (underground
oven) just outside the town community center (sabla).
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Figure 25. A bundle of cooked meat (khiṣfa) is pulled out of the still-hot tanūr oven.
The oven is approximately 3.5 m wide and 5 m deep and is used to cook huge quantities
of meat during religious holidays. Wood fuel and maintenance are paid for by members, who
each contribute a few riyāl-s before and after each use. Group members compete to do the most
“work” during the brief period while the tanūr is in use. They volunteer to carry wrapped
parcels of meat (khiṣfāt) from each house to the oven, and deliver them a day later, after cooking.
Some members carry the wrapped raw or cooked mutton in wheelbarrows, but houses further
into the neighborhood usually require a pick-up truck. A younger relative of the driver stands
over the cab in the bed of the truck, shouting out to neighbors that they are collecting freshly
wrapped parcels or dropping them off. Others work on chopping wood and building a massive
fire inside the oven, reached by lowering ladders down into it. At the events I participated in,
after the fire was of a suitable size, villagers quickly hurled in over a hundred khisfāt at once.
Once they were inside, they dragged a huge metal cover over the mouth of the oven and sealed it
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with mud standing by, kneaded by foot by a half-dozen younger group members. After a day of
sealed cooking, ladders are lowered down into the still smoldering oven and those “not afraid of
work” head down into the oven. Once down, they attach ropes to the various meat parcels, which
are hauled up by groups circling the smoking opening. Afterwards, they distribute the meat to its
owners, clean the oven, and cover it until the next barbecue.
I arrived in Manaḥ for the first time a week after a collective clean-up of a falaj.
‘Abdullah, a performer I had met before in Muscat, joked that I had shown up “just in time to
help celebrate” but not help in the hard work, just like his brothers reportedly always do. He
continued:
We’ve done this many times, the razḥa troupe. We don’t just razḥa, we help in many
ways. We do this because it helps the Sultan, as well. We need to start taking care of
ourselves, our own houses and the falaj is part of that. Many people complain to the
government, ‘give us this or that’, no, no, no. Here, we are not like that, we are humble.
We don’t want problems and we’re not afraid of hard work.
Others concurred, giving examples of nearby towns and their reputed fear of hard work. “We’ll
become like the Sa‘ūdīs,” said one, “tired only from counting our money!”
These kinds of work are either public (like working with the tanūr) or made public
(telling stories about one’s valued work). More precisely, work like this is only made public
insofar as it is dignified, masculine, honorable, and signals the worker’s economic power, bodily
strength, wisdom, responsibilities, and skills. We can briefly contrast this kind of talk with talk
about wage work, in offices and government ministries, which is almost always negative. Often
this work is not challenging or interesting, or alternatively extremely stressful. For example, one
Omani ‘āzī singer worked as a guard at a water pumping station. When asked about his work
(dawwām), he replied, “I don’t do anything. I just sit. It’s not work but it’s for the government so
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it’s ok.” Guard work is not valued work insofar as it does not improve the social standing
(broadly construed) of the worker in the way that valued work can.
Due to this, when the topic of work comes up in many razḥa and ‘āzī poems, we should
interpret it as a kind of work that is a “good deed,” that is dignified, and that reaffirms masculine
identities. In this way, performers frame performance as work, good manners, pride, and
heritage, an endeavor that is industrious and rebuilds the community. Praise is different from and
in some ways opposed to labor that is undignified or servile. Rather than being handed
everything that they have, performers categorize razḥa as a kind of productive and useful labor
that is necessary to reproduce community. In this same vein, when performers talk about
composing poetry for razḥāt and ‘āzī, they refer to it as “work.” Those who avoid performance
unreasonably are referred to as “shirking” or “slacking,” qaṣaru/yaqṣar. Further, if they have to
excuse themselves from an invitation to perform with a good reason (say, due to dawwām or
wage work), they often reply to the invitation saying, “I apologize, I have work” to which the
administration replies, “thank you, that’s fine, you’ve not shirked/slacked (mā taqṣaru).”
When the manager of the Firqat al-‘Arabī, Ḥamad, first drove me around the ring road
that encircles Manaḥ, he brought me to a short, graded hill to the north side of the town. When he
climbed out of his Subaru to take in the view, he waved his hand across the brown landscape.
“When I was younger, this was all green,” he said softly. “Now look, this is dead lot after dead
lot. My land is back further south, and it grows a little, water is available. Water is available. But
here…” I commented on the lack of date palms, which I had also seen in ‘Ibrī, where a drought
of over five years was just breaking.
Ḥamad: Look, there are some. But that’s not what these fields were, these were oats, barley,
wheat, grass for animals. In the town we have more dates, but here is grain. Grain doesn’t need

310
too much water and look, there’s not enough. We have date palms in the south, but there's little
water and people are now burning them, you'll see the smoke later in the year.
BJG: Where does the water come from?
Ḥ: It comes from ‘Izkī, from the falaj al-Malikī.
BJG: No! That’s so far [~twenty-three km].
Ḥ: Wallahi, it’s a long falaj. Our ancestors were strong, they came with Malik bin Fahm [the
ancient Arab leader and “founder” of Oman] and they made the falaj-s. And now we preserve
them, when our fathers were poor and had nothing, they preserved them. Now, with the
renaissance, we preserve them still. They are life, seriously, they are life.
BJG: Can’t you use mechanical pumps?
Ḥ: Of course, but the water is low in the earth, the earth is thirsty. Ask others, when they built
their houses I saw that they dug down a meter, two meters and found water. Now, you have to
dig and dig. The government made a dam, you know, there’s one near Firq [a small town
between Manaḥ and Nizwā] and one in ’Imṭī [a town north of ’Izkī], we will see them. But in
Manaḥ we have to be careful with regard to water. For fifteen years there has been drought,
water is not available.
Ḥamad was making clear that some obligations are shared by the community as
necessities of its survival. Mechanical pumps were an option but have depleted water levels for
the entire community. Government intervention can be imagined, but the onus of responsibility
falls, for Ḥamad and for many other Manḥīs, onto the people of Manaḥ themselves.
a. Praise as labor for the community
It may seem strange to think of valued labor emerging as a way in which performers
frame their praise as signaling their dignity, especially when the major exchange cycle is
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predicated on mutual obligations of unequal gifting. This discourse seems to motivate an
alternative moral universe, one in which good workers reap their just rewards, when the
Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism presents a moral universe where webs of interlocking and
unequal mutual obligations knit together stratified social classes. For most rentier theorists, the
labor of Gulf citizens is hardly a consideration, because the state provides benefits regardless of
their labor. If in Kuwait Sulayman Khalaf could claim that the state presented an “image of
unlimited good,” an indefinitely long future of wealth and plenty for all, for example, Limbert
has shown that no such idea can be claimed for Oman, emanating either from the state or the
people (2010). Rather, she writes that people conceive of Oman’s economic renaissance as a
kind of “dream-time” between the “realities of poverty” in the past and the imagined future
(2010, 11). As Limbert shows, this perception has deeply altered Omanis’ relationship with their
own past and with notions of “communal responsibility,” neighborhood relations, and women’s
sociality (2010, 11-16, 132, 80-1).
Such uncertainties were likewise present in Manaḥ, but Manḥīs were quick to point out
the ways that they were working hard to improve Manaḥ by themselves and along with the state.
When I pointed out that only a minority of Manḥīs performed in the razḥa, one participant
rejoined that “more came out” during the religious and national holidays, but it was true that
“others stay in their houses nowadays and forget who they are.” Another performer, on a
different occasion, responded to the same point by pointing out that these days, people feel “they
deserve more from the government and forget their manners.” A different Manḥī pointed out that
everyone knew razḥa, but some were embarrassed, or were “too lazy, afraid of work,” or “were
conceited (mutakabbirīn, anfhū kidha (pushing his nose up with his finger)),” because it is
associated with rural life. But when National Day comes, he said, “you’ll see, everyone
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participates.” Despite this speaker’s confidence, the participation of “everyone,” even during
festivals and state holidays, is not guaranteed. As we saw in the last section, invitations and even
pestering is sometimes necessary for the group to be brought together. When Ḥamad and the rest
of the administration brought me along to gather the missing members out at the prayer room in
the agricultural exclave before the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival, they made this clear. Each had stories
of the amounts of phone calls, texts, emails, and visits that they made in order to secure the
highest possible turnout for events.
“Being a manager is constant work, and mind you, there’s no money in this art,” Ḥamad
began:
You have to love the arts in your heart, have them in your heart, in order to do this. To
get the youths to come to meetings, I have to call them, send messages, emails, I go to
where they are, I go to their work (dawwām) and find them and ask them. ‘Why didn’t
you reply, why haven’t we heard from you?’ If they have circumstances (ẓurūf) then we
say okay, peace be upon you. If there’s work, ok. But if they’re just slacking (yaqṣarū
bass) then I will keep going after them (fa-adawwur ‘alayhum ‘alā ṭūl). You have to do
this. I take time to do it this way, because it’s easy to slack and be lazy but we must work
and work or we might lose ourselves or we will forget our culture (lāzim nashtaghal wanashtaghal walā iḥnā ma‘adūmīn walā rāḥ nansī turāthnā).
Others agreed with this assessment and volunteered similar stories regarding their work to keep
the group together.
This everyday maintenance of male social ties across households is a similar kind of civic
labor. In this case, much of this community work is performed amongst and between men as kin
and quasi-kin. Letters, text messages, and home visits to cajole, convince, and persuade group
members to perform with them is a constant endeavor. The extent and intensity of this
community-sustaining labor amongst Omani performance groups may seem surprising given the
fact that so many simultaneously report that praise is a kind a mutual response that is “necessary”
to functioning of the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism. These discourses may compete less
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than they at first appear, however. As we saw with the farmers dressed to the nines, denying the
compulsion to perform is a way to index autonomy. Often, messages that solicit performers
reference the necessity of performance, dignity, and representation and stress communal
obligations. In a way, this civic labor of men soliciting one another is one method by which these
discourses of communality circulate amongst performers. This circulation serves to guarantee
continued participation in the exchange cycle. Praise requires considerable mental, physical, and
emotional exertion, but that burden is lightened with many hands.
b. “As for laziness, it has no place”: Generosity accrues to those that work
It is in performances that the results of this community work are most clearly seen.
Returning to the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival, when the group was finally together and dressed, they
circled up around the drummers in the parking lot and started to sing short melodies individually,
trying to encourage someone to throw the first shilla. After a moment, an older performer sang a
razḥa qaṣṣāfiyya including a few already composed poetic half-lines:

أنثر سالمي على الدار والحلة
مثل السيل يسيلك الغدرانة
طرب يبكي ما حد يشله
يبكي بعبر والناس كسالنة
Inthar salāmī ‘alā al-dār wa-l-ḥilla,
mithl al-sayl yisaylik ghadrāna
ṭarab yabkī mā ḥadd yishīluh,
yabkī bi-‘ibr wa nās kaslāna
Spread my greetings to the homeland and the encampments,
Like the soft rain drizzling down to you [and settling in] small, clear pools.
Ṭarab weeps [because] no one sings the poetic line,
It weeps to its heart and the people are lazy.
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As the poetic line circulated a few times, the ‘āzī singer that worked in the water pumping station
shouted over the group, “or they are thieves! (walā ḥarāmī!) instead of wa nās kaslāna. This
replacement (kaslāna/ḥarāmī) was a joke, but further reveals the relationship between praise,
work, and generosity. Those who fail to sing the lines are lazy, or worse, are thieves. They take
the generosity of rulers for granted and give nothing back, do not work. Another element of this
relationship is how it frames work and labor as a moral good to be desired, especially work for
the community. Recall the ‘āzī given for the opening of the soccer pitch in Manaḥ:
Every homeland is built by men / When those men work hand in hand.
As for laziness, it has no place / neither near nor far.
This is the mission of every youth / Wading into challenge and difficulty.
And for those that walk the path of rightness / It's impossible for their actions to fade.
Work to “build” the homeland is valorized and mythopoetically made into a “mission”
for every youth. Youths, at least for many of my interlocutors, are the most in need of direction.
Importantly, praise not only responds to certain kinds of labor, but also mythopoetically
presents certain kinds of labor as valued. It both constructs and presents certain kinds of activity
as praiseworthy, thereby ideally promoting them. Citizens themselves are rhetorically produced
as actors who can work to benefit their homelands in various ways (though many of the more
workaday and unflattering aspects of this sociable labor are not at all recognized). Those who are
lazy are complacent and take advantage of the mutualistic relationships between rulers and the
ruled. Those who work, in contrast, present themselves as part of the same moral economy in
which the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism operates. Framing praise as a kind of labor, and a
specialized one at that, makes maintenance of the social order and maintenance of the relations
between rulers and ruled a valued and responsible activity.
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For some, learning the arts is also “work,” work that is valued since it reproduces
community and passes on traditions. When I asked why more people do not feel obligated to
praise, one interlocutor, Muḥammad from Nizwā, replied that:
Muḥammad: Praise and the arts are not difficult, but people are busy. People now live alone,
they do not come down to the market to razḥa with us. When my father was young, they would
play the drums in town and everyone heard. Nowadays, how do you play the drum so everyone
hears (kayf taṭabl ‘alshān sim‘ayū al-jamī‘)? But you will see, the old-timers always bring their
grandchildren to do razḥa if we are doing it and they see us. The youths know that this is a
hobby, yes, but an important one. People have work, they have duties, there is pressure on them,
but still the arts are here. This is authentically Omani, and it takes effort to maintain and spread
these things. Our fathers and ancestors worked to pass these down to us, and we must struggle to
maintain them.
BJG: Does the government not help in maintaining the arts? Patronizing them?
M: What does the government do? They sit in their offices and they drink coffee. They are
experts in drinking coffee, they don’t know the arts. They just like to film [the arts] for
television, but they don’t know [the arts]. It takes real work (yaḥtāg ‘alā al-shughl) to learn
them, years I mean. What you’ve seen is a drop from an ocean, one drop from an ocean.
He then shared with me a beautiful little video that he had in his phone, which slowly
scrolled through a variety of black and white pictures while a solo singer gave a mulālā’ and
versed a razḥa:

أول زمان الطرب زاهي
واليوم راحوا مزهينه
صاروا العرب ساهي والهي
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والقلب يصيح الطرب هينه
’Āwal zaman al-ṭarab zāhī,
Wa-l-yawm rāḥū mazahaynuh,
Ṣārū al-‘arab sāhī wa lāhī,
Wa-l-qalb yiṣiḥ al-ṭarab haynuh.
In the past, ṭarab was bright and lively,
And today those that brightened it have gone;
The people have become neglectful and forgetful,
And the heart cries out, “ṭarab, where is it?”
The term ṭarab here refers to a feeling that is deeply linked to musical performance, that
A.J. Racy defined as a kind of “ecstasy” (2004). Here, it is a stand in for attention and caring for
the funūn. The text has the tone of a lament, that the funūn might be lost due to neglect and
effects an urge to the listener to join the singer in searching for that feeling of ṭarab, set deep in a
past but not yet, perhaps, gone. This will take work, Muḥammad emphasized, teaching and
learning and commitment. The work of praise is part of the work of community, undertaken by a
community and what makes a community. When it is successful, it helps to link communities to
the ruling classes and integrate their plays of power in ways that do not threaten the solidarity of
the community while not risking the social ills of rebuffing such gifts.
Conclusion
This chapter has presented the Razḥa Integration mechanism as manifested through
several discourses. This mechanism works within razḥa performances to shape the way they are
interpreted by performers and elites alike. By presenting themselves as dignified, morally-correct
local recipients of elite generosity, they at least partially skirt the potentials for dependency and
weakness potential in the broader Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism. Additionally, they frame
their contributions and obligations (as necessary praisers, with praise as labor) as linking them to
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elites in a web of mutual obligations that I have called a moral economy. Moral economies are
those in which transactions are not neutral and anonymous, but reciprocal and affirming of social
relationships.
What I think is important here is that the praise response is not just acknowledging
generosity and recognizing dependency. As we have learned from scholars like Buenconsejo
(2002), the norm of reciprocity does not exhaust the effects of gift exchange. Rather, the
atmosphere, the embedded and interpreted meanings of exchange, can be altered or influenced
by thoughtful action. By attending closely to performance, or rather to the ideas that inform
performance and make it meaningful, we see that razḥa does more than account for generosity,
or even just impel it. Instead, the actual performance of razḥa is understood as asserting pride,
dignity, masculinity, autonomy, civic care, and other strong, positively valanced states.
Potentially, conceptually anyway, razḥa receives generosity without conceding dependency just
as it draws elites into the continued giving that sustains a moral economy and a shared
community. Nevertheless, I do not think that razḥa somehow distances itself from the flows and
constraints of global capital. Rather, it asserts a different logic of circulation: reciprocity. And
yet, the reciprocity remains necessarily addressed to the only institution that can sustain such
dramatic and transformative acts of generosity: the state form.
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Chapter 5: Warfare and Welcome: Historical Sources on the Role of Omani Performance
Practices and State Power
And the instruments of entertainment that have no use
Outside of themselves are to be broken whenever they are found,
In all of their types that exist,
Because in this there is no benefit.
-‘Abdullah bin Ḥumayd “Nūr al-Dīn” al-Sālimī (1286-1332/18691914) in the Jawhār al-Niẓām.
Some readers may wonder how it could be possible that a musical practice could possibly
have been a stable, public social mechanism of legitimation and the construction of a moral
economy in a region of the world that is most well known for its peoples’ intense condemnation
of “music.” I don’t want to hand-wave this issue away. I think it’s a good question. In fact, when
we dig into this confusion, we find that it is far more interesting than just a legalistic valuation or
condemnation of music. What I show in the chapter is that razḥa and ‘āzī have been
provisionally tolerated in Omani Arab Muslim society not because it is orthodox to do so, pace
Talal Asad, nor because they are particularly meaningful practices for constructions of a moral
self, contra Shahab Ahmed (2015). Rather, they are tolerated merely because they are practical:
they serve some explicit purpose. In fact, many “musical” genres are tolerated for precisely this
purpose. This seems to be an underrecognized issue in the interminable debates on whether
“Islam” condemns or tolerates or valorizes music. Historically, razḥa and ‘āzī seem to have
been tolerated because they were technologies of warfare—and insofar as they supported war,
they were deeply connected to statecraft, elites, and leadership.
In order to show this, I analyze both historical records and Ibāḍī Islamic rulings on the
status of music and musical instruments. I review some of the literature in ethnomusicology on
these topics, as well as some major attempts at theorizing Islam and Islamic legal practice. I
conclude the chapter by examining the close relationship between razḥa, ‘āzī, and state power.
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An Untended Flower: Music in Omani Histories
Writing a musical history of Oman based on primary sources is extremely difficult. In a
conversation with another student of Omani music, she remarked that it was an “untended
flower” (warid mā yughtadhī)—it had the potential for great beauty and meaning, but was
mostly left alone. As Walīd al-Nabhānī notes in From the History of Music in Oman: Problems
and Texts (Min tārīkh al-mūsīqā fī ‘Umān ’ishkālīyāt wa nuṣūṣ) (2016):
The number of historical musical studies in Oman is small and this is not surprising given
that we know that Omanis did not write on this topic or on the arts in general, despite
their contributions in other sciences, such as astronomy and medicine. The first attempts
at paying attention to Omani music—collecting, classifying, and analyzing—date back to
the early eighties of the last century. This is when His Majesty Sultan Qābūs ordered the
collection of Omani musical heritage in a national plan adopted by the Ministry of
Information, and this launched the first efforts in this field. Features of interest [then]
rolled out continuously in the study of Omani musical arts, their instruments, and their
different aspects. (al-Nabhānī 2016, 11)
As al-Nabhānī and other authors (al-Kathīrī 2005; al-Shaydī 2008; Christensen and Castelo
Branco 2009; El Mallah 1998) note, no primary documents thus far uncovered in Oman or about
Oman specifically cover music. Not only are primary histories relatively few, but those that we
possess were written by Ibāḍī intellectuals who were, in general, strongly opposed to music in
theory and in practice. Musallim al-Kathīrī adds that these sources “have focused most of their
attention on political and military actions, and mention of some musical instruments and their
uses comes [only] sparsely in their pages” (2005, 47). Those that do come, however, are
undoubtedly about razḥa, further cementing the genre as the one most closely associated with
political power in Oman. In a conversation with al-Kathīrī himself, he told me that the “razḥa is
the history of Oman.” While this is true, the actual stitching together of this history is perhaps
impossible due to the occasional nature of the poetry. At the ends of events, I would often ask
poets what they sang that day, and more often than not, they had already forgotten the text.
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While razḥa-s are clearly commentaries on the day, they are not purposefully memorized like the
qaṣīda, the famed “register of the Arabs.” Razḥa-s were rarely written down before literacy
achieved its current levels. More important in terms of written sources is that literate Ibāḍī
scholars108 were asked to make statements on the Islamic legality of music on several occasions
and these opinions were collected. While we will see that much of the information offered by
these scholars is outdated (especially regarding instrument types), it is the perspective they
provide on the limited permissibility accorded to music that interests us here.
Warfare and Welcome: Omani Orientations to the Charge of Music
A few days before Ramadan began in 2016, I was sitting in Ḥamad’s majlis enjoying a
ḥilba, a milky fenugreek-flavored drink. As I was setting out my notebook and recorder, Ḥamad
noticed a book on the status of music in Islam in my bag.
“Oh, father,” he moaned. “What is this?”
“This?” I picked up the book. “This is a book about Islamic jurisprudence…”
“Well, I can see that, doctor, what do you want with it (shtibā bih)?”
“I just wanted to know the opinions of Ibāḍī scholars on music…”
“That’s fine,” Ḥamad said, leaning back and pulling his dishdāsha over his feet, “but
you’re not studying music. If you want to know about that, it’s not in razḥa. There’s no melody,
there’s no singing, there’s no instruments (mā shay al-naghmāt, mā shay al-ghinā’, mā shay alma‘āzif). But I’m no scholar, don’t ask me. I don’t know. Listen, I don’t want to enter into that

108

Eickelman (1983) estimates the literate population in al-Ḥamrā’ in the 1940s at eight percent,
“of whom most possessed little more than basic literacy,” and offers this as a reasonable guess
for the rest of Inner Oman (166).
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issue, I don’t even want to enter it (mū bāghī adakhkhalu). The razḥa is for warfare and
welcome, that’s what I say to any Imam.”
“That reminds me, why isn’t the razḥa ever performed if a new mosque is opened?” I
asked facetiously, trying to corner him. I knew that this was a total impossibility, even then.
“Oh, lord spread blessings and mercy like rain. That is a good question for the Islamic
scholars, I do not know.”
Months earlier, I was discussing some of the local arts that were less well-known than the
razḥa and the ‘āzī with Khamīs, the leader of a new troupe in ’Izkī. We were meeting in his
‘azba, a kind of semi-permanent camp and corral for grazing stock, eating dates by the goat pen
that he affectionately referred to as the “UN” (“I’ve got every type of goat in there,” he boasted,
“Indian, Pakistani, Sindhi, Afghan, Somali, Kenyan, Nubian, Egyptian, Georgian, Bosnian, Iraqi,
Persian, Balochi, Roman, and Chinese—it’s the UN of goats (al-’umum al-mutaḥḥida māl alhūsh)”). After a half-hour of chatting, a pickup full of Khamīs’s male kin pulled up. We
exchanged pleasantries and they joined us in eating dates.
“We’re talking about music,” Khamīs said casually, flicking his eyes over to his younger
brother.
“The arts?” His brother replied.
“No, music, this Englishman wants to study music here.”
“Well, not music, God lengthen your lives,” I jumped in, “I want to study the arts. But we
were chatting a bit about music around here. Khamīs said that you all perform al-rūgh in the
early dusk?” Al-rūgh is a genre of instrumental reed-pipe music accompanied by drumming and
some sung poetry. The word rūgh refers to both the genre and the reed-pipe, which is shaped and
played like the more common mijwiz. I have never encountered any source that discusses al-rūgh
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and so it may be a genre that is mostly performed by shawāwī (semi-nomadic herders)
performers, whose music is largely undocumented in Western scholarship. The area around ’Izkī
is, however, home to many rare and undocumented instruments, including a kind of gourd
resonator monochord, a large family of African-derived idiophones, and so on.
“Al-rūgh,” his brother chuckled, “that’s the horn-pipe of Satan (mizmār al-shayṭān)109,
that al-rūgh. The only thing worse is the zār, did you hear about the zār?” The zār is a common
name for a genre of healing music mostly performed by and for women: as it deals with jinn,
supernatural beings, it is roundly condemned by Islamic scholars.110
“Zār? You want to see a zār, doctor?” Khamīs perked up. “Mizmār al-shayṭān, ha! I hold
a zār here every night. Zār and mizmār, all night.” Of course Khamīs did not hold a performance
of zār or rūgh every night, but he was voicing an opinion contrary to his brother’s take on music.
Rather than acquiescing to the putative illicit nature of music, as Ḥamad would later do, Khamīs
pushed back against that discourse, claiming to embrace a profoundly controversial genre of
music.
As these anecdotes show, Omanis express a wide range of perspectives on music, from
those like Khamīs’s—that embrace music—to those that condemn it. Before we discuss
particular Ibāḍī perspectives on the issue of music, however, we should outline the general stakes
of the debate over the status of music in Islamic discourse. Such a foray bears a long pedigree:

The famous rebuke uttered by the Prophet’s father-in-law and longtime follower Abū Bakr in
an equally-famous hadith. Abū Bakr admonished two women of the ‘Anṣār singing in the
presence of the Prophet on a festival day by saying, “The horn-pipes of Satan [mizāmir alshayṭān] in the house of God’s Prophet!” The Prophet’s reply: “Let them sing, O Abū Bakr,
verily to every nation there is a festival, and this is our festival.”
109

See Janice Boddy’s 1990 ethnography Wombs and Alien Spirits for a deeper discussion of
zār.
110
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Amnon Shiloah introduces it as an “interminable debate” in his Music in the World of Islam
(1995, 31). “The debate elicited views that varied from complete negation to full admittance of
all musical forms and means, even dance,” he continues, “between these two extremes we can
find all possible nuances” (1995, 31). Oman is no exception. Early in my research, when I was
not pursuing Omanis’ perceptions of the Islamic status of music, I nevertheless recorded a wide
range of beliefs. These often correlated with the social and economic position of the actor: an
official in the Omani Center for Traditional Music told me that “that debate is over, from the
Middle Ages the scholars agree that music is permitted”; a performer of the Sufi-inflected111
mālid genre told me that “rhythm (al-‘īqā‘) is a powerful tool for religion, and must be used with
care”; a performer of razḥa at the Muscat Festival brought me a fatwā declaring attendance at the
Muscat Festival to be avoided if possible because it included music (mūsīqā, “especially from
Bahrain,” he added).
Understanding how differently positioned Muslims regard music requires both historical
and ethnographic engagement. To do this, we should begin, in Talal Asad’s terms, “as Muslims
do, from the context of a discursive tradition that includes and relates itself to the founding texts
of the Qur’an and the Hadith” (1986, 14). This is precisely Lois Al-Faruqi’s initial point in her
1985 article on “Music, Musicians, and Muslim Law,” worth quoting here in full:
The first question that must be asked if we are to avoid misunderstanding the attitude of
Islam toward music and musicians is: Who or what shall be regarded as speaking for
Islam? We are all well aware of the multitudinous collections of often contradictory
statements, both oral and written, on music that have come from various regions and
periods of Islamic history. Are all of these sources to be regarded as equally qualified to
speak for Islam? Or are we to content ourselves with examining only one person's or one
group's opinion on the matter? In order to be true to the data and to Islamic civilization, it
Valerie J. Hoffman points out that a major difference between Ibāḍī and Wahhābī doctrine is
the importance of mysticism to Ibāḍī scholars (2015). While few Ibāḍīs might refer to
themselves as Sufis, a similar concept of sulūk, or “pathways” in religion, is present in many of
the writings of scholars during the 19th century Ibāḍī “renaissance.”
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would seem that the researcher should investigate as many as possible of the materials
that a consensus of the Muslims themselves consider to be authoritative in these matters.
Coverage of the sources of wide acceptance within the culture is demanded by logic as
well as cultural and intellectual honesty. (1985, 3-4)
The irony of course, is that starting “as Muslims do” reveals precisely the core complexity of
discussing music and Islam: that there is no obvious universal position. The only sūra, or verse,
in the entire Qur’ān that scholars have argued refers directly the music is Luqmān 6: “And of
those people who buy idle talk to lead [others] astray from the path of God without knowledge,
and take it as mockery, they will [face] a humiliating punishment.” The central term in this sūra,
“idle talk,” is a translation of al-lahū al-ḥadīth, whose exact translation has been subject to many
opinions.112 Indeed, this is why Asad promotes studying Islam and Islamic practices as
“discursive traditions” (1986, 14). For Asad, “a tradition consists essentially of discourses that
seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct forms and purpose of a given practice” (14).
Such practices are constituted within discourses that relate to past, present, and future, and are
Islamic insofar as they are practices “into which Muslims are inducted as Muslims” (15). An
Islamic practice so constituted is authorized as orthodoxy by those with power—“wherever
Muslims have power to regulate, uphold, require or adjust correct practices,” Asad claims, “and
to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones, there is the domain of orthodoxy,”
which is “crucial to all Islamic traditions” (15). For our discussion here, we should recognize that
the “interminable debate” over the legal status of music is precisely the kind of discursive
tradition to which Asad is drawing attention. However, despite Asad’s claim of the constant push
for orthodoxy (and orthopraxy), the status of certain kinds of music remains doggedly murky.
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This situation is noted by historian Shahab Ahmed when he criticizes Asad’s notion of
Islam as a tradition in What is Islam? (2016):
The subtle yet crucial problem with Asad’s conceptualization of Islam as a “discursive
tradition” is precisely his locating the definitive quality of the discursive tradition in the
dynamic of authoritative prescription of the correct: that is, in orthodoxy, which emerges
irresistibly in his conceptualization as the “crucial” component in Islam. (2016, 272-3)
For Ahmed, it is incorrect “to put forward a schema where the definitive purpose of the
discursive tradition/Islam is the production of orthodoxy” (273). “The effect of Asad’s
conceptualization of Islam as a discursive tradition,” he continues, “is to present Islam as a
tradition which, for all its variety, is constituted by an overriding concern to institute orthodoxy”
(273). Ahmed instead argues that, at least within what he terms the “Balkans-to-Bengal
complex,” a “temporal-geographical entity” stretching from Sarajevo to Dhaka, a huge range of
discursive practices have flourished—"Avicennan philosophy, Akbarian Sufism, Suhrawardīan
Illuminationism, Ḥāfiẓian poetics, figural painting and wine-drinking”—never striving for
orthodoxy, embracing complexity, and that are nevertheless “at the very center of the discursive
tradition” and hence Islam (277). One of Ahmed’s strongest statements of this fact comes from
analyzing the musical life of Amīr Khusraw, the famed inventor of qawwālī, (650-725/12531325). Noting that music is rarely considered “Islamic,” he shows that despite this, “in the selfstatement of Muslims, we find that music is made meaningful precisely in… Islamic terms”
(427). Ahmed claims that Khusraw’s heterodox and anti-authoritarian “couplets on music
constitute and make normative statements that are at once philosophy, Sufism, theology,
Qur’ānic exegesis and law” and hence take part in the “discursive tradition” as much as any
scholars seeking orthodoxy.113

Ahmed concludes that positions like Asad’s and those that have built on his ideas have
generally failed to thoroughly investigate the notion of “authority” in Islam. One scholar who has
113
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What we learn from Ahmed’s criticism of Asad is that to use Asad’s definition is to focus
squarely on the hegemonic play of power in Islamic societies. Productively, Ahmed frames
Asad’s position as one that allows us to draw a succinct link between Islamic discursive practices
and the politics of the state, in its many forms.
In Oman and amongst Ibāḍīs, what is interesting about the outcome of this debate over
the status of music is not that it does not seek orthodoxy and orthopraxy, since it decidedly does.
Rather, the avowedly Islamic conclusions of it admit the performance of a controversial
practice—the razḥa—for controversial reasons. Ibāḍī rulings on music are neither simply a
matter of applying or constructing an orthodoxy, as Asad would have it, nor do they merely
privilege the capacity of practices to “have meaning” for Muslims, as would Ahmed. Instead, we
can see a strong pragmatic thread, attending closely to context and wary of the ramifications of
overzealous condemnation. Rather than trying to establish an Ibāḍī “doctrine” on music, we can
use these writings and fatwas to trace the shifting role of music in Oman. Historically, the razḥa
is deeply associated with the state and with political (and tribal) power due to its connections
with warfare, social communication, and communal organization. The ability to host a razḥa and
act as its patron is a demonstration of one’s political position and resources. However, the razḥa
is not a straightforwardly admitted practice since it does not sit easily with most Islamic scholars
in Oman. The reason why is explored next.

taken this quite seriously (and before Ahmed’s critique) is anthropologist Hussein Ali Agrama
(see for example 2010) who casts the fatwa as a form of ethical practice. Far from modeling
fatwa as an authoritarian tool in the “overriding concern to institute orthodoxy,” Agrama argues
that the authority of the fatwa lies in its ability to offer guidance and wisdom, not a capacity to
enforce compliance (2010, 14).
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Music and Muslim Law, Redux
Al-Faruqi’s classic investigation of the status of music in Islam presents a hierarchy of
“sound art expressions” (handasah al-ṣawt) that are arranged in relation to two poles whose
statuses are clear (1985, 7). At the top of the hierarchy lies the most legitimate form of handasah
al-ṣawt: Qur’ānic recitation (qirā’a), and at the bottom is “sensuous music associated with
unacceptable contexts” (8). Virtually all Islamic scholars are in agreement on the position of
these two forms. Down the hierarchy (which al-Faruqi operationalizes as representing fewer
people assenting that that genre is straightforwardly legitimate [14]) are, in order:
A. Religious chants: (adhān, tahlīl/ṭalbiyyah, takbirāt, madīḥ, tasbīh, and taḥmīd) that are a
duty to believers;
B. Chanted poetry with noble themes;
C. Family/Celebration music (lullabies, women’s songs, wedding songs, etc.)
D. “Occupational” music (caravan chants, shepherd’s tunes, work songs, etc.)
E. Military Music (ṭabl khānah) (8).
Everything “below” this threshold is commonly considered “music”—mūsīqā—and is therefore
at least controversial if not fully illegitimate. Al-Faruqi valuably concludes that the intention of
the hierarchy was not to “destroy all sound-art” (27), but rather to submit musical pleasure to
higher ethical standards. She argues that “a number of interrelated aspects seem to have been
involved in determining the implicit hierarchy of sound art that is described here” (13). However,
the four aspects she picks out (conformity with Qur’ānic chant; conformity with the “aesthetic
demands of the culture” (13); community acceptance or esteem; and “conformance in sound-art
to the moral demands of Islam”) do not account for either the reasons why this hierarchy
developed or the role of hegemonic power in the attempts to establish it as orthodoxy. These are
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not the questions she was seeking to answer with her article, but we can usefully extend her work
by introducing these concerns.
Al-Faruqi presents a picture of Islamic proscriptions on music that hints at two further
aspects of the implicit hierarchy of Islamic sound-art. The first aspect is the dual nature of
condemnation and promotion. As Asad has argued, the tendency to orthodoxy is not only
negative, that is, excluding certain practices, but also positive, that is promoting certain practices.
Al-Faruqi rightly notes this when she writes that the hierarchy was meant as much to promote
certain genres as it was to delegitimize others. We also see that the construction of certain genres
as music preserves other genres from the charge of being music. This discursive tradition of
judging music not only marks some genres as legitimate, but also marks some as other. These
other genres include music for frivolous entertainment, music that promotes sensual eroticism,
music that is non-functional: genres that are not serious or functional. Hence, the people who
engage in them are not to be taken seriously. Those who do not engage in them, conversely, are
serious and should be taken seriously or taken to be doing something useful. Islamic
proscriptions on music and non-music serve to distinguish types of behavior from one another
and associate those behaviors with different bodies, minds, classes, and the like. As Shiloah
writes, “the total prohibition involves only art music, which displays man’s vanity and primarily
furthers interest in mundane, worldly matters” (Shiloah 1995, 37). These he contrasts with
Islamically permitted genres, whose acceptance is due to the “predominance of the text in
religious or folk music, wherein the combination of sounds is relegated to a secondary role, or is
a device mainly designed to support the words and enhance their meaning” (37). In fact, the main
social punishment that those who play and make a living by unlawful music receive is that their
testimony in Islamic courts is invalidated (see al-Sulaymānī 2011).
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The second aspect that these authors bring out but do not directly express is the role of
function in the determination of what is Islamically permitted. The four aspects that Al-Faruqi
puts forward for explaining the organization of the hierarchy clearly focus on the higher end of
the chart. Al-Faruqi seems to justify the chart in terms of how the other legitimate forms of art
relate to the chanted Qur’ān. While this is clearly operant in the case of the religious chants that
sit just below the chanted Qur’ān in Islamic permissibility, there seems to be little that connects
the rest of the legitimate genres to the Qur’ān. Rather, what connects these other legitimate
genres is that they fulfill a certain specific role, that is, they have a defined and unobjectionable
social function. Women’s wedding music, lullabies, “occupational” music, and military music
have relatively clear functions but little relationship to the recitation of the Qur’ān. The final
division of legitimate music is chanted poetry with “noble themes.” In the context of this
dissertation, we can see how and why it might be more parsimonious to think of this as a
functional genre as well: this poetry is often praise or the kinds of serious political poetry from
rulers that has long been a part of Arabian political discourse (Sowayan 2003).
As we will see, Omani (and other) Ibāḍīs have attended quite sensitively and
pragmatically to the question of the status of music, just as they have maintained a clear
orthodox stance and attention to the meaningful aspects of musical practices. As Agrama (2010)
has noted, the power of the fatwa lies not on what basis it can compel action, but the way that it
offers avenues of action. In this case, it compels actions by attempting to mark the boundaries of
ethical engagement with performance practices by picking some out as moral, some as immoral,
and others as simply practical. The question is then whether or not this emphasis on function and
usefulness is a part of the Islamic discursive tradition on music.
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“Devotion is a Wide Door”: Islam, Ibāḍī Pragmatism, and the “Problem” of Useful Music
When we look at Ibāḍī scholars’ judgments pertaining to music, one recent text stands
out: Khālid bin ‘Īsā bin Ṣāliḥ al-Sulaymānī's Al-ghinā’ wa al-ma’āzif fī al-mayzān: qirā’a fī alaḥkām al-fiqhiyya al-mut’aliqa bi al-ghinā’ wa al-ma’āzif wa ḥukmhumā fī al-islām (Singing
and Musical Instruments in the Balance: A Study on Jurisprudential Judgments Pertaining to
Singing and Musical Instruments and their Judgment in Islām, 2001). Al-Sulaymānī gives an
overview of the debate surrounding music first by looking at the Qur'ān and the “pure sunna”
(Ibāḍīs regard only a small selection of ḥadīth-s as “pure”), then by taking up a philological
approach to the definition of the key terms “singing” (al-ghinā') and “the playing of musical
instruments” (al-ma‘āzif). Finally, he reviews the more recent perspectives espoused by Ibāḍīs
and the other Islamic legal schools (Shī‘ī, Ḥanāfī, Shafa‘ī, Mālikī, and Hanbālī). Interestingly, alSulaymānī begins his text with a section called “A Necessary Word,” in which he writes that
some might think that writing a book about music is already problematic, no matter its
conclusions. He imagines them saying:
Does he not realize (the poor fool) that he who is addicted to trivialities of mind is
himself trivial?!! That he invites the people to walk the dark path in which he himself
lives?!! That he has set himself as a demeaner of this great religion?!! That he attacks
God and His Prophet by analyzing what God and His Prophet have made
impermissible?!! (2011, 17).
This passage shows us that the default position of the informed layperson is that music is already
impermissible. Further, even an investigation of it is problematic because it may lead some
people astray. Al-Sulaymānī answers this charge by writing that compiling such a book could be
of some benefit to others in clarifying their religion. He quotes the Sūra-s al-Dhariyāt 55: “And
remind, for reminding benefits the believers” and the famous Āl-‘Umrān 110: “You are the finest
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nation raised up to [benefit] the people, enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong, and you
believe in God” to set himself as one who reminds the Muslim of what is forbidden.
Al-Sulaymānī then discusses the key terms of al-ghinā’ and al-ma‘azif and reviews how
many scholars before him have used the terms. These two terms are often used in conjunction
with one another in the Islamic jurisprudence on music, referring at least in general to “singing”
and “musical instruments and the playing of musical instruments.”
a.

Al-ghinā’ and al-ma‘āzif

Al-Sulaymānī writes that “singing” (al-ghinā’ ) is a “polluted word” (kalima
mulawwitha) due to its association with “those that draw from singing a craft and profession; and
those that bring to it musical instruments that move/agitate the spirit, that arouse passionate love
and obscenity” (20). It is for this reason that “those with common sense are on their guard
against using the word ‘singing’ (al-ghinā’) and avoid it, and they replace it with other words
such as the word inshād” (20). Such a shift in vocabulary does not change the status of music
that is already “polluted.” “If we come to the general meaning of the word al-ghinā' amongst the
Arabs,” Al-Sulaymānī continues,
we find it comes amongst them by the meaning of [1] beautifying the voice and uplifting
[raising] it, and by the meaning of [2] the ḥudā’ [cameleers’ songs], and [3] songs of
poetry on occasions of happiness and joy and otherwise, [though subsequently] this word
was stuck after that with al-ghinā' al-mājin (“immoral singing”] as the most common
usage. (21)
Al-Sulaymānī concludes by firmly distinguishing between al-ghinā’ al-mubāḥ and al-ghinā’ almuḥarram. Mubāḥ (CLA, permissible) in Islamic jurisprudence means something that is
permitted but for which there is neither reward nor punishment, something towards which one
ought to cultivate indifference. Al-ghinā’ al-mubāḥ for al-Sulaymānī “is chaste, modest,
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respectable, authentic singing, free from the traces of indecency and which is not accompanied
by musical instruments and the forbidden ṭarab. This type is now classified under the name
inshād” (23). As for al-ghinā’ al-muḥarram, al-Sulaymānī quotes Māliki scholar Abū ‘Abdullah
al-Qurṭabī (610-671/1214-1273):
It is immoral singing…[as al-Qurṭabī said] it is ‘singing which agitates the spirits and that
arouses them to passionate love, amorous poetry and obscenity… which moves the still
and reveals the hidden… this is that type of singing if it has poetry that celebrates
[women in verse] by mentioning women and descriptions of their beauties, and
mentioning wine and other forbidden things upon which there is no difference [in opinion
amongst scholars] in their being forbidden… As for what the Sufis have created these
days it is from an addiction to listening to the sung (samā‘ al-mughannī) and the
instruments of ṭarab.” (24)
As we saw above, at some point the last definition, that is, music being associated with
immorality, became the most commonly used definition of al-ghinā’. Other types of singing used
to be referred to as ghinā’, including the Islamically licit genres of wedding/life cycle and
occupational music. However, the word itself has come to represent all that is negative and illicit
in vocal music for many Islamic scholars.
Al-ma‘azif, likewise, has come to refer to all musical instruments and the playing of
them. Early definitions, such as those compiled by Ibn Manẓūr (d. 711/1312), indicate that alma‘āzif referred only to the playing of instruments, not the instruments themselves, equating it
with malāhī, or “entertainment.” Later scholars amended the meaning of al-ma‘āzif to include
musical instruments themselves (al-Sulaymānī 2011, 24-6). A point worth lingering on here is
that the instruments and their functions as reported by al-Sulaymānī are of considerable
antiquity. There is, for example, no reporting on new instruments or on a wide range of
commonly used instruments and considerable attention is paid to instruments that haven't been
used in hundreds of years. For example, his list of instruments includes the kinārā (“about which
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there is some disagreement” as to whether it is an ‘ūd or a duff), the kūba (an hourglass drum),
and the ṣanj (the Persian cheng or harp).
Walīd al-Nabhānī notes the same confusions in his chapter on musical instruments
discussed in the Omani Ibāḍī fiqh literature. In a chapter devoted to the case of the dāhir, he
notes that Ibāḍīs have often defined al-ma‘azif only as chordophones, using the word al-mizāmir
for aerophones and al-mizāhir for idio- and membranophones (2016, 44). Similar to the
misunderstanding over the kināra, al-Nabhānī cites other scholars who have reported on the
kibārāt, some saying that “it is an ‘ūd as well, and some folks say it is a duff” (44). Al-Nabhānī
concludes that, due to this confusion and the surrounding context, the instrument “was not
present at the time of the author,” Muḥammad bin ’Ibrāhīm al-Kindī (d. c. 508/1115).
b. Ibāḍī Pragmatism: Condemnation and Conciliation
When al-Sulaymānī shifts his focus to presenting the perspectives of Ibāḍī perspectives
on music, he is unequivocal:
The reader of the books of Ibāḍi scholars that treat the question of singing and musical
instruments and what is related to them (in the judgment of jurisprudential scholars) finds
that Ibāḍism is amongst the harshest of all the Islamic schools in condemning singing and
its instruments. There is no difference amongst Ibāḍī scholars and their rulings, neither in
the past nor in the present, on the question of forbidding singing and musical instruments.
Rather, their statements on the two are the most ruthless of all statements, and they
consider the two amongst the greatest of sins and most reprehensible actions. (2011, 95)
Such is the position espoused by Muḥammad bin ’Ibrāhīm al-Kindī, cited above: “listening to
entertainment is disobedient, sitting amongst it is sinfulness, and working in it is apostasy (of
ungratefulness towards God’s blessings, CLA. kufr al-nu‘ama)” (96). Many Ibāḍī scholars have
interpreted this kind of harsh judgment as permitting the destruction of instruments as a means of
defense against them. The breaking of instruments is a common behavior cultivated in “enjoining
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the right and forbidding the wrong” (see Cook 2000). Such a statement is recorded by the
11th/17th century Ibāḍī scholar Shaykh Muḥammad bin ‘Abdullah bin Jum‘a bin ‘Abīdān alNizwī:
As for the dahra/daïre and the mizmār-s and all the instruments of entertainment, it is
permitted for you to break them if you are able, if they are used or not. As for the
dahra/daïre, the āṣnāj (cymbals] and zamārāt, they are to be broken wherever found, used
or not. As for the reed instrument (qaṣba), as it has been said: ‘when it is used and there
is singing with it’… as for the duff-s, if they are used outside of the month of marriage,
then they are to be broken. (cited in al-Sulaymānī 2011, 98)
Another instrument mentioned by the Ibāḍīs, more familiar in Central Asia, is the ṭunbūr.
Interestingly, Mūsā bin Ābī Jābir al-Manḥī (of Manaḥ, d. 181/797) writes that one has
“permission to leave it unbroken “if it was without adornment (’idha kān l-ghayr zayna),
[though] if the value of the ṭunbūr seemed high, then most scholars permitted breaking it ‘even if
it was of great value’” (al-Nabhānī 2016, 45). As opposed to discussions of instruments that
perhaps were not used in Oman or were no longer used there, these details seem to indicate that
not only was the tunbūr present at some time, but that it was differentiated in construction.
Lieutenant Wellstead reports but does not name an instrument that may be related to this ṭunbūr:
“seated cross-legged under the scanty shade of the date-palm, I have often listened to [a
Bedouin] thus amusing himself for hours. The only accompaniment is a rude guitar with two
strings” (1837, 74-5).
Al-Kindī reportedly asked another scholar, ’Abī al-Ḥuwārī, about
the dahra/daïre, is it to be broken if it is not played? And he replied: yes, it is broken… so
I said to him: And if I see a duff in a house is it for/upon me to break it? He said: Yes,
that is for/upon you. Another speaker said to him: Is it permitted to sell duff-s at a Muslim
souq [or marketplace]? He said: No, that is not permissible. (al-Sulaymānī 2011, 99)
On this last point, the selling of music instruments in a Muslim souq, another scholar compares
this to the “foolishness of the relaxation of the [obligation] to covering of the men of the world”
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“the letting down of hair onto backs,” men dressing like women and the converse, or allowing
youths and idiots to carry weapons (al-Sulaymānī 2011, 103).
Ibāḍīs were careful not just to condemn their own music, but that of Africans, British
subjects, and Indians as well (Cook 2001, 409-10). British Imperial officers stationed in Muscat
noted in 1869 that the influence of Sa‘īd bin Khalfān al-Khalīlī, an Ibāḍī scholar, had reached
such a level that he outlawed the weekly music sessions of the Siddi-s (a population derived from
enslaved Africans) in the capital (Johny 2010, 70). Similarly, the British Political Agent in
Muscat had to intervene when Ibāḍī leaders requested that he prevent his Indian subjects from
beating drums or playing musical instruments. Disbrowe [the Political Agent in Muscat]
refused to heed the request. Instead, he replied that if these activities were restricted only
during hours when it is unreasonable or caused disturbance then an understanding could
be reached between the two sides. [Imām] ‘Azzān in his reply stated that music was to be
banned at all time [sic] and no concession would be made to British subjects. (Johny
2010, 71)
However, recall that ‘Azzān’s time as Imām was predicated on his opposition to imperial
ingresses in Oman and his call to reassert the religious basis of the Imamate.
The essential statement on music for our purposes, however, is a qaṣīda written by the
famed Imām ‘Abdullah bin Ḥumayd “Nūr al-Dīn” al-Sālimī (1286-1332/1869-1914) in the
Jawhār al-Niẓām fī ‘ilmī al-’adyān wa-l-aḥkām (The Jewel of Order in the Science of Religions
and Judgments), a collection of poems and prose sections that gather and expound on Ibāḍī
Islamic themes. In the section entitled “Book of the Order of the World,” in the subsection on
“Enjoining the Right and Forbidding the Wrong,” he writes the following lines:
And the instruments of entertainment that have no use
Outside of themselves are to be broken whenever they are found,
In all of their types that exist,
Because in this there is no benefit.
Bin Maḥbūb told us about his compatriot;
That he played a drum with no mind to it.
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And in their telling, he [Bin Maḥbūb] rent the leather [of the drumheads]
And that is incumbent upon any of the proper [Muslims].
And they are not permitted to play the drum,
For entertainment — but for two 'just meanings':
And that is the terrorization of enemies,
And as a response to the distant cries [of communication],
And as a call to the prayers of the festival (al-‘īd)
Or to a serious and purposeful meeting between them [Muslims].
(cited in al-Sulaymānī 2011, 96-7)
Nūr al-Dīn demonstrates the harsh Ibāḍī take on music as requiring the destruction of musical
instruments. However, what this passage shows most clearly is the pragmatic Ibāḍi interest in
function and uselessness. The poet’s main criticism of music and musical instruments in this
passage is that the instruments of entertainment are to be broken “because in [them] there is no
benefit” and they “have no use outside of themselves.” Al-Sulaymānī adds that musical
instruments are “not [the kind of things] that are benefitted from” (97). When the “two ‘just
meanings’” for using instruments are provided, they are clearly phrased in terms of function:
insofar as drums are useful in times of war (to terrorize enemies and coordinate soldiers) and in
peace (to gather the Muslims to festival and consultation) they are permitted. This is a clear
expression of what Al-Faruqi presented as the hierarchy of handasa al-ṣawt, but the justification
of it is not presented in terms of the sound-art’s similarity to the recitation of the Qur’ān, but of
its benefit to believers in other ways.
The current Grand Muftī of the Sultanate of Oman, Aḥmad bin Ḥamad al-Khalīlī, has
issued several fatwas about music and echoes his predecessors very closely. Condemnation
should be the general stance, but bets are hedged. The general Ibāḍī interpretation of music
contends that the “al-lahū al-ḥadīth” mentioned in Luqmān 6 refers to music, musical
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instruments, the purchase or renting of music, and nearly everything else related to it. In an
undated fatwa issued by the Muftī, he summarizes an Ibāḍī position:
Al-lahū is impermissible (yaḥram al-lahū) when it pulls to it corruption and emits
iniquity. Its impermissibility is evidenced by the true speech of the Most High: “And of
those people who buy idle talk to lead [others] astray from the path of God without
knowledge” [Luqmān 6]. Al-lahū al-ḥadīth in this verse is “singing,” as narrated by the
learned interpreter and translator of the Qur’ān Ibn ‘Abbās—God’s mercy upon him.
Thus it was told about the Prophet—May God send prayers and peace—through the
telling of 12 of his followers, of [his] prohibition of singing and playing and instruments
(al-ghinā’ wa-l-‘azif wa-l-zamr). Despite this, scholars have permitted, in the case of war,
what inspires ḥamās (vigor, enthusiasm) in the believers and strengthens their resolves.
However, war songs (inshād-s) that carry ḥamās are conditional provided that they do not
come at the expense of religious duties, such as impeding the duty to remember God and
the duty of prayer; surely, God knows best. (cited in al-Sulaymānī 2011, 106)
Once again, function outweighs the doctrinal slash-and-burn prohibition of music. Music is, in
fact, too useful to ban completely. In my discussions of this with another religious scholar, he
explained to me that non-Muslims often think that Muslims ban alcohol and music without
exception: “In fact,” he pointed out, “alcohol and music are common. Why? Because you need
alcohol for cleaning, chemistry, for useful things (ashiyā’ mufīda) like perfume. It is the same
with music. It is not ḥarām without exception—if it is useful and beneficial to the Muslim, he
must use and benefit from it.”
The definition of permitted sonic art for Ibāḍīs is also quite wide—as Al-Faruqi notes, it
is only that music which is most strongly associated with immoral settings that is uniformly
denounced. In a 2005 fatwa, the Muftī also commented on a variety of inshād-s that were sent to
him. The letter and response read:114
July 2005 / Jumādā al-thānī 1426 Fatwa
In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.
His Eminence the Shaykh / ’Āḥmad bin Ḥamad al-Khalīlī the Venerable Grand Muftī of
the Sultanate:
114

I have not yet found the sound examples that accompanied the letter.
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Peace be upon you, and God’s blessings and mercy,
The included attachment with the letter is a group of inshād-s that include various
vocal expressions. Since the controversy amongst people has increased around [music’s]
judgment according to the Sharia, we submit it to your Eminence, seeking from you the
blessing of notifying us as to its status.
The attachment is ordered as follows:
1 - Al-duff?
2 - Western music/rhythm? (al-‘īqā’ al-gharbī)
3 - Sea music with or without interlocking clapping?
4 - Invigorating military music?
5 - Melismata (Āhāt) - by a natural human voice?
6 - Melismata by sampler (a human voice entered into a computer then used in
performance)?
7 - Autotune (a human voice entered into a computer and purified to become sharp, free
from melodic impurities)?
8 - Vocal alternatives (a human voice entered into a computer which then undergoes
editing until it becomes like another voice)?
9 - Bass (al-bayz) (a rough voice accompanying music/rhythm either human or nonhuman)?
The answer: It is well-known that devotion is a wide door. So he who is prudent
leaves [unmolested] the non-prohibited—that is most safe and forthright. As for the
judgment, I do not find in what has been presented in these expressions something that is
forbidden except for the Western music, insofar as it is in imitation of non-believers, and
the Sea Music with interlocking clapping due to the clapping. Surely God knows best.
(cited in al-Sulaymānī 2011, 109-110)
Is Music Useful or Useless?
What emerges from the discussion of music most clearly is (1) that proscriptions on
music made by Ibāḍīs are very fine-grained, and (2) that a crucial deciding factor is whether or
not the music or instrument serves a discrete and necessary social function. Hence, while musical
instruments are broadly impermissible, commonly held exceptions exist to preserve what is
useful and beneficial—similarly, music that is considered to have no use or benefit is prohibited.
Discussing Ibāḍīs’ take on musical instruments in general, Cook reports that
[Omani Ibāḍī] jurists will consider—though not necessarily adopt—a kinder view of an
instrument if it meets one or more of the following criteria: if it is not actually being
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played; it is being played without the accompaniment of singing, revelry or partying; it
could in principle be used for some legitimate purpose; it is being used by children rather
than adults. (2001, 411, italics mine)
One example of this kind of thinking is given by al-Nabahānī when he writes that the large qaṣba
(CLA, “reed,” flute) was “beneficial in remembering the hereafter (or death in another reading).
It was reported about Al-Wuḍāḥ bin ‘Aqaba (f. 237/851) that his son Ziyād saw him listening to
the sound of the large qaṣba while crying” (2015, 45-6).
This practical mode of thinking in religious matters was reported by Limbert (2010) in
her ethnographic research on sociality in Bahlā’ as well. However, Limbert notes the reverse:
While older Bahlawis [people from the town of Bahlā’] considered neighborly sociality a
condition of being a proper and pious person, I quickly learned that some younger
Bahlawis considered this visiting to be an impediment to human responsibilities to God.
Being social, younger Bahlawis argued, was a distraction from the constant remembering
of God that was incumbent upon pious individuals. Thus, rather than considering this
sociality to be “proper” (that is, religiously sanctioned), younger Bahlawis argued that it
was useless (ghayr nafa’a), a waste of time, and thus a sin. (2010, 14)
Rather than the usefulness of a practice determining its acceptability, it is the uselessness of an
action (within a certain discourse) that condemns it. Despite protestations that visiting might, in
fact, be a kind of work (shughl] (like praise), its frivolity is enough to make it sinful. Limbert
notes that Oliver Leaman (1980) traces this tendency of equating “uselessness” with sin back to
the 3rd/10th-11th century Islamic jurist ‘Abd al-Jabbar, who first presented the uselessness of an
action as “sufficient condition of its evilness,” whatever the consequences (129). If, as ‘Abd alJabbar claims,
everything has value because there is a purpose behind its existence, anything which is
not in accordance with this purpose must be evil. The performance of a useless action
must be objectionable on such a view, since it involves acting as though there were no
all-encompassing purpose at work in creation. (Leaman 1980, 129)
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Despite the high-mindedness of this claim, for Omanis the concept of uselessness is a very
practical one. A common saying amongst Omanis when evaluating something is to say “mā
yaṣlaḥ,” which means both “it’s not proper” and “it’s not useable, not practicable,” or the
opposite, “yaṣlaḥ,” meaning that it is fitting, serviceable, or useful. An Omani proverb runs, gald
al-fi’r mā yaṣlaḥ l-al-raḥmānī (lit., “a mouse’s hide isn’t useful/enough to skin a raḥmānī
drum”), used to refer to meager attempts to solve a big problem. Encouragements to drink more
water, juice, or coffee, to eat more, or to use incense are accompanied by the phrase, “it will
benefit you” (yistafīdak). After many interviews and performances, I was asked “did you benefit
from it?” (tistafīd minnu?) Discussing the moral dangers of coffee and coffee consumption in
Bahlā’, Limbert cites a jurisprudential qaṣīda by the scholar Mājid bin Khamīs al-‘Abrī (12521340/1836/7-1921/2) who “simply notes that there is nothing wrong with coffee and that its
effects are not harmful, but rather useful” (66).
a. Legitimating the Drums of War
However, the most important exception for a discussion of the razḥa and the drumming
in it is the Ibāḍī exceptions for military music. “It is noteworthy that the attitudes of the [Ibāḍī]
jurists are not uniformly hardline in all these matters,” writes Cook, and that “the single most
prominent motive behind the softer views is military” (2001, 410). His paragraph on this
exception is worth citing at length:
One jurist who considers playing chess a grave sin allows it when the object is instruction
in military strategy. Another describes male shrieking as a wrong and a residue of the
Jāhiliyya, but relents when asked to consider it as a war-cry intended to rally the troops
and strike fear into the enemy; he expresses the hope that it may then be permitted,
though his preference would be for the use of the Islamic war-cry ‘God is greatest!’ …
One jurist recollects that in the coastal city of Ṣuḥār, Maṭṭār and his men had not been
prevented from use of this drum [the duhra], and he wonders what the doctrine of the
scholars concerned can have been; we know from elsewhere that Maṭṭār and his men
were Indians [possibly Baloch], a military force which the Imām maintained in Ṣuḥār.
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Another jurist states that a certain Abū ’l-Ḥuwārī al-Ma‘nī used to object to the Indian
who beat the drum in the camp (sc. at Nizwā in the Omani interior), and distanced
himself from the Oman in consequence. More striking than any of this is the discussion
of the question whether the imam may overlook the misdeeds of his own followers in
wartime; one view accepts this concession, the other rejects it. The emphasis on military
efficacy is doubtless linked to the resilience of the imamate in Oman. (Cook 2001, 410411)
Al-Nabhānī notes the same process regarding drums in the Interior. “It seems that drums
acquired their legitimacy from some Islamic scholars due to their effect they had during war and
in meeting the enemy” (2016, 46). He writes, “Shaykh Khamīs bin Sa‘īd al-Shaqṣī (c. 1030s1090s/1620s-1680s) confirms that when he said:… ‘In our days, the drum is not considered
shameful (lā yistaqbaḥ al-ṭabl) especially if it was a time of war, in a parade at the (military?)
camps, and perhaps as a sign or notice of that” (46). Al-Shaqṣī concludes that “each time period
and people has its own legal judgment,” and al-Nabhānī astutely notes that this is perhaps written
with a sense of resignation. Al-Shaqṣī was, after all, “one of [Imām Nāṣir bin Murshid’s] central
supporters” and “this period was a time of the wars to unify the nation and throw out the
occupying Portuguese” (46). This echoes the stances cited in earlier sections from the current
Grand Muftī, Nūr al-Dīn al-Sālimī, and others. In the next section, we will examine more closely
the context and social ramifications of this doctrinal position over the last few centuries, and the
controversial role it has had in aiding state power.
“The Right has come”: Music in Omani statecraft
In the previous section, we have seen how, despite early and continued condemnation of
music and musical instruments, Omani Ibāḍī intellectuals have made special exceptions for the
drum in times of war or for the inspiration of fighters. In this section, I collect and review much
of the extant textual evidence for the role of music in non-jurisprudential contexts. I focus on two
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contexts: that of Oman proper, and the Omani colonization of East Africa and Zanzibar. As we
shall see, reports of music in these contexts are often associated with the violent display of state
power. Insofar as music is played in the context of such state displays, it is tolerated as useful.
Outside of this context, it is often condemned. This trend is especially well-documented since the
early 11th/17th century, which corresponds with the rapid expansion of Omani state power,
internal development, and imperial ambitions. It is perhaps unsurprising that the bulk of
anecdotes including drums and performance come from this period.
a. Oman Proper
Omani musicologist Musallim al-Kathīrī has gathered some of the few mentions of music
and instruments that exist in the native Omani historical texts, especially from Nūr al-Dīn alSālimī’s history Tuḥfa al-’a‘yān bi-sīra ahl ‘Umān (Masterpiece of the Notables in the Story of
the People of Oman, 1998]. In al-Sālimī’s retelling of the origin myth of the Omani Arabs, it is
the Persians who used “trumpets and drums” in their fight against them, while the Arabs did not
(al-Kathīrī 2005, 48). However, somewhere in the intervening millennia Arabs began to use
drums for a variety of purposes, often communal, military, and political. Due to the paucity of
evidence over this period, we will confine ourselves to the last two or three centuries.
Historical examples of music and drumming largely begin with the end of the Ya‘āriba
and beginnings of the Āl Bū Sa‘īdī dynasty, in the mid-18th century. Nūr al-Dīn and bin Razīq
both retell the story of the founder of the Āl Bū Sa‘īd dynasty Aḥmad bin Sa‘īd’s Trojan Horselike hoodwinking of the Persian invaders at Barka using drums (al-Kathīrī 2005, 48). Aḥmad had
apparently invited all the remaining Persian leaders in Oman to a grand feast in the fort at Barka,
during which he fed them lavishly (including perhaps alcohol). In their overfed stupor, Aḥmad
commanded a drummer to play from the ramparts and call out, “anyone who has a complaint
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against the Persians, come take your revenge!”115 Upon hearing the call, Omanis fell on the
trapped Persians and murdered them, save for a number who were expelled back to Bandar
Abbas. Later in bin Razīq’s telling, two descendants of Aḥmad cemented peace between them
“by beat of drum” (Badger 1871, 202), while another anecdote notes the presence of horn
trumpets amongst the army of the Imam ‘Azzān (r. 1284-6/1868-1870) (Al-Kathīrī 2005, 48).
More than just the presence of drums, the razḥa complex has long been associated with
warfare. Al-Kathīrī notes that comparable to other Islamic contexts, music had a “specific
military function in Omani armies” (2005, 48-9). An anonymous text recorded in the late 1980s
can serve as an example:
Sayyidī lan ’amr ‘alaynā
Nasabbiq al-bārūt wa-l-nār
Fī al-ma‘arak lan talāqaynā
Nartamī law damnā gārī
Our Lord [need] not order us;
We race to the gunpowder and spark.
In battle you will not find us
Falling, though runs our blood!
Wellsted is likely the first to describe the dance in English and does regard it as a “war dance.”
Men dance with weapons and display their courage and skill-at-arms (1837, 69, 319-22):
Upon my return to the tent [in Ga‘alān Bānī Bū ‘Alī, a town in the southwestern
Sharqiyya region] I found there the whole of the tribe, at Beni-Abu-'Ali, consisting of
about two hundred and fifty men, assembled for the purpose of exhibiting their war
dance. They had formed a circle, within which five or six of their number now entered.
After walking leisurely round for some time, each challenged one of the spectators by
This is likely the ṣāyiḥ, a town crier who played instruments (a drum also called ṣāyiḥ or horn
trumpets, barāghīm) and made announcements, typically employed in many forts and castles as
described by al-Shaydī (2008, 119 n.266). Al-Kathīrī adds that “one Omani citizen” recalled that
drums were very common in signaling certain kinds of activities: one knew the sound of the
neighborhood’s drum, and different drums announced the arrival of important guests, others that
enemies were at the gates. Al-Hashimy writes that Sultan Fayṣal sounded a drum to warn the
citizens of Muscat that “it was unsafe to stay outside the walls at night” due to the Imam Sālim’s
raids (1994, 108).
115
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striking him gently with the flat of his sword. His adversary immediately leaped forth,
and a feigned combat ensued. They have but two cuts, one directly downwards at the
head, and the other horizontally across the legs. They parry neither with the sword nor
shield, but avoid the blows by leaping or bounding backwards. The blade of their sword
is three feet in length, straight, thin, double-edged, and as sharp as a razor. As they carry
it upright before them, by a peculiar motion of their wrist they cause it to vibrate in a very
remarkable manner, which has a singularly striking effect when they are assembled in
any considerable number. The shield is attached to the sword by a leathern thong; it
measures about fourteen inches in diameter, and is generally used to parry the thrust of
the spear, or jambeer [likely the khanjar]. It was part of the entertainment to fire off their
matchlocks under the legs of some one of the spectators, who appeared too intent on
watching the game to observe their approach, and any signs of alarm which incautiously
escaped the individual, added greatly to their mirth. Their only music consisted of a small
drum, beaten by a slave. (Wellsted 1837, 69-70)
The context, dueling, and regalia he describes are strikingly similar to current practice in the
Interior, with the exception of the playing of a single drum as opposed to a matched pair. Rather
than just dodging the sword, the aim nowadays is often the satisfying clack of hitting your
opponent’s shield. The circle dance style of the razḥa might have been developed in the
southwestern Sharqiyya—this is certainly the opinion of many of my interlocutors—and this text
provides some more evidence. Yusuf al-Shawqi, the Director of the Omani Centre for
Traditional Music prior to Musallim al-Kathīrī, notes that a variety of the razḥa which involves
the two encircling lines is named razḥa al-ḥuwāmah (the “gliding razḥa”) and is “common in the
provinces of the Sharqīyah, especially in Ṣūr, Ja‘alān Bānī Bū ‘Alī and Ja‘alān Bānī Bū Ḥasan”
(1994, 155). In the interior, however, this style coexists with many others, which are likely just
as antique.
Later, in Muscat, Wellsted describes another razḥa form, involving meeting lines:
The men amused themselves [during the ‘īd celebration] with horse and camel races, and
with the same description of war-dance as I have described in my account of the BeniAbu-'Ali Arabs. They also practised another, which I have never seen elsewhere: two
lines form at the distance of ten or fifteen yards, and approach each other to the sound of
a drum, beaten by two slaves stationed midway between them. They proceed at a slow
and measured pace, until within about two yards from each other, and then either party,
after simultaneously bowing their heads, retreated to the same distance as before; in this
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manner they continued to approach, bow, and retreat as long as I remained. (1837, 31922)
This style of razḥa is another unnamed but common form in the Interior, and the blending of the
two might be evidence of the development of the line form outside of the southwestern
Sharqiyya, and the circle form within it. In any case, both are closely associated with warfare and
the movements of soldiers and battle lines.
Direct evidence of the razḥa being used in warfare is presented by bin Razīq in his
history of the Āl Bū Sa‘īdī-s (bin Razīq 2001). Sulṭān, the son of the Imam Aḥmad Āl Bū Sa‘īdī,
the governor of Ṣuḥār who repelled the Persians from Oman, was living in Gwadar on the
Makrān coast after a failed coup against his father. The Baloch ruler there granted the town and
its environs to Sulṭān as a gift, which the Omanis retained until the late 1950s. After the death of
his father and nephew, who had been appointed the wālī of Muscat by his own father (at that
time the Imam Sa‘īd bin Aḥmad), Sulṭān returned to Oman in c. 1206/1792 and marched on
Muscat. He sent a letter before him proclaiming that he was only interested in attacking the forts
of the city and would leave the inhabitants and merchants in peace. The merchants, one in fact
the author’s father, devised a clever way to gauge the strength and will of the defenders. The
merchant families fired muskets into the valley through which Sulṭān’s army would have to
march and cried that they had met the enemy. When the defensive forts in Muscat merely fired
their muskets into the air in a bid to pretend that they were willing to fight rather than emerging,
the merchants of Muscat knew they would be defeated by Sulṭān’s army.
About an hour afterwards Sultan and his force approached through the Wadi, with their
swords drawn and singing as their war-song this noble sentiment, “The right has come
and has overthrown the wrong; the wrong is overthrown!” (wa siyūfihim maslūla wa
Sulṭān yamshī ’imāmihim. Wa sha‘ārihim hadhihi al-āyā al-sharīfa, ‘jā’ al-ḥaqq wa
zahiq al-bāṭil, ’inna al-bāṭil kān zuhūqan’ [bin Razīq 2001, 370]) When they reached my
father's house, my father went out to Sultan, took his hand, congratulated him, and
informed him that he had read his letter to the notables and merchants of Maskat, and that
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they had expressed themselves much gratified at his consideration for them [Sulṭān soon
successfully took the forts.] (Badger 1871, 217)
The original text in question here gives a more literal translation as “and their war-song
was this noble verse of the Qu’rān,” since the quoted war-cry is found in Sūra al-’Isrā’ 81. With
the description of marching, naked swords in hand, a leading patron, and a collective war-cry, I
think it is not unreasonable to read this as an example of a razḥa or very conservatively as some
kind of proto-razḥa. Here, an army marches and gives a war-cry together, clearly fulfilling the
practical premise of Ibāḍī Islamic tolerations for razḥa—prosecuting military action against a foe
of the state. The text of the presumptive razḥa is also Qur’ānic, therefore waylaying concern that
the text might be objectionable on other grounds.
Several of the “cousin” forms of the razḥa in the Ẓāhira and Buraymī region are also
clearly linked to warfare. One, al-ḥarbiyya, is simply named “the one for war (CLA, ḥarb).” AlShaydī notes that al-‘ayyāla, “one of the arts of war and the sword,” is named for “attackers” or
“those that come against” (O. Ar, ‘āl, pl. ‘ayyāl) (2008, 211, 211 n.610). “It was named thus al‘ayyāla because it was performed for warfare when one tribe came against (ta‘āl) another”
(2008, 211 n.610). An example from 1986:
Yā dār al-falak, yā dār wa nayyāl al-ghumām
Winn shira‘ al-maṣgūl ḥinnā fī hawwāh
Wilā’ wilaynā al-dār wa al-‘izz istigām
Wilā’ namawt wa nistirīḥ min al-ḥayāh.
O Heavens, O home of the dispeller of clouds.
The swords come buzzing and we’re in love.
If we fled the homeland and upright honor,
Then we die and take a rest from life.
Al-Kathīrī claims that the razḥa al-wahābiyya form is named after the Saudi Wahhābī
movement, as the dance groups performed to prepare for battle against them during their
incursion in the early 1800s. “Nowadays, the wahābiyya / ‘ayyāla is known in the areas that were
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the stage to this conflict,” in the Ẓāhira, northern Bāṭina, and in the United Arab Emirates (50).
Al-Kathīrī continues: “arms (swords, daggers, rifles, and camel-sticks) are considered a common
symbol in dance within many of the traditional Omani musical forms, as in [the arts that
exemplify] ḥamās, self-praise, and praise” (2008, 50).
Razḥa-s were clearly closely tied to fighters and fighting. Following our investigation in
the first section, this should imply that this kind of music was permitted insofar as it fulfilled a
function. Interestingly, historian Sa‘īd bin Muḥammad bin Sa‘īd al-Hashimy, in his dissertation
on the rule of the revivalist Imam Sālim bin Rāshid (r.1331-8/1913-20), records that
According to one story [Imam Sālim] was walking one day near the fort of Nazwa (the
old traditional capital of the Ibāḍ) and he heard some soldiers singing and dancing. He
shouted at them: behave yourselves in this place! When the soldiers heard his
commanding voice they became full of fear and became quiet. (1994, 56)
Clearly Imam Sālim was admonishing these soldiers for performing what was likely a razḥa.
This story helps to show that razḥa were necessary at certain times but were not necessarily
warmly embraced by elites at all times. Razḥa is useful and dangerous. While it is valued for
instilling virtue and encouraging the faithful, it can also inspire religious rebuke and celebrate
vice. Some of my interlocutors, for example, were especially fond of razḥa-s that were called
ghazaliyya, love razḥa. One such razḥa was taught to me after a raucous meal of ṣalūna, a kind
of watery curry, whose gingery spice was said to excite the eater to sing this:
Kharagat min al-ḥuṣn al-muṣūfa
‘ūdihā116 yaḥanni al-ṣufūf.
ṣadrihā sab‘a niṣūf
tabarī al-‘ila wa al-sigām
‘aynihā nugm al-thirayya’
khudhihā badr al-tamām
mazūrihā mā dām ḥayya

.

As mentioned in the first chapter, this literally means “her wood,” in this region of Oman read
as “her tree trunk,” referring to her figure.
116
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bukra wa ta‘ad al-khiṣām
She went out from the fair castle,
Her slim waist swaying.
Her chest is half a seven,117
That cures all sickness and ills
Her eye is the North Star,
Her cheek the full moon.
Her visits are what sustains life;
Bah, tomorrow consider the consequences!
This is precisely the kind of poem that would in any other case be considered forbidden as
immoral singing, ghinā’ al-mājin. However, this razḥa is now sung at weddings (“just late in the
evening, you know, when the kids are off to bed,” one man sheepishly offered).
Recall that since the Imam was not allowed to have a standing army, tribes had to be
petitioned to join his military excursions. Often Imams did this with letters (see al-Hashimy
1994), but from what we’ve seen it seems likely that much of this work amongst common people
was accomplished through sung poetry. In the entry on razḥa in his 1994 Dictionary of
Traditional Music in Oman, Shawqi writes that it “was a way of announcing war, victory, peace,
or the mediation of peace between warring parties” (1994, 152). This recalls the peace
announcement made between Imam Aḥmad’s descendants cited above, but also highlights the
razḥa’s role in the context of military action. Razḥa not only encouraged and invigorated those
doing battle, but also mediated information about warfare, broadcasting it amongst both
belligerents and those uninvolved in the actual prosecution of armed conflict. Al-Shaydī gives an
example of a razḥa sung in the context of a meeting between different parties:
ḥinnā birūg al-mikhāyil
wa-l-ri‘ūd al-gawiyya
tashad linā al-gabāyil
yawm ḥall al-ligiyya
A seven written in Indian numerals, used in Oman, is ٧, and so “half a seven” cut horizontally
is thought to resemble cleavage.
117
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We are the lightning of the incessant downpour,
The peals of strong thunder.
Witness the tribes mustered to us,
On this day of meeting! (2008, 122)
A razḥa like this one probably played an important role in not only invigorating soldiers but
informing them of the stakes and encouraging them and their leaders to join.
Another intriguing anecdote shows us further how the arts were both folded into the state
apparatus and functioned in disseminating information. In ‘Ābī Bashīr Muḥammad “Shayba” bin
Nūr al-Dīn ‘Abdullah bin Ḥumayd al-Sālimī’s (d. 1314-1406/1893-1985) history of the 20th
century Imamate Kitāb nahḍa al-’ā‘yān bi-ḥurriyya ‘Umān (The Book of the Notables’
Renaissance in the Liberation of Oman], he chronicles the election of the Imam Muḥammad bin
‘Abdullah al-Khalīlī in 1920. “Just after sunrise on Friday the 13th day of Dhī al-Qa‘ada of the
year 1338/1920] the religious scholars, notables, and ‘those that bind and loose’ (’ārbāb al-ḥall
wa-l-‘aqd) gathered in the Nizwā mosque” to finalize the contract and pledge of allegiance to the
Imam Muḥammad bin ‘Abdullah al-Khalīlī (324). They apparently had to nearly force the title
on him, and even “did not take from him a pledge nor condition, as was taken from weak
Imams,” something that would limit his activities and purview as Imam (324). After listing the
personages that then pledged allegiance to the new Imam (concluding with “the common folk”),
His Eminence ’Abū Mālik gave the people a speech about contract, then after him ’Abū
Zayd gave a speech to the army. After the conclusion of the two speeches, the majlis
participants dispersed and the Imam took power—the doors were opened for him,
cannons rang out the good news, and fine singers and criers began spreading (the news
around Oman, wa qām al-ṣādiḥ wa al-bāghim bi-l-nashr).
Happiness effaces this honor presented,
So the sad do not frown when you are smiling. (al-Sālimi 1998, 324-5)
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The terms al-ṣādiḥ and al-bāghim require explanation here. Al-ṣādiḥ118 refers to a fine, powerful
male singer, a kind of falsetto which is also used to describe the singing of birds. The verb it is
derived from means “to sing, to chant” (Wehr 1994, ṣ-d-ḥ). Al-bāghim is slightly less
straightforward. A historian put it to me this way:
Historian: What al-Sālimi means here is not the literal meaning, this word means a cow
or gazelle or camel that is lowing/bellowing. Baghama means to cry out, or to call out but
it is for pastoral animals. Often this is said between the mother and the young, the young
lows after the mother. It wants milk, it sees a lion, like this. Here, it is a combination of
terms that shows that all were singing the name of the Imam, in high voices, the ṣādiḥ,
and the low voices, the bāghim. Like we say, I searched East and West—did you go all
the way to China and then to America? No, it is an expression of magnitude, do you
understand me?
BJG: Yes, it is clear now. And what do you think he means by this, in terms of the arts?
H: This is unmistakable; he means by this the ‘āzī and the razḥa (kiānat al-‘āzī wa-lrazḥa), this is the ṣādiḥ and bāghim respectively. The high voice and the low voice, this
also carries the meaning of the high classes (al-khāṣa) and the low (al-‘āma) in society.
In this he means the news spread far and wide.
It is important to mention here that the historian in question knew the topic of my dissertation
and so his attribution of the meaning of ṣādiḥ and bāghim as ‘āzī and razḥa may be more
friendly than factual.

The ’ism fā‘il of the verb ṣadaḥa/yaṣdaḥ, ṣ-d-ḥ; though see Wehr 1994 who defines it as a
“note raised a semitone, a sharp.”
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However, there is some evidence that ‘āzī-s and razḥa-s were performed for the Imam
Sālim’s election ceremony in 1913. During my research, an ‘āzī began to circulate on social
media that was claimed to be one sung at this election. “A qaṣīda from an ‘āzī dating to around
1913, to the election of the Imam Sālim bin Rāshid al-Kharūṣī,” the text read, “the same spirit of
ḥamās and national pride that was in that day is in this ‘āzī.” I could not corroborate the
historical accuracy of the poem myself, though many readers claimed that the antiquated
language was enough proof—many words challenged even accomplished poets. Al-Hāshimy
claims that many of the poems that were read that day “were later published in a book called
Tahānī al-Imām Sālim b. Rāshid al-Kharūṣī (Congratulations to the Imam Sālim bin Rāshid alKharūṣī] by [Shaykh] Nāṣir b. Sulaymān al-Lamkī in Zanzibar in 1332/1914” (1994, 88). Note
that this election proceeded with the same formal order of genres of oral performance as we have
seen in celebrations involving the wālī of Manaḥ, during the opening of the soccer pitch, and
others. First, there are formal speeches given by relevant persons, followed by recited poems
written for the occasion, followed by “singing and chanting.”119 In any case, the translation of
this purported ‘āzī is incomplete and tentative. Nevertheless, the ‘āzī demonstrates much of what
has been claimed regarding generosity and giving, communal representation, and mutual
obligations between rulers and ruled:
I invoke the name of the Originator,
My heart sharpened by my important task.
The news has spread about the Ghāfirī (meaning the Shaykh Ḥimyar bin Nāṣir al-Nabhānī alRiyāmī [d. 1920], who was counted as the leader of the Ghāfiri faction in the Sultanate)120
In Jan Morris’s description of the Sultan Sa‘īd’s 1955-6 royal progress through the Interior,
Sultan in Oman, she describes the reception of the Sultan in Nizwā in terms similar to those
expressed by other authors; typically, no specific mention is made of music.
119

A staunch ally of Imam Sālim’s Imamate, he led the Bānī Riyām tribe on several campaigns
against Bahlā’, Gabrīn, and Rustāq on behalf of the Imamate.
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That he is extraordinary, and the Imam comes forth.
He is extraordinary, and the faithful come forth.
‘Ibrī and Tanūf have escaped.121
Ḥimyar is insatiable, no man exceeds him,
Other than widowers and orphans.122
Other than widowers; Father of the right,
Who makes things affordable by his own wealth!
From Sharjah and the northern country,
Beyond wasting from hunger, he devours foods.
Beyond wasting from hunger, he is to them a seller of his life (shirāh],
And to them he dispenses the zakāh tax.
They have called the Maghrib prayer for years,
And he loves the Muslims’ victory.
They said, “yea, we are ready!”
The people are at the ready.
Obediently, the people are ready,
And they are proud of Nizwa, the westernmost.
In the fort123 blows a strong wind,
Undertaking the destruction of the ugly.
Undertaking the destruction from the wall.
O bin Ḥamad, there is no victory for you.124
Confronted, he despaired from life,
He drank from the fated cup of death by his own hand.
He drank the cup of death from his own hand,
This refers to the two towns joining the Imamate, presumably. Tanūf was the place where the
Imam Sālim was elected; ‘Ibrī was the “turbulent frontier province” of the Imamate, bordering
Saudi Arabia and constantly threatening independence (Wilkinson 1987, 254).
121

This was said to refer to Ḥimyar’s humility; others claimed it referred to his “hunger for war,
which was like a widower’s or orphan’s hunger for food.”
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Likely Nizwā fort, where Imam Sālim held power.

Referring to Sayyid Sayf ibn Ḥamad Āl Bū Sa‘īdī, the ruler of Nizwā fort, who committed suicide during
the Imam’s siege of it.
124

353
The sugar-cane presses did not speak of it.125
Follower of the writings of the [high officials]126,
A horse [i.e., bin Ḥamad] they led by the halter and bit.
A horse they led goes onward,
[While] the army is in the mosque safely,
Not one fatigued, unbroken;
By God the victory is everlasting.
The WhatsApp message concluded, “it is said that the owner of this ‘āzī is Barīk bin Ḥamūd bin
Khaṣīb bin Salīm bin Mubarak bin Khanjar bin ‘Umrān al-Raḥbī (of the house of the ’Awlād
Salīm).” The same poem can be found online with similar attributions.
A final anecdote brings us to the next section of this chapter. W. H. Ingrams, the wellknown British historian of Zanzibar, recalled that one day, while he rested at Chake in Pemba, a
crew of Omani sailors had arrived, forced to seek shelter there rather in Zanzibar due to bad
weather. Being British, he writes that
I asked them all to tea. They were Suris [from Ṣūr in Oman] and it was my first contact
with them. What struck me most was the fact that they were all black. They had,
however, finer features than our Bantus and were bearded…they rather alarmed me by
coming to tea armed to the teeth with sticks, swords and round shields of rhinoceros hide,
as well as the usual jambiya [curved dagger] round their waists. Some also carried small
war drums. After the gentle manners of my Zanzibar and Pemba friends the uncouth
habits of the seafarers at first surprised me, but they were friendly and appreciated the
party even if they were not entirely at home with cups and saucers and cakes. However
they were quite happy with the sherbet and black coffee in Arab cups, and afterwards
proposed to dance a Razha for me.
The reason of the armament now became clear. Their intentions were peaceful but
the display they gave was extremely warlike. The orchestra of drums struck up and the
rest, pairing themselves off, indulged in mimic contests on the lawn, which I thought
might end fatally at any moment, for they made great sweeping lashes at each other with
their swords, which were apparently only avoided by dexterous countering with shields
Nizwā and this region in general was known for growing a large amount of sugar-cane, which
was pressed into a sweet drink; perhaps what carried the poison that the wālī drank?
125

126

Probably referring to the Sultan’s administration, for whom the wālī held the city.
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or by leaps in the air over the passing sword which would have made any skipping
enthusiast envious. Some performed with jambiyas, making circular downward strokes
parried by shield. When one overcame his opponent he would sit astride him and make as
though to gouge out his eyes with horrifying realism. (Ingrams 1966, 38-9)
Once again, the razḥa is associated with warfare and welcome. In this case, it is performed by
sailors coming down the East African coast. In the next section, we will see how this movement
of people is further evidence of the central role of the razḥa in the politics of the state.
b.

Omani colonization of East Africa

The final source of evidence on the role of music in Omani statecraft comes from the
Omani expansion into East Africa. In the period from about 1650 to 1898, two successive waves
of colonization and imperial ambition animated Omani leaders and merchants to take more
sustained interest in controlling East African trade. This expansion was begun by the Ya‘āriba
dynasty, though as Wilkinson comments “the power of the Ya‘arubī merely increased without
being consolidated” (1987, 50). It took the economic base and connections of the Āl Bū Sa‘īdī-s
to achieve that consolidation. “From the 19th century on,” historian Beatrice Nicolini writes,
examining the second wave (1750-1898), “it was the blood-red flag of Oman that formed a tie,
and not merely in the figurative sense, between the Omani enclave of the port of Gwadar in
Makran-Baluchistan, the principal ports of Oman and the island of Zanzibar through the
movement of peoples, precious goods and slaves” (2004, 4). Zanzibar was first considered as a
capital city of the Omani empire in 1829, under the reign of Sa‘īd bin Sulṭān, who expanded
Omani influence up and down the East African littoral some 960 miles in total (Ingrams 1931,
160-3). Though much has been made of the move,127 for our purposes what is interesting is that

127

See Nicolini (2004, 136-8) for an overview.
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at some point in this period, Omani (or at least Arab) dances began to be performed by the
Swahili-speaking populations in Zanzibar and its environs.
East African coastal peoples had, over the period in question, adopted and integrated
many foreign influences within ngoma dance practices. As ethnomusicologist Kelly Askew
notes, Swahili communities “developed aesthetic preferences for cultural borrowing and the
appropriation of foreign elements” due to their historical role as intermediaries in Indian Ocean
trade (2003, 611). These borrowings reveal how often music and dance have been associated
with and constitutive of political power in East Africa (Askew 2003, 628). She examines dansi
and ngoma (glossed as “modern” and “traditional” genres respectively) to show how such
aesthetics “have clear economic utility” in the context of highly dynamic and multicultural trade
networks (2003, 632). These dances in turn were linked with competing dance associations,
themselves folded into the well-known East African urban moiety system, which acted as a
“basic integrative device for urban settlements” (Ranger 1975, 20). In light of these social
structures, Askew writes that
music and politics thus combine to create a powerful mix of political action and agents in
Swahili history and present-day practice. Through music, Swahili individuals have
appropriated European [and Arab] symbolic and cultural capital for themselves, voiced
their political agendas in song, debated political action, and used musical events as
opportunities for education and organization. (2003, 630)
These factors lead Askew to conclude that “politicking itself constitutes a Swahili aesthetic
principle. ‘To sing about’ (kumwimbia) someone, something, some event, some process and by
so doing effect social change is no small matter” (2003, 631).
Tracing these shifting influences, Ranger writes in Dance and Society in Eastern Africa,
1890-1970 (1975) that “in the early 1890s, the dominant influence [on East African dances] was
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still Arab” (20). A British imperial officer, R. Skene, provides a valuable overview of Swahili
dances from that period, published in 1917. Skene’s first entry is on “The Razha Dance”:
The Razha was originally a war dance practised by the Arabs in Arabia prior to starting
out on a raid. It originated at Manga in Muscat, and is danced with naked swords, the
object being to get the muscles of the sword arm into training. The Hatharmut or
Hadramaut Arabs also dance it, but use daggers instead of swords. The dancers, who of
course are all men, stand in two rows facing each other, or in one row. They advance
slowly a few inches at each step, keeping time to the drumming. The sword is held
perpendicularly in the right hand, the fore-arm being at a right angle with the body. While
holding the hilt of the sword in a perfect balance between the thumb and the first and
second fingers, the base of the hilt is given a smart blow with the wrist so as to make the
blade of the sword quiver. Being highly polished and made of fine supple steel, the
quivering blade reflects the light in a most effective manner. This can only be done with
the long straight double-edged sword of Southern Arabia and not with the scimitar-like
blade used further north, owing to the thickness of the latter weapon. The music for the
Razha dance is supplied by a drum called a chapuo, cylindrical in shape, covered with
goat skin on both ends. It is about eighteen inches long by eight in diameter, and is
played on both ends with the hands, while hung across the waist of the drummer by a
cord round the neck. A bass drum is also used, called a vumi of the same shape as the
chapuo, but larger, being two to three feet long and fifteen inches in diameter. It is beaten
in the same manner as the chapuo. Anyone who knows how to dance can join in. No
refreshments are served. (Skene 1917, 413)
Ranger adds that in Zanzibar “it was performed by ‘the men standing in a row and jerking their
swords in the same manner as Arabs jerk their swords, one of which may sometimes be seen in
the hand of a Swahili dancer of the Chama’[another dance form]” (Ranger 1975, 20). Several
features of this are worth commenting on. First, the name of the dance as reported by Skene is
precisely that of the Omani razḥa, though he claims it “originated” in Muscat. This attribution is
likely using Muscat as a symbol of Oman in general. Secondarily, the description of rows of
dancers is very much in line with Wellstead’s 1837 description of a dance in Muscat, while the
“shaking” of the sword blade is good evidence of a direct link with other descriptions of Omani
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dance. Similarly, the pair of drums here resemble in both size and differentiation the kāsir and
raḥmānī of Oman.128
An expert on taarab music in Tanzania, musicologist Janet Topp Fargion, adds that
“before their introduction to taarab, Shaib Abeid [a member of the first taarab club] writes,
[dance associations] played music known as kinanda cha marwas and tari la diriji, but their
favorite was to sing nyimbo za raz-ha (raz-ha songs) and other Arabic songs at weddings and
other celebrations” (Fargion 2016, 208). These dance clubs were “comprised of people of
Hadrami descent” and she cites this fact, Skene’s description of kinanda (another dance), and R.
B. Serjeant’s (1955) reports of a similar name, razīḥ, being used for a different dance in
Ḥaḍramawt in Yemen, to conclude that the dance arrived from that region. While she also cites
the entry on razḥa from Shawqi’s Dictionary, the evidence presented in this chapter seems to
point to Oman as the origin point of at least the razha described by Skene.
Arabs were not the only groups to have their dances adopted and transformed in East
Africa. Ranger documents that British, French, and German dances, marches, costumes,
instruments, and musical ideas were all brought into the beni ngoma in various ways. What is
clear is that each successive empire’s display of pomp and circumstance were, sometimes
flatteringly, sometimes sarcastically, emulated in East African’s own dances. What makes this
interesting is that razḥa was not only performed in entertainment, but also as a serious
demonstration and recognition of state power by Arab colonialists. Some films of these dances

Note that Wellsted described the dance in Ga‘alān as involving just one drum and in Muscat
involving two. There is some evidence that this style of drum pair was adopted in Oman from
Swahili drummers, much like the adoption of the shape, construction, and name of the misundū
drum from Zanzibar in the Afro-Omani līwa, a popular African-derived musical practice in the
Gulf.
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are available, but they are difficult to accurately provenance.129 This is a major reason why East
Africans seized on the razḥa to emulate: just like the European military marches they adapted
later, the razḥa was a display of power. It functioned to display the authority, military might, and
unity of the Arab colonizers. Razḥa carried out a specific function, not only in battle, but in
peace as well (what relative peace can be had in a government based on trading slaves and
colonization).
Conclusions
This chapter presented an interpretation of razḥa as a central expression of state power in
Oman, uneasily validated by Ibāḍī Islamic jurisprudential opinion. The relation of state power
and music is evidenced by the deep connections between religious interpretations of music
within the theocracy and later Sultanate and in the central presence of razḥa in the expansion of
Omani state power down the East African littoral. Practicality and purposefulness seem to be an
under-recognized heuristic that motivated the legal determinations of several ’Ibāḍī legal
scholars discussed here. Organized sound, drumming, dancing, and the emotional products of
those activities are too socially useful to condemn wholesale. This usefulness of this dancing and
drumming to the state was made clear by its spread along the state’s lines of colonial conquest.
So let’s turn to that now.

Dramsi Nizwa. “ ‘Umāniyūn yū’idūn fann al-razḥa fī Zinjibār ‘ām 1949” [Omanis perform
the razḥa in Zanzibar, 1949]. Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 15 Aug. 2017. Web. 15
Aug. 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-1t9GTc0ltE
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Chapter 6: The Gift of Rule: Legitimating the Authoritarian State with Razḥa and ‘Āzī
Music is more than a decorative art… it is a powerful medium of social order.
(DeNora 2000, 156)
States have a peculiar dual character. They are at the same time forms of institutionalized
raiding or extortion, and utopian projects. The first certainly reflects the way states are
actually experienced, by any communities that retain some degree of autonomy; the
second however is how they tend to appear in the written record.
(Graeber 2004, 65)

How does the modern authoritarian Omani state assert itself as real, effective, and
legitimate? And on what grounds can we interpret the performance of razḥa and ‘āzī as helping
to constitute the state as such? How, in short, do state performances of razḥa and ‘āzī help
constitute state hegemony? I’ve claimed that certain performance practices, the razḥa and the
‘āzī, have had variable but functional roles in legitimizing the political order of Omanis in the
past and in the present. As I have shown in previous chapters, this legitimation is predicated on
the function of the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism: the perception that mutual obligations
prevail between Omani Arab performers who direct praise and generous leaders who do good
deeds by directing goods, services, and infrastructure to local communities. There is a
recognition of mutuality between rulers and ruled, predicated on the adequate performance of the
duties and obligations placed upon them. We have explored this relationship from several
perspectives and with some problems in mind: from the perspective of performers, as engaging
in the Omani/Arab ethos of generosity, how it both displays and undermines relations of
dependency, and how it has articulated with Ibāḍī Islamic rulings on music. In chapter 3, our
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focus was on individual leaders, logical targets for praise. Here, we trace the shift in this system
from individuals to the abstraction of the state. Over the course of the 20th century, as many
Omani and non-Omani ethnographers have shown, the social contexts of these performance
practices have drastically shifted. These shifts have situated the razḥa and the ‘āzī as the two
indigenous performance practices that have become most publicly associated with the modern
state, its myth-making, and its project of legitimation. I propose that razḥa and ‘āzī have become
so central to state ritual and the formation of the Omani state as a cultural entity because they can
model the class relations that legitimate state domination.
Throughout this chapter, I offer a Gramscian, that is, a critical political economic
approach to praise in order to show how this sense of mutual obligation takes on the character of
an exchange relationship between rulers and ruled, and what this relation entails in the context of
an Arab authoritarian state. “The State,” however, is a complex concept and requires
considerable unpacking. In doing so, I propose a theoretical orientation to the state that sees its
material and economic basis and the various ideological projects that reify it as an object to be
related to as joined at the hip. “The historical production of the state” is, as anthropologist
Fernando Coronil puts it, “a mystifying complex of practices and beliefs” (1997, 116). By taking
on the useful ideas in the “nonrealist” approach embraced by recent ethnographers of the state
(Krupa and Nugent 2015, 8-14) and addressing its weaknesses through a strict reading of
Gramsci’s political economy, we can come to a richer understanding of the form, history, and
development of the state as historically conditioned sets of relations and the practices and beliefs
that sustain them. “States” are fully dual-natured: they are at once social and class relations
between rulers and ruled, whose particular forms are historically and culturally mediated, and the
complex of practices and beliefs that help frame and legitimate these relations, which are in turn
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realized in institutions, apparatuses, and cultural forms. The state is a material and an immaterial
existence at once, faces that reinforce and mask each other to produce an illusion of unity.
In Oman, the modern Sultanate took the character it did due to the mapping of particular
historical class configurations onto political institutions in such a way that power was
concentrated within a small group of elites, along with their ‘ulamā’ and merchant allies. These
elites asserted a level of independence from their allies and constituents by placing themselves as
virtually the sole beneficiaries of integration into global capital flows, the development of the
extractive oil economy, and colonial support (Ayubi 1995, ch. 7; Al-Naqeeb 1990). In order to
sustain this dominance, Gulf leaders now had the dual task of maintaining the pretense of valuing
“traditional” social relations while developing a modern state apparatus that was wholly
authoritarian and oligarchic. Anthropologist Maurice Godelier has hypothesized that class
relations of state domination are often sustained through the development of an ideology of debt,
specifically of obligation and exchange, and I offer some new perspective on his argument by
tracing some modern applications of it (Godelier 1986, 13-15, 166-7; Graeber 2012; Yeh 2013).
I argue that this framing of elite giving as generosity is ultimately a form of governance as gift:
the gift of rule. Just as gifts of gold require a reception and a response, so does the gift of rule,
the gift of order, the gift of safety and plenty.
Based on my argument that this sense of mutual obligation is modeled in the performance
of razḥa and ‘āzī, I show that relations of dependency are realized between the state/Qābūs and
performers in state-sponsored events that are, in turn, taken as a model of state-society relations
as a whole. I trace how these relations of obligation and exchange have shifted from local to
national levels and from regional to state rulers in order to argue that this shift has had an
important role in legitimizing the state through praising the Sultan, who has positioned himself
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as a human proxy of the state writ large. In so doing, I focus on the role of the state and its
structural and ideological formation in the 20th century in changing the sociopolitical context of
these practices, effectively controlling and directing their potential legitimizing power. This is
the critical bridge between performance practice and projects of legitimation undertaken by
states. Performance of razḥa and ‘āzī serve, in part, to mask the dependency relations that obtain
in authoritarian contexts by framing them as exchange or mutual obligation, which both draws
on historical ideals of authority and reasserts them.
Considering this proposal will prompt us to ask how we ought to understand these praise
practices as a political activity in an authoritarian state without political parties, formal
representation, a legislative body or any of the other trappings of modern state politics.
Throughout, I show how some historically salient features of performance (such as praise,
celebration, and legitimation) have continued to function in more or less similar ways within the
modern state, while others (such as communication, martial excitation, and communal
representation) have been downplayed, become superfluous, or have been quietly suppressed.
Further, the rise of the significance of razḥa and ‘āzī in public discourse and their inclusion in
public state ceremonies is not coincidental, but part of a larger campaign of asserting the
essential “Arabness” and “uniqueness” of Omani culture, the display of solidarity between rulers
and ruled, and an attempt to form a kind of Omani nationalism that is deeply wedded to the state
and its image of Oman. To frame this discussion within broader strands of political
ethnomusicology and anthropology, I first synthesize some of the recent literature in the
ethnomusicological and anthropological approaches to the state as an analytical category and
interrogate some assumptions regarding the content and conduct of “politics” as a kind of
activity. Next, I give an account of Omani state formation that focuses on the ways that these
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approaches to the state help explain shifting social relations between rulers and the ruled and the
ways that elites have shaped the context of praise performance. Finally, I elaborate the way in
which the Omani state has implicated organizations of civil society in its strategic manipulation
of generosity, praise, and dependency and the cultural ideals that have linked those practices and
beliefs in the past.
To begin this final chapter, however, I want to present two situations. The first is the
image that opened this dissertation: the monumentally successful ‘āzī that was presented to the
Sultan during the 40th anniversary celebrations just outside of Muscat. The second is the
controversy over the cultural “ownership” of the ‘āzī as negotiated between Oman and the
United Arab Emirates. Looking at these two situations exemplifies the stakes of some of the
questions this final chapter seeks to address.
a.

The 40th Omani National Day celebration, 2010

The international success of the 2010 ‘āzī performance by Muḥammad bin ‘Alī alMarzūqī for the 40th National Day was perhaps unexpected. Not only had every National Day
celebration since the 1970s been celebrated with one or more ‘āzī-s performed by talented
singers, but al-Marzūqī himself had been singing in a similar style (and in front of Sultan Qābūs)
since his breakthrough performance in 1994 at the Eid celebrations in Ṣaḥam as a boy. However,
the combination of a dramatic, strongly worded poem, the performance of a lifetime, a
choreography of striking bravado and audacity, and an almost solemn intensity cultivated by the
bare-bones presentation (especially when compared to the spectacularly over-the-top “operettas”
that often accompany these celebrations in the Gulf) made this performance a genre-shaping one.
In the words of an aspiring ‘āzī performer in Manaḥ, “now everyone sings like al-Marzūqī;
everyone is just copying him rather than learning the right way.” The various videos of this
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performance on YouTube have garnered hundreds of thousands of views and comments from all
over the Arab world and beyond. Perhaps the most telling examples of its success come from the
way in which ‘āzī-s all over Oman for a variety of occasions are now performed the way this 40th
anniversary performance was choreographed, rather than in the older choreography. Rather than
marching in a circle, for example, many groups now choose to remain still or march straight in
one direction. For the 40th anniversary celebration, the ‘āzī al-Marzūqī led a few important poets
and performers, all of whom contributed to planning and arranging the performance, and a huge
square formation of choral singers behind him in a straight line towards the seated Qābūs,
through a stage-set castle built to mimic traditional fort architecture. The square of choral singers
behind al-Marzūqī were all members of different performance troupes from throughout the
country who were interested in or experts in the ‘āzī. With each line, al-Marzūqī and the group
behind him waved their swords and guns and marched a few steps toward the Sultan. They
moved into an open space framed by thousands of armed guards, soldiers, police, wrestlers, and
armed dancers. Between each hemistich, this larger group raised their guns and swords into the
air, beat drums, and cried responses: wa-slimt! (Truly!) or Hāāā! Aḥmad al-Riyāmī, an ‘āzī from
Manaḥ, remembered it this way.
Aḥmad al-Riyāmī: Of course, we were called and invited to join in the National Day celebration
[in 2010], and we were eager to go (mutaḥamasīn). They called us from the Ministry of Heritage,
I think it was…
Ḥamad al-Tawbī: Yes, it was.
AR: Right, so they said ‘we’re gathering all these groups together to put on the biggest ‘āzī, alMarzūqī will give it (rāḥ yilqā‘u), and it is a qaṣīda by al-Masrūrī, who also wrote the ‘āzī for
the,…’ what was it…
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BJG: The Year of Heritage in 1994?
HT and AR: Yes, yes.
AR: So, when we got there, by God, there were hundreds, there were thousands. It was an ocean,
and they all loved the arts. They had tents set up for us, food, bathrooms, prayer rooms, it was all
there. All provided, all available (mutawāffir kulluh). They had tents, big tents, and we stayed
there for several days, and we did rehearsals for a few days.
BJG: Did you get some money for going?
AR: Yes, there was some money. The arts cost money, you know.
BJG: Do you remember…
AR: Ah, well, a few hundred riyāl I think… I’m not really sure. They were generous gifts (kānat
āndiyya), as we say.
BJG: So, you got some generous gifts, did you have other reasons to go? Was it an obligation
(lit. “upon you,” ‘alayk) like with the soccer pitch? Because of the generous gifts, I mean?
AR: No, no, no, the money was for participation, that was not the reason for participation… I
mean, the money is not important.
HT: Yes, like this.
AR: So … [AR asks BJG to repeat question about whether the obligation was similar to the
obligation felt at the opening of the soccer pitch in Manaḥ, BJG does so] Yes, yes it was similar
(yitishabah al-’amr). We have to represent ourselves; we recognize Oman and we are proud of it
(naftakhir bih). That’s love of country, you know, love of Qābūs. This is not an invitation one
ignores/forgets (al-da‘wa mā yunsī).
BJG: Of course. So, let’s watch the video… then I can ask…
AR: Yes, let’s go…
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[We watch the video on a laptop.130 As we do, AR sings the lines and hums the melody for
words he does not remember.]
HT: Did you see our brother in there, duktūr? He was in the group following.
BJG: No! Where were you, brother?
AR: [scrubs backwards through video, then points to screen] Here, look. I was thinner then,
[laughs] (wazinnī kān khafīf). I think that’s me, it’s hard [to tell].
BJG: Were you there, O Ḥamad?
HT: Yes, but we were on the sides. He [Qābūs] gave us all rifles, real ones. F-A-L [pronounced
as English letters].131
BJG: Why were you not in the group following?
HT: Well, that group was for people who knew the ‘āzī, experts in the ‘āzī I mean. Aḥmad, he’s
an expert. They all learned from each other, and we were on the sides, responding, I mean.
BJG: Wow, Aḥmad, that must have been really wonderful. Did you enjoy it?
AR: Yes, it was very beautiful. It inspired me to memorize the ‘āzī, to want to perform the ‘āzī
as well. Everyone, I tell you, everyone who followed the ‘āzī that day remembers it. It was all
legends, like the legends team (firqat al-Āsāṭīr, a soccer team that only fielded players who had
“retired” from the official soccer club roster. The team had been the discussion of conversation
beforehand.] there at the head, the ‘āzī [al-Marzūqī] the poet [al-Masrūrī] and that al-Tawbī who
was too busy to be interviewed by you, [laughs]. They were all there. It was wonderful.

Badr al-Rabī‘ī. “Fann al’āzī min mahrajān al-sha‘abī li-l-‘īd al-waṭanī al-arba‘īn 2010” [The
‘āzī art from the 40th National Day popular festival.]. Online Video Clip. YouTube. YouTube, 29
November 2010. Web. 13 July 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yh5p8Qxp9Nc
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HT is here referring to a standard British Commonwealth rifle, the Fusil Automatique Legér
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BJG: And he memorized the poem and gave a beautiful performance…
AR: Yes, that is very important. It was his performance, but he did not sing live, it was a
recording; it’s necessary because mistakes are not welcome in this kind of thing, [these things]
require very precise timing.
The staging of this event is telling and can be fruitfully contrasted with other similar
events. Generally speaking, one kind of state-sponsored event is composed of a selection of
“traditional tableaus,” usually referred to in Oman as lawḥāt (“tableau” or “scene”). These
typically include a variety of local dancers and singers performing lightly choreographed
regional performance genres, such as women dancing al-bar‘a in Ẓufār or men dancing the alrawwāḥ in Musandam, in a stadium setting. Such performances might also include equestrian
displays, camel-riding, pounding wheat, a local giving a qaṣīda, or other elements of local
folklore and material culture being presented to various governmental authorities. For example,
the relatively uncelebrated National Day celebration filmed for TV in Nizwā in 1987 contained
both razḥa and ‘āzī, but both were presented more or less in historically accurate ways and were
not previously recorded and played over a speaker system.132 This led to a relatively quiet and
human performance, as opposed to the almost overwhelming volume associated with similar
celebrations throughout the Gulf. In 1987, the ‘āzī was conducted in the typical manner
associated with the Dakhiliyya and Sharqiyya provinces, with the ‘āzī himself moving around the
inside of a half-circle of responders, not facing a particular addressee. On the other extreme of
civic celebrations, there are the highly choreographed ’awbirayt (“operetta”) spectaculars so
popular with Gulf autocrats. These typically involve elaborate fireworks, lightshows, tremendous
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It should be noted that this was perhaps the first planned National Day celebration after the
completion of the nationwide folklore documentation project launched in the early 1980s.
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screens, and through-composed, semi-narrative songs in the Mashreqi ’ughniyya mold that
dutifully display well-mannered children, beautiful women, and chivalrous men delivering
obsequious monologues in Classical Arabic. Such performances often present a highly edited
version of the national myth, with flawless choreography and tremendous spectacle, but hold
apparently little interest to any of the Omani viewers with whom I watched them. Exceptions,
especially amongst men, were performances of ‘āzī, razḥa, or genres like murabba‘, a kind of
rhymed verse delivered at a blistering speed. These were, they noted, undoubtedly performed by
actual Omanis and not Iraqi, Palestinian, Jordanian, or Egyptian performers brought in as
“ringers,” as Rasmussen (2012) puts it.133
It was a thoughtful and powerful combination of these two types of staging that have
been seen at national events before that lent such potency to the 40th anniversary ‘āzī. It was a
blending of spectacular choreography and commitment to presenting actual Omanis engaging in
performances that were meaningful to them. In terms of spectacle and choreography, the array of
armed men in service of Qābūs were all aligned and facing him or marching by and saluting him,
referencing the poetic line “we all are a razor-sharp sword in your hand” (we will address the full
text later in the chapter). He had symbolically armed them, and they in turn recognized this and
saluted him with those admittedly unloaded weapons. The invincibility of the Sultan was on
display, unworried by the thousands of guns before him. Similarly, the performers were all given
new uniforms, swords and weapons so that they would have an almost anonymous, non-localized
or specific, presence: the Arab Omani everyman. Finally, the actual audio of the ‘āzī was pre-
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See Rasmussen 2012 and Rasmussen and Al-Harthy 2012 for a more detailed discussion of
these events. Rasmussen downplays the importance of “traditional” art forms presented therein
in favor of music composed outside of Oman for Omani celebrations. In my experience, Omanis
have little interest in these composed songs.
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recorded and edited to be of very high quality in terms of sound and performance. However,
these adapted elements do not completely overshadow the historical inspirations of the razḥa and
‘āzī. The streams of dancers were not, it should be noted, foreign dancers flown in for the event,
but were a broad spectrum of experienced Omani Arab men drawn from all over the sultanate to
perform the most masculine, belligerent, and ḥamās-inducing war-dance, the razḥa, in local
dialect and with local drummers, costumes, and drums. Duelers danced and leapt in between the
huge groups of marchers, interacted with the drummers and flashed and buzzed their Omani
swords as they passed the Sultan. With respect to the ‘āzī, al-Marzūqī presented a typical melody
and vocal timbre for an ‘āzī, which also retained the most common refrain type of the coast,
ṣubiyān yā kibār al-shiyyim (O, youths of the highest moral character). The combination of these
styles of choreography lended the performance both the air of traditionality and authenticity and
the direct, even overwhelming presence of the choreographed spectacle. In unison they were
profoundly arresting.
b. Who can throw the best ‘āzī? Contested ownership of performance practices in
Oman and the UAE
Certainly, the best evidence for the potency of the ‘āzī in representing the Omani state
and praising its leader is the fact that the performance was adopted by the arrangers of the 42nd
celebration of the foundation of the UAE in Abu Dhabi in 2013. Called “The Spirit of Union”
(which has been the brand of the Emirati National Day celebrations since the 40th anniversary
celebration in 2011), the 2013 ‘āzī performance in Abu Dhabi was based on similar
performances held in the UAE in the past. This year’s, however, included a round of razfa-s (a
dance similar to razḥa, but without drumming and usually performed in static facing lines) led, in
fact, by Muḥammad bin Zāyid al-Nahyān, the recognized crown prince of Abu Dhabi. The
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performance134 was given by ‘Ayḍa al-Manhālī, an Emirati popular singer who began his career
singing shallāt, a kind of sung poetry that includes drumming but no “music,” and who later
transitioned to the world of Gulf pop. Al-Manhālī’s ‘āzī was only partial—he deleted the initial
ṣayḥāt, or calls to the listeners; only sang two lines per cycle; the “wa-slimt!” response from the
chorus only occured after the first full line; and, finally, he did not use the typical beginning and
ending line, “wa-muslimīn tikabbir!” with the response, “allahu akbār!” Al-Manhālī has gone on
to give several more ‘āzī-s since then, often at National Day performances throughout the UAE,
as have performers like Ḥamad al-‘Āmirī and Ḥussayn al-Jassimī. In each instance, the
performances have evolved slightly—take for example Ḥamad al-‘Āmirī’s 2017 performance135
at the “March of the Tribes” during the Zayid Traditional festival in Abu Dhabi, whose
choreography was modeled more closely on the 2010 Omani ‘āzī. This example was a
processional ‘āzī, but instead of taking a few steps and stopping for each verse, the groups never
stopped walking forward, through the large faux fort architecture.
Omanis I spoke with about these performances were divided. Some took the fairly
extreme position that the Emirates was “stealing” or “buying” the culture of Oman in a bid to
give itself a history or a civilization that it “did not have.” Others were more pointedly
disappointed at the failures of the Emiratis to accurately portray the ‘āzī, citing certain faults in
performance that were, to them, unacceptable. Many criticized the vocal quality of the

’ārā’ al-’akhbāriyya. “‘Ayḍa al-Manhālī – Al-‘āzī – al-yawm al-waṭanī” [‘Ayḍa al-Manhālī –
Al-‘āzī – National Day] Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 2 December 2013. Web. 12 July
2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6YtFyJT84iw&t=68s
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Helal Alkaabi. “Fann al-‘āzī / li-l-shā‘ir Sayf Muḥammad al-Ka‘abī / ’idā’: Ḥamad al-‘Āmarī
/ masīra al-qabā’il / mahrajān Zayid al-turāthī” [Al-‘āzī art / by the poet Sayf Muḥammad alKa‘abī / Performance by: Ḥamad al-‘Āmarī / March of the Tribes / Zayid Traditional Festival.”
Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 3 Dec 2017. Web. 5 Dec 2017.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jkD-jzUg4I
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performances, the failure of ‘Ayḍa to memorize the poem (he instead read off of a piece of
paper), the inclusion of female participants, and the fact that he was behind a lectern like a
“businessman” [English word used].
Late in 2017, I sat down with several members of the ’idāra (administration) of the Firqat
al-‘Arabī in the guardhouse of a water pump station in ‘Izz to discuss some of these
controversies. As my host sat down with a steaming pitcher of strong, clove-scented tea, the
group around me had broken into a small chat about the new group being formed in Birkat alMawz. Having lived there for some time, I was asked if I knew about it. I hadn’t heard anything;
I knew that the leader of the effort was related to the leader of a performance group in Nizwā, but
I did not think that the group had been formed in any official way. The youngest member of the
group held forth that they would undoubtedly play with their hands on “Bengali” drums, not in
the appropriate Omani Arab way using a striker and a switch; others concurred. On that note of
Omani authenticity, I asked the group if the razḥa or ‘āzī was present in the UAE. They actively
denied this, though one pointed out that the UAE and Oman were once one land (balad) and one
people (sha‘b) and therefore had to share one group of inherited practices (mawrūthāt).
Anticipating this little burst of nationalism, I had brought with me a YouTube clip of a news
report from the Emirati news channel Dubai One on an art called al-taḥūrība or al-taḥūrayba
performed by the Naqbī tribe from Ras al-Khaimah. The report clearly presented al-taḥūrība as a
legitimate Emirati source of the ‘āzī-like performance at Emirati National Day festivities in the
years prior. Other such reports have claimed the Ẓanjālī tribe from Fujairah as a basis, who
perform an art called al-‘azwah. In any case, it is at least clear that the practice is or was present
throughout the region in the recent past. Here is an excerpt of that conversation:
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[After watching the video, in which an elder Naqbī is interviewed on the practice and several
examples are shown. Some of the coverage is from a conference organized by the Ras AlKhaimah government.]
BJG: So, how about that? What’s up with that? Have you ever heard of al-taḥūrayba?
Member 1: Never.
Member 2:

By God, this is a bunch of fakers, I think (muqallidīn, ‘ataqad).

Member 1 and 3: [laughter]
Member 2: Believe me, brother. Believe me, these Emiratis will make it all up (byakhtalaq kill
shay al-’imārātiyyīn). The ‘āzī is Omani, 100%. It is only Omani and uniquely Omani. They
don’t have a civilization (ḥiḍāra), so they perform the ‘āzī erroneously like this (fa-ya‘āzū bi-lghalaṭ kidhā).
Member 1: You’re right, I think it’s made up. It’s not true. I sympathize with this Naqbī fellow,
listen to him talk about it—
Member 2: Don’t feel bad for him, brother, he’s just grubbing for cash (mā t‘aṭaf ‘alayuh yā
’akhī, bass yatamaṣlaḥ!)!
All: [laughter]
BJG: Really, I don’t know what to think. Perhaps it’s just very very old.
Member 1: Like I told you, I’ve never heard the word “taḥūrība.” What does that even mean?
BJG: … I thought it was like when you say a “little bird” (‘aṣfuwayyir) from “bird” (‘aṣfūr)136…
taḥūrayyyyyyba, like that…
All: [chuckle]
Member 1: Then what’s a taḥūrba?
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That is, producing the diminutive by placing a long ī before the final root letter.
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BJG: … By God, I do not know.
All: [laughter]
Member 2: [hitting Member 1] If the doctor doesn’t know, forget the issue.
Member 3: Seriously though, look what they are doing. They are much more famous than
Oman, they can spread this celebration (qādarīn ‘alā nashar h-al-iḥtifāl), and if we don’t
preserve these things…
All: [grunting agreement)
Later that evening, another group member joined us and I was urged to summarize the video of
the Naqbī performance practice. I did so, and he concluded, “This Naqbī fellow got a lot richer
after saying that!”
BJG: Do you think so? Did they give him a bribe or something (’āṭūhū rashwa walā shay)?
New arrival: Bribe? Well, of course, I mean, they pay off all their citizens… (yaksabū kull almuwaṭanīn)…
BJG: Pay off?
NA: Yes, from what I’ve seen (mā shāshaytlī). Really, they pay them off, or else why would
they stay? Why would he steal our culture?
BJG: I understand you, but is that not similar to when the Sultan gives at the National Day
festivals (mūb hadhā mutashāba yawm al-sulṭān ya‘aṭī fī ḥaflāt al-waṭanīya)? Money, I mean?
That’s the same, he pays, you perform. He pays you off for a performance.
NA: [waving his hand] No, no, you’re mistaken. Listen, Oman is an old country (balad ‘arīq)
and the Sultan is wise. He knows how to be a leader (qā’id). There, it’s a young country, they
need to buy off the citizens for them to participate (lāzim yaksabū al-muwaṭanīn ‘alā shān
mushārika). They have no history, nothing else but money…
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BJG: True, being a good leader means you have to give…
NA: Believe me, brother, this is a different thing. I’ll give you an example—you know that big
palm tree-shaped island out there in Dubai… what’s it called? [someone chimes in
“Gumayrah!”] Yeah, Gumayrah, Yumayrah, whatever. So, when they made that, Shaykh
Muḥammad, the money ran out, the investment. They could not complete it. So what happened?
BJG: I have no idea!
NA: Brother, Qābūs came and funded the whole thing. He funded it, and then gave it right back
to Shaykh Muḥammad. He didn’t sell it, he gave it (mā yibī‘uh, ya‘aṭīuh).
BJG: Ah, so he was generous! He was showing…
NA: No, that wasn’t generosity. He was sending a message. He said, “We’re powerful. We have
money and we know how to use it.” [The Emirati government] know[s] that Oman is much
stronger than they are, even though they are richer. Everything in the Emirates is bigger,
stronger, taller, true. But there’s no planning, no love of country (ḥubb al-waṭan) or anything like
that, so they buy them off. My point is, if they take our culture and traditions, then we will step
in (binadkhal al-’amr).
The continued use and evolution of the ‘āzī and ‘āzī-adjacent forms in the UAE,
sometimes rising to outright claims to ownership of the practice on the part of UAE authorities
and researchers, has continued to intensify the rivalry between Omani and Emirati performers
and citizens. These kinds of performances and claims offended many Omani performers I
worked with, who remembered the 2013 Emirati performance with a certain ire and were happy
to point out all of its flaws, according to their understanding of ‘āzī. This contestation of the
ownership and “rights” to perform the ‘āzī was certainly exacerbated by the 2017 move on the
part of the UAE to claim the ‘āzī via the UNESCO Intangible Heritage program, placing it on the
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list of “Intangible Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding” under the sponsorship of UAE. This
was in spite of the fact that the same practice was inducted into UNESCO’s “Representative
List” of Intangible Cultural Heritage for the Sultanate of Oman in 2012. Further, Oman and the
UAE have jointly filed to preserve several other performance practices, including al-razfa, al‘ayyāla, al-taghrūda, and even Arabic coffee, the majlis, and falconry in the intervening period.
Why would they not do so for the ‘āzī, or why would Oman not admit the UAE to the same
practice at the later date? Why these states would compete over the authenticity of this particular
practice seems clearer in the light of its use as a choreographed symbol of the power of the state
and the display of popular legitimation couched in apparently traditional terms.137 Part of why
Omani state authorities and Omani citizens value the ‘āzī is precisely that it is perceived as a
uniquely Omani art, one that mythopoetically speaks to Omanis and their history even while it
creates it. Note also who is making this argument: not politicians and state agents, but state
citizens. As has been demonstrated in many other contexts, ordinary people take it upon
themselves to replicate or innovate state ideological discourse. In the Omani case, performers
situate themselves as uniquely able to performatively legitimate their state through the
recognition of actual mutuality. Others simply play at the same game.
c. Praising the Omani State
These two examples help to illustrate the importance of indigenous and historical
performance practices to the modern state’s development and the stakes involved in performing
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In searching the lists of Intangible Heritage, I have seen only two similar examples of this
kind of “competitive” inscription: between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the status of rice pilaf
(Palav or Oshi Palov) in 2015-6 and an upcoming situation in which Malaysia and Indonesia
appear to be claiming similar martial arts called silat which are to be reviewed in the course of
2018-9.
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them to legitimize the state. Both are examples of people talking about the state and its
characteristics, a practice that Akhil Gupta and others have identified as crucial to the ideological
functioning of the state (Gupta 1995; Gupta and Sharma 2006; Nuijten 2003). The first lends
credence to the idea that even within national performances, performers are deeply moved and
continue to feel compelled to perform over and above proffered material gains. As we will see,
state officials take advantage of these emotional and personal connections to draw people into
particular configurations of relations of dependency with the “state” writ large. As the first
example helps illustrate, the sense of obligation to the state on the part of performers is real, even
if the concrete benefits received by them are difficult to articulate. This arrangement is no
accident. The second example serves to demonstrate the intensity of the competition between
state officials and institutions to lay claim to certain performance practices. It also exemplifies
some ideas about the “rightness” of the behavior of leaders, with Qābūs acting in the right and
Emirati leaders in the wrong. The practices in question are neither random nor the most
representative of local history. Rather, they are specifically chosen and modified for their
potential in modeling and disseminating state elites’ ideology of state-society relations and
displaying Arabness and hegemonic masculinity (in Connell’s 2005 sense; Connell and
Messerschmidt 2005). Further, it shows that some performers recognize that it is state agents
who try to manipulate culture and history for their own benefit.
As is always the case, these practices are variously interpreted and meaningful to
differently situated actors. However, to really understand how and why these arts have come to
serve state power so closely, it is important to contextualize them in the recent political history of
Oman. Importantly, we must do this without sacrificing an understanding of the cultural ideals
and practices that have animated relations between rulers and ruled in the past. If these genres
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have had some legitimizing power for various authorities in the past, they remain potent in the
present within a strictly circumscribed ambit: legitimizing the authoritarian state. In the rest of
this chapter, I examine the ways in which these performance practices help to model certain
kinds of relations between rulers and the ruled, those which I have referred to as “ideals of
authority” earlier.
To show how this shift from praising particular local leaders to the abstract and totalizing
figure of the modern state has occurred, we need to understand the drastic social effects of state
formation in Oman. As I have argued in previous chapters, part of the legitimacy of the modern
state is derived from ideals of authority that were shaped historically and are reasserted and
reinterpreted within modern praise performance. Here, I add an analysis of the development of
the state that shows how its unique development has worked to support the continued relevance
of praise while also sharply constraining its application. Such a situation retains the effects of
praise while denying them to any institution save for the state/Qābūs or its proxies.
To evidence this, the main historical trajectory I follow in this chapter is the
centralization of the authoritarian state under the rulership of Sultan Qābūs (r. 1970-present) and
his father, Sultan Sa‘īd (r. 1932-70). In Oman, this process of state formation and centralization
has had a negative aspect—that is, closing off some alternatives, such as competing structures of
authority, and sharply circumscribing certain types of performance—and a positive aspect, by
supporting other alternatives, promoting certain forms of performance, social welfare, and
development programs. It is important to realize that these are not separate or separable
processes or projects, but rather results or effects of other policies and projects of Omani state
formation. As such, this chapter is not a retelling of this history with a focus on “cultural” themes
or cultural policy when such data is available. Rather, it is an examination of the ways in which
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elite-led state formation has shaped the context in which razḥa, ‘āzī, and other formerly political
performance practices have changed and adapted to the contexts and consequences of state
formation, and how these practices in turn have come to legitimate the Omani state.
Seeing Something Like a State: Perspectives on State Theory
States are complex phenomena. They are difficult to study, especially for ethnographers,
because they are diffuse, historically conditioned, and exist in densely interwoven material and
ideological linkages. This, in ethnographic disciplines, has tended to produce what Jonathan
Spencer calls anthropology “within the state” rather than “of the state” (Spencer 2007). Rather
than interrogating the phenomenon of the state as a form or concept, such ethnographies simply
assume the state is what appears and documents life within it. Countering this is the research
agenda that has been termed “the ethnography of the state” (Gupta 1995; Sharma and Gupta
2006). Why, however, should we focus on “the state” when we study music and politics?
First, this is a study of music as political behavior, and “the state” is often assumed to be
the primary shaper of what constitutes politics in the contemporary world. This was not always
the case, so showing this makes valuable room for critique of the state form and its politics
(Amborn 2019).. Second, as we shall see, the state is a profoundly cultural phenomenon. Not
only is it a developed political technology (cf. Robinson 1980) but it is also staffed and hence
shaped by particular individuals. As such, it is affected by a variety of cultural norms, ideals, and
habits that pre-exist it. As several scholars have also shown, this is manifested in the ways that
elites often draw upon musical ideas, behaviors, or metaphors to characterize the state, its
relations to its people, and its cosmic correctness (Brindley 2012; Guy 1999, 2005; Pasler 2009).
Such mixed hermeneutics should be taken neither as coincidence nor as idiosyncratic. We have
seen the deep and compelling interaction between notions of generosity, legitimacy, and praise.
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Music and performance have long been social tools of elites, though each context of their
deployment may bear unique insights into how states operate. Focusing on “the state” and its
particularities—the class composition of its officials, the system of state apparatuses, its putative
capacities, its cultural basis—in such contexts foregrounds the ways in which music and
performance articulate with the display of power, authority, political legitimacy, and state
violence. Studying music and the state with these two reasons in mind can help the study of
music and politics in general to move beyond studying music as a means of asserting rights.
building identities, or protest. Instead, a critical perspective on the contemporary state helps to
contextualize such musical behavior squarely in terms of the relations between rulers and ruled,
cooptation and coercion, and in a way that does not presume that the form of the state and its
imposition of political leadership is natural.
A number of recent musicological monographs have engaged with the notion of the state
and its agents as central to the production of music and performance.138 Studies by Askew
(2002), Castro (2011), Foster and Gilman (2015), Guy (1999, 2005), Meeker (2013), Schauert
(2015), and Stirr (2017) all focus on the role of the state and elites in attempting to legitimate
state power by way of specific policies on music and its performance. State elites pursue various
agendas and target performance practices with certain strategies in mind. While Guy’s research
shows how minority elites have patronized a music associated with their own ethnic group to
support the claims of the state they virtually control, Anna Stirr (2017) and Lauren Meeker
(2013) have documented other cultural policy strategies in Nepal and Vietnam.
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The scholar whose approach is best able to explain the interconnection between state and
non-state agents, the delicate interlinking of coercion and cooptation, and the mutual
reinforcement of ideological constructions and material social relations is Antonio Gramsci.
While Gramsci’s approach to the state shifted over his career, his basic insight was that the
“state” is not the thin veneer of political institutions (or simply an idea), but that it is rather
“integral,” meaning that it “includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of
civil society (in the sense that one might say that the State = political society + civil society, in
other words hegemony armored with coercion)” (Gramsci 1971, 263). Here we also see
Gramsci’s second key insight: hegemony. As anthropologist Kate Crehan notes, hegemony is a
much-contested term (2002, 99). “Hegemony for Gramsci simply names the problem,” Crehan
concludes, “that of how power relations underpinning various forms of inequality are produced
and reproduced” (2002, 104). It is the fitful and tenuous integration of the elements of civil and
political society that helps define the development of certain capitalist states: religious scholars
and their interpretations, musicians and their music, bankers and their logics are brought into
temporary alliances with the army and the maintenance of borders, the delimitation of proper
forms of political speech, police and the cries for law and order. This shifting alliance of interests
is what Gramsci calls “hegemony”—the “‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant influential group”
(1971, 12). The Gramscian approach is dynamic and historical, offering an explanation as to how
non-elites are drawn into the political, martial, and economic schemes of elites, but it also gives
us a way of explaining why and how legitimacy and ideals of authority can develop in such a

381
way as to make claims on those same elites.139 Basic to Gramsci’s approach is the recognition
that the “imposition” of the “general direction” of social life is “‘historically’ caused by the
prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position
and function in the world of production” (12). Class position is the basis of the ability to impose
such a direction, but the successful imposition of the “general direction” subsequently increases
the prestige and social power of the dominant.
What needs to be emphasized here is that focusing on social relations—in this case the
political subjection of the ruled by the rulers—and how they play out—in the selective
distribution of state-controlled goods, resources, and infrastructure—helps to give a material
basis to our study of the state. Social and material relations interact with the development of the
cultural and ideological practices and beliefs that characterize the relationship between state
elites and those they govern, which in turn legitimize and normalize those relations. Rather than
only looking to the effects of practices, new formal organization, culturally mediated conjurings
of the state, or simple class cleavages, we need to triangulate and integrate these approaches.
Concentrating on the suppression of alternative political projects (Bodirsky 2016) and the sheer,
technical scale of state power to fund and administer expansive infrastructural development
(Harris 2012) focuses our attention to ways that the coherence of the state is not merely a product
of ideological projection or imagination. Nevertheless, the state is not just a fixing of social
relations, but it also a rich site of ideological and semiotic potential. The structuring of this talk
and the delimitation of the imaginable is crucial.

This is especially the case if we consider Gramsci’s understanding of culture (cf. Crehan
2002).
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The construction of state hegemony is a good way to investigate this complex character.
State hegemony is reciprocally material and ideological—these are not different categories, but
tactical resources. In the Omani case, material constraints such as state directed giving and the
deliberate management of non-state giving help us to frame the selective representation of
historical models of ideal authority and the solicitiation of praise and understand their role in the
overall production of state hegemony. Practices that bridge the apparent gap between material
and ideological constructions of the state are crucial for understanding a fuller picture of the state
as form. The position as sketched out above is clearly Gramscian, but not the “hegemony lite”
version of Gramsci criticized by Crehan (2002). Rather, as Bodirsky points out, it is the
“’political economic’ Gramsci, who understood the making of hegemony as a process whereby a
dominant group sought support from subordinate ones through both ideological and material
means” (2016, 124). This approach allows us to recognize the structural uniqueness of the Omani
state, whose wealth is extremely concentrated and whose “development” is substantially state
directed, and how these material constraints interact to produce ideological opportunities, which
in turn impose their own constraints on material relations.
In Oman, sung praise is the crucial bridge between the material and ideological, the rulers
and the ruled, coercion and consent.
The Gift of Rule: Political Economy, Reciprocity, and Hegemony
How does this bear on our study of the Omani state, praise, generosity, dependency, and
the gift? Returning to Godelier with the insights from Gramsci and the critics of the
“ethnography of the state,” we can analyze how material social relations and state ideology are
mutually constructed and mediated by performance. Godelier hypothesized that forms of social
inequality like the state required a legitimating ideology, specifically, that rulers and ruled were
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linked by mutual obligations inherent in shared conceptions of exchange (1986, 13-15). “The
exercise of power must appear as a service rendered by the dominant to the dominated that
creates a debt of the latter to the former” that is then repaid (14). Godelier proposes that the most
important and telling part of this exchange is that material goods (food, money, labor, and so on)
are rendered to the dominant, while immaterial, ideological “goods” (religious and magical
ritual, for example) are rendered to the dominated (14, 77). This relationship is precisely
reversed in Oman, as I have described it. Here, it is the expressive potential of sung poetry and
dance that is controlled by status inferiors that is rendered as a service to status superiors as a
response to their material generosity and fulfillment of their obligations to them. While
“immaterial” goods are of course rendered by the state, such as feelings of safety and security,
promises of development, safeguarding heritage, and so on, the reversal is compelling enough to
warrant comment.
What Godelier has in mind here is a standard definition of taxes. Taxes are paid by the
ruled to their rulers, who in turn propitiate deities, for example. Wilson has shown, however, that
in the case of the SADR, the state-movement in Western Sahara has promulgated the notion that
distribution is a form of reverse taxation wherein “the poor tax the rich” (2016, ch. 4). In the
recent past, SADR agents had control over the array of rations given out by the UN and
international relief agencies, but individual Sahrawis could make demands on those stores for
their use. She documents how distribution functions as a mode of governance and makes the case
that it was borrowed from practices that leaders of tribal structures developed. This is, for
Wilson, an example of how supposedly wholly different political structures can make use of
similar strategies in governance. In the case of the SADR and Oman, I would argue that it is not
the particularities of exchange that should interest us, but the quality of the relationship
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established. The institution of a structured relationship of dependence may be more important,
ideologically speaking, than the actual direction and quantity of transfer, as Florence Weber
noted with reference to the gift.
One of the values of adopting a Gramscian approach to the state and its legitimating
strategies is that it does not arbitrarily separate “economic,” “political,” “ideological.” and
“cultural” or “symbolic” factors. Rather, for Gramsci, there is no prying apart the “practical”
from the “theoretical” activities with which the state “not only justifies and maintains its
dominance but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules” (Gramsci 1971,
244). As Crehan puts it, the value of Gramsci lies in his simultaneous insistence on the “reality
of fundamental, systematic inequalities” and the “complexity and specificity of the cultural
worlds different people inhabit” without reducing it either to economic determinism or some
irreconcilability of human experience (Crehan 2002, 7). With this expansive ambit, the
Gramscian approach urges us to critically appraise other similar accounts of the legitimation of
the Omani state, which may include analyses that focus on the “rentier state” hypothesis,
international relations, political culture, or policy-oriented accounts. While Gramsci allows us a
way to remain critical of these approaches, especially in their approach to the state, we can still
appreciate the contributions they make.
This is perhaps especially important to studying the “state” in the Arabian Peninsula, as
there seems to be a veritable cottage industry of developing new compound terms to precisely
describe the state or political-economic system of this region. The terms quickly blossom out of
control: Do rulers practice “patrimonial”140 or “‘aṣabiyyah capitalism”141 in the
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“theopetrocracies”142 of the Gulf? Is the “eudaimonic legitimacy”143 enjoyed by “neotraditional”144 or “post-traditional”145 “petro-Islamic”146 “rentier states”147 predicated on their
“tribal ideology”148 or on “Islamic state capitalism”149? This tendency to analytically isolate
Arabian Peninsular states is particularly vexing when it clearly belies a bias that posits Arabs as
so “different” from the rest of the world that they require new technical jargon to even
understand their situation. Oman is unfortunately doubly cursed since it is at once a shining
example of “non-democratic legitimacy” and touted as an example of “good Arabs,” neither too
religious nor too belligerent. The notion that the character of these states is something
unprecedented that requires new categories to explain implies that they have broken from some
standard mold, rather than having their own specific history. Even their contemporary relation to
their own history requires explanation, mired as it is in the same conservatism and backwardness
that plagues their economy. The question, a classic “denial of coevalness” in Fabian’s (1983)
terms, lingers in these works: how can they be “traditional” and yet so “modern”?
We can and should retain a measure of skepticism in the study of the “state” so described
while still integrating their insights, instead of deliberately ignoring them as the “ethnographers
of the state” so often do (as freeing as that might be). Ideally, the results of these studies help to
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flesh out my performative approach. This is because, as Donald Kurtz notes in a study of Aztec
Imperial legitimacy, “legitimating strategies do not follow one another,” meaning that they are
not separately or sequentially implemented and then evaluated by elites (1991, 163). Rather, state
projects of legitimation are an “everything and the kitchen sink” approach, taking place on many
social and time scales, within many groups, and by various actors involving multiple techniques.
It is important to not overestimate the importance of performance (or any one element) in the
development of state hegemony, but to see these various projects as intertwined. Take, for
example, the notion of qarāba150 that Paul Dresch and James Piscatori mention but do not
elaborate on as a core component of the developing distinction between citizens and rulers in the
introduction to their edited volume Monarchies and Nations (2011). Maintaining qarāba,
meaning “closeness,” means limiting the sheer number of claimants on an elite’s time and social
and economic capital, which, as Shryock showed in Jordan, is an expression of both power and
dependency. The ability of social elites to access state power is crucial to their status, which is,
obviously, wholly dependent on that access. The clear way to manage this simultaneous
weakness and strength is to avoid using that access. Limiting the number of claimants on the
material benefits of your access to state networks requires limiting public activity, because norms
of governance and respectability put a high value on generosity. When Peter Lienhardt first
arrived in Kuwait to pursue his research in the 1950s, he noticed that “shaikhs no longer walked
along the streets being greeted by people as they pass,” but instead were only glimpsed moving
between air-conditioned cars and buildings, moving with “hurried dignity” (1993, 38). Managing

150

A similar notion was put forward by Enver Koury in 1978, analyzing social power in Saudi
Arabia as taking the form of “circles” and “networks.” Power flowed from the inside to the
outside, and so positioning oneself as close as possible to the source was a generator of prestige
and access.
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publicity and access is a performance of distinction, but also a practical adaptation to state
dependence. Analyzing qarāba as a cultural ideal that manages and models relations between
elites and non-elites fits well with my account in Oman, and adds more evidence to explaining
why elites do not dance and are separated from performers to the extent that they are only
addressed within explicit performative parameters. These “smaller,” more micro-level
explanations should ideally be illuminated by those on a larger scale. Taking a Gramscian
approach gives us an example of how they might be.
As I see it, performance is clearly an important part of legitimizing the state because it
models state-society relations, it has immense mythopoetic and affective power, and it displays
what is taken as a uniquely Omani heritage. It is therefore useful for shaping the boundaries,
shared history, emotional bonds, mutual obligations of rulers and ruled, and social relations of
material inequality of the contemporary authoritarian Omani state. “Perhaps the only necessary
first step” to the production and projection of state legitimacy, Kurtz continues, “is increased
state control over the nation’s economy” (1991, 163). State control of the economy in Oman was
firmly secured over the last hundred years with the help of the British and the discovery and
monopolization of oil resources, but projects of legitimacy have been manifold. In the Omani
case, razḥa and ‘āzī are one way in which relations are modeled and mythopoetically rendered as
essential to the state and status quo. State spectacle does not therefore display spontaneous
celebrations of the state. In many ways it simply cannot: the vacations days and the actual day of
celebration are not announced by the state until the last minute.151 Invitations for groups to
perform are likewise loaded: they are, as in the words of my friends in the interview in the first
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economic and workforce management reasons, which are not particularly interesting to us here.
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part of this chapter, “not something to be ignored.” This is because they are both beneficial and
carry a potential penalty in refusal, twinned notions that rely on material inequality. Spectacles
do, however, motivate understandings of obligation and mutual dependence. Just as one is
socially conditioned to stand at the national anthem, so some Omanis are conditioned to see
praise and good deeds as reciprocally engaging one another, as properly existing in a moral
economy. What I want to explore in the next section is that the image of the state as “giving” and
“providing” may not actually require giving and providing equally or even consistently. Rather,
the perception that the state can and does give may be enough to develop and sustain unequal
relations.
If praise and generosity are reciprocal, they operate analogously to the logic of gifts.
They produce relationships. The gift of the praiser is—broadly—legitimacy. The gift of the
Sultan is—broadly—rule.
a.

Personalizing politics…

In Oman, the form, idea, and practices of the authoritarian state have been directly linked
to the personage of Sultan Qābūs. This has had direct effects on the organization and
continuation of praise practices in the Sultanate. Outside scholars nevertheless debate the
intensity of his authoritarian control, with some characterizing his rule as a kind of “hands-off
paternalism,” while others describe it as a “personality cult” (notably Valeri 2009). Whatever its
character, this theme is of interest to us insofar as we can show that this “personalization” of
Omani authoritarianism has caused praise to become increasingly centralized and unidirectional
–that is, directed not toward local or regional leaders but only to Sultan Qābūs, and therefore the
human stand-in for the state itself. This has had the effect of symbolically collapsing the image
of the modern state into the figure of the Sultan, so that praise of a person became praise of an
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institution. Given the importance of address in praise poetry, such a symbolic shift bears
importantly on the notion of legitimacy, both of the Sultan and the state form. This
personalization has had the added effect of inculcating the sense of a personal relationship and
mutual obligation that obtains between the Sultan and the ruled, which, in turn, leads to effusive,
enthusiastic state praise performances. What state officials perhaps saw as an authentic
expression of the popular will was, in fact, the performance of praise directed at the only praise
target that remained: the Sultan himself.
The drastic monopolization of praise has come largely at the expense of the potential
political authority of other competing forms of social authority: the Imamate, the revolutionary
Marxist state, and the sociopolitical structuring role of tribal authorities. This is especially
important when we consider that the re-formation of the Imamate in the early 20th-century
directed at least some performers to produce an ‘āzī for it, analyzed in the last chapter. These
alternative structures, in the terms of Eric Gordy’s 1999 study of Milošević’s Serbia, were
“destroyed,” leaving the authoritarian state as the only alternative. The structural shifts from a
patchwork of quasi-independent tribal chiefdoms to a highly decentralized but structured
imamate government to a massively centralized modern bureaucratic state entailed many
changes in many performance practices. Such changes and shifts have likely spurred performers
to make similar changes throughout Omani history, as the fortunes of governing structures have
waxed and waned. For example, the formation of the modern state within an international statesystem prompted performers and other governmental agents to adapt certain performance
practices to align with state narratives of equality, progress, and development, part of a broader
campaign to legitimize the state by reference to development and history (Phillips and Hunt
2017). While huge, spectacular displays on state holidays (planned, orchestrated, and
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choreographed by non-Omanis, as Rasmussen and Al-Harthy 2012 document) have received
some attention, these studies have largely ignored or downplayed the history and significance of
the “traditional” genres displayed, why they have been chosen, and what they mean to certain
Omanis. As the brief examples at the beginning of this chapter illustrate, razḥa and ‘āzī are
important sites for the demonstration and celebration of the reigning state’s relationship to its
people.
Rather than giving an overview of Omani state centralization efforts, I want to focus here
on the way that these efforts have worked to personalize politics and monopolize praise. There
have been many such efforts, and the pattern I pick out here is one of many. One, however, bears
specific mention: while I focus on co-optation of alternative authority structures by the state, it is
necessary not to overlook that each of the cases discussed here involved organized state violence
in many forms. The Imamate was invaded and occupied in 1955; tribally organized opposition
was besieged, bombed, and exiled through 1959; and the Marxist revolutionaries in Dhofar were
hunted, exterminated, and jailed from 1962-1976.
b. … and monopolizing praise
The most important process to monopolizing praise in the Interior was the “decline in
importance of the tribe after 1957… and the corresponding decline in the role of the shaykh” as a
result of increased state centralization efforts after the absorption of the Imamate (Peterson 1978,
101). As Uzi Rabi points out, Sultan Sa‘īd’s state-building attempts during and after the Jabal
Akhḍar war (1957-59) were part coercion and part cooptation, but much effort was focused on
breaking up tribal power blocs (2011, ch. 3). Sa‘īd’s dwindling control in the interior was due to
the Imamate’s “system of monetary compensation (with the help of the Saudis)” and the Sultan’s
own “tightfistedness” which had become “his trademark among the tribes” (108-9). In fact, by
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1957 Sa‘īd had moved permanently to Salala in the southern region of Dhofar and until 1970 left
Aḥmad bin Ibrahīm Āl Bū Sa‘īdī as his agent in Muscat “to distribute [the Sultan’s largesse]”
(meager as it apparently was, Peterson 1978, 74). With the successful conclusion of that
conflict,152 however, the Sultan took strong measures to curtail the potential political power of
the tribes, largely by apportioning a larger military force to local wālī-s and by forcing out
influential tamīma-s (such as those of the Shiḥūḥ in Musandam) (121-2). More effective was
what Nazih Ayubi has called the “defensive strategy” of “segmental incorporation” whereby
having defeated, disarticulated or persecuted social forces, political organisations and/or
ideological orientations that represent a serious challenge to the regime, [state elites] then
co-opt their members (individually or in divided segments if possible) into the regime’s
own politico-organisational set-up. (1995, 234).
Sa‘īd accomplished this by not recognizing the authority of powerful tamīma-s like Sulaymān
bin Himyār al-Nabhānī of the Bānī Riyām and instead directly dealing with the smaller units that
composed that alliance, such as the leaders of the al-Siyābī, the al-Ruqaysh, or the al-Tawbī.
Such contacts led to the direct state subsidization of a larger number of “lower-level” shaykh-s,
granting them a measure of independence that undermined the necessity of inter-group alliances.
When Omanis returning from the hajj in Saudi Arabia relayed to the Sultan that Sulaymān bin
Ḥimyar wished to return to Oman with his family, Sa‘īd put such incredibly onerous stipulations
on him that it made return virtually impossible (142-3). This was a bid to put an end to powerful
tribal alliances, such as Sulaymān’s Bānī Riyām, because they could potentially oppose the
hegemony of the state. Instead, the state would deal with much smaller tribal groupings while
simultaneously curtailing their effective power and limiting their social relevance (Eickelman

Originating and concluding with British colonial violence, which, as Halliday put it, “both
exacerbated the conflict between the interior and the coast and prevented its resolution” by
refusing to recognize an interior state and imposing coastal rule in order to make the colony “pay
for itself” (1975, 284).
152
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1987, 199). Rather than turning to local authorities for subsidies, guidance, arbitration, and
defense, smaller political units were all directed towards the central state. Under Qābūs, a similar
policy of strong wālī-s, modern policing, and direct connections to smaller local units effectively
prohibited strong tribally organized bodies to emerge. While leading, as Limbert’s interlocutors
lamented, to a proliferation of shaykh-s, this proliferation ultimately served to make “the tribe”
politically insignificant.
The elimination of alternative authority structures and the decline of the importance of
shaykh-s helped pave the way for the state to begin to implement widespread, unidirectional
distribution as a mode of governance. Especially in the reign of Qābūs, state development was
made into perhaps the main interest of the state and was heavily centralized. As Jeremy Jones
and Nicholas Ridout claim:
In order to secure the newly, but perhaps provisionally unified state, [Qābūs] would have
to replace traditional tribal political structures, in which people looked to tribal leaders
for all their basic needs—employment, justice, education—with a new administration
organised around his own power. This would require a new conception of government:
rather than an ultimate source of authority, to whom quasi-autonomous tribal shaikhs
might turn at times of crisis or need, the sultan himself would have to become a provider
of services, offer a responsive and day-to-day involvement in the lives of people scattered
across extensive territories. (2015, 161)
Insofar as local leaders were able to distribute generously, it was with what the state had allotted
them. Praise began to be directed not in many directions—to the Imam, to tribal leaders, to the
Sultan, to generous patrons, local notables, and the like—but exclusively to the Sultan. Shaykh-s
were no longer crucial members in a network of redistribution but were rather made dependent
upon those same structures. The poems collected by the 1985 “folklore campaigns” by the
Ministry of Information are as much a reflection of this efflorescence of praise for the Sultan as
they are a symbol of its efficacy. An overwhelming proportion of the poems in the collection
mention Qābūs in some way, recognizing him, for example, as the “patron” of the nahḍa, while
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few if any mention other figures (1994). While there are new ‘āzī-s sung in the name of political
candidates, we should not confuse this with opposition to that state or Qābūs—in fact, most of
these begin by praising him.
This constriction in praise targets not only helped to monopolize praise but has helped to
render praise of the Sultan as praise of the state. Recall that while the soccer pitch in Manaḥ was
funded by Bank Muscat and only administered by the Ministry of Sports Affairs, Qābūs was
taken as a symbol of good leadership for Khālid, the ministry patron, to follow. Bank Muscat and
all the mangers, administrators, and bureaucrats who actually paid for and organized the building
of the pitch are not mentioned. Instead, they are folded into the figure of the Sultan, and hence
the state, to whom all legitimate praise is directed. Praise on National Day, at hospital and
university openings, for local infrastructural projects, joint weddings funded by real estate
companies, and so on are not celebrated with effusive praise of the actual individuals involved,
but instead the Sultan. Even local wālī-s are mentioned far less than the Sultan. This is a feature
of rule and praise in the authoritarian state, not a bug. It is not a misattribution to praise the
Sultan when ‘Aqār, the real estate firm, funds a joint wedding. The administrative tedium of rule,
of giving, of development, are masked by the figure of the generous Sultan, from whom all
things flow and to whom all praise is sung.
The ability to frame all development as coming from the state/Sultan and as fulfilling a
mutual obligation to which the ruled must respond is a primary ideological achievement of the
Omani state. Ayubi concludes that the first part of this achievement is based, in general terms, on
an economic independence that allows elites to enjoy their advantages without incurring the
social burden of taxation (1995, 235). By not demanding taxation, the generous rule of the Sultan
becomes a gift that can never be repaid. “The ruling stratum,” he continues, “does not therefore
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have to be “unpleasant” either to the owning classes by taxing their profits or to the working
classes by extracting parts of their surplus labor,” allowing state elites great latitude in political
mobility (1995, 235). Waterman’s study of jùjú in Nigeria, “a rentier state” (1990, 222),
similarly hints that praise for local “big-men” and concomitant generosity served to obscure
agonized class relations in Lagos (1990, 222-5). That all development is ultimately from the
Sultan is a commonly held idea, even if it is factually false. It is materially predicated on the
state’s unprecedented ability to direct funding and development, but a great deal of
“development” is funded and overseen by private corporations.
In his 2018 dissertation, Robin T. Steiner argues that the notion of “corporate social
responsibility” (CSR) has been introduced into Oman over the last few decades as a neoliberal
intervention to help “roll back” the state (2018, 27). This CSR model puts part of the burden of
development, distribution of subsidies, and providing welfare and services onto corporations that
are seeking access to government contracts and other benefits. Especially in local development,
corporations not controlled by the state have built schools, clinics, and wells as part of this CSR
scheme as a form of “rent-seeking,” that is, acting to secure certain benefits from the state (56-7).
Acting generously “render[s corporations] into worthy recipients of state support” (75).
However, as Steiner shows, CSR policies have not only eased the burden of the state but have
also helped to extend the effective reach of its apparatuses and accomplish its agents’ goals (28,
78). In this case, we can clearly see why Gramsci urged us to see “the state” as composed of both
the apparatuses of government and “civil society,” both working in tandem to reproduce state
hegemony. In this case, it is the state as generous giver and provider (Steiner calls this
“paternalistic”) and the populace as grateful receiver.
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There are two further features of this personalization and monopolization that deserve
comment. The first is that events like the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival in Manaḥ are held with a dual
purpose, in terms of directing praise. They simultaneously display the faithfulness and the
gratitude of praisers to the Sultan and the loyalty and effectiveness of the wālī. When al-Waḥshī
organized the festivities, it not only displayed his close connections with and effective rule over
the people of Manaḥ but also his own generosity and loyalty to the state/Sultan. Secondly, as
noted in chapter 3, while generosity may seem a strange habit to attribute to states, it is easily
attributed to rulers. Classicist Paul Veyne attributed this to people talking not of abstract qualities
of leadership, but of the “personal qualities of the reigning prince” (1990, 37). We might also see
a basis for this in the way Arabs of the Peninsula have often been recorded as distinguishing
between the good traits of the ruler, al-ḥākim, and the reprehensible obscurantism, laziness, and
stupidity of the state, al-dawla. Seeking and picking out the individual person as figurehead is a
way of personalizing relations of domination while maintaining a skeptical view of government
in general.
This skepticism can come in many forms. Christensen and Castelo-Branco noted in 2009
that many performers in Suḥār took issue with Yūsif bin Khāmis al-Maqbālī, the leader of the
official state performance group, Firqat al-funūn al-sha‘abiyya li-l-wilāyat Suḥār. Despite the
fact that he and another shaykh controlled who “may participate in any given state affair” along
with the budget of fees that they may charge and what arts “represent” Suḥār, locals nevertheless
“question his artistic competence” (2009, 206). While no such official exists in Manaḥ, similar
struggles over who controls access to government largesse are constant. Before a particularly
well-attended event for National Day in 2017, I witnessed the wālī invite all of the groups in
Manaḥ to perform. The group from al-Ma‘arā was to be at the head of the line of dancers that
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welcomed guests, and was invited to drum. On the day of the performance, another group leader
claimed that the wālī had in fact invited his group to be the head of the lines of dancers. The first
group’s leadership reacted harshly, threatening to ask the wālī himself what he intended. Since
the second leader would not relent, and insisted that he was, after all, the “mas‘ūl” or “agent” of
the government on issues of the arts, the first group retreated to go pray. On the walk over, I
talked with one of the leaders of the first group.
“I heard him claim he was the ‘agent of the government’ in Manaḥ, is that right?”
“No no no,” he replied, “there’s no role like that, no agent here. I’ve never heard of that;
he’s just got a big head and wants to think he’s important. Even if he was, he would be bad… in
reality, he would fit right in with the rest of those in the Ministry of Culture!”
c. ‘Mastering’ Personalized Relations of Dominance: ‘āzī, razḥa, and power
Anthropologist Catherine Bell has argued that early work on ritual and performance in
political contexts maintained that it served to “express beliefs in symbolic ways for the purposes
of their continual reaffirmation and inculcation” (2009, 182). What she has concluded, however,
is that “the projection and embodiment of schemes in ritualization is more effectively viewed as
a ‘mastering’ of relationships of power relations within an arena” that allows for the contestation
and negotiation of them (182). Performance, especially performance like ‘āzī that is in so many
ways ritualized, can also be conceived of in this way. I see these hypotheses as mutually
sustainable: performance not only helps to turn beliefs into public symbols, but it also serves to
demonstrate and integrate established social relations of power. Performance is a way of
comprehending and acting out those relations.
Take for example the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival discussed in chapter 4. The purpose of the
festival was to celebrate the health of Sultan Qābūs, but the performance itself was in front of
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local and regional leaders, like the governor of the wilāyat of Manaḥ, seated on padded bleachers
in the front row. The audience is both the Sultan, in a general way, but also those elites in the
first row. Those are the elites who have some say over the everyday distribution of state
resources, time, and attention, who broker contacts between companies and local communities,
who direct generosity in certain ways. One reason why praisers perceive themselves as necessary
is that they are seen as circulating praise and as therefore compelling and amplifying the
generous giving practices of anyone who listens to them. The “farewell” razḥa they chose to
close this event typified this message (see music example 6).
At the conclusion to the ceremonies at the fī ḥubb Qābūs, the gathered razḥa groups were
clustered around the front of the bleachers where the audience and local notables had been
sitting. The group needed a new razḥa to tactfully end the proceedings, and after some false
starts, some of the members of the Firqat al-‘Arabī started to sing out a mulālā’—a kind of
unaccompanied melody set to vocables that outlines the coming razḥa poetry. After his fellow
group members hushed the crowd, two groups began to form to sing the melody back and forth.
Fī widā’ allah yā ‘aṣḥāb al-maruwwa’!153
Jawdukum wāfī min zād al-’ajawwadī.
Li-tuwāda‘inā fī widā’ al-makhūwwa!
‘andukum shāyim wa sayīr al-bilādī
Farewell! Go with God, O you exemplars of manly virtue!
Your generosity is ample and increases generosity yet more,
We take our leave in brotherly farewell;
You have amongst you one of great virtue, leaving our lands.
We should understand those whose “generosity is ample” to be those elites seated in the front
row and state elites from anywhere else in Oman. The razḥa, like much praise, is a kind of wish.
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Al-maruwwa’ is a term that, like chivalry, rolls many concepts and practices into one term. It
is a “noble” way of being and includes comportments like high-mindedness, bravery, liberality,
generosity, courage, and so on but with a distinctly masculine valence.
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It presents behavioral ideals not by merely describing them, but by giving them an explicit
positive valence. It’s not just that someone gave, but that giving “increases generosity yet more.”
It wasn’t just some petty bureaucrats who moved some money around or cut some deal, but
“exemplars of manly virtue.” Finally, the singers firmly state their familial relation to those state
elites in a “brotherly farewell.” Familial rhetoric is not only motivated by elites, but also
subordinated classes. Of course, some poets parrot back the claims of the leader to be a kind of
“father” to the nation, but Omanis at least when they perform this razḥa, invoke brotherhood.
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Music example 7. Widā’ allah, as performed by the gathered troupes of Manaḥ at the fī
ḥubb Qābūs festival in Manaḥ
Returning to the 40th National Day ‘āzī, we can take a closer look at how social
relationships with the state are manifested in state spectacle, and how this helps to cement state
hegemony. Entitled “Wilā’ al-qā’id” (Loyalty of the Leader), the poem was written, edited, and
recorded long before its display at the national day celebrations in Muscat in 2010. The
addressee of the poem switches several times, from a general audience to Qābūs to Oman to the
gathered performers.
[Provisional translation.]
Praise be to God, the Supporter / Unique, with none before him in anything.
Creator of all his worshippers / Bounty comes from his extended hand.
Pray on the best of mankind, the Prophet / Our mediator on the day of calling.
He is lucky who prays and fasts, / he is found in a bed of roses.
Time greets the land of the noble/generous / With pride from the first age.
Those who respect you are not ashamed / And no one is shined upon like [Oman or the Sultan].
Land of dignity and honor! / There is no equal to [Oman’s] actions;
Ready with sword and razor / at any prattler or jealousy.
Her sky is enveloped by full moons; / 40 in number completed,
All of them in delight and joy, / the happiness in them uncounted.
From the rising of the dawn / erupting on the low, illuminating the cowardly,
Our standard is amongst bright meteors, / the drum beating on it in preparation.
An eye raised [to] the zenith of the sky, / covering [Oman’s] beginning in light.
From [the Sultan’s] carrying it, animosity is diminished / and every mountain and lowland is
illuminated.
You lead the deserts by [Oman’s] light, / despite idle chatter and vain delusions;
One who wished for her unveiling / from what in his eyes was a blight.
Oman, home of the most noble and generous! / To its progeny, the ages are young,
By the favor of the Lord of the Two Worlds / [Oman is] smiling with a face of happiness.
Oman, your ages [pass] in joy / and happiness drinks from your flower (warid);
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You lead the deserts with a true light / How many of the thirsty drink from your watering place
(wirad)?
Oman, my path is firm! / to you all shining faces attend;
Your glory is as high as the winnowing winds, / it shines [hanging] on the peg-heads.
Yesterday gathered the mighty / and the proud in your land of lion's dens;
From refined thinking: / a sword flickering from the sheath.
The erroneous opinion does not distract [them] / when they build resolute might;
In the forenoon, you quenched [the thirst of] their swords / and by blood each raider arrives.
For our land he attended and began it; / the clouds of the greedy have melted away
When you began to oppose them; / Swords [like thunder] responding to lightning.
Oman, O you might of the lion's den! / the people of magnanimity and generous gifts;
The suspicions of the unbelievers have failed, / Your people, on high, remain strong.
We are sincere and faithful to your might, / O land of highest qualities!
Though we be fathers or sons / The bond of our blood to [Oman or the Sultan] is a testament.
We came to you, O issue of the generous, / We came at your invitation to respond and fulfill
your request.
We all are a razor-sharp sword in your hand, / And the free154 don’t turn away from a promise.
What we behold has witnessed hard times [lit., spittle]; / When your standard raises,
We came to you, young and old / Your command compelling one and all.
Our Sultan is of noble lineage: / with pride [he is] the issue of the most noble.
By you Oman has achieved high stations, / Amongst the highest you stand out alone.
Qābūs, Sultan of the lands / We all are witness to your justice.
O, you who raised the wall-pegs / you are honored by your name being treasure and pillar and
bond.

There are several themes in this poem that deserve mention. The first is that the generosity of the
Sultan is emphasized in several places: comparing his generosity to a watering hole where many
animals stop to drink, offering invitations to perform, and so on. The second is that the image of

Recall the discussion of ḥurr in Chapter 5, referring to generosity, nobility, and freedom of
action in one nominative.
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Oman as a kind of transhistorical entity is contrasted with the Sultan and the modern state. For
example, lines like “Though we be fathers or sons / the bond of our blood to [Oman] is a
testament” is followed by a direct address to the Sultan, by saying “we came to you, O issue of
the generous.” The bond of blood is with Oman, but the performers have come to sing praise for
a particular leader, Qābūs. Another theme is the performers offering themselves as soldiers to
violently oppose doubters and enemies, a blending of consent and force that speaks directly to
the establishment of state hegemony. Vanpee (2014) argues that this offer of martial support is
one of the key features of the obligations that the ruled owe to the ruler: military support.
Dancers uniformly prefer to carry weapons when they dance, usually swords or rifles. Since
carrying rifles is now often considered uncouth, some groups have replaced real rifles with
wooden facsimiles, which both allays fears that they might be discharged and allows for more
members to have access to them, limiting squabbles over who gets to hold the gun during the
next dance. The second obligation, of course, is rhetorical support in the form of poetry and
performance. The following line is a perfect example of the twinning of consent and coercion
and the absorption of elite ideals by non-elites:
We came to you, O issue of the generous, / We came at your invitation to respond and fulfill
your request.
We are all a razor-sharp sword in your hand, / And the free don’t turn away from a promise.
The promise here, of course, is violence in the name of Qābūs, acting to coerce some unnamed
other. What makes it particularly powerful is that it was invited and freely given by the
performers. Here, the poem presents the praisers as free, and, as free men, they would never
betray a promise made—intimating that the Sultan, as a free man himself, would never do so
either.
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At the conclusion of the performance, al-Marzūqī makes it very clear to whom this ‘āzī is
addressed: Sultan Qābūs. He does this by “improvising” a repetition in the declamation of the
final line: “Qābūs, Qābūs, Qābūs, sultān al-bilād!” Such an expansion—the repetition is not a
part of the text—is a powerful artistic decision, though it seems minor. Even though al-Marzūqī
made and performed it months in advance, it is still a focal point of discussion when this ‘āzī is
brought up in conversation (see music example 1).
In fact, after the performance, the poet al-Masrūrī and the ‘āzī al-Marzūqī gave a joint
interview with Khālid al-Zadjālī, Oman’s answer to Katie Couric.155 After playing this final line,
al-Zadjālī animatedly asked them, “Qābūs was written just one time in the text… but I don’t
know, is this amendment an addition or enthusiasm (ḥamās): from Masrūrī or Marzūqī?” To
which Masrūrī responds, “As I told you, this one is a blessing (rizq),” punning on al-Marzūqī’s
name. Masrūrī continues by praising his performance, attributing the repetition to “impassioned
feelings within him,” referring to al-Marzūqī, and that he performed as he felt it, without being
requested to do it. Al-Marzūqī explains that it was a sincere expression, since al-Masrūrī “lived”
the poem, believed in “every letter in it,” just as much as he wrote it. “I believed in every
meaning to be found in it,” al-Marzūqī reflected,
I spoke it (qultuhā) and I expressed myself in it, I spoke it and expressed in it what was
behind me, around me [the dancers and the national festivities]… I expressed myself in it
by, what, I made those behind the screens present (istḥaḍart man khalf al-shāshāt). I
spoke it and expressed in it to every person sitting in his house, who didn’t attend. I
spoke it expressively for all Omanis and I made this meaning appear (istḥadart hadhā alma‘anā).

YuSuF ALAMRI. “Muḥammad al-Marzūqī wa Muḥammad al-Masrūrī fī hinnā ‘Umān”
[Muḥammad al-Marzūqī and Muḥammad al-Masrūrī on “Here is Oman”]. Online video clip.
YouTube. YouTube, 5 Dec. 2010. Web. 13 July 2017.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eoZ3DARWT-k
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Pausing, al-Marzūqī reflected that “amongst the greatest oaths for this nation is that we treat the
Sultan reverentially, hospitably.” He stressed that even when the benefits of the Sultan’s actions
are not initially clear, his wisdom would “dissolve the clouds” of doubt and shine through in
time. He then went on to describe how he was especially pleased so many young people found
meaning in the ‘āzī, since the Sultan had always strived to embody Omani tradition (ḥaraṣ ‘alā
an yagassid al-turāth al-‘umānī). Here, al-Marzūqī places the reciprocal relations in a clear light.
Omanis must treat the Sultan as they do in performance, as he is embodied in Omani tradition:
hospitably.
The ‘āzī in 2015 (“Pride and Taking Strength in the Leader of the National Renaissance”)
is a useful foil for some of these themes. In terms of imagery and performance, the two are
similar (al-Marzūqī tried to reach for the same emotional impact by “improvising” a similar tonal
expansion in the line “O hearer, understand,” for example). However, the closing line to each
stanza is in the typical style of the Interior, wa al-‘izz bi-Allah yidum, “The might of God is
everlasting.”156
Thanks be to God, the One and Only / The Everlasting, the Unique, the Steadfast.
There is no equal to him, and no son / The Lord is the most high.
Pray on the Lord of mankind (i.e., the Prophet) / He who brought the Laws of peace,
Who circumambulates the great Ka'aba / In his ultimate ḥajj.
Glory to the land of the Noble! / Its sights are set higher than the high peaks;
Between the planets and the stars / our flag shines upon its pole.
Oman, since long past times, / Glory has had in it its place;
He has not conducted her in the wedding procession to the festival / For just anyone who
professes to him his desire.
The loftiest mountain peaks / Give her high dues!
This every desert has witnessed / the action of brave and valorous leaders.
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Past times will not be counted [It is not wanted [that] we count past times] / to the mighty, the
people of action;
Outstretched necks witness / [that] we are razor-sharp swords for her [Oman].
Oman! the refined glory! / Her actions and beneficial deeds are the utmost.
What comfort follows hearing it, / reason overwhelms the lips.
Oman! O hearer, understand / From before Mālik bin Fahim,
You won from the high ones a share; / What we hear next is his call.
Oman! You of sound nature, / O land [in which] all the free are noble and generous.
O sun, undarkened by clouds, / In every land and in all space.
Oman! The rising of the sun attends her; / The brilliance of lightning does not compare.
The highest of the planets high above; / His generosity is likened to the highest.
[Oman] is raised up by it, the noble, the mannered; / A symbol of dignity and good manners.
He preserved integrity and the promise of security and safety / Against those who restrain his
land or its open tracts.
All foes and the covetous, / In their necks [they carry] the indignities of debt.
They bend to Muscat in request; / the [giving] palm is the invitation of the Creator.
O, you who follow this image / Muscat calls to him, "yes!"
Even if he was blameworthy in the past, / We forgive the past and its evils.
Our Sultan is lordly origin, / offspring of Aḥmad bin Sa'īd
He of great wisdom and vision, / Chivalrous, God grant life to his fame.
O my lord, your command is a fortress / in all times.
The arm is yours, you are the guarantor of safety; / You are the shārī and you have the wisdom
of al-shirāh.
Qābūs, Sultan of the lands / O, giving generously is a mercy to mankind;
Every peak and valley / Cheers Qābūs and his devotion.
The most telling two lines in this ‘āzī are “All foes and the covetous / in their necks [they carry]
the indignities of debt. They bend to Muscat in request; / the [giving] palm is the invitation of the
Creator” and what follows it, “O, you who follow this image / Muscat calls to him, “yes!” Even
if he was blameworthy in the past, / we forgive the past and its evils.” This line, in the
understanding of many of my interlocutors, was directed at the various protestors that took part
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in the wave of Arab Spring protests in Oman, largely in the industrial port of Suhar.157 Others
claimed that it was directed at the various governmental figures who were fired by Qabus in
response to the protests. When I pointed out in later interviews that it could easily be referencing
both groups, several agreed, but pointed out that indirection was a particular talent of good poets.
Notice how the line is phrased, however: the foe is specifically demeaned for having “the
indignities of debt” on his “neck.” Earlier in the poem, “outstretched necks” witnessed the
violent power of the Omani state. Those who bear that debt “bend to Muscat” to ask for benefits
and the generosity they receive in turn is likened to an invitation. Then, the poet specifically calls
to the listener who “follows” this meaning and urges them that repentance is acceptable, and they
will not be turned away. Muscat here is clearly a stand-in for Qabus, a giver of benefits and
forgiveness, but also a potential source of violence. This meaning is emphasized by the turn
directly to a verse that establishes Qābūs as a prestigious part of a long dynasty, and who has the
“great wisdom and vision” that is required to be a good leader.
In fact, the entire 2015 ‘āzī is much more concerned with violence and generosity than
the 2010 poem, which was deeply interested in the mythopoetic creation of Omani history. While
lines like “the arm is yours, you are the guarantor of safety” make reference to the role of leaders
in maintaining peace and public order, the next line is very warlike in tone. Recall that the
idealized elected Imam came with certain contractual obligations, stipulations, or licenses. One
type of Imam was the shārī, or “seller” Imam, one who “sells” his own life, who was granted full
license to declare offensive wars against other groups and states. The line “you are the shārī and
you have the wisdom of al-shirāh” is an explicit reference to Imamate leadership patterns, those
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that were deliberately and violently destroyed by the current Sultan’s father. Here, Qābūs is
called the “seller” Imam, who has the wisdom of knowing how and when to fight.
I read these—similar to many of the other poems I have presented—as framing the
people, the reciter, and performers as petitioners of the addressee. In this case, however, the
addressee is the modern, authoritarian state in the guise of Qābūs. This I see as the recognition of
a relationship of dependency that may not imply disrespect but does reflect deep material
inequality. The recognition of this dependency is, in effect, a recognition of the ramifications of
this material inequality. In her study on nabaṭī patriotic poetry, Vanpee notes that the term sinād,
“pillars,”
is frequently used for both the ruler and the ruled in the context of their ‘ahd, their rights
and obligations vis-à-vis each other. The support of the ruler is envisioned as protection
from threats and enemies (hence sinād al-diyār: “pillar of our abodes”) as well as
material provision and caretaking. On the other side, the role of the people as sinād is
understood, as giving moral as well as military support. This moral support takes the
form of approval of the ḥākim’s rule and recognition of his national leadership. The
people support the ruler militarily by providing manpower. The use of this same term for
both parties in the ruler-ruled relationship demonstrates an understanding of the covenant
as a reciprocal agreement with duties and expectations on both sides. (2014, 112)
Despite her reliance on terms like ‘ahd and bay‘a, which many of my interlocutors considered
old-fashioned and rather crude to describe present circumstances, her point translates well to the
Omani case.158 Take, for example, the final line of the famed 40th anniversary ‘āzī:

،قابوس سلطان البالد
نشهد لعدلك أجمعين
،يامن تعليت الوتاد
وتشرفت باسمك سند
Qābūs, sulṭān al-bilād,
These older terms are still used in many “old” razḥāt, however, which are still sung. For
example: “Our line is a line strong of determination, in calamity we are all ready // We did not
forget those old oaths [al-‘ahūd al-qadīma], from the time of our ancestors, the first ones.”
158
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nashad li-‘adilak ’ajma‘īn.
Yā man ta‘alayt al-witād,
wa-tasharrafat bi-’ismak sanad.
Qābūs, Sultan of the lands!
We are all witness to your justice.
O, you who raised the wall-pegs,
You are honored by your name being treasure and pillar and bond.
Here, the reciprocal and yet unequal relationship is clearly made with references to pillars and
pegs of different sorts. The terms are witād and sanad. Witād in Omani Arabic usually refers to
pegs that were hammered into the interior mud-brick walls of homes, castles, and forts in order
to hang belts, jars, gowns, and so on. Witād function here as a locally relevant type of firm
support, upon which other objects hang, here rendered as a metaphor for the state. Sanad is used
three ways in Oman: it can mean “treasure,” a valued thing, or it can mean a “bond,” as in a
promise or guarantee, but it is also the singular of the term sinād that Vanpee translates “pillars.”
This is the crux of the line, the power it has as a lexical and grammatical act (Duranti 1994;
Webster 2016, 2018). In discussing the line with my Omani friends, no one could say which term
was best, but all recognized that all were apt. In previous attempts at translating this line, I tried
to choose one of these terms and explain the others. I now think that choosing one translation of
the term is not helpful.159
As Alessandro Duranti has shown in forms of Samoan political speech, lāuga in the fono
council, such minor acts of lexical and grammatical choice in situations of heightened speech can
have immense social power (1994). “Information flows” of dense conversation turn quickly to
“moral flows,” the exchange of moral assessments (174-75). He explains this moral-flow
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hypothesis by claiming that “in addition to cognitive constraints and requirements, (i.e., regulated
in the information flow [of conversation]), discourse proceeds by building moral worlds, in
which characters are introduced and assessed as examples of moral types, whose actions and
attributes are either to be praised or to be condemned” (174). By making, evaluating, and
assessing action according to these moral types (what I have called ideal models), fono speakers
“redraw not only a political but a moral map of their community” (174). “Politics,” Duranti
continues, “is about selecting the people that fit the descriptions of the icons created by the moral
flow” (175). Duranti’s claim about the moral flow of information is helpful in the Omani case.
The ‘āzī itself is a mapping of a moral type onto the figure of the Sultan, who in turn is praised
for his continued fulfillment of obligations. The denseness of praise as a linguistic gift is an
index of the power of the generosity that prompted it and the moral economy in which they are
mutually embedded.
The Sultan is honored by calling his name a treasure, a bond, and a pillar upon which the
moral economy rests just as he honors the praisers by keeping up his obligations. The state
stands as a wall-peg, supporting whatever is hung there above the ground and in easy reach. The
linkage between the ideas is clear: the bond is a promise, holding to a pledge, protected and
valued as a treasured object, while the pillar holds something up. In this case, the actions are
conflated. First, it is the raising of the wall-pegs (witād), which, following Vanpee, refers to the
social obligations that constrain the ruler at the heart of the ruler-ruled mutual relationship.
Second, the Sultan is honored by his fulfilling and holding fast to that pledge, making his name a
“bond” to his people who in turn “bear witness” to his just acts. Finally, we can understand that
this fulfillment of mutual obligations is a treasure, something to be cherished and from which to
draw pride. The Sultan is the one who raised Oman to its current level, and it is his continued
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pledge to do so that engenders such praise. This should be read as a claim to legitimacy based on
the continued fulfillment of social obligations between rulers and ruled.
Despite the linguistic denseness, there is a kind of double masking taking place here. The
first is that the performance is lip synched, staged, and heavily edited while nevertheless giving
the impression that it is live, improvised, and spontaneous. The themes of voluntarism
nevertheless run through these praises, as they do many others. The second is that the poem is
presented as a genuine public address to the Sultan when it was in fact deliberately produced to
give that image. While the Sultan personally may have had little to do with the planning, it was a
small cadre of elites who sought to present these ‘āzī-s as somehow representing the people’s
opinions and perspectives on the state/Sultan. While the poem may do this, we need to also
recognize that it may have also formed the basis for ordinary people to form relationships to the
Sultan/state and Omani cultural distinctiveness more firmly. These genres, charged with
associations with tradition, armed manliness, and structured class relations, both present the class
relations desired by elites and offer a way for subordinated classes to internalize, integrate, and
naturalize these structures of inequality as part and parcel of Omani state society.
Poems like this offer an opportunity to help define persons in social, historical, and
cultural space, and certainly help to sharpen the image of the social relations that define inclusion
in the Omani state. This is not a trivial or unimportant function, especially in the current political
climate that seeks to claim distinctive cultural heritages for each Gulf state, as we witnessed in
the second opening anecdote. This is what was meant by the “mythopoetic” function of poetry
from earlier chapters: the social relations modeled in the choreography and imagery of the poetry
bring those social relations from material to ideological life. They draw lessons and moral
implicature from the material relations of inequality and generosity to the social relations of
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dependency, leadership, and legitimacy. At the same time, they furnish actors with emotionally
invigorating symbols and connections that serve to solidify identities and affiliations.
Not all performances model mutual obligations with the state. Compare the remarks
about money in the opening ethnographic description with another such episode, involving an
Egyptian business owner trying to hire the same group for a short performance in Muscat.
Trading WhatsApp audio messages back and forth, the group leader demanded over 500 OMR
(1300.39 USD) for the performance, which the Egyptian thought was ridiculous. “The arts are
not cheap,” my friend chided, winking at me. Here, the group leader was taking advantage of the
lack of a relationship between himself and the Egyptian—the exchange of money would
terminate their relationship, and so therefore was the only real reason to perform. Elites of this
kind hire performance troupes to mark particular occasions and to be seen as patrons of Omanis
and their culture, even if they themselves have virtually no interest or regard for it. I have
witnessed many of these events, ranging from the opening of table tennis tournaments to opening
shopping malls and auto dealerships. Steiner’s (2018) work helps us to understand why these
kinds of events are similar to state spectacles, and yet why they do not inspire any sense of
mutual obligation and focus on monetary exchange.
Similarly, for National Day celebrations, many civic bodies hire performance troupes to
give an ‘āzī or even to make a film demonstrating their devotion and national pride. These events
as well demand monetary recompense. One useful example of this is an ‘āzī video160 prepared by
civic leaders in Ṣuḥār in the summer of 2017 on the occasion of the Sultan’s trip to the coastal
city. As the ‘āzī declares, “this voice is meant for the public / I verse this ‘āzī to spread it far and

Almawahib Adam. “Farḥa al-Saba‘īn | Al-‘īd al-waṭanī 47” [The Happiness of the 70s |
National Day 47]. Online Video Clip. YouTube. YouTube, 19 November 2017. Web. 19 Nov.
2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15g7ypL2jA0#action=share
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wide.” The video then shows the huge new Sultan Qābūs mosque accompanying the line, “Pride
dresses her, Ṣuḥār,” using the literal term for dressing oneself with clothing. The Sultan Qābūs
mosques (jāmi‘) are an obvious example of the generosity of the Sultan and the directedness of
his developmental projects. Most large cities now boast these huge buildings, similar in
architecture and in purpose. Next, the ‘āzī continues:
We monitor your arrival every year / And the viewers, by God, are like a flood
To joyfully celebrate the coming / to the fertile land, never left to desolation.
Here, the poet presents Ṣuḥār as a land of plenty that has nevertheless been “dressed” by pride,
meaning this Sultan or his guided development. Now, the people of Ṣuḥār await his yearly
arrival and boast that they have not let their land become “desolate,” demonstrating that they do
not take the Sultan’s gifts for granted. Typically, this ‘āzī lacks the beginning ṣayḥāt and the
proper praise to God and the Prophet before expounding on the main theme, marking it as an
example of a performance that is either more mimicked than based on expertise or shortened to
appeal to modern tastes, as we saw with the Emirati case in the opening ethnographic examples
in this chapter.
Short videos like this are common. I was invited to the filming of one in the Interior town
of Ādam, in which the Firqat al-‘Arabī was hired to star in a local music video to be called
“Farḥat al-saba‘īn,” “The Happiness of ’70,”161 referencing the year Qābūs seized power.
Organized by some of the wealthier inhabitants of Ādam, the film was designed to be a reflection
of the “spirit” of the town throughout the nahḍa. The razḥa and ‘āzī for the event were written
and recorded prior to the event, and the Firqa from Manaḥ was largely expected to lip-synch to
the song and be filmed. The location of the film was in the old town center of Ādam, in the shade
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of the tremendous ghāf tree named Ṣubāra, surrounded by the old abandoned shelters of the
families who now lived out near the ring road. The film crew, local to Ādam, welcomed the
Firqa members warmly but quickly set to work getting light levels and setting up cameras. After
briefly considering putting me in the film, they began playing the song through several
loudspeakers and coaxing the group to dance.
Farḥat al-saba‘īn min ’a‘āda,
Qādihā al-sulṭān min ṣāna‘,
Wa-l-’ā‘ādī mā lahā qādar,
Fī haymat sulṭānnā wa-‘umānnā
The happiness of ’70 once again!
The Sultan guided it from its first construction.
And enemies have no power,
in [the face of] the overwhelming love our Sultan and our Oman.

Music example 8. A razḥa composed for a praise video for the 47th National Day
celebrations.
They began by using their drums, which led to a confusion over dance steps, specifically whether
they were to dance with the song or the drums. The final cut of the song used hand-played drums
rather than the striker and switch they filmed for the video. The solution to the dancing problem
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was playing the recorded song even louder, since no audio was being recorded anyway. Soon
though, the director called for a cut and demanded that something be put over a distracting
electrical socket in the frame behind the group. A production assistant ran up and put a thermos
in front of it, which drew a bark from the director:
“Not that, put something historical there! Put a sword or something!”
The assistant dutifully ran off to a corner where a number of historical objects lay in a
pile. He quickly grabbed a broken jahla water jug and leaned it against the socket; this was
deemed to be pretty good.
Later, when the actors came to perform the ‘āzī, I sat with a group of locals as they took
in the whole performance. After a few aborted takes, the group was restless.
“Listen, brother, you’ve got to raise your voice,” one complained, turning to another, “tell
him he’s got to raise his voice.”
The performer snapped back between takes, wiping sweat from his brow. “Shouting
won’t do anything, it’s already recorded!”
“Anyway,” the peanut gallery continued, “you’ve got to raise the sword and shake it (‘izz
wa-tihizz)! If you don’t do that, don’t call it an ‘āzī. Do it! You need to look strong, you just look
hot.”
I asked him if he knew a lot about the arts: “No, not really,” he replied, “I just know he’s
not doing it well.”
This was an interesting conclusion, because this ‘āzī was unlike any other I have seen. It
was very produced, involving a range of vocal skills that are not historically part of ‘āzī practice
and that trend more towards ānashīd styling. Second, while this ‘āzī also eliminated the ṣayḥāt,
two main singers traded lines back and forth, which, for most ‘āzī practitioners, would disqualify
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it entirely. This was, to me, similar to the attempts of Emirati producers to arrange the ‘āzī in a
way that was more modern and, perhaps, more amenable to current production standards. The
poem itself praised the Sultan in typical ways, tracing him back to his ancestors and noting how
his rule was a continuation of their pattern.
What these two kinds of productions reveal is the way that “civil” institutions (recording
companies, singers, local elites) are involved in the creation and solidification of state hegemony
in this context. Yet they lack the gravitas and sense of deep mutualism that animate
performances directly patronized by the state. It is clear that few if any of the participants outside
of the Firqat al-‘Arabī had much knowledge about the actual performance of razḥa and ‘āzī, but
it had become enough of a symbol of national pride, expressed in “traditional” terms, that it
could be mimicked with a certain verisimilitude. This leads to an important question. Why go to
the trouble of making these videos if you don’t know how to perform the genres in them?
Along with Steiner’s work that shows these attempts to represent the elite patron as
generous and deserving of state support, we should consider this a kind of ethnic boundary
marking. Expressing a group’s or town’s patriotism and devotion to the Sultan/state in the form
of razḥa-s and ‘āzī-s makes a certain claim about the links between the performers and the ethnic
and social character of the state. In this case, the adoption of razḥa and ‘āzī as not only proper,
but as “traditional,” paints Oman and the performers as an Arab state and renders public
declamations of patriotism as masculine. Razḥa is demonstrably a public, male, and Arab
performance genre that is addressed to worldly power. Razḥa-s, historically, were undoubtedly
performed by men and by Arabs, and so this link is logical. But not everyone even heard these
genres, let alone performed them—certainly not even all “Arabs” in interior Oman. The
boundaries of modern Oman contain many groups who perform in many ways. Ādam, in fact, is
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a town with a strong Bedouin element, and yet no sign of this is apparent in the video purporting
to represent it. Afro-Omani practices are not subject to nearly the level of elite interest as razḥa
but especially ‘āzī, even though they command large audiences when performed. Similarly,
Balochi performance practices have been virtually removed from the public eye (though this is
partially at the request of the Pakistani government). The point remains that the political, public
praise performance of razḥa and ‘āzī make certain claims about the public character of the state,
and the identity of the people involved in performance. They are, in part, making a case for
themselves to be included in the privileged ethnic strata of the state. Elites in Ādam are staking a
claim in the privileges of belonging to the state in its modern form—Arab, masculine, dignified,
praising. And yet, Uzi Rabi shows that Sultan Sa‘īd, as late as the 1960s, claimed that it was
simply a quirk of history that Muscat had Arabic as a lingua franca: he certainly considered
himself to be more aligned with and similar to the Muslim states of India and Pakistan than the
wider Arab world (2011, 118-9). Miriam Cooke’s (2014) recent work on the ethnic character of
Qatar shows how social distinction and ethnicity are bound up together, as well: real Qataris are
citizens and are Arabs, and are therefore claimants on state prosperity, while those of Persian
descent (no matter how distant) are second-class.
This is partly on display in the video taken in Ādam. The actual performers, those
knowledgeable about these practices, are rendered as a physical, human element of the stage
dressing. The voices, poetry, drumming, and melodies that they are visually tied to are not their
own. One member not present at the filming said he was worried that “real lovers of the arts”
would see the group participating in the faulty ‘āzī and think that they did not know how to do
the real thing. When I asked why no one corrected them, he replied, “that’s not our place to enter
into their production like that. They will do as they do.” The response I would have liked to have
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given is that it was not their place to do as they liked with these performance practices. I would
have liked to point out that those folks who made the video—who I am sure meant absolutely no
harm, and acted only out of a sense of national pride and a desire to embrace their local
performance practices—would never have done so if structural, material, and political
developments had not made it seem beneficial. This highly centralized authoritarian state,
predicated on distributive development, exhibits a tacit cultural policy that frames it as Arab,
masculine, and traditional. Razḥa and ‘āzī have emerged quite specifically as national
performance practices because they display these qualities as well as demonstrate the proper
social relationship between the state/Sultan as generous giver and the people as loyal receivers.
Conclusion
James Ferguson (2015) has recently reflected on the importance of distribution to the
future of global economies, as wage work becomes less and less stable and more and more
scarce. He calls these “distributive livelihoods”—lives that are built not from waged labor, but
from distribution. Citing work on distributive economies, guaranteed basic incomes, and “just
giving money to the poor,” Ferguson shows how distribution might be a way of securing humane
futures in inhumane times. Reading his work, however, one wonders what kinds of responses
this distribution will bring—and if we have learned anything from reciprocity, it’s that giving
impels a response, no matter the gulf. Ferguson’s hopes for a distributive politics are predicated
on being open to surprise and induction, so let me make one such surprising induction here.
In Oman, relations of dominance and inequality are masked as relations of mutual
obligation obtaining between the state/Sultan and subordinated classes through the selective
reinterpretation and staging of a particular set of historically Arab and masculine performance
practices. Relations of dominance are, in James Scott and Pierre Bourdieu’s terms,
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“euphemized,” that is, framed as emerging not from domination but as from other social bases:
leadership, protection, dependency (Bourdieu 1977, 190ff,; Scott 1985, 306-8). Razḥa and ‘āzī
have had a similar role in connecting rulers and ruled in the past, and the historical imaginings of
those events help to explain their adoption by authoritarian regimes in the present. Razḥa
conjures notions of warfare and bellicosity, noble and heroic men, and the mutual bonds that the
defense of the polity create in service of guaranteeing the continuation of a functioning social
order. Likewise, ‘āzī turns on the formal mythopoetic confirmation of the links of mutuality that
obtain between a generous ruler and his body of followers. In tandem, these arts are both a
potential source of hegemony for the state, but a hazardous one. As Tochka and others have
shown us, relying on performers to deliver the ideological message of the state is a risk.
Performance forms have histories just as performers do. The proof of this is the way that
performers use praise as a moment not only to praise, but to represent themselves, their
community, and their moral universe.
By framing state projects of development as generosity, praisers play a crucial role in
developing and propagating a relationship model that posits the state as generous giver and the
people as a grateful receiver. For elites, state ceremonies display this tendency most accurately
and with the least amount of pushback. As I documented in chapter 4, however, performers
nevertheless present themselves as active, dignified, and powerful equals to the Sultan, in some
communal moral sense. While the ultimate project of state hegemonic legitimation may be
tentatively secured as a détente, Omani performers are not wholly “flattened” or encompassed or
made dependent in the process. If chapter 3 showed us the potential of state giving to produce
dependency, and chapter 4 documented the ways that performance waylays this potential,
chapter 6 has shown us the ways that the Omani state has sought to assert itself as the one power
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to which all others swear allegiance. This assertion has come partly by centralizing praise (which
was a two-way process of state urging/staging and performers’ active solicitation of state agents
and resources) and partly by the destruction of political alternatives. While the state may provide
(for some), it does not provide a choice.
I have called this the gift of rule: the deliberate framing of political domination as a
benefit. Framing development as generosity is one way this is accomplished. As Godelier
pointed out, relations of domination are easier to accept when they seem like part of an ongoing
exchange. While Godelier’s hypothesis is at least skeptical that this is anything other than a
legitimating ideology (as we all should be), the Omani data presented here should give us just a
moment of pause. Praise may offer a way of not just accepting this ideology of exchange as a
given, but making it at least partially true, in the limited sense of being an actual material
transfer of goods. What’s good about insisting on the actual material movement of goods is that
it makes what elites think about that transfer unimportant: the giving is enough. Encouraging,
developing, and urging the cultivation of generosity in the powerful, and the not-so-powerful,
may be an important model for a future “distributive politics” on a larger scale. Opening palms
with praise does not allow them to frame their giving as disinterested nor as altruistic, but as a
responsibility and an obligation.
Inculcating generosity in elites through praise may be one of the “small arms in the class
war” that was stored away too early. It’s a small, innocuous, and unassuming way of shaping the
behavior of the people who have the potential to do the most good and the most ill. I don’t expect
that all praise does this, but I think some can. When Omanis praise, they do not just receive the
gift of rule, they animate various responses and returns to it. Of course, sometimes they don’t.
But by asserting that this Godelierian exchange between elites and non-elites is not just naked
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exchange but instead a moral economy in which equal participants are bound by networks of
historically sedimented obligation, praise may constitute a genuine mechanism that operates on
the potential dangers of dependency. It might offer a way to shape domination, to accommodate
it while not exposing oneself to threat.
Nevertheless, the détente of hegemony is a neverending chain of move and countermove,
action and reaction.
So praise, in the end, may not be much in the face of all that. But it is something.
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Appendix A.
Arabic texts of the ‘āzī-s cited in this dissertation, arranged by approximate date of composition
and performance.

1. The 1913 ‘āzī given at the election of Imām Sālim bin Rāshid al-Kharūṣī, discussed in chapter 5,
including expository text.

قصيدة لفن العازي" يعود تاريخها إلى حوالي عام ١٩١٣م عند بيعة اإلمام سالم بن راشد الخروصي  ،وفيها
:ما فيها من روح الحماس والعزة الوطنية من هذا العازي

سميت باسم المبتدي
والقلب من همي بري
شاعت علوم الغافري ( المقصود الشيخ حمير بن ناصر النبهاني الريامي  ،حيث كان يعد زعيم الحزب
الغافري في السلطنة )
انه ندر وانصب امام

انه ندر وانصب الوف
وتزامطن عبري وتنوف
حمير نهم ما حد ينوف
غير األرامل وااليتام

غير األرامل اب حالل
وابرخ عليهم باالموال
من الشارقة وبلد الشمال
فوق البهط يلهم طعام

فوق البهط اليهم شراه
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واليهم بديد من الزكاة
والسالمي ما من قداه
قالوا مغرب من العام

قالوا مغرب من سنين
ويحب نصر المسلمين
قالوا نعم متولمين
ناس على الطاعة والم

ناس على الطاعة زهوب
واستفتحوا بنزوى غروب
القلعة زمر فيها الهبوب
قامت تهدم من الدمام

قامت تهدم من الجدر
يا بن حمد مالك نصر ( يشير الى السيد سيف بن حمد البوسعيدي الذي كان يحكم قلعة نزوى والذي انتحر
اثناء الحصار)
وخالف ايس من العمر
بيده شرب كاس الحمام

بيده شرب كاس الممات
ما تحكيبه معصرات
تابع رسوم العاليات
خيل يقودونه بخطام
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خيل يقودون اسير
والجيش في الجامع بخير
ما حد عضيل وال كسير
والنصر باهلل والدوام

قيل أن صاحب هذا العازي للشاعر بريك بن حمود بن خصيب بن سليم بن مبارك بن خنجر بن عمران
الرحبي ( بيت والد سليم )
2. The 2010 ‘āzī delivered by al-Marzūqī and written by al-Masrūrī for the 40th National Day
celebration outside of Muscat in 2010. There are a small number of mistakes in this written
transcription that do not reflect the text from the actual performance.
والء القائد
.تأليف الشاعر :محمد بن حمد بن علي المسروري
أداء :محمد بن علي بن خميس المرزوقي

الحمدهلل المعين
فرد والقبله بدى
خالق عباده اجمعين
والرزق من كفه مدد

صلوا على خير االنام
شفيعنا يوم الندا
محظوظ من صلى وصام
يلقاه في حوض الورد

حيا الزمان ارض الكرام
بالعز من عهد األول
ياللي احتما بك ما يضام
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حاشى وال يسناه ند

ارض الكرامة والشرف
أفعالها مضرب مثل
مصيونة بسيوف وشلف
عن كل مهذار وحسد

يغشى سماها م البدور
وافي عددهن أربعين
كلهن على بهجة وحبور
والفرح فيهن ما يعد

من مطلع المشرق نشب
على الدنا ضح الجبين
راياتنا بين الشهب
تخفق بها الكوس وتعد

عين علت كبد السماء
تغشى مطالعها بنور
من حملها غيض العداء
وتنير كل جبل وهد

تهدي الفيافي بنورها
من غير هذرات وغرور
حد تمن سفورها
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من كان في عينه رمد

عمان دار األكرمين
على ذراها الدهر شب
من فضل رب العالمين
متبسمة بوجه السعد

عمان دهرك في سرور
والسعد من وردك شرب
تهدي الفيافي في صح نور
كم حايض حوضك ورد

عمان دمتي في ثبات
لك حاضر زاهي الجبين
مجدك على في الذاريات
سساني على روس الوتد

أمس حويتي الطايالت
والعز في أرضك عرين
من فكر عالي الدرجات
سيف تجلى من غمد

ما شاغل الرأي الوهم
لما بنوا عز مكين
تروي ضحى أسالفهم
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من دم كل غازي وفد

ثنى العدوو يسحب خطاه
ذابت غيوم الطامعين
لما تبادت للجباه
أسياف من براق رد

عمان يا عز العرين
ألهل الندى والمكرمات
خابت ظنون الجاحدين
شعبك على العلياء وطد

إنا لعزك مخلصين
يا أرض عالين الصفات
آباء كنا أو بنين
عهد دمانا له شهد

جيناك يا نسل الكرام
جينا نلبي دعوتك
كلنا فيدك سيف هذام
والحر ما يثني الوعد

ما ننظره شهد الرضاب
لما تعلى رايتك
جيناك من شيب وشباب
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أمرك على الجمع وفرد

سلطاننا عالي النسب
بالعز نسل األكرمين
نالت عمان بكم رتب
نحو المعالي تنفرد

قابوس سلطان البالد
نشهد لعدلك أجمعين
يامن تعليت الوتاد
وتشرفت باسمك سند
3. The ‘āzī given at the 45th National Day festivities in 2015, with the same poet and declaimer
as ‘āzī 2, above.
فخر واعتزاز بقائد النهضة
.تأليف الشاعر :محمد بن حمد بن علي المسروري
أداء :محمد بن علي بن خميس المرزوقي

الحمد هلل األحد
الدائم الفرد الصمد
ما له شريك وال ولد
رب تعلى في عاله
والعز باهلل يدوم

صلوا على سيد األنام
اللي أتى بشرع السالم
ما طاف بالبيت الحرام
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عامر بحجه منتهاه
والعز باهلل يدوم

المجد في أرض الكرم
نظراته أعلى من القمم
بين الكواكب والنجم
رفت علمنا والقناة
والعز باهلل يدوم

عمان من ماضي الزمان
المجد فيها له مكان
ما زفها للمهرجان
كل من يحدث له صباه
والعز باهلل يدوم

أعلى الجبال الراسيات
يلها رسوم عاليات
كل الفيافي شاهدات
فعل الصناديد الكماة
والعز باهلل يدوم

ما با نعدد ماضيات
ألهل الفعل والطايالت
يشهد رقاب العاصيات
إنا لها سيوفن مضاه
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والعز باهلل يدوم

عمان المجد الرفيع
غاية فعلها والصنيع
و لي ما رضى تالي سميع
العقل يغلبها الشفاه
والعز باهلل يدوم

عمان يا سامع افهم
من قبل مالك بن فهم
حازت من العليا سهم
التالي ما نسمع نداه
والعز باهلل يدوم

عمان يا شأن سليم
يا أرض كل حر كريم
يا شمس ما يغشاه غيم
في كل أرض هللا وفضاه
والعز باهلل يدوم

عمان حاضرها شروق
ما يماثله لمع البروق
أعلى الكواكب فوق فوق
شأن إلى العليا نداه
والعز باهلل يدوم
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عال بها الفذ الشهم
رمز الكرامة والشيم
صان األمانة والذمم
للي نصا داره وفضاه
والعز باهلل يدوم

كل العدا والطامعين
في رقابهم ذمات دين
ثنوا لمسقط طالبين
والكف للخالق دعاه
والعز باهلل يدوم

ياللي تبع هذا الرسم
مسقط تنادي له نعم
لو كان في ماضيه ذم
نصفح عن الماضي وأساه
والعز باهلل يدوم

سلطاننا من أصل سيد
من نسل أحمد بن سعيد
ذو الحكمة والرأي السديد
شهم وحي هللا نباه
والعز باهلل يدوم
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يا سيدي أمرك مصان
في كل حاالت الزمان
ذراع لك وانت األمان
شاري ولك حكم الشراة
والعز باهلل يدوم

قابوس سلطان البالد
يا جود رحمة للعباد
كل الرواسي والوهاد
تهتف لقابوس وفداه
والعز باهلل يدوم
The ‘āzī written and given by Rabī‘ al-Mallāḥ at the soccer pitch in al-Ma‘arā in 2016.

سميت به رب الجالل
قيوم حي وال يزال
وبنثر سالم كالزالل
للضيف والجمع الرحيب

حييت يا نسل الكرام
شرفت أهلك والمقام
واهديتنا منك وسام
يا مبدع القول العجيب

يا مبدع قول وفن
يل هادئ الطبع اشجن
حن دارنا تعزف لحن

4.
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متباشرة بك يا لبيب

اما سمعنا بخيتك
جينا حضور في حضرتك
يا سيدي ذي طلتك
نفخر بها وبدون ريب

سيد وبن سيد بجد
انت يا خالد بن حمد
لو قمت بأفعالك أعد
قلمي ما ظنه يستجيب

كل دار تبنى بالرجال
لما تتعاضد بالرجال
أما الكسل ماله مجال
ال من بعيد والقريب

هذه همم كل الشباب
خاضوا التحدي والصعاب
واللي مشي درب الصواب
ال يمكن أفعاله تغيب

هذه عوائدنا في منح
نحيي الرسوم اللي تصح
قابوس علمنا وتصح
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قابوس لألمة طبيب

يا ديرتي المعرى سالم
نلتي فخر نلتي احترام
حولك رجاالت نشام
هذا ماهو شيء غريب

والخاتمة أرجو العذر
والوقت بالسرعة يمر
لو كان لي زايد سطر
لعزيت إلى قرب المغيب
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Appendix B.
1. Arabic Oral Poetry and Prosody.
The prosody of the Omani oral performance practices studied in this dissertation can be parsed
using both qualitative meter (i.e., syllabic weight, stress, and rhythm) and quantitative meter (i.e.,
formal patterns of long and short segmental units). As Liebhaber (2010) points out, the divide in
counting qualitative and quantitative metrics in Arabian poetics is “unsatisfactorily resolved”
(163) and therefore requires some comment.
The relation between text, recitation, and melodic performance is complex and amenable to
analysis. Rather than take up melody here as well, I focus on text and recitation. Following the
lead of interlocutors, I analyzed poems either as recited or as sung.
2. Method.
The method I employed was a mix of tactics found in Caton (1984, 1990), Sowayan (1982,
1985), Kurpershoek (1994-2005), Palva (1993), and Liebhaber (2010, 2011), and Peutz (2008).
In counting quantitative meters, I grouped segments into two categories: long (–) and short (u) by
noting consonants (C), short vowels (v) and long vowels (V) following Caton (1984, 45-122) and
others.
Long segments: CV, CvC, CVC, CvCC [CVCC]
Short segments: Cv [vC]
Breaking the poetic line into these segments does not respect word boundaries but instead
focuses on the sound of the spoken line. As noted by Caton (1984) and Sowayan (1982, 1985)
some typical features of recitation are the elision of the al- article, linking consonants across
word boundaries, and vowel addition (anaptyxis) or deletion (catalexis), among others explored
below.
In order to analyze qualitative meters, I follow the stress patterns that I elicited and recorded or
identified myself and verified in discussion.
Two stress weights occur a “strong” beat (rendered in CAPITALs) and a “weak” beat (rendered
normally).
e.g., ṣa-BAḤT ‘u-MĀN al-YAWM …
According to Bailey (1991), the number of weak stresses between strong stresses may vary
widely and exhibit no obvious pattern. The focus is only on the strong stresses.
Liebhaber (2010) concludes that differences between quantitative and qualitative meters may be
reduced to the difference between recitation and singing, but this conclusion may be premature
because of the wide variety of changes that sung poetic lines undergo. Poems can sometimes
differ drastically when they are recited or sung (a feature noted by many other Arabists). Long
vowels can be elongated (e.g., salāāām) or shortened (fī > f-; ‘alā > ‘a-), consonants may be run
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together (al-mu‘aẓẓam > l-ma‘ẓam), tanwīn consonants elided in speech may sometimes appear
(e.g., bi-‘ibir > bi-‘ibirin), and vowels may be systematically inserted (wa-l-ḥilla > awal-ay-yaḥilla-’uh). Not all of these changes cause poetic lines to more closely correspond to quantitative
meters, but may be attempts to align along different axes (rhythmic feel, dance steps, etc.).
3. Quantitative Meters.
As a quantitative example, all ‘āzī-s analyzed in this corpus use a form of the classic quantitative
meter rajaz, whose basic four-segment foot can be rendered:
| – – u – | or | u – u – | or | – u u – | (for this final variant see Shibi 2018)
Rajaz is by far the most commonly used quantitative poetic meter in the corpus I analyze.
However, it appears in couplets of two feet each rather than the classical three. For example, the
first line of an ’alifiyya or “alphabetical” ‘āzī:

الباء بطال المسلمين
إل ُهم عوايد من سنين
ياما وياما مجاهدين
فوج الخيول الصافنات
Al-bā’ biṭāl al-muslimīn,
’Ilhum ‘awāyid min sinīn;
Yāmā wa yāmā mugāhidīn,
Fawg al-khayūl al-ṣāfināt!
The [letter] bā’: Bravest of the Muslims,
They have had their ways for years.
Over and over striving [in battle],
On their swift-footed horses!
Dividing the lines as above we find:
| al.

bā’.

bi.

ṭā.

//

lal.

mus. li.

mīn. |

|–

–

u

–

//

–

–

–

u

|

| CvC. CVC Cv CVC // CvC CvC Cv CVC |
And so on:
| ’il.

hum. ‘a.

way. //

| yā.

mā.

wa. yā. //

| Faw. gal.

khi. yā. //

yid. min. si.
mām. gā.
laṣ.

ṣā.

nīn. |

hi.

dīn. |

fi.

nāt. |
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Here we have two couplets of two feet of rajaz for a total of eight feet. Some notable analytical
features are the linking of the final “mīm” of yāmā with the initial “mīm” of mugāhidīn and the
elision of the short vowel “u” in the final foot of the third line. Final consonants join al- articles
that follow them (e.g., between the feet of line 1 and 4). It should also be noted this is not CLA
but Omani dialectical (‘awā’id > ‘awayid; fawq > fawg written with a jīm; antique terms like
biṭāl; and colloquialisms like yāmā wa yāmā). Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that
quantitative meters necessarily moved with retentions of a Classical speech patterns.
Anaptyxis is also common in quantitative meters. The 40th National Day ‘āzī, for example, is
fully composed in rajaz when anaptyctic syllables are added:

،قابوس سلطان البالد
نشهد لعدلك أجمعين
،يامن تعليت الوتاد
وتشرفت باسمك سند
Qābūs, sulṭān al-bilād,
nashad li-‘adilak ’ajma‘īn.
Yā man ta‘alayt al-witād,
wa-tasharrafat bi-’ismak sanad.
Qābūs, Sultan of the lands!
We are all witness to your justice.
O, you who raised the wall-pegs,
You are honored by your name being treasure and pillar and bond.
| qā.

bū.

s(i).

sul. // ṭā.

| –

–

u

–

CV

Cv

| CV

// –

nal.

bi.

–

u

lād. |
–

|

CvC // CV CvC Cv CVC |

And so on:
| nash. had.

li.

‘ad.

// lik.

’aj.

ma. ‘īn |

| yā.

man.

ta.

‘al.

// lay.

tal.

wi. tād. |

| wat.

shar.

ra.

fat. // bis.

mak. sa. nad. |

In this case, a final short vowel “i” is added to the third segment (“s”) of the first line, which in
written form simply ends the word Qābūs. These anaptyctic vowels are justified in Caton 1982
and in subsequent studies. This insertion makes the modified rajaz meter perfectly regular.
Catalexis is also common. For example, take this inherited razḥa, which also exhibits rajaz, but
concludes with a three-segment foot:
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أنثر سالمي على الدار والحلة
مثل السيل يسيلك الغدرانة
طرب يبكي ما حد يشله
يبكي بعبر والناس كسالنة
Inthar salāmī ‘alā al-dār wa-l-ḥilla,
mithl al-sayl yisaylik al-ghadrāna
ṭarab yabkī mā ḥadd yishilluh,
yabkī bi-‘ibr wa nās kaslāna
Spread my greetings to the homeland and the encampments,
Like the soft rain drizzling down to you [and settling in] small, clear pools.
Ṭarab weeps [because] no one sings the poetic line,
It weeps to its heart and the people are lazy.
| ’In. thār. sa. lā / mī. ‘al. ad. dār. / wal. ḥil. la |
| –

–

u – / –

–

u

–

/

–

– u |

| mith. lis. sa. yil / yi. say. li. kal. ghad. rān. na |
|

–

– u

– /u

–

u

– / –

–

u |

For example, a poem by Khalfān of the Firqat al-Ma‘amad discussed 258ff.:

أول سالم هللا لقابوس المعظم
يلي علينا فاض بجود ومكرومات
صبحت عمان اليوم في خبرا النعم
وياهللا عمره مديد سنين في طائالت
‘Awal salām allah li-Qābūs al-mu‘aẓẓam
Yalī ‘alaynā fāḍ bigūd wa makrūmāt,
Ṣabaḥt ‘umān al-yawm fī khabr al-nu‘am
Wa yā allah ‘amru madīd sanīn (fī) ṭā’ilāt
First, God’s greeting to Qābūs the great,
He rules over us, overflowing with generous gifts and benefits,
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Oman awoke today to blessed news,
O God, his age great, years of might.
In this case, no perfect repeated quantitative patterns emerge due to repeated breaks and
modified feet, but rajaz is a good first approximation.
|u–u–/u–u–/––u–/–|
|u–u–/––u–/u–––|
|u–u–/––––/u–u–|
|u–––/u–u–/––u–|

4. Qualitative Meters.
If grouping segments in this way did not yield a pattern, I elicited recitations or sent recordings
of my recitations to interlocutors to judge accuracy. This often resulted in an obvious qualitative
pattern.
In terms of syllabic weight, a qualitative analysis of the last poem analyzed yields:
’a-WAL

sa-LĀM a-LLAH,

li-QĀ- būs AL- mu-‘AṬṬ-am

ya- LĪ

‘a-LAY- nā FĀḌ,

bi-GŪD wa MAK-rū-MĀT

ṣa- BAḤT ‘u-MAN al-YAWM, fī KHAB ri AL- nu-‘ĀM
wa YĀ

a-LLAH ‘am-RU

ma-DĪD sa-NĪN fī ṬĀ -’i-

LĀT

Here, alternating syllabic stresses yield a clear rhythmic pattern of six stressed beats and payoff
of a final additional stressed beat in the final line. This “additional” beat’s arrival is hinted at in
the first line’s final unstressed beat, compared to the middle two lines concluding with a strong
stress. Here, the quantitative meter and the qualitative meter present alternate analyses.
In cases where quantitative meter is wholly inaccurate, such as this razḥa analyzed in 419ff.,
qualitative metric structures are more parsimonious.

في وداع هللا يا أصحاب المروة
جودكم وافي من زاد األجوادي
لتوادعنا في وداع المخوة
عندكم شايم وساير البالدي
Fī widā’ allah yā ’aṣḥāb al-maruwwa’!
Jawdukum wāfī min zād al-’ajawwadī.
Li-tuwāda‘inā fī widā’ al-makhūwwa!
‘andukum shāyim wa sayīr al-bilādī
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Farewell! Go with God, O you exemplars of manly virtue!
Your generosity is ample and increases generosity yet more,
We take our leave in brotherly farewell;
You have amongst you one of great virtue, leaving our lands.
In this case, the abundance of “long” segments precludes a clear or even implied quantitative
pattern. Yet, following Bailey (1991) and Liebhaber (2010), a clear qualitative pattern emerges:
four strong stress lines followed by three strong stress lines. The variable number of unstressed
beats are typical of qualitative poetic meters.
fī wi-DĀ‘ a -LLAH yā ’aṣ -ḤĀB al-a-ma -RU -wwa
jaw-du-kum

WĀ

li-tu -WA-da‘ NĀ
‘an -du-kum

fī min ZĀD al-a-ju -WA -dī
fī wi

-DĀ‘ al-a-ma -KHU-wwa

SHĀ- yim wa SĀ- yir al-bi -LĀ -dī
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